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The screen and relational ontology
8“It seems evident now that screens are a relevant part 
of our contemporary world. Whether at work, at home, 
traveling, or immersed in some form of entertainment, 
most of us find ourselves increasingly in front of 
screens – television screens, cinema screens, personal 
computer screens, mobile phone screens, palmtop 
computer screens, and so forth.”
Lucas Introna and Fernando Ilharco1
“The language of the screen has become an actual 
material condition of our existence, for its geometry is 
not only ever-present but also manifold.” 
Giuliana Bruno2
“Our world has become a world of screens… today 
screens form part and parcel of the interiors of offices, 
hospitals and homes almost everywhere in the world. 
We are surrounded by and live with screens.” 
Jojada Verrips3
9When introducing the screen as a subject of analysis, what is most often noted first is its ubiquity 
in our environment. The screen is a very successful thing, it enters our lives in many ways and 
performs a variety of different functions. Although screens have a long history in interactions 
between humans and their environments, a comparatively recent shift in the screen’s materiality 
toward the technological has made it a more prominent part of our daily lives. The screen has 
become an interesting point of discussion – it can be used theoretically as a device that links 
discourse about human-technology interactions with discussions of human spatiality; as a 
connection between representational and experiential frameworks; as a device to question the 
nature of the ‘real’. Screens often draw debates about the role of technology and representation 
as environmental conditions. But when it comes to defining what a screen is, the material screen 
itself – the object that takes up space – is not often found to be important. 
Screens have been analysed across a variety of phenomenological and semiotic frameworks. 
Each of these analyses finds different, often contradictory qualities and impacts for the screen. 
The impetus of this thesis is to position these qualities and impacts within the structures that 
give rise to them. In short, this thesis describes a relational ontology of the screen that places 
particular emphasis on material interaction and the structures of perception. I will begin this 
introduction with a brief survey of key studies of the screen, looking at the approaches taken and 
roles defined within them. I will then introduce the main problems and aims of this thesis and 
outline the methodology and methods applied in this research. The introduction will close with 
a summary of the content of the three chapters and a brief discussion of implications.
Understanding screens
Screens have been analysed both according to what they hold in common as things; and according 
to the differences between their effects. Historical definitions of the term ‘screen’ are perhaps 
quite different to how we understand the term today. The origins of the term in Middle Dutch, 
Frankish and Proto-Germanic languages suggest a form of protection: as a shield (scherm) or 
partition (skrank); a barrier to something unwanted. This meaning, however, has diversified over 
time. Lucas Introna and Fernando Ilharco, for example, categorise the present-day significance 
INTRODUCTION TO SCREEN ONTOLOGY
1. Lucas D. Introna and Fernando M. Ilharco, “On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness,” 
Human Studies 29 (2006): 57.
2. Giuliana Bruno, Surface: Matters of Aesthetics, Materiality and Media (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 7.
3. Jojada Verrips, “‘Haptic Screens’ and Our ‘Corporeal Eye’,” Etnofoor 15, no. 1/2 (2002): 21
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of the ‘screen’ along three main themes: projecting/showing (e.g., TV screen), hiding/protecting 
(e.g., fireplace screen), and testing/selecting (e.g., screening the candidates).”4 Introna and 
Ilharco find that screens are united by an ability to “call for attention” by presenting information 
that is already presumed relevant.5 Taking a classical phenomenological approach, Introna and 
Ilharco address the screen non-contextually. Their research performs a detailed analysis of 
the conditions of possibility of screenness – that is, the always already present conditions that 
allow us to recognise a screen as a screen. Using this approach, Introna and Ilharco propose 
that the essence of the screen lies in “holding our attention and framing relevance.”6 However, 
understanding the screen as a common essence is problematic for design. Defining the screen 
through this commonality neglects the changing impacts it can have, and the different forms it 
can take.
Art historian Amelia Jones considers the commonalities of screens by focusing on their effect 
on self-representation. The commonality of the screen in her discussion lies in representation, 
in the contributory role of the image of the self in identity and subjectivity. She writes that 
“from the early modern period onward, the notion of self is bound up with complex beliefs about 
representation, and in turn with the development of imaging technologies.” Jones examines the 
representation of bodies, noting that semiotics becomes a less effective framework for examining 
these representations as the image itself begins to move, as in video works. Jones argues that 
the ability to read a pure image of the body, “as a ‘sign’ for something else – the person or thing,” 
becomes polluted by action and intent, and the analytical eye becomes less easy to apply.7 
Media theorist Anne Friedberg also uses representation as a way of examining the screen, but 
does so by way of metaphor. In her book The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft, Friedberg 
explores the screen using the window as a literary device in order to show commonalities in the 
ways that space is produced across different screens. However, she also begins to introduce 
differences across the spatial representations of screens, touching on technologies such as the 
camera obscura, cinema, television and computer, and connecting each to changes in the way in 
spatial representation and perception. 
There are, of course, differences between the things that are called a screen, both in their 
materiality and in their spatial representation. The role of these differences is equally important 
to the commonalities amongst screens. Screens as objects, particularly, are not a uniform entity, 
even amongst their individual types. For instance, Anna McCarthy discusses the variation 
amongst the experience of television, remarking on its “malleable and heterogeneous physical 
form… encompass[ing] giant video walls and video banks, flat screens that look like illuminated 
11
signs, small and large consoles.”8 Experience suggests that television affects our behaviour and 
our environment differently depending on whether it is present as a small screen in our homes 
or as a bank of screens in an art installation, a billboard in a shop window or a distraction in a 
waiting room. The term ‘television’ alone covers a range of objects and experiences. 
The differences amongst screens are even greater when considered across their individual 
types. Technological screens are often seen as entering everyday life with the advent of cinema. 
Although screen forms such as the camera obscura pre-date the cinema, the popularity of 
cinema as a representational medium generated not just the new spatial typology in which it 
was housed – the movie theatre – but also new spatial typologies that supported movie-making; 
along with new social rituals and ways of working. The impact of cinema on spatial and social 
understanding includes not just the space that is represented, but also the space that is created 
around the cinema.9
 
As the technological screen broke free of its specific place of the movie theatre and entered more 
and more public and private spaces, the analysis of its role in our lives became more complex. 
Television was met with discourse that was both admiring and fearful, and provoked artistic 
experiments that challenged its role in perception and identity. Some of these experiments drew 
specific attention to the spatial qualities of the object of the television, such as Paul McCarthy’s 
Press (1973): “I pressed my face and upper torso against a sheet of glass with saliva acting 
as a lubricant against the glass – when viewing the tape, I appear to be inside the monitor 
pressing against the screen.”10 Others discussed its role in our social lives from an individual 
4. Lucas D. Introna and Fernando M. Ilharco, “The Ontological Screening of Contemporary Life: A Phenomenological Analysis of 
Screens,” European Journal of Information Systems 13, no. 3 (September 2004): 8 
5. Lucas D. Introna and Fernando M. Ilharco, “The Ontological Screening of Contemporary Life: A Phenomenological Analysis of 
Screens,” European Journal of Information Systems 13, no. 3 (September 2004): 8.
6. Introna and Ilharco, “On the Meaning of Screens,” 65.
7. Amelia Jones, Self/Image: Technology, representation, and the contemporary subject (London: Routledge, 2006), 5; xv.
8. Anna McCarthy, “From Screen to Site: Television’s Material Culture, and Its Place,” October 98 (Fall 2001): 99.
9. Understandings of the spatial representations in cinema range from the experience of represented space to techniques of 
representation and their impacts. Susan Buck-Morss, for example, discusses spatial experiences of the cinematic image in her 
chapter “The Cinema Screen as a Prosthesis of Perception” in The Senses Still, ed. C Nadia Seremetakis (New York: Routledge, 1994), 
45-62. Similarly, Pasi Väliaho, in “Spellbound: Early Cinema’s Transformational Spaces,” Space and Culture 16 (2013): 161-172 looks 
at how the represented spaces of cinema are incorporated into ongoing spatial experiences. Harper Cossar, in “The Shape of New 
Media: Screen Space, Aspect Ratios, and Digitextuality,” Journal of Film and Video 61 no. 4 (Winter 2009): 3-16; and Zofia Trafas, 
in “Designed for Impact: Widescreen and 360-degree Cinematic Interiors at the Postwar World’s Fair” Interiors 3 no.1–2 (2012): 
143–166; look at the technologies of spatial representation, exploring changes in screening formats and their impact on spatial 
experience. The impact of cinema in creating its own spaces – theatres, movie sets, and even towns – is of particular interest to 
architectural historians. See for example Amir Ameri, “Imaginary Placements: The Other Space of Cinema” in Journal of Aesthetics 
& Art Criticism 69, no.1 (Winter 2011): 81-91; and Anne Friedberg, The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2006), 162-170.
10. Paul McCarthy, quoted in Jones, Self/Image, 135.
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perspective. In Television and the Moral Imaginary: Society through the Small Screen, sociologist 
Tim Dant  argues that television creates a “moral imaginary” or “repository of ideas about the 
possible ways of living in the world.”11 Dant’s approach to television takes cues from experiential 
phenomenology, arguing that the televisual image is inhabited using similar mechanisms to the 
lifeworld, and it is this mode of inhabitation that allows social mores to be transferred across 
it. Others again address the television on a broader sociological scale. Heidegger comments in 
The Thing that television reaches “the peak of the abolition of every possibility of remoteness,” 
fundamentally altering space-time relations.12 Tony Fry’s edited volume RUATV: Heidegger and 
the Televisual extends this Heideggerian perspective on the television, positioning the televisual 
as itself an “ontological domain” that enframes experience.13 Guy Debord’s spectacle; Marshall 
McLuhan’s ‘medium as message’; and Jean Baudrillard’s simulacra each comment on the role of 
the televisual in socio-political structures from different philosophical traditions, each finding it 
a highly effective medium in altering social relations.14
The critical theory that developed around television was, for the most part, an extension of that 
applied to film.15 The technological and contextual differences between the two mediums may 
be substantial, but critiques of the media often draw commonality from their presentation of 
moving imagery, and the socio-political context for that imagery. Such conflation gave analysis 
of the television a certain bias. It meant that these discussions tended away from the much 
older role of screens in homes – such as the use of paper screens and lattices in separating 
space and maintaining privacy, particularly in Asian and Islamic cultures – and toward the 
production of imagery.16 What was at issue in this discourse was not the spatial and material 
arrangement of the home, but the impact of technology on everyday (and, for the most part, 
Western) life. The television was used as a cutting example of the way that space and time were 
being fundamentally altered by technology. It was not so much the object of the television and 
its role in the home that was of concern, but the technology-space relation.
The effects of screens on spatiality and sociality was extended with the increase in popularity of 
the personal computer, when the screen’s impact on work also entered into discussion. Bailey, 
Leonardi and Barley, for example, describe different uses of computer screens in work situations 
using a semiotic framework by placing the referent within the work context. They describe work 
that is done “on, through, or within representations” depending on whether representations are 
manipulated as an end point (as in graphic design work), towards a physical object for which the 
representation stands in (as when manipulating a robot arm remotely with a keypad) or within 
a representation framework (as in sending and reading email).17 Each of these, they argue, 
demonstrates a different experience of working with screens. 
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As the screen morphed again into the portable computer, the tablet, and the smartphone, the 
contexts in which a person could interact with a technological screens exploded – as again did 
discussions of the impact of the representational aspects of these devices on everyday life. The 
spatial impacts of such devices have been explored at some length.18 Michael Joyce performs an 
anlaysis of the spaces of the internet and its constant remaking of place. He uses the example 
of the location of an image of a pig “seven ninths of the way down” an internet page and its 
location “elsewhere, in a gif file for instance” to show that “the experience of this space ... stands 
metonymically both for the space of abstract structures of its representation (window, system, 
browser, frame) and for the composite space (the site, the web, the story, the reading) in which 
we experience it.”19
The question of what a screen is is often approached within the context of media: screens become 
representative of systems of displaying image-based content. When considering the television 
or smartphone, assessment of the screen as a medium can of course be highly appropriate – 
carrying images and providing access to media spaces is part of what these screens do. But this 
approach tends to subsume the individual instance of a screen into a universal medium. The 
11. Tim Dant, Television and the Moral Imaginary: Society through the Small Screen (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 2.
12. Martin Heidegger, “The Thing” in Poetry, Language and Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 163. 
13. Tony Fry, “Introduction,” in RUATV? Heidegger and the Televisual, ed. Tony Fry (Sydney: Power publications, 1993), 12-13.
14. As established in Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Detroit : Black & Red, 1977); Marshall 
McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964); and Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and 
Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) respectively.
15. Helen Wheatley; in her “Introduction” in Re-Viewing Television History: Critical Issues in Television Historiography, ed. Helen 
Wheatley (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 1-12; remarks that television is often included as one medium within a larger set of ‘media’ 
when considering sociopolitical histories of media and communications. Dant, in Television and the Moral Imaginary, 72-8, states 
that early content for television mimicked the modes of production of cinema. He then attempts to break the ties between television 
and film by noting the differences in the ways they are situated and experienced.
16. Inge Daniels, for example, discusses the use of timber and paper screens in establishing permeable boundaries within Japanese 
homes in “Japanese Homes Inside Out,” Home Cultures 5, no. 2 (2008): 115-140. Hanna Papanek establishes the use of carved 
timber screens in maintaining privacy and gendered spaces in South Asia in “Purdah: Separate Worlds and Symbolic Shelter,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 15, no. 3 (June 1973): 289-325 
17. Diane E. Bailey, Paul M. Leonardi and Stephen R. Barley, “The Lure of the Virtual,” in Organization Science 23 no. 5 (2012): 1485.
18. James Ash, in “Emerging spatialities of the screen: video games and the reconfiguration of spatial awareness,” Environment 
and Planning A 41 (2009): 2105-2124 describes video games as directly impacting spatial awareness and spatial understandings 
amongst those who use them. Ash notes that, as the user becomes actively involved in the production of space on screen, a 
number of differences present between spatiotemporal knowing in the world at large and that of video games. He considers these 
as spatiotemporal substitutions or re-mappings. Similar concepts of spatial extension, remapping and translation can be found in 
Daniel Black “Where Bodies End and Artefacts Begin: Tools, Machines and Interfaces” Body & Society 20 (2014): 31-60;  Giorgos 
A. Papakonstantinou “Multimedia spatial organization: Towards a different type of cultural economy” Technoetic Arts: A Journal 
of Speculative Research 9, no. 2-3 (2011): 315-320; Chris Chesher, “Navigating sociotechnical spaces: Comparing computer games 
and sat navs as digital spatial media” Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 18 (2012): 
315-330.
19. Michael Joyce, “On boundfulness: the space of hypertext bodies” in Virtual Geographies: Bodies, space, relations ed. Mike Crang, 
Phil Crang and Jon May (London: Routledge, 1999), 228.
14
individual, material context of the screen, this television or that smartphone is lost to its role in 
displaying the image. 
There have been studies that bring the screen closer to this material context. Anna McCarthy’s 
work in “From Screen to Site,” focuses on the placedness of screens to counter the rhetoric of 
derealisation. McCarthy takes a particularly material view of media, arguing for considering 
the material and spatial context of the screen as an object, and discussing the socio-political 
relevance of television screens. The images of television that she presents make clear her intent 
in concentrating on the material of the television, its individual physical presence rather than 
its action as a medium. The impact of the individual televisions is examined at on a broader 
scale than the individual interaction, as creating a socio-political space. It is what the material 
television represents that seems most of interest to McCarthy. Yan Yuan and Kathryn Smith 
trace similar trajectories of the socio-political meaning of the television: Yuan traces its social 
value as an object in Chinese migrant communities, and Smith its popularisation in post-war 
Britain.20
Screen materiality can also be viewed from the point of the image rather than the object. 
Laura U. Marks’ understanding of the screen materiality surfaces from Film Studies. Marks’ 
interest in the screen lies primarily with the materiality of the image. Her concept of haptic 
visuality has been widely adopted in screen understandings, particularly those that use 
experiential phenomenology.21  Her text Touch: Senuous Theory and Multisensory Media, which 
collects and revises a series of her essays from 1993-2000, begins at the point of perception 
with an explication of haptic visuality as a mode of perceiving a material image. The fourth 
section particularly presents a series of essays that focus more strongly on ‘bodies’ of images. 
‘Video’s Body, Analog and Digital’ looks at the differences in structuring representation across 
digital and analog media, originally constructing this difference as one between electrons 
and information, the first of which retains a referent in the ‘real’, and the second of which 
does not. In ‘How Electrons Remember’, however, Marks reframes this understanding, asking 
whether the material basis of analog and digital video is substantially different, and showing 
that “digital images are existentially connected to the processes that they image.”22 ‘Immanence 
Online’ traces this materiality through various levels of the material of representation, from 
subatomic to social. Marks particularly notes the role of the erroneous medium is revealing its 
materiality, naming the ‘errors’ of circuits as “tiny declarations of electronic independence.”23 
In her examination of image materiality, Marks moves beyond the material effect of the image 
and into the materiality that supports it. For Marks, different ways of encoding images support 
different kinds of interactions with the image. Although her critique does not explicitly extend 
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into the materiality of the screen, Marks certainly opens the question of the screen in regards to 
its material make-up and impacts.
Architectural theorist Giuliana Bruno develops Marks’ ideas of image materiality and the ways 
it interacts with the materiality of the object. Her book Surface: Matters of Aesthetics, Materiality 
and Media attempts a “remapping [of] a genealogy of screens as material forms of projection,” 
linking the materiality of the surface through mediums of textile, cinema and architecture.24 
These surfaces, according to Bruno, are transformative support for the material manifestation 
of the visual. She notes the ability of the image to co-opt a surface, saying that “when a surface 
condition is activated… on visual planes, it changes our notion of what constitutes the support 
of the image and its way of siting a medium.” That is, the material identity of the screen is 
transformed as it ‘becomes’ the image. Throughout her analysis, Bruno regards the screen as a 
more or less passive entity, regarding it as a surface that is “acted on, plastically activated, and 
sculpted.”25 Any potential efficacies of the screen’s materiality are left unresolved.
Alongside the seemingly sparse collection of examinations of what the materiality of screens 
might mean are a countless number of studies addressing its technological development and 
design. However, these studies tend to implicate changes in use as the main effect of screen 
materiality, focusing on new ways of accessing and manipulating the information presented by 
the screen.26  
The screen is a pervasive form, not just materially within the environment, but also in the 
structures of thought and communication. A diversity of screen appearances spawns a diversity 
of approaches to exploring the phenomena – the examples above come from a wide variety of 
disciplines including art history, philosophy, cultural studies, media and communications, film-
making, technology studies and architecture. Each of these understandings of screen tell us 
something about what the screen is, about what it means, how it acts and how it is supported. 
But they all seem to be about something other than the screen itself. In other words, there is 
20. Yan Yuan, “Acquiring, positioning and connecting: the materiality of television and the politics of mobility in a Chinese rural migrant 
community” in Media Culture Society 36, no. 3 (2014): 336-350. Kathryn M. Smith, “Domesticating Television: Changing Attitudes in 
Postwar Britain” in Interiors  3, no. 1–2 (2012): 23–42.
21. See, for example; Jones, Self/Image; Verrips, “Haptic Screens”; Karl Hansson, “Fluxus Haptics” in Media and Materiality in the Neo- 
Avant- Garde, ed. Jonas Ingvarsson and Jesper Olsson (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 51-62.
22. Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 161
23. Marks, Touch, 180.
24. Bruno, Surface, 107.
25. Bruno, Surface, 4; 101.
26. Studies focusing on developing new screen products and interfaces are not overly relevant to my argument here, but the theory of 
affordance, often used in these studies as a way of connecting product design to use, enters the discussion in chapter one. 
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a tendency in theory to approach the screen according to the images that it bears or the social 
meanings that it holds. These two understandings of what the screen represents – as a thing 
that presents symbols and a thing that is itself a symbol – draw a relation between material 
instances of the screen and what it means for people. However, this relation is not directly 
addressed. The screen is taken as a screen for people without considering how the structure of 
this human context might affect what is understood of screens.
Problems and aims
The screen is a hard thing to keep a hold of because it seems to encompass far more than the 
object that exists in space: it acts as a conceptual notion, an analogy, an encounter and an 
ontological mode as well as a physical artefact. However the object of the screen is still the basis 
of the interaction – it is the thing with which we interact. In its role of displaying imagery, 
the screen as a thing in itself seems to hide behind its actions. The ability of the television, 
for example, to display images is dependent on the material composition of its pixels; but the 
imagery it presents also competes with this materiality. The television can present as an object 
present in a room at the same time as it is a medium for imagery. Understanding the screen 
from the context of media often overlooks this material context, and in so doing excludes many 
types of screens from analysis.  Some of the things that we call a “screen” are not connected 
to a context of display: a flyscreen for instance, or a carved timber lattice, act more as spatial 
barriers than sites of display.  The term “screen” in its verb form also has meanings in excess 
of display – although I might screen a movie, I might also screen participants for a study. The 
screen in this second context refers to a process of filtering or sorting. 
This project began with an attempt to understand the spatial and social effects of the screen. 
It quickly became apparent, however, that trying to understand the screen as a generalised 
effect did not allow difference to be incorporated into this understanding – it did not show how 
disparate meanings of the term ‘screen’ could come about, or allow for the difference in the 
appearance and action of screens. As such, it was not particularly useful for design. While the 
canonical literature that describes the effects of screens focuses on their social meanings and 
actions, there is little indication of how this might be contextually grounded within the material 
meeting of a particular person and a particular screen. There is no indication of how to translate 
this experience into a designed object.
Introna and Ilharco note that “we seem not to see screens qua screens.”27 This assessment 
seems intuitively true, and has been demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs – we do, after 
17
all, often look through screens to images and other spaces. But on closer analysis it seems a 
strange sort of proposition to make. What does it mean to see a screen as a screen? Does it mean 
taking the screen as separate from the image as the cinema invites us to do?  Does it refer to 
the material make-up of an object that takes up space, or perhaps the meaning that a human 
makes from the object as with McCarthy’s analysis? Does it mean taking the screen according 
to its phenomenological conditions of possibility, as Fry and others have attempted? The screen 
holds a unique ontological place as it resists being understood as one thing: it is present both as 
representational and as actual; it produces space, occupies space, separates space and connects 
space; it can be highly technological or a simple built structure; and it can promote different 
methods of spatial engagement between people and people, and between people and objects. As 
a designer, my own bias encourages me to understand the screen more firmly in its materiality; 
to ask questions about the influence that the physicality of different screens has on the way that 
we understand them; and with them, ourselves and the space that surrounds us. Such questions 
help address the screen according to a spatial and material lineage, a field in which the screen 
is under-theorised.  
My aim in this thesis is to describe a relational ontology for the screen, using a range of 
theoretical frameworks30, in the hope of understanding the individual nuances with which the 
screen is understood. This relational ontology will focus on the role of materiality in the way the 
screen is understood, particularly discussing how concepts such as the subject, object, virtual, 
real, agency, and material are found within screen interactions. Before I go further  to describe 
the project aims and structure, I will take a moment to draw some boundaries around my use of 
the two key terms in this aim:  ‘screen’ and ‘relational ontology’.
Screen
Using a term such as ‘screen’ suggests that the thing being referred to shares a common identity 
with other things, without defining what about this identity is common.31 Naming a thing a 
‘screen’, then, suggests it has a certain ontology; a set of characteristics that define it in some 
way. The relation between naming and ontology will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 
27. Introna and Ilharco, “On the Meaning of Screens,” 62-3.
28. These frameworks are introduced in “Making screen relations”, p.23. 
29. In What is a Thing?, Martin Heidegger develops an argument in which the name of a thing is always derived from the need to point 
out an instance of it. Naming, for Heidegger, is demonstrative. In this way, the individual thing is always included in the universal. 
In his analysis included alongside the text of Heidegger’s lecture, Eugene T. Gendlin writes that naming a thing, such as a screen, 
means that “we thereby take and know it as the same as many other things not here and now” which are also called by that name. 
See Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing?, trans. WB Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch, analysis by Eugene T Gendlin (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1967),  260.
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three when it arises as being particularly at issue; but for now this relation presents a particular 
problem for positioning an initial definition for the term ‘screen’. 
In exploring a relational ontology for the screen, I am looking for the identity of things that 
might be described by the term. Defining the term ‘screen’ is, in many ways, the central problem 
of this thesis. Taking this as the case, an appropriate starting point for my analysis might be 
any ‘thing’ that is commonly described by the term. Some problems come immediately to hand 
from this starting point. The first is in deciding what I can and cannot use as an example to 
begin my exploration. The term ‘screen’ could include any number of disparate objects, concepts 
and processes, and which of these I include at the outset would no doubt affect the kind of 
ontology I find. The objects, concepts and processes the term describes may have little in common 
physically. They may not have physicality at all. 
As this thesis aims to understand the screen through design and to situate this understanding 
within the broader context of the screen, I am particularly interested in the material thing of the 
screen – the object that inhabits space even as it effects it. As such, I will limit my definition of 
the term ‘screen’ to the object of the screen and its context. The term ‘screen’ is limited here to 
its noun form, a screen or the screen, and particularly as it relates to a physical thing or group 
of things. 
The second problem lies in the term ‘object’ and what it denotes in relation to the screen. 
Particularly, what part of a screen is the screen—object; and what is an object as it appears in 
perception? This thesis begins with the assumption that the object is the physical part of what 
is referred to by the term ‘screen’. The role of the object in screenic perception will be discussed 
further in chapter one, and tested more thoroughly in chapters two and three.
Finally, there is also a common effect to screens that needs to be defined at the outset. The 
discussions of the impact of screens presented above tend to focus on technological screens, 
those that produce some sort of moving imagery.  While I do not wish to limit the discussion 
here these screens exclusively, there have been arguments made that the motion of this imagery 
is what allows the characteristic effects of the screen. Rather than splitting the ‘technological’ 
from the ‘non-technological’, I will take forward the notion of a moving space to explore the 
effects of screens.28 Lattices and other architectural screens fulfil this need, as the space seen 
through them is, or is capable of being, in motion. By contrast, the paper on which a photograph 
is printed does not allow the kind of spatial experience that seems to underpin our everyday 
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30. In Television and the Moral Imaginary, Dant identifies the movement of the image, synchronised with sound, as important in its 
impact on our understanding of self, other and world. He uses the term ‘continuous present’ to describe the sense of becoming 
that attracts our mechanisms of meaning-making to the screen. Dant holds that movement is essential to employing this perceptual 
mechanism with the screen, and thus essential to the spatial experience of the screen. Whether or not it is possible to concretely 
define what constitutes ‘technological’ in this context, taking some screens as ‘technological’ and others as not would introduce a 
number of arbitrary divisions in to this analysis; divisions that are not directly related to the screen as a class of entities.
31. Approaching ontology and perception together situate this discussion in phenomenology. Heidegger’s process of ‘worlding’  argues 
that understanding the nature of things relies on perception, so that “coming back to these entities understandingly is the existential 
meaning of letting them be encountered by making them present; that is why we call them entities ‘within the world’.” [Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Collins, 1962), 366, emphasis added]. 
Merleau-Ponty perhaps best explicated this connection in his discussion of object permanence, saying that “our perception ends 
in objects, and the object, once constituted, appears as the reason for all the experiences of it that we have had or that we could 
have.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A Landes (London: Routledge, 2012), 95. Merleau-
Ponty holds that things are present for humans because human perception unites sense impressions into a meaningful experience.
involvement with the term.  Although photographs could be described as a kind of screen, they 
will not enter into this study.
The types of screens that will enter this discussion, then, will be those that have a defined 
physical structure and that have a relationship to moving space, either through presenting 
moving imagery or filtering perceptual access to existing spaces. These constraints work to 
anchor this project within the field of design and spatial experience. Approaching the screen as 
an object that defines moving space allows understandings to surface about the relation between 
design, the screen and space. 
Occasionally, the terms ‘screenness’ and ‘screenic’ will be used; the former refers to the nature of 
screens, and the latter refers to things that are almost, but not quite, screens.
Relational ontology
This project attempts to look at how the screen is there in experience. Such a question is an 
ontological one, but it approaches ontology in a particular way. This is not the type of ontology 
that is looking for the common properties of the thing that hold true over time. Although the 
variations of form and behaviour within screens do lend themselves well to this sort of analysis, 
to say that the screen holds some quality by which it can be recognised generates specific 
assumptions that will be made apparent in the following chapters. 
Instead of looking for the screen in terms of what it is, I am considering it in terms of how it 
comes to be. Ontology is approached in this project as a process, and particularly a process 
that involves embodied perception.29 Approaching ontology in this way might imply that the 
being of things themselves is dependent on human perception, presenting overtones of social 
constructivism. I do not mean to imply, in taking this approach, that the material world itself 
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is contingent on human perception. Rather, I mean simply that the way that the ‘screen’ is 
understood is always dependent on the structure of human understanding. To look for a sense 
of the screen that is separate to the human experience oversteps the very thing that people 
have access to. No matter what scale or level of abstraction a person attempts to understand 
the screen, this understanding will always be contingent on the modes and nuances of human 
perception.
Describing the ontology of the screen as a perceptual process allows an approach that considers 
the screen in terms of its relationality. Whereas the essence and conditions of possibility of the 
screen occur on a scale outside of any individual encounter with it, a perceptual ontology shows 
the screen as being generated within an encounter.32  The different ways in which this encounter 
can make sense, and what this means for understanding the screen, are the subject of the three 
chapters.
In any relational encounter, there are (at least) three ways of understanding how things are 
related. The first is by looking at the things that are related, the relata. The second is by looking 
at the relations themselves.33 The third is to look at the structure of relationality – that is, 
how the relata and relations effect and constitute one another in an ontology. These three 
perspectives form the bulk of the analysis of the screen in this project, and are the structure 
around which the thesis chapters are divided. Each of these frameworks approaches the screen 
with its own priorities. Each carries assumptions and logical structures that give a particular 
understanding of the screen, and it is important to acknowledge the role of these structures in 
the understandings that are taken from analysis. 
The ontology of the screen I will discuss in this thesis focuses on the screen as a relational 
device. The purpose of this thesis is not to find an answer as to what the screen is. To the 
contrary, I hope the following text will establish that such a task is impossible. Instead, the aim 
is to explore ways in which the screen surfaces in perception and understand differences in how 
it is approached. This includes understanding the bias inherent in different ways of looking at 
the screen, and connecting the structures of these analyses to what is found in the screen. By 
understanding these connections in each case, I hope to identify something else, something that 
reoccurs across these ways of looking, or escapes them entirely.
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The thesis is presented in three chapters, each of which correspond to one of the three perspectives 
on the relational ontology of the screen. Within these chapters, the analysis takes place in two 
interconnected halves, which I have called a ‘making’ and a ‘breaking’. I will briefly outline the 
reasoning behind this structure, then move to discussing the conceptual underpinnings and 
methods of both the ‘making’ and ‘breaking’ in more detail.
The cues for the structuring of this text are taken from Jane Rendell’s Site Writing. Rendell 
states that she intends site writing as a method in which “the boundary between subjects and 
objects is more porous and arguments are made not only directly, but through association and 
implication.”34 The technique results in a “situated criticism,” one that is particularly effective 
in exploring a relational ontology because of the way in which relations are accessed. That 
is, relational ontology implies that things arise from encounters between other things. As 
mentioned, the screen is explored here as a material relation between a person and an object. 
However the only way of understanding this relation is from the positioning of a person – a 
positioning that includes particular perceptual bias. Put simply, any relational ontology of the 
screen will always be situated within the structure of human understanding. Acknowledging 
the role of this structure in what is understood situates a person within the relation.
Splitting the thesis into three perspectives allows different understandings of the screen to 
surface from within three different modes of thought.  This makes clear the positioning of each 
mode in relation to the others. It also allows connections to be made between the conceptual 
structure of the mode of thought and the outcomes of the analysis.  However it is not only the 
conceptual structure that affects what is understood – the methods of interrogation also affect 
what can be found. 
32. In this way, the screen can remain immanent rather than transcendent, opening ways of accessing ontological understandings. 
Manuel DeLanda takes a similar stance on relational structures in Assemblage Theory (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
2016).
33. In approaching relationality in this tripartite way, guidance was taken from the relational ontology of Brian John Martine’s 
Indeterminacy and Intelligibility (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). Martine discusses the tension between the 
boundedness of relata (the determinate) and the openness of the constantly shifting relations that we describe them by (the 
indeterminate). He concludes that to consider one without the other ignores fundamental aspects of experience – the determinate 
and indeterminate are themselves related, bound within a structure of experience.
34. Jane Rendell, Site Writing: The Architecture of Art Criticism (London: IB Tauris, 2006), 2. Rendell offers a number of techniques for 
achieving this effect. Some of these techniques are moving across boundaries and thresholds, fluctuating pronouns, and exploiting 
the design of and relations between pages.  She also raises the possibility of a situated writing outside text – in art or video. These 
techniques have been put to use in the creation of this thesis.
STRUCTURING THE ANALYSIS: MAKING AND BREAKING
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At the outset, it was clear that the ontology of screens has both material and representational 
aspects, and that these are both encountered as the ‘screen’ in interaction. A traditional written 
analysis will attempt to construct a generalised understanding. That is, it will look for the 
screen, rather than this screen. This generalised understanding is important to the ontology 
of the screen as it represents a ‘making’ of screen relations on the conceptual level. Finding 
a relational ontology from written analysis means working within a particular logic and at a 
particular scale; however this is not the scale at which the material context of the thing can be 
acknowledged.35 
Something was needed in addition to written analysis to address the material context of the 
screen, and to elaborate its dynamic with the representational; something that would work at 
the scale of the individual occurrence in order to understand the particular thing of the screen. 
This individual context was found using three forms of creative practice: amateur robotics, 
animation and personally situated writing. Together, these methods challenge the generalised 
understanding of conceptual analysis by finding its limits, the places where it no longer applies. 
In finding (and crossing) these limits, individual occurrences ‘break’ the constructed generalised 
understandings of the screen. 
Each of the forms of analysis used herein are situated, they come with their own logics and 
structures that affect understanding. In this thesis, the construction of the screen in written 
analysis sits alongside its provocation through creative practice. Importantly, it is between these 
modes that the thesis performs and that an ontology of the screen is sought.
In each chapter, the two halves of the thesis – the screens’ ‘making’ and ‘breaking’ – are presented 
in a way that allows them to interact. In serif font, a body of text presents an argument about 
the ontology of the screen, representing a construction or ‘making’ of the screen. Alongside 
this text lies the ‘breaking’ of the screen through creative practice, presented using a variety 
of techniques and written in san serif font. The two halves are established in varied spatial 
relations across the recto and verso pages, with colour used to emphasise the method most 
suited to the argument. 
In chapter one, the ‘making’ appears as a single column of text on the recto page, highlighted in 
red. The ‘breaking’ appears on the verso page in two columns. In chapter two, the significance 
of these two parts is inverted. The ‘making’ remains on the verso page, but is now presented in 
two columns.  The layout of the text leaves space for the single column of the ‘breaking’ on the 
verso page, which is highlighted in blue. In each of these chapters, the ‘making’ and ‘breaking’ 
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are kept separate, and one is given priority over the other to reflect the structure of the way 
of looking. There are, however, connections implicit in the spatial positioning of two halves 
that provoke the argument being made. The reader must decide how to interrupt the flow of 
the prioritized argument to accommodate this ‘other’ information.  In chapter three, the two 
halves are presented in a single flow of text, with the ‘making’ justifed toward the binding and 
the ‘breaking’ toward the margin. These pages are highlighted in green.  The details of the 
connections between the two halves of the text, and the significances of these connections, are 
left implicit. In this way, an indeterminate meaning can be held between them, an excess of 
other possibilities that interplays in unspecified ways with the determinations to either side. 
To emphasise the interconnections across the thesis, each of the chapters is conceived as a 
particular figure. This figure acts as a depiction of the conceptual structures of the written 
analysis – an axis, a plane and a field respectively – and the way in which it is interrupted by 
the creative practice – as a cut, a deformation and a twist respectively. The use of these three 
figures is discussed in the chapter summary below, as well as within each chapter itself. They 
are not intended simply as metaphors for reflective understanding, but as a kind of discursive 
performance. In each case, the written analysis and creative practice will be treated according 
to the appropriate figure.
The resulting analysis may feel at times like it sits on the surface of things. This is not 
coincidental: the screen is constituted materially as a series of surfaces, and staying on these 
surfaces means staying with the screen. Moreover, if the ontology of a thing is found between its 
determinations, as relational, then proceeding deeper into the determined forms cannot by itself 
reveal the thing. Analytical language has a tendency toward determination. For the most part, 
language involves defining experientially vague qualities and conditions, drawing boundaries 
around them so they so they can be compared and contrasted. Drilling down into the terms of 
analysis is more likely to reveal the structure of the analysis itself than the experience being 
described.36 As such, this thesis is not concerned with engaging the internal structures of any 
of the philosophical texts discussed herein, or in approaching these bodies of work as objects of 
35. Martine remarks on the confounding nature of language in finding individual instances of things within analysis: “No sooner do 
we try to describe the individual independently from the universal than we run into an apparently insurmountable problem: the 
words – any words – that are the basic toolsof the task… stand in direct logical contrast to the entities one is trying to describe as 
independent. The only tools available to description are already biased in favour of the universal.” Martine, Indeterminacy and 
Intelligibility, 1-2.
36. A similar issue seems to motivate N. Katherine Hayles to look into the role of metaphor in scientific enquiry in “Desiring Agency: 
Limiting Metaphors and Enabling Constraints in Dawkins and Deleuze/Guattari,” SubStance 94/95 (2001): 144-159. Hayles argues 
that metaphors are capable of opening lines of inquiry in scientific research by interacting with constraints, forming a ‘push-pull 
dynamic’ that allows a greater level of understanding than either alone. It is the power of the metaphor to refer to more than it 
explicitly states that is useful in this regard, as it allows possibilities to come to light that remain in excess of the actualised state
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analysis in themselves. Instead, it aims to use the concepts and mechanisms described therein 
more pragmatically – to apply them to screen understandings.
Making screen relations
A written analysis is presented as a conceptual ‘making’ of screen relations, and the theory and 
terms that form this analysis will be established in this section. Within the chapters themselves, 
concepts and terms will be introduced gradually as a response to provocations arising from prior 
analysis rather than being explicitly stated upfront. In making this move, I intend to show that 
the development of the argument did not begin with this theory: rather, that it arose from the 
interplay of the analysis and the creative practice.
In focusing on a relational ontology, this project takes a primarily phenomenological approach. 
However, it also relies on poststructuralist concepts such as the assemblage. These approaches 
are not considered to be in conflict – rather, the systemic scale of poststructuralist logic is used to 
complement the more intimate scale of phenomenological experience. Using phenomenological 
and poststructuralist concepts side-by-side allows this thesis to explore the screen as a 
multifaceted experience.”
The spatial design fields are no stranger to phenomenology: it is a particularly useful methodology 
in these fields as it allows both the material and the representational to be considered in terms 
of an encounter between person and thing. The engagement of body, object and space is one of 
the primary mechanisms that define ideas such as ‘inhabitation’ and ‘dwelling’, for instance. 
Phenomenology allows the thing to be discussed according to how it is experienced; not just as a 
matter of reflective thought, but from within a relational structure. 
In performing this analysis, I will deal with two main branches of phenomenology. Heidegger’s 
phenomenology is used as it addresses ontology in a way that stresses concepts of personhood, 
spatiality and things. The four main sources consulted in this project – Being and Time, “What is 
a Thing?,” “The Thing,” and “The Question Concerning Technology” – each approach the role of 
people, space and things in perception differently; allowing them to inform the thesis at crucial 
points as its argument evolves.37 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whilst being less comprehensive in his 
approach to the appearance of the world, defines a particular role for the body in the structures 
of perception. His lecture series “The World of Perception” and Phenomenology of Perception 
particularly inform arguments about materiality in chapter two.38
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Three additional branches of thinking are also incorporated that, despite showing varying 
amounts of departure from phenomenology, express some methodological similarities. Both Don 
Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek have developed sets of relational constructs that they refer to 
as post-phenomenological. These describe a number of relations between people, technologies 
and the world as they impact perception (Ihde) and action (Verbeek). The analytical structure 
of relations as expressed in Ihde’s Technology and the Lifeworld (1990) and Verbeek’s What 
Things Do (2005) inform ideas about interaction in chapter one; and the concept of technological 
intentionality is used in discussing agency in chapter two. 
New Materialist and Feminist theories inform the thinking behind chapter two, particularly as 
they place the encounter as the basis for generative relations. Diana Coole’s Rethinking Agency 
(2005) and her essay ‘The Inertia of Matter and the Generativity of Flesh’ (2010), along with 
Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2010), form the basis of a rethinking of materiality and agency 
as it applies to the screen. Elizabeth Grosz’s approach to ‘The Thing’ as it appears in Architecture 
from the Outside (2001) is used alongside Heidegger’s essay of the same name to develop an idea 
of how a screen might be defined in perception without emphasising the relation of use.
The third chapter employs aspects of the thinking of poststructuralists Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, and more particularly Manuel DeLanda, to look at the connections between the screen 
as relata and the generative relations that underpin it. The relationship between Deleuze and 
phenomenology is fraught with controversy.39 I do not wish to enter into debates about the 
genealogy of Deleuze’s thought in this thesis, but I use the concepts of assemblage and topology 
as a way of approaching the relational structure of the screen in chapter three. This analysis 
relies heavily on DeLanda’s Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason 
(2011) and Assemblage Theory (2016), along with Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, 
to construct a topological understanding of the screen. The approaches of Brian Massumi 
and Bernard Cache (in Parable of the Virtual: Movement, affect, sensation (2002) and Earth 
37. Being and Time was first published as Sein und Zeit in 1927 and translated into English in 1962. What is a Thing was originally 
given as a lecture called “Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen” in 1935-6 at University 
of Freiberg and translated into English in 1967. “The Thing” was originally given as a lecture entitled Das Ding, in 1949, and was 
published in English in 1971. The “Question Concerning Technology” was originally published as “Die Frage nach der Technik“ in 
1954 and translated into English in 1977 as the title essay in a compiled volume.
38. “The World of Perception” was broadcast on French National radio in 1948 and published in English in 2004 in a book of the same 
name. Phenomenology of Perception was first published as Phénoménologie de la perception in 1945, and was translated into 
English in 1962.
39. Although Deleuze and Guattari’s thought arises outside the bounds of phenomenology, there is some discussion in the literature 
of the compatibility of certain poststructuralist and phenomenological concepts. See, for example, Joe Hughes, Deleuze and the 
Genesis of Representation (London:  Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008), 3.
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Moves: The furnishing of territories respectively) in constructing relational topologies are also 
influential.40
These four branches of thinking are applied to the screen as an object of analysis. Each provides 
different insights into the screen. The theories will be introduced gradually as the argument 
develops in response to particular material or conceptual provocations, and the impact of these 
ideas on the understandings generated through this thesis will be made apparent as they unfold. 
Four established screen types are used as examples during this analysis – lattices, cinema, 
televisions, and portable screens such as smartphones. As the thesis progresses, the analysis 
relies less heavily on established screen types, looking instead toward artworks that express 
screen-like qualities but may not be considered screens per se.
Defining terms
Drawing on a broad range of disciplines raises a particular problem with terminology. Different 
disciplines often use the same term in different ways, or with nuances of meaning that do not 
directly translate from one to another. While being conscious of these complexities, this thesis will 
approach terminology fairly naively, a technique which Jane Bennett uses as a “postponement 
of a genealogical critique of objects.” This thesis is interested in formalised meanings, but it is 
also specifically interested in the excess of these meanings. Rather than delving into the object 
from the outside, according to the history defined by the language of different disciplines, a 
“moment of methodological naivety” allows meaning to develop from inside the object; from the 
ways it shifts under these terms.41 Toward this end, I have lent a certain ambiguity to the text 
– defining and redefining concepts as they change in application and leaving an incompleteness 
in definition. Occasionally, the context of a certain term as carrying meaning in a certain way 
will be important to the argument. In these cases, the origin and meaning of the term used will 
be clarified. 
There are, however, nine terms that are pivotal to this thesis that will benefit from being defined 
up front: object, thing, subject, person, real, virtual, space, materiality and agency. These terms 
are interrelated and are used to explore the basis of screen ontology, both within this thesis 
and elsewhere. Some of these terms will be used consistently through the thesis, others will be 
redefined as new understandings are discovered. Establishing an initial, working definition for 
each of these terms will allow the argument to develop more effectively.
Of the terms I have attempted to use consistently throughout the thesis, object, thing, subject 
and person are the most prevalent and most important. The object and the subject are discussed 
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primarily as relata, set within a Cartesian opposition. The opposition between these terms, and 
the way that this opposition plays out in analysis, is one of the starting points for chapter one. 
The aim of chapter one, however, is to reveal an excess to the dichotomy of the object and the 
subject; and this excess will be described using the terms thing and person.  This second set of 
terms is not an opposition, instead it describes a relation.
By using the term ‘screen—object’, I refer to the physical screen as it opposes the thinking 
subject, or the inert screen as it opposes the active subject. The screen—object thus sits as a 
determined form that carries ontological assumptions of discreteness and permanency, a form 
that is thought of in opposition to the subject. The parts of the screen that lie in excess of 
this permanency will be approached using the term thing. The screen—thing, then, includes 
something more than an inert object. It refers to the material of the screen, but also to its effects 
or potential effects. Within the relata-based analysis of chapter one, this might include the 
screen—object plus the space it divides; or the screen—object plus the idea of the screen, the 
ways it is represented.  When discussing relations in chapter two, screen—thing might refer 
to the indeterminate screen; the screen as it is before it becomes determined, prior to reflexive 
thought. The person in this scenario shows a similar excess to the subject. Within the relata-
based analysis, this term might include the subject plus their physical body; in the relation-
based analysis it might refer to generative embodiment – the person before they are revealed to 
themselves as subject.
The second set of terms that are important to this thesis are real and the virtual. These terms 
will be redefined as the argument develops. In the first chapter, real and virtual refer to types of 
space – the real being the physical, material realm; and the virtual being the representational 
realm of the image. These two spaces together ‘make up’ the spaces of the screen, but interact 
in such a way to oppose one another. In the second chapter, these terms are inverted. The 
real is used in reference to the generative plane of relations, and the virtual to the things that 
are pulled out of this plane as relata – being shadows of this inaccessible realm of the real. In 
chapter three, the meaning of the virtual shifts again. Here the ‘real’ is defined as consisting of 
the actual and the virtual; the ‘virtual’ being that which is possible, and the ‘actual’ that which 
is present. These shifts in meaning will be explained more thoroughly as they occur. 
40. A Thousand Plateaus was first published as Mille Plateaux in 1980 and translated into English in 1987. Earth Moves was originally 
composed as the unpublished Terre Meuble in 1983 and translated into English in 1995.
41. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 17. Bennett uses this approach to 
reveal and participate in shaping, an activity that is outside of the human. 
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Similar shifts in meaning occur in the last set of terms, materiality and agency. In chapter 
one, materiality and agency are discussed as properties that belong to relata. Particularly, 
materiality consists of the properties of an object and refers to the physical make-up of the thing 
– its largeness or smallness, for example. Likewise, agency is linked to the subject and refers to 
intent and efficacy, an ability to decide and bring about effect.42 Chapter two spends some time 
redefining materiality and agency as processes. Materiality and agency in chapter two do not 
refer to the properties of relata, but are themselves generative of these properties.43 In this shift, 
materiality particularly becomes more than a physical property. The definition of materiality 
broadens to include ontological and abstract considerations that arise during material relations. 
When circumstances demand, these generative materialities and agencies will be referred to as 
materialisation and agentialisation. In chapter three, materiality and agency become perceptual 
conditions for establishing a field of possibility for the screen that is both composed of and moves 
beyond its physical instances.
Breaking screen relations
A series of creative works are presented in tension with the written analysis as a conceptual 
‘breaking’ of screen relations, and the methods that form this analysis are established in this 
section. The works played a significant role in the development of the project, and contribute to 
the analysis by providing an alternative access point to screen relations. They draw on a range 
of processes and take three major forms: material objects produced using amateur robotics, 
animation and video work, and personally situated writing. 
The material object
The primary form of creative practice is the material object. Three sets of objects were created, 
each correlated with one of the three perspectives that structure this thesis. These objects work 
alongside other forms of creative practice, acting to sway the observations and reflections back 
toward the material thing. All were created using an amateur robotics platform, Arduino. I will 
discuss the choice of Arduino as a medium now, before introducing the three sets of objects and 
briefly describing their role within the chapters.
Robotics is not a common design medium in spatial design. Outside of the spatial disciplines, 
robotic design is most often directed towards a particular purpose and has an intimate relation 
with human labour, especially the mimicking or replacement of human behaviours. However, 
there is potential for robotics to work as a creative medium rather than a functional one. I chose 
this medium for two reasons: its emphasis on active materiality, and its restrictive nature. 
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Robotic things lend a particularly material bias to this project that more representative forms 
of practice would be less able to express.  This materiality of the objects is particularly powerful 
because of its activity. Robotic things can engage with and respond to people in ways that other 
things cannot. Or, more accurately, robotic things make their interactivity with people very 
apparent. This lends robotics an advantage over other forms of object-making in this project, as 
the role of the material can be approached in a similar way to the role of human intent. 
To maintain the role of the objects in disturbing screen relations, I was particularly interested 
in retaining a sense of surprise in the creative works, rather than have them address particular 
functions. For this reason, I chose an amateur robotics platform. This decision has two advantages 
for this thesis. The first of these is that it is not a medium that I am expert in as a practitioner. 
By maintaining an amateur relation with the creative medium, the medium has more impact 
on the practice. That is to say, an expert practitioner has tested limits, found boundaries and 
developed working procedures which allow them to express their design intent by manipulating 
the medium. The knowledge and skill of an expert reduces the scope for surprising events; for 
the medium to protest or fail in revealing ways. 
The second advantage lies in the restrictive nature of the platform, and this is the major advantage 
of using Arduino over more developed robotics platforms. Mimicking human behaviours and 
structures requires substantial processing power. Platforms that use external processors are far 
more effectual in this regard and can perform complex and computationally involved processes, 
such as video analysis and pattern finding. This processing power allows human processes, such 
as those that structure sight, to be easily reproduced. The resultant systems often ‘think’ like 
humans. 
By contrast, the Arduino Pro Mini that provides the processing platform for the objects of this 
thesis has only 32kB of programmable memory. Such a restrictive platform forces a change in 
methodology. It necessitates human engagement with machinic methods rather than applying 
human methods to the machine.  The type of design that results is less intent-driven and occurs 
more as an active communication. Differences between robotic and human structures in regards 
42. These definitions follow traditional Cartesian notions of materiality and agency, in which agency belongs to the (human) subject 
and material is, by contrast, ineffectual; acted upon rather than active. Diana Coole; in “Rethinking Agency: A Phenomenological 
Approach to embodiment and Agentic Capacities,” Political Studies 53 (2005): 125;  notes that such definition  pays “ontological 
homage to a Cartesian dualism that separates minds from bodies and spiritual from material substances.”
43. The redefinition of materiality and agency as processes reference the work of Jürgen Habermas, Elizabeth Grosz, Diana Coole, 
Jane Bennett and others in decentring agency from the Cartesian notions of the subject and, ultimately, from the human. Coole, 
particularly, develops a notion of agency that focuses on capacities and their surfacing in pre-personal and trans-personal domains 
as well as the personal. Bennett, in Vibrant Matter, follows this non-personal agency to define materiality itself as active and lively.
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to time, memory, and precision became particularly apparent through these processes. Chapter 
two, particularly, discusses how machinic engagement revealed understandings about the 
design process and about the screen.
Three sets of material objects were produced using these methods. In chapter one, the Behaviour 
Boxes were created to isolate and demonstrate certain aspects of the screen in a way that 
might stress the materiality of the object (despite this materiality not being wholly expressed). 
However, they did not behave as expected.  Rather than demonstrating connections between 
subject and object, as I initially assumed they would, the  Behaviour Boxes began to break these 
connections. This result framed the way that the written analysis and creative practice interact 
within the thesis. The Behaviour Boxes, particularly, seemed to disturb the dichotomy of the 
subject and object. This discovery exposed something important about the ontology of the screen 
and shaped the direction of the thesis as it developed.
The remaining works build on this sense of breaking to distort the screen in various ways, in an 
effort to reveal more of this excess. In chapter two, Gaze Returner and Moubie act to interrupt 
the ways that spatiality is produced, disturbing traditional notions of materiality and agency to 
show these as interconnected processes in revealing the screen. In chapter three, Some Assembly 
explores the role of pace in spatial ordering, twisting the structure of relationality to find a 
critical transition where something inert turns into something active. This third set of works 
draws attention to the structure of relationality by changing the scale at which the screen is 
attended to. The works are introduced more thoroughly at the beginning of each chapter and are 
discussed at moments throughout the chapters where they provoke new meanings or challenge 
the assumptions of the argument. 
The works are referred to within the thesis as ‘bots’, a friendly abbreviation of the more formal 
‘robot’44. Each of these objects works to break screen relations in a certain way. They are 
somewhat screenic, but not exactly screens. Using this approach helps reveal screen ontologies 
by making clear what the screen is not through mechanisms that interrupt them surfacing in 
perception.  
Animation and video
Animation and video are also used as a creative practice. Despite the robotic objects being the 
subject of the animations and videos, these techniques in all cases add layers of understanding 
to the bots themselves. As such, they are not used purely as forms of representation or 
documentation. They do not document the bots per se, rather they document my understanding 
of the person-screen relation provoked by the bots. They form part of an analysis of the objects, 
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particularly as they relate to their situation, and so stand as creative practices in their own 
right. 
 
Animation is used in chapters one and two to demonstrate aspects of the human-object 
interaction between me and the Behaviour Boxes, Gaze Returner and Moubie. The technique 
allows a communication of the interactions between myself and the works in both design and 
analysis, situating my material and spatial interactions with the work. Video is used in chapter 
three to manipulate Some Assembly’s performance to allow further conditions to surface. The 
video that is presented as part of Some Assembly’s performance focuses on manipulating the 
pace of the work, allowing an access to the screen condition that wouldn’t otherwise be available. 
These two techniques present a peculiar problem to this thesis. The created objects are moving 
works, and any analysis of them needs to take movement into account.  The ability of animation 
and video to represent these moving objects as it analyses them means they are the most fitting 
technique for interpreting the works in the thesis. However, both rely on the reader watching 
the interpretation through a screen. As the intent of these works is to break the ontology of 
the screen, inserting a commonplace and established (and unbroken) screen between the work, 
myself and the reader can detract from the efficacy of the works. The intact screen that the 
reader watches presents a paradox. This second screen may overpower the nuances of breaking 
undertaken by the bots. 
The problem of the reader’s ‘second screen’ is particularly apparent in chapter three, where 
it is directly addressed. The animations in chapters one and two make deliberate aesthetic 
moves to counteract this effect. De-contextualisation of the interaction from its surrounds and 
the addition of textures over the represented information mean that these works can easily be 
recognised as imaginative. The ways in which screen relations are broken is communicated in 
the content – it is represented within the animation by showing my interpretation of the works. 
In video, however, these techniques are not available. Some Assembly relies more heavily on the 
reader’s direct interpretation of the work as represented. The material object exists as a direct 
material relation between me and the bot or set of bots. This relation is not directly accessible to 
you as the reader. The animations and videos sit between the me—bot relation and you. 
44. The term ‘robot’ was first introduced by playwright Karel Čapek in the 1920s. The term is derived from the Czech words robotnik, 
meaning serf or peasant, and robota, meaning forced labour. See Wesley L. Stone, “The History of Robotics” in Robotics and 
Automation Handbook, ed. Thomas R. Kurfess (London: CRC Press, 2004), 1.1.4. My contraction of the term to ‘bot’ attempts to 
diminish connotations of servitude whilst referencing the mode of production and materiality of the work.
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Personally situated writing
A form of personally situated writing is used to more thoroughly elucidate my relation to both 
the bots and the written analysis. This writing represents my thoughts about and relations to 
the bots, particularly as they interact conceptually with the written analysis; acting as a bridge 
between the creative works and the distanced analysis of the main body of text. This text is 
written casually in the first person and acknowledges the ways that I am situated toward the 
work. It addresses the questions, orientations and intents revealed through the series of objects.
Such personally situated text suspends the distance usually present between an analyst and the 
object of their analysis. This distance is important, of course, and takes its place in the written 
analysis. Understanding the individual material context of the screen, however, requires an 
individual approach. I need to situate myself at this individual scale. 
Each form of creative practice has its own strengths and weaknesses in expressing aspects of 
how the screen appears (or fails to appear) in perception.  Placing these forms of situatedness 
alongside the written analysis allows a critical engagement in a “constant back-and-forth” 
between my experience as designer and interactant; your experience as a reader; and objective 
accounts that describe and frame the experiences of others.45 The relational ontology of the 
screen that I find; my analysis; occurs across these modes of communication.
45. Diana Coole, “Rethinking Agency,” 127-8. Coole notes Merleau-Ponty’s hyper-dialectics as a means of situating critique. Coole 
argues that, since “no thinker can coincide with the lived,” the situatedness of each observation needs to be acknowledged. She 
recommends, as a way of accessing this situatedness, “engaging critically in a constant back-and-forth between (first person) lived 
experience and (third person) objective accounts of it, while also experimenting with concepts that emerge from the changing 
world they describe.”
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In summary, the structure of the thesis document arises from the perspectives and situations 
discussed above. The thesis is divided into three chapters, each responding to a particular 
perspective on relational ontology. Chapter one looks at the screen from the point of view of 
the relata, or what the screen is (or appears to be). Chapter two looks at the screen from the 
point of view of the relation, or how the screen surfaces. Chapter three looks at the structure 
of relationality of the screen, or when and why the screen surfaces as these things according 
to these methods. Within these chapters, my analysis is presented between a formal written 
analysis and a series of creative works. In splitting the analysis of the screen along these lines, 
I am not trying to enforce the separateness of these approaches; rather I am trying to show how 
they have different emphases that intrinsically rely on one another. To make this clearer, each 
chapter is presented as a figure that demonstrates the interrelation between the ‘making’ and 
‘breaking’ of screen relations.
The first of these chapters considers the screen from the point of view of the relata. The 
fundamental assumption of this type of analysis is that the relata occur as pre-existing entities 
that enter into a reflexive relation. My entry point to the screen’s ontology, then, addresses the 
screen according to the forms and behaviours by which it interacts, and the dichotomies that 
define this interaction. The purpose of this chapter is not to perform a relata-based analysis or 
to pose dichotomies in an attempt to describe the screen; but rather to find the slippage in those 
otherings and uses already posed.
The chapter begins by discussing the role of relata within relationality, and notes the reliance 
of a relata-based analysis on the use context, and its tendency toward dichotomisation. The 
written analysis in this chapter constructs the screen in terms of two major dichotomies – the 
subject and the object, and the real and the virtual. The relata of these dichotomies form two 
points, connected by a relation which draws them together and an opposition which forces them 
apart. The figure of this ‘making’ is therefore conceived as an axis. The Behaviour Boxes act 
as a device by which to explore the role of the object in realising the ‘screen’. They attempt to 
cut the connection between relata in an incomplete way by expressing a role for themselves in 
the reflexive relation, working within the discursive structure to provoke slippage in relational 
assumptions. The chapter is thus presented as an axis and a cut.
Chapter one concludes with the observation that disappearance and negation are the ontological 
basis of the screen. This leads to an understanding of the screen as creating a gap, an 
THESIS SUMMARY
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understanding that is linked to the assumptions made when performing a relata-based analysis. 
Alterity is discovered as a mechanism for interrupting the negation of the screen. The chapter 
also notes the importance of materiality and agency in how this view of the screen is maintained, 
opening the way for chapter two to invert the primacy of relata and relation in analysis. 
Chapter two considers the screen from the point of view of the relations of materiality and 
agency. The fundamental assumption of this type of analysis inverts the assumptions of the 
last: relata occur as reflexive reactions to pre-existing and generative relations.  The screen 
is considered in this chapter as being drawn out of a point of tension within materiality and 
agency. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how screen relata can surface differently in 
different contexts.
The chapter begins by discussing the role of relations within relationality as generative rather 
than reflexive. Materiality and agency are then reframed as non-directional, generative relations 
from which the screen emerges as a particular point of tension. The two processes are shown 
as internally competitive but mutually reliant. The written analysis in this chapter constructs 
the screen in terms of a homogenous plane of relations. It is only when the plane is disturbed 
that difference can arise between things and the relations can be understood. The figure of 
this ‘making’ is therefore conceived as a plane. Gaze Returner and Moubie act as devices by 
which to explore the role of agency and materiality in realising the ‘screen’. They attempt to 
stretch the relational plane, challenging expectations in regards to the way that the screen is 
realised through processes of materiality and agency by expressing their own spatial relations. 
The chapter is thus presented as a stretched plane.
Chapter two concludes with the observation that the material directedness of the screen lies 
in a form of spatial ordering that occurs alongside, rather than for, humans. To engage with 
this form of ordering means that the onus of interaction is shifted: a person needs to find a new 
relation with the screen rather than the screen working for the human. The chapter particularly 
notes the importance of time and scale in how relata surface from relations, setting the way for 
chapter three to explore this structure in more detail. 
Chapter three considers the screen as a structure of relationality. The fundamental assumption 
of this type of analysis is that relata and relations are bound within and emerge from a larger 
structure. The screen in this chapter is considered as a region of understanding in which relata 
and relations are nested within one another rather than being arranged hierarchically. The 
purpose of this chapter is to find the boundaries of this region – to find that point at which the 
screen turns in to something else or vice versa.
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The chapter begins by noting the difficulty in anlaysing relata and relations separately, with 
different ontological priorities. It establishes a mode by which the screen can be generalised 
while keeping a sense of individual experience. The written analysis in this chapter constructs 
the screen as an indeterminate assemblage which becomes territorialised at in different ways to 
produce different relata and relations. The sum total of these relata and relations forms a field 
of possibility for the screen. The figure of this ‘making’ is therefore conceived as a field. Some 
Assembly act as a performance that provokes the crossing of thresholds in this field, turning a 
screen into a collection of pixels. The performance works to twist the field of possibilities in a 
way that turns one relatum into another. The chapter is thus presented as a field and a twist.
Chapter three concludes with the observation that speed, order and density act as parameters 
by which critical transitions take place within the field of possibilities of the screen. This leads to 
an understanding of the screen as having a certain pace which defines its properties, tendencies 
and capacities in any instance. The pace of the screen is connected back to how the screen 
is defined as a relatum. The chapter maps the topology of the screen as it has been revealed 
through this thesis. This map is not intended as an exhaustive definition of the screen, but as a 
suggestion of a perceptual region, and as an articulation of some of the parameters from which 
the screen might emerge. 
A final conclusion then argues that each of the three perspectives suggests a different ontology 
for the screen, and that these arguments link back to assumptions embedded in the way of 
looking, showing that each understanding is situated within its mode. 
Implications
The findings act as a topology of screen understandings. They provide insight into what screens 
have in common, and also into how they arise differently in their contexts. The findings contribute 
to the fields of media studies and spatial studies by outlining a territory of ‘screenness’ that 
includes individual encounter amongst generalised understandings; one that particularly notes 
the connections between how screens are understood and the assumptions and structures that 
craft these understandings. They provide insight into what screens have in common, but also 
into how they arise differently in their contexts.
The findings also work to situate design amongst other modes of understanding. For the purpose 
of this thesis, design is understood primarily as a methodology rather than a discipline. Design 
is a system of thinking and doing that pays particular attention to the role materiality plays in 
the meaning humans derive from their environments and objects.
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Likewise, the primary role of design in this project is as a method of theoretical interrogation. 
That is, the things that are produced using design methodologies in this thesis – the bots, the 
animations and videos, the creative writing and even the thesis itself as a curated presentation 
of this process – are not the point of the thesis. Although the creative works do things, these 
things are not functionally or aesthetically driven, nor are their effects fixed. Design is used here 
in an explorative manner to disrupt written analysis at the same time as it works alongside it. 
Similar points of departure can take drastically different turns in written analysis and creative 
practice. That is, design acts here as a counterpoint to written analysis, providing an alternative 
access point, another way of looking that is outside of analytical literature. 
Design is embedded in this thesis as part of a process that elucidates a series of understandings 
about a thing. It is not an exercise in the production of commodities, but a way of understanding 
– a mode of critical thought that pays particular attention to communication with materiality. 
When taken as proposing a methodology, the findings of this thesis have implications for the 
interactions and relations between theory and practice. Particularly, the thesis implies that 
design methods can be beneficial as tools for enriching understanding of domains of knowledge 
outside of the traditional design disciplines.
However, the content of this thesis, its findings about the screen, also has implications for design 
as a discipline. In this light, the findings of this thesis are useful for designers seeking a greater 
criticality in engaging with screens as tools in the design process, as mediums for conveying 
design information, or as the products of design. Although these outcomes are not necessarily 
discipline-specific, the findings of this thesis could promote conceptual understandings of the use 
and experience of screenic elements in a variety of design disciplines. These include architecture 
(such as in the experience of articulated building facades), interior architecture (such as in 
the experience of transparency or spatial permeability, whether this be analogue or digital), 
object design and industrial design (such as in the connections between material, form and 
understanding of a product), and user-experience design fields (such as the design of human-
computer interfaces).
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46. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1987), 
161.
 
This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a 
stratum, experiment with the opportunities it  offers, 
find an advantageous place on it, find potential 
movements of deterritorialisation, possible lines of 
flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions 
here and there, try out continuums of intensities 
segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at 
all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the 
strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight.
Deleuze and Guattari46

AN AXIS AND A CUT




This analysis begins with what is most immediately apparent in relational ontology – the things 
as they are, the relata. I will discuss here how relata are defined generally before outlining some 
implications of this definition for the analysis. The section will conclude with constructing the 
figure of the screen’s making-and-breaking under these implications.
Looking at the things involved in relations means considering sets of relata and the way they 
are involved with one another. The focus of such a view lies on the character of the relata and 
their roles and identities within the relation. These roles and identities are defined according to 
the observable properties of the relatum, which allow it to interact with other relata. Because 
these properties belong to the relatum, each relatum is held as separable from the relation, each 
able to stand on its own. The relata are seen as discrete entities that pre-exist any particular 
encounter.1 
The assumption that relata pre-exist and are separate from relations might cast the thing as 
standing alone, as being a determinate entity that is potentially uninvolved in interactions. If 
this is the case, it becomes tempting to see the thing according to Heidegger’s vorhandenheit – as 
present-at-hand, an object available for study without reference to its context.2 However, relata 
show particular types of properties that directly reference their contexts. The relatum might be 
considered as separable from its relations, but the types of qualities discovered in approaching 
a thing as relata are inherently relational. Despite the relatum holding properties that are 
described as though they are separate from any phenomenological encounter, these qualities are 
not wholly independent from it. 
For example, a smartphone might be described as ‘small’. ‘Smallness’ is thus seen as a quality 
or property that the smartphone has, regardless of whether or not it is involved in an encounter. 
Smallness is not independent of the encounter, however, as being small is inherently relational: 
STRUCTURE OF A RELATA-BASED ANALYSIS
1. Martine notes the tendency for things to be approached as discrete elements defined by properties in the opening to 
Indeterminacy and Intelligibility (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). He states: “I had started off, in a manner 
typical of the modern tradition, assuming that some of the things in our experience are universals, others individuals, and 
that in order to describe the relation between these two primary entities it would be necessary to detail something like their 
fundamental characteristics.” Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 1.  
2. Heidegger discusses the present-at-hand as “wordless” – the thing removed from its context. He notes that, if objects appear 
according to their properties, they are isolated from their assignments and references. This is not an ontological ‘reality’ as it has 
no reference to worlding – in other words, to the relational context. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarie and 
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Collins , 1962), 81-2.
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The Behaviour Boxes are a series of four isolated, 
boxed behaviours.3 Each is a discrete entity, a thing 
working on its own to do something to me or my 
perception of space; or you and your perception of 
space. They’re not screens. But they might be part-
screens, a screen cut up into bits to better express 
the confluence between what it is and what it does. 
Behaviour Boxes
Pitchmatcher is made from a microphone and a 
speaker. It runs sound through a Fourier transform, 
breaking your voice up into buckets of different 
frequencies until one of them overflows. Once it’s 
drenched in a frequency, it’ll emit this frequency. It’s 
voice is your voice (but a little different). It represents 
you (but a little differently). 
Mover is made from two lights, two wheels and a 
continuous rotation servo. It decides whether it’ll go 
forward or backwards, it’ll indicate a direction, and 
then it will move. Sometimes it lies though – it always 
moves the direction it decides, but sometimes it’ll 
indicate the opposite direction. What it tells you it’s 
going to do isn’t always what it does. 
Colourmapper is made from an Liquid Crystal Display 
and an infrared sensor. It bounces light off things 
and determines how far away they are. It maps this 
distance to a red value, then it shows you this colour 
so you can see the distance too. If you’re looking 
at the LCD, chances are that the thing it’s bouncing 
light off is you. It’s showing you the distance created 
between you. 
Touchbuzzer is made from touch-sensitive fabric and 
a vibration motor connected with a simple if-then 
code clause. If it feels you near it, it’ll make sure you 
feel it too; responding to your electrical pulses with 
it’s own. It’s all about the tactility of interaction, not 
visual display. Fig 1. Behaviour Box Introduction. [Video, 00:17].
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something can only be small in comparison to something larger. To describe a smartphone 
without reference to its most common relation of encounter might be to quantify its size rather 
than qualify its scale. The ‘smallness’ of the thing would instead be described according to 
the dimensions of its sides, or to its overall volume. The quantification of a thing in this way 
approaches the object as present-at-hand, as it is removed from its phenomenological context. 
The properties of relata are relational in the sense that they reference an assumed relation, 
but they are nevertheless taken as attributes or properties of the thing per se. That is, the 
relations into which the thing enters are assumed in the description of the relatum’s properties. 
The properties of the relata are seen as pre-existing the perceptual encounter, and only when 
these properties are encountered in perception do they form relations. It follows that the focus 
of analysis when looking at relata is on the relatum’s properties and the role they play in the 
assumed relation.
This basic definition of relata has two important impacts on what a relata-based analysis may be 
able to reveal about ontology. Firstly, in taking the relata as intrinsically holding properties of 
an assumed relation, the thing becomes an extension of its relational contexts. When considering 
relations between people and objects, this context is a human one. For example, if a thing is 
small and graspable, it becomes mobile – able to be moved. The thing itself, however, is not 
mobile (nor small, nor graspable) without its relation to the human. In considering these factors 
as properties of the things per se, the thing becomes an incarnation of human need or desire.4 
Looking at the relata stresses the context of use. The parameters of the description already 
assume a use relation – whether a screen is graspable, as a relatum, is dependent on its 
suitability for use in-hand. In defining the parameters of the description, the context of the 
thing has already partially determined what it is. The thing is already for something – some 
functional, material, social aim – as this is the basis by which the properties can be discovered. 
The relata-based analysis of the screen requires a ‘for’ relation, and this relation is the basis of 
the way that the screen appears in perception. Importantly for the analysis, though, this use 
relation is not constitutive of the screen itself, which must exist separately from the relation 
in order to enter in to a relation of use. I will return to the idea of the ‘for’ relation later in the 
chapter. 
3. See appendices A through D for circuit diagrams and code.
4. Use, particularly, plays an important role in how things appear in perception. Heidegger identifies the use context as the primary 
ontological reality in ready-to-handedness: “that with which our every-day dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves…
[but] primarily the work… The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered.” Heidegger, 
Being and Time, 99.
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A second observation is that relata-based analysis is most effective when considering pairs of 
relata. The simplest way to characterise the properties and roles of relata is in contrast to one 
another – in a relation of scale, one relata is large and the other small; in a relation of speed, 
one is fast and the other slow; and so on. The ‘othering’ of things in this manner is one of the 
fundamental bases of relata. As Brian John Martine notes, “no determinate position of any kind 
can be marked out without an intelligible other.” For something to be what it is, there must 
be something which it is not – an ‘other’ by which to differentiate it. The structure of the other 
allows us to find “how things are different from one another while at the same time participating 
in a coherent whole.”5 This approach lends itself to dichotomisation. Describing the difference 
between relata is an effective way of qualifying their roles in the relation, and so the roles 
recognised for each relata tend towards extremities.6 
However, it is important to note here that any relatum’s pair is bound as much in sameness as 
it is in difference. For example, the positing of ‘black’ as the opposite of ‘white’ is only a useful 
differentiation because of the commonalities between the two. Saying instead that the opposite 
of white was green, or a potato, or an automobile (each of which are arguably more ‘different’ 
from white than black), is not a useful exercise as it does not allow us to understand what 
white is. A sensible opposition relies on a commonality between the two terms. Both white and 
black are the sum (and absence) of all colours depending on whether additive or subtractive 
colour systems are used. Importantly, their difference can only be understood because of this 
commonality. Black is chosen as an other to white because of what is already experienced of 
white. Although they are set up as reciprocal opposites, white is the term that has already taken 
ontological priority – black is defined only in terms of what it can help us understand about 
white. Black, as an other, becomes part of “the logical constitution” of white.7 
The sameness inherent in this relation of opposition is generally not made explicit. The relation 
between relata works in tension, as the relata oppose each other; but also in compression, as 
they are drawn together in commonality. The dichotomous pairings nested in screen ontology are 
important, then, not just in how the terms are held apart, but also their commonalities. Although 
the oppositions within these pairs of relata are interesting, these differences are, in many ways, 
pre-determined by how the opposition is constructed. What escapes these dichotomous relata is 
as useful in understanding the ontology of the screen as what is caught within them. 
5. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 22; 39.
6. What is hot is not-cold, what is large is not-small and so on. Martine uses the example of water and fire in this respect. He first 
establishes that at least one not-water is needed to clarify what water is, and then shows that this not-water has to have a 
character of its own that enters in to the constitution of water itself. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 43-49.
7. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 47.
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Fig 2. Opposition and Slippage 1.
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The purpose of this chapter, then, is not to perform a relata-based analysis or to pose dichotomies 
to describe the screen; but to find the slippage in those otherings and uses already posed. As 
discussed in the previous section, it is not the relation of use itself which is of interest, nor 
the differences between the dichotomous pairings of the screen, but how these are constructed. 
This section has established that the fundamental assumption of this type of analysis is the 
occurrence of relata as pre-existing pairs of entities that hold properties. These properties allow 
the relata to enter into a relation. By focusing on these relata, the relation that is established is 
a reflexive one, usually characterised by its impact on the relatum considered primary.8 In the 
case of the person—screen relation, the primary relatum is the person. This relation is in both 
tension and compression, and implicitly reveals the role the screen plays for us.
The figure of the written analysis begins with two points corresponding to relata. On the broadest 
level, these relata are a person and a screen. The diametric opposition of the termination points 
arises from the figuring of the points as fixed and separate to the relation – one relatum acts 
from one end of the axis toward the other, opposed by the force of the other. The properties of 
the relata are responsible for the strength and direction of the impact – from one relatum to 
the other. However, an incongruence is then presented, in that the properties of the relatum 
are already inherently relational. That is, before the opposition presents itself, a relation gives 
rise to their properties. To gain stronger access to the ontology of the screen, the opposition 
needs to be disturbed in order to reveal the assumptions of the relation. In the two-dimensional 
figure of the axis, this move amounts to a cut, an incomplete form of severance of each relata 
from their other. Care must be taken with this cut. The cut cannot sever the thing from relation 
entirely, or it will become present-at-hand, ceasing to be a relatum at all. The cut also cannot 
immerse the thing completely within the relation, or it will disappear from perception. But if the 
relatum begins to express itself as a function of the relation, there might be a discord produced; 
a slippage between the already-presumed relatum and the thing as it presents itself. 
The intent of this chapter is to perform such a cut. Discursively, this will be done by identifying 
the relata nested within the person-screen interaction and the relational assumptions that 
underlie them. I will perform, in this text, a series of logical ‘flips’ that occur while trying to keep 
hold of the screen-as-relatum. A set of created objects, the Behaviour Boxes, will also work within 
this discursive structure to provoke slippage in the relational assumptions. The cut performed 
in this way is intended to draw out aspects of screenic ontology.
8. In Martine’s example of water and fire, fire (as heat) is used to account for what makes water different, but also for its internal 
differences – heat is responsible for water’s phase transitions between solid, liquid and gas. This is how it impacts the primary 
relatum of water. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 45.
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Sides and bottom, of which the jug consists and by 
which it stands, are not really what does the holding. 
But if the holding is done by the jug’s void, then the 
potter who forms sides and bottom on his wheel 
does not, strictly speaking, make the jug. He only 
shapes the clay. No—he shapes the void. For it, in it, 
and out of it, he forms the clay into the form. From 
start to finish the potter takes hold of the impalpable 
void and brings it forth as the container in the shape 
of a containing vessel. 
Heidegger, The Thing9
Designing to cut
Design often means drawing links between the 
properties of the designed thing and the intended 
impacts, or the impacts made. The impact belongs 
to the thing. As a designer, I can use understandings 
like formal aesthetics, gestalt or semiotics to connect 
the things that I intend to the way that I make them. 
Perhaps I might use repeating vertical elements to 
make a ‘tall’ space. Perhaps I might create a forced 
perspective by tapering columns toward each other 
to exaggerate visual effect. I could then, quite reliably, 
say that anyone who walks into my tall space will 
have their eye drawn upward, experiencing ‘tallness’ 
in their own comparative smallness.
A designer makes a form makes an effect. The thing 
is a vehicle for the designer’s intended experience. 
A flat relation is established: from designer, though 
thing, to impact. This relation has a direction and a 
type. The designer creates an impact, and relates to 
the thing to inscribe their intent. In the act of analysis, 
the user relates to the thing to derive an impact. The 
thing, always in the middle, always related to.
Can design perform a cut between relata? Can 
it provoke or reveal slippage in these relational 
assumptions? The aim of such a design method 
would need to challenge links between aesthetic 
attributes and experiential outcomes. The causality of 
these links would need to be weakened. Behaviours 
and forms might be seen instead as provocateurs, 
drawing attention to the thing in interaction. The 
thing might become something not related to but 
something that relates.
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9. Martin Heidegger, “The Thing” in Poetry, Language and Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 167.
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How might such a thing be done? Could it steer 
away from the idea of use, of a thing for a purpose? 
Could it cut things up and remove them from their 
context,  holding the relata apart so far that they 
sever from one another? Could it cross-code the 
stacked dichotomies of the relata-based analysis to 
disrupt its structure? Could it latch on to the thing 
for itself, the thing expressing its own role in the 
relation? Could it design with a screen, rather than 
for a screen?
Relata that are opposed to one another at the same 
time as being connected. Two forces are at play: a 
force of opposition, which keeps the relata apart; 
and a force of attraction, which keeps the relata 
together. If a cut is performed, what will happen to 
the relata?  Will they be flung apart, overwhelmed 
by the force of opposition? Or will they gravitate 
towards and collapse into one another? At what 
point in this movement away or towards will the 
screen stop being a screen?
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Having established the parameters of the analysis and the aim of this chapter, this section will 
discuss two of the strongest dichotomies within discourse about screens. The most apparent 
relation between a person and a screen is that which concerns them directly as entities, 
discussed in terms of the subject and the object. There is also a wider context to this interaction 
that specifically relates to the screen’s abilities to modify spatial relations. Spatiality becomes 
particularly at issue within screen interactions. The second dichotomy discusses the presentation 
of this space in terms of the real and the virtual. 
The subject and the object 
I will begin by discussing the construction of the opposition between subject and object 
generally, before examining how this construction poses a problem for understanding the screen, 
introducing a split between the screen, as a universal; and the individual screen of experience. 
An appropriate first step is to identify how the subject and object are held apart in their relation. 
This relation is between a subject and an object that interact, so the properties of the relata 
determine the characteristics of this interaction. The subject and the object are defined, in this 
case, according to differences in the ways they can interact.
The difference between
The subject and the object are best considered in this context as a difference in the ability 
to act and, therefore, to form a relation of interaction. The inter-reliance of subjectivity and 
a capacity for intentful action have a strong establishment. Elizabeth Grosz, for example, 
discusses subjectivity as being reliant on the capacity for action in terms of “autonomy, agency, 
and freedom,” which she believes have been “the central terms by which subjectivity has been 
understood in the twentieth century and beyond.”10 Diana Coole likewise marks the role of action 
in phenomenology, citing Uexkull’s understanding of life as “the opening of a field of action,” and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s focus on embodiment being built on an understanding that the body 
“literally incarnates material capacities for agency.”11 Amy Allen cites Foucault and Arendt, 
similarly, as sharing “a central concern with the interrelationships among the concepts of 
power, subjectivity, and agency.” She remarks that “unfortunately, Foucault himself isn’t very 
DICHOTOMISING THE SCREEN
10. Elizabeth Grosz, “Feminism, Materialism, and Freedom” in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics ed. Dianna Coole and 
Samantha Frost (London: Duke University Press, 2010), 139.
11. Diana Coole, “Rethinking Agency: A Phenomenological Approach to embodiment and Agentic Capacities,” Political Studies 53 
(2005): 103; 101
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careful with the distinction between subjectivity and agency; he tends to use the two terms 
almost interchangeably.” Allen stresses the priority of the subject over agency, saying “it seems 
clear to me that subjectivity is a precondition for agency; after all, one cannot have the ability 
or capacity to act without having the ability or capacity to deliberate, that is, without being a 
thinking subject.”12 Whereas Grosz’s and Coole’s concerns lie primarily in displacing ideas of 
freedom and agency from the subject (which they achieve by taking a relation-based rather than 
relata-based analysis), Allen squarely states her position that agency, as the capacity to act, is 
an intentional construct. It belongs to the ‘thinking subject,’ which pre-exists any act. Intentful 
action, according to this form of analysis, belongs to the subject, not the object. Importing this 
understanding to an analysis of the screen, however, introduces a problem.
According to the parameters of relata-based analyses, the person as subject and the screen 
as object each act in opposition to the other. To begin with, this presents two directions of 
interaction: the object that affects the subject, and the subject that affects the object. Or, to stay 
true to form and describe these relations according to the primary relatum of the subject: the 
subject that is affected by the object, and the subject that affects the object. In order to maintain 
the separateness of the subject and the object, the object cannot be effective in its own regard. 
To maintain the integrity of the subject, the screen can only be used, it cannot exhibit its own 
agency.  However, the bounds of the analysis also require that both antagonistic impacts – the 
subject affected and effective – be acknowledged. This seems distinctly at odds with some types 
of screens, such as the television, which are often described as producers of space – that is, as 
effective in their own right. 
The problem of the effective screen
It seems at first as though these problems might be linked to the screen as a piece of technology. 
Similar problems arise in automated technologies as a whole, as these often constitute modes of 
production. The forms of agency exhibited by technologies were of some interest to Heidegger, 
who poses a kind of effectiveness for technology in The Question Concerning Technology. He 
addresses the problem of technological activity challenging the divide between the subject and 
object by de-individualising the potential activity of the object. I will now elaborate on how he 
approaches technology as a universal construct.
Heidegger outlines a role for technology as a system of showing the world, one whose effects are 
wide reaching; stating that “technology is no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing.” The 
12. Amy Allen, “Power, Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 10 
no.2 (2010): 132; 135.
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world, according to Heidegger, cannot reveal itself as it is because it is always already subject 
to an enframing, the assembling and ordering of things so as to be revealed in a particular 
way. Heidegger counters technology as a mode of revealing the world, to the mode of poesis, the 
revealing of things as they themselves are.13
The action of technology works separately to human intent, enframing the world to reveal it 
as standing-reserve – as raw material for use in technological processes. Heidegger regards 
the way that technology enframes the world as its essence, the true meaning of technology 
that endures through and underlies any particular instance of technology. The power of this 
enframing, and thus the agency of technology, lies in it being a priori to human activity, and 
thus to any encounter with a particular piece of technology. In this way it acts upon humanity, it 
“banishes man into that kind of revealing which is an ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, 
it drives out every other possibility of revealing.”14 The result is that non-technological ways of 
revealing are concealed and, because these alternatives are not immediately present, the role 
of technology as a particular mode of enframing is itself concealed. Technological enframing 
appears as the only mode of revealing. Heidegger thus presents the essence of technology as 
effective.15
Scale of effect
Heidegger’s description of technology is as a relatum that holds properties of an enframing 
relation. Heidegger makes his reasons for this clear: he is looking for the Wesen or ‘essence’ of 
technology, some part of technology that holds over time and over each occurrence of technology, 
though itself is not necessarily technological. However, his approach has a certain directionality. 
By looking for an essence of technology, Heidegger is describing a thing in terms of its relation 
using a certain scale – that of a person interacting with a technological world. Technology is 
active in this collective sense, so that the world is called forth for any person already enframed 
by technology’s essence, and technology is found within the world as a result. In this way, the 
technological essence avoids approaching any single piece of technology as having an individual 
agency. It is not a technological object that expresses agency, but a technological force.
13. Heidegger writes: “The revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold in a bringing-forth in the sense 
of poesis. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that 
it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.” Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, Trans. William Lovitt, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 12; 14.
14. Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology, 27.
15. Heidegger writes: “It seems time and time again as though technology were a means in the hands of man. But in truth, it is the 
coming to presence of man that is now being ordered forth to lend a hand in the coming to presence of technology.” Heidegger, 
Question Concerning Technology, 37.
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Heidegger contrasts his construction of technology to the instrumental view, which approaches 
technological interaction on the scale of a person interacting with a-piece-of technology. The 
term ‘instrumental’ describes a relation of use in which the subject affects the object, and 
the technological relatum is described according to its useful properties. These two views of 
technology address their relata on a different scale – the technological essence as universal and 
the instrumental as individual. The hazard that Heidegger identifies in the instrumental view 
is that, by concentrating on technology-as-instrument, technological enframing and its impacts 
are concealed: “so long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the 
will to master it. We press on past the essence of technology.”16 Essentially, if a generalisation 
is to be taken from the instrumental view so that something can be said about technology as 
a whole, the relatum of “technology” must be described according to properties generated in a 
relation with a-piece-of technology. The essence of technology as a whole, in this case, is derived 
from the sum of its parts; and these parts are unable to include an action on the person without 
abandoning the subject—object dichotomy. The description of technology that results from this 
conflation is neutral and does not, for Heidegger, address the essence of technology.
To be able to examine the relation in which the object can affect the subject and still maintain 
the separation of the subject and object, Heidegger approaches the object as a de-individualised 
force. Such an approach is disallowed by the instrumental view, which is considered inadequate 
as a result. However there is another potential hazard that might be identified in the conflation 
of the individual and universal, and this occurs in the opposite direction: in assuming that any 
single technological thing, as an instance of technology, carries the properties of a relation that 
is the essence of technology as a whole. Heidegger appears to warn against this in The Question 
Concerning Technology in the way he defines the essence that he seeks, saying “when we are 
seeking the essence of ‘tree’, we have to become aware that That which pervades every tree, as 
tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees.”17
If the enframing relation belonging to the essence of technology is taken as a property of the 
piece-of technology as relata, then each interaction with a technological thing becomes passive. 
In this case, the subject loses their ability to affect the object. The object, as relatum, holds the 
property of technological enframing, which is a priori to any possible interaction of the subject. 
By the time a person interacts with a-piece-of technology, technology has already caused them 
to be affected.
16. Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology, 32.
17. Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology, 4.
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To bring the discussion back to the person and screen as subject and object, a small gap can 
now be seen in the reciprocity of the relata axis. Although the ‘object’ in each case holds the 
same (often ill-defined) referent, the properties of this relatum are drawn from a different kind 
of relation – from a relation to a universal on the one hand and to an individual artefact on 
the other. The relation does not present itself as a closed loop, but as an open one. Because the 
relata per se hold the qualities of these relations as properties, there are two distinct roles to 
consider for the screen: a role where the person is affected by the collective ‘screen’, the subject 
affected, and a role where a person affects an individual screen, the subject that affects. I will 
now consider how these two points are constructed in screenic discourse.
The subject affected
When considering the screen in terms of the subject that is affected, the screen begins to take 
on distinctly nonmaterial properties. Rather than holding material properties related to its use 
by the human body as previously discussed (small, mobile, fast, etc.), the screen is found to be 
a type of force that acts on the embodied and/or social being of the subject, thus affecting their 
subjectivity.
Katherine Hayles begins to outline such an effect by considering a role for technology in identity. 
In the prologue to How We Became Posthuman, Hayles uses the Turing test as a demonstration 
of subjectivity being challenged by screen technologies. She maintains that the challenge does 
not reside in the making of a machine that thinks (and thereby must be regarded as a subject), 
but in the intertwining of the computer screen and human subject. This intertwining happens in 
two forms: for the viewer, the person attempting to determine whether their opponent is woman, 
man or machine, who has accepted that the screen might be human despite its separation from 
embodied form; and for the opponent behind the computer, who becomes an overlay of embodied 
and represented forms mediated through the screen. Hayles comments that the Turing test 
“made the crucial move of distinguishing between the enacted body, present in the flesh on one 
side of the computer screen, and the represented body, produced through the verbal and semiotic 
markers constituting it in an electronic environment.” She asserts that “[t]his construction 
necessarily makes the subject into a cyborg, for the enacted and represented bodies are brought 
into conjunction through the technology that connects them.”18 
18. N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), xiii.
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Free acts come from or even through us (it is not clear 
if it matters where the impetus of the act originates 
– what matters is how it is retroactively integrated 
into the subject’s history and continuity)… free acts, 
having been undertaken, are those which transform 
us, which we can incorporate into our becomings in 




The Pitchmatcher acts as I act, it talks as I talk. Am I 
talking to it or talking through it? Am I thinking with 
the Pitchmatcher towards an absent social other, or 
am I thinking at the Pitchmatcher as that other?
The Pitchmatcher’s voice overlays mine. It mimics 
me like a parrot. Could I rely on this to communicate 
with others? Is there enough information in the tonal 
variation that someone might make sense of me 
through the Pitchmatcher? Could I merge with this 
device to screen myself from others? Perhaps.
Or, if I speak quickly enough, take long enough 
pauses, the Pitchmatcher and I could almost have 
a conversation. Is there enough slippage in the 
tonal analysis to make a meaningful difference 
between what I say to it and what it says to me? To 
make meaning of the communication between us? 
Perhaps.
But if I refuse to interrupt my 
speech patterns, If I stay myself 
as I am, the experience of using 
the Pitchmatcher is frustrating. 
It’s constantly interrupting me, an 
impudent debater more intent on 
getting its airtime than developing 
its argument. 
The Pitchmatcher is acting on me rather than with 
me, It’s trying to screen my ability to impact space 
and communicate with my human others. It wants 
me to stop talking. I’m not talking through it, and I’m 













The role of the screen in this fundamental change of the subject is a mediatory one that affects 
identity, so that “the overlay between the enacted and the represented bodies is … mediated by 
a technology that ... can no longer meaningfully be separated from the human subject.”20 
The social screen
Hayles thus sets out an othering of the person and the screen, reinforcing the ability of the 
screen to influence human identity, and thereby subjectivity, through dislocating the ‘subject’ 
and ‘body’. The role of the screen in this example is as a mediator, a surface onto which a person 
is represented in order to interact with others. Such a role strongly echoes Lacan’s model of the 
screen in psychoanalysis.21 Echoes of Lacanian mappings of the subject can be seen throughout 
screen and media studies. For example, Tim Dant and Amelia Jones present similar roles for 
particular screens. Tim Dant’s Television and the Moral Imaginary refers to the television 
screen as a repository for possible social interactions, the site of moral development in which 
possibilities for being can be recognised against the images of other people and their actions. 
This moral role is fulfilled even “before it is switched on.”22 Amelia Jones’ discussion of televisual 
flesh in Self/Image: Technology, representation, and the contemporary subject understands the 
screen “as a deep site of interchange where self and other recognise their profound reciprocity 
and even simultaneity… who take on constantly mutating shapes and meanings.”23
Jones aligns the screen’s ability to influence subjectivity with similar issues of fidelity in 
mimicking the body as a sign of the self, citing a series of works in which the screen itself is 
itself corporeally challenged. She writes of Paul McCarthy’s Press (1972), for example, that the 
screen “refuses to allow McCarthy to escape, and thus to some extent seems to divide him from 
us.” As the artist makes a single surface of his skin against the image, though, the screen “also 
embodies McCarthy as we experience him obnoxiously and somewhat threateningly forcing 
himself into ‘our’ space.” Works that specifically address the screen in this way draw attention 
to its mediatory role in “marking intersubjectivity and identification as complex processes.”24
19. Grosz, “Feminism, Materialism, and Freedom,” 146.
20. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, xiii.
21. Lacan uses the word ‘screen’ to describe the process of meeting the gaze of the other. In Lacan’s model, the screen is a conceptual 
surface against which a person maps themselves for presentation to the other, in anticipation of the other’s gaze. In doing so, a 
person splits their being between representation and expectation. They receive from the other “a mask, a double… a thrown-off 
skin, thrown off in order to cover the frame of a shield.” Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, trans. 
Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 107. Although Lacan’s use of the term screen is clearly analogous, the screen as a 
medium has been considered as a mediator of social relations in a similar way. Screens are a means of access to others, and they 
become implicated in the way that self and other are constructed. 
22. Tim Dant, Television and the Moral Imaginary: Society through the Small Screen (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 127.
23. Amelia Jones, Self/Image: Technology, representation, and the contemporary subject (London: Routledge, 2006), 141.
24. Jones, Self/Image, 135; 140.
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In following the relata-based analysis, the next step is to identify the properties of the screen 
relatum that allow it to affect subjectivity in these ways – as a site for the transmission of mores 
and exchange of identities. These properties will belong to screenness as a whole, to the essence 
of the screen. For this reason, Lucas Introna and Fernando Ilharco’s classical phenomenological 
approach to the screen in their articles The Ontological Screening of Contemporary Life: 
A Phenomenological Analysis of Screens (2004) and On the Meaning of Screens: Toward a 
Phenomenological Account of Screenness (2006) can contextualise these abilities.
A screenic essence 
Introna and Ilharco see the ontology of the screen as directly tied to its ability to present 
information. Their focus is not on individual engagements with screens, but on that which 
“enables us to identify each and all particular appearances of screens as ‘screens’ in the first 
place.” Introna and Ilharco assert that screens are perpetually called to attention as presenting 
information that is always already presumed relevant, and hold that the screen’s “central intent 
is a demand or a call for attention”; in that it presents, or more particularly makes present, 
relevant information.25 This relevance, however, does not belong to the content of the screen 
necessarily, but to the screen itself in its use. They propose that the screen is “already implicated” 
in the act of screening – an act that implies that what arrives in individual experience will be 
“relevant for us at that particular time is happening.”26 
The pre-existent condition of screening as a process of finding relevance implies the relevance 
of the content presented by the screen. That is, the screen’s involvement in the always already 
presumed world of screening gives it its qualities as a thing. Introna and Ilharco remark that 
“because the content in front of us always shows up within our involvement… it is already 
presumed relevant, as deserving our attention. This aspect is crucial. The content in front of us 
is not just presumed relevant, but is already presumed relevant.” The meaning of the screen is 
thus described as “holding our attention and framing relevance,” a meaning that is not given 
to the specifics of the content, but to the presentation of “an already screened world… which is 
already consistent with our ongoing involvement in that world.”27 For Introna and Ilharco, it is 
the ability of the screen to frame relevance that allows it to influence people.
25. Lucas D. Introna and Fernando M. Ilharco, “On the Meaning of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of Screenness,” 
Human Studies 29 (2006): 61-2. Lucas D. Introna and Fernando M. Ilharco, “The Ontological Screening of Contemporary Life: A 
Phenomenological Analysis of Screens,” European Journal of Information Systems 13, no. 3 (September 2004): 8.
26. Introna and Ilharco, “On the Meaning of Screens,” 63.
27. Introna and Ilharco, “On the Meaning of Screens,” 64-66.
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Dant presents a similar argument in connecting the movement of the image and its synchronised 
sound to the ability of the television to hold attention. Like Introna and Ilharco, Dant draws 
attention to the presentation of information, but highlights the temporal as well as geographic 
aspects of making present. He uses the term “continuous present” to describe a sense of 
becoming that attracts human attention. Participation in the spatial image is dependent on this 
synchronicity and fidelity, and in turn allows the moral imaginary to develop. The disappearance 
of the screen object is crucial to this procedure, as it allows the “embodied and material process 
of watching” to be forgotten. Without this immersion, a critical and moral distance is maintained 
that weakens the ability to transmit mores.28 For Dant, it is the television’s ability to perceptually 
disappear that allows it to impact the subject.
Material?
The screen, in each of these analyses, is shown to be a powerful entity that has enormous 
potential to affect subjectivity. However, when describing the properties of the screen that 
arise in considerations of this kind, the screen-as-object dissipates into a kind of force. That is, 
although the analysis asks for properties to be responsible for the effects of the screen, these 
properties cannot be described without individuating the encounter. As a general relatum, the 
screen becomes a mediator, a repository, something that demands attention; but these qualities 
cannot be linked to its material form. Although these descriptions take a tentative step towards 
describing the screen as active, they do so in the sense of a container. The effect that was initially 
described as belonging to the collective of the screen is instead given to something else – the 
image that holds attention, or the people behind that image; as the institution of broadcast, or 
the artist pushing out of the television. The screen is seen as something that shapes, but that 
has no shape or content of its own. The activity of the screen, in each of these cases, is not an 
outcome of its materiality or design, but of a wider social value.
In many ways, the perceptual disappearance of the screen is to be expected from the assumptions 
made in regard to the effectual relation. The screen which effects is not an individual object, as 
its appearance as such would suggest a challenge to the subject—object dichotomy. But this also 
poses a problem for the analysis – if the screen is not present in perception, and has no content 
or effect of its own, how is it a relatum? A stronger understanding of how such a perceptual 
disappearance can occur might help define the screen as relatum at this scale. In this regard, I 
refer to Don Ihde’s ideas of technological mediation.




Don Ihde’s discussion of technology in Technology and the Lifeworld addresses perceptual 
disappearance by putting forward a set of mechanisms by which technologies intervene in 
the relation of intentionality between human and world. Ihde’s work has been described as 
postphenomenological, in that it attempts to use phenomenological concepts such as embodiment 
and the lifeworld, while at the same time keeping hold of the materiality of technology. The aim 
in so doing, as discussed by Ihde’s contemporary Verbeek, is to avoid an understanding of the 
phenomenology of technology that relies solely on its conditions of possibility.29 That is, Ihde 
and Verbeek wish to address technology within interaction, rather than attempting to find its 
transcendental essence.
Ihde puts forth four categories of relations between humans and technologies – background, 
embodiment, hermeneutic and alterity relations.30 In each of these relations, a technology 
intervenes in perception, which Ihde describes using the relation of I—world, in a different 
way. Background relations are defined through their lack of direct encounter between person 
and object, figured as I—world(-technology). In this regard, the technology mediates context 
without being recognised itself.  Embodiment, hermeneutic and alterity relations involve 
different positioning of the technology within an encounter. Embodiment relations describe a 
subsumption of the technology into the body schema, as with a pair of glasses. Ihde figures these 
relations as (I-technology)—world, because the person and technology form a single relational 
entity. Hermeneutic relations conflate the technology with the world, as in reading a scientific 
instrument. Ihde figures these relation as I—(technology-world). Alterity relations address 
technology as an ‘other’, as the object of perception. These relations Ihde figures as I—technology 
(-world); as the technology is not acted through or with, but on.
Ihde’s framework is initially able to maintain the subject—object dichotomy, which is then 
‘breached’ by the formation of the two into a relational pair. The experience that Ihde describes 
is subject-bound. In each case, ‘I’ am related to the world and to technology in a different 
configuration, and these remain the objects of my encounter. But Ihde decentralises the subject 
by describing two relation where a new entity, a relational pair, is formed. In the case of 
hermeneutic relations, this new entity is the technological world. For the purposes of this thesis, 
this encounter may occur between a person and a screen-world, where the screen represents a 
body that can be ‘read’ as being perceptually present. This kind of relation might explain the 
29. See Peter-Paul Verbeek, What Things Do, trans. Robert P Crease. (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005).
30. See Don Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 72-111. 
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disappearance of the screen into the space it represents. In the case of embodiment relations, the 
new entity is a technological self or screen-self. Such relations might describe the use of screens 
to achieve aims or access spaces.
It is worth noting that Ihde’s understanding of technology is somewhat broader than Heidegger’s, 
and includes non-automated technologies such as tools. Such a definition would include lattices 
within the ‘technology’ of the screen. The role of the technology in Ihde’s analysis is essentially 
mediatory: aspects of objects seem to be measured against a non-compositional ‘baseline’, 
presupposing a person with a set of agencies, and an object that interferes, negatively, positively 
or otherwise, within that set of agencies. Ihde has described two ways in which the object can 
disappear as perceptual focus – into the body and into the world. These are differentiated from a 
scenario where the object never appears in perception (background technologies), and a scenario 
in which the object does not disappear but remains as a perceptual other (alterity relations). 
A screen-world
Following Ihde’s framework, it could be said that the screen disappears within perception because 
its properties, which characterise it as a relatum, belong not to a screen but to a screen-world. 
The relation between a person and the screen-world ensures that the screen-world appears 
as relatum, rather than the screen itself. It is not just that the object is no longer the focus of 
attention – that the screen becomes ready-to-hand in some way – but that it fails to hold any 
relational properties of its own. The relation of effect that would allow these properties to belong 
to the screen also moves to some other entity. 
Perhaps the most extreme example of this shift of effect is Debord’s  Society of the Spectacle, as 
it moves through the disappearance of the screen to a point where even the image disappears. 
Debord proposes a society for which the world itself has become an image – not in the sense of 
a collection of individual images, but as “a social relation among people, mediated by images.”31 
Here Debord outlines a role for the image as a tool for maintaining socioeconomic relations. 
These relations, he holds, generate the technology of the ‘spectacle’, which is established at a 
mass scale as an instrument of power. Any instance of the image, or an object that holds it, is 
simply a support for spectacle; such that “lived reality is materially invaded by the contemplation 
of the spectacle whilst simultaneously absorbing the spectacular order… reality rises up within 
the spectacle, and the spectacle is real.”32
31. Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Detroit: Black & Red, 1977), 4.
32. Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 8.
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Two positions are shown here. As a collective subjectivity interacting with the world of the 
spectacle, Debord’s account is socially determinist – technologies are instruments of social power 
systems. However, as the individual approaches the spectacle, the spectacle becomes enframing, 
it “subjugates living men to itself.” The slippage between the collective and individual within the 
subject-object relation is made particularly clear here: the spectacle (as a collection of images) is 
not neutral, it actively works against ‘men’; however it does so because of a socioeconomic power. 
The world is thus recognised as both technologically determined (as individual people interact 
with a technological world) and socially determined (as technological strategies are employed by 
a socioeconomic system). Debord resolves this contradiction by conflating the technology of the 
spectacle with the social forces that maintain it, saying that “the spectacle is nothing other than 
the sense of the total practice of a social-economic formation,” and that the subjugation enacted 
by spectacle towards men happens only to the extent that “the economy has totally subjugated 
them.”33  
The role of the screen in this process is barely its own. The spectacle subjugates, but is in turn 
subjugated. The structure of the analysis does not allow any individual instance – of image or 
screen – to hold effect, and so these entities cannot hold the properties of this effectual relation 
as relata. If the image is dissolved by a “social-economic formulation,” then the material that 
image is presented on must also dissolve. Materiality is compromised, being replaced instead by 
a system in which “simple images… become real beings.”34
It is in the sense of disappearance that the screen-as-relatum is only understandable as a 
support or mediator; a container. However, the act of disappearing implies that the screen is 
revealed perceptually, that the screen has aspects that escape disappearance. It has, at the 
least, something which is able to disappear in this way. Holding on to this excess might reveal 
what it is that disappears. 
33. Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 11-16.
34. Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 18.
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It disappears. Is it that it was here, and then it wasn’t; 
or was it just not? Can its absence be made present?
The thing that refuses to 
disappear
There are traces of what’s left behind. Ameri’s 
shameful blank surface of the cinema screen, 
made beautiful and menacing in Hiroshi Sugimoto’s 
photographs.35 McCarthy’s televisions, sitting proudly 
in homes, decorated like shrines with flowers and 
cloths (or else, perhaps, hidden in a cabinet).36 What 
do these actions of homage to the television signify 
– is it an indication of a social relation between the 
person and object?  
The uncanny screen, drawing attention to itself in its 
‘off’ state, stubbornly refusing its use. Do all screens 
resist in this way? The barrier of the room divider, 
if I pound at it trying to get in (or out), stands firm 
consistently with its use. It expresses itself through 
its use, and only disappears when I try to get around 
it by thinking through it, denying it. It is only if I 
succeed in breaking it that its ‘off’ state occurs, when 
I become aware that the divider wasn’t the only 
thing stopping me. I’m still not allowed in (or out), 
the barrier was something immaterial all along, and I 
still have to cross it.
The screen resists disappearance when it expresses 
itself, its role in the relation. Perhaps this is in 
supporting this relation even when I don’t want it to 
(a barrier is a barrier whether I’m on the inside or the 
outside of it). Or perhaps it is in refusing to support 
the relation (a blank cinema screen is stubbornly 
material). Either way, it remains in place despite me.
A screen expressing its role expresses a kind of 
alterity along with it. In its resistance to being used 
(specifically, used by me), the screen becomes an 
‘other’. But more than just the focus of perception, it 
becomes something resistant, something stubborn, 
something expressing itself and acting on its own 
behalf. It is there, when before it wasn’t.
73
35. Ameri describes attempts to hide the cinema screen behind curtains as serving “primarily ritual and ideational” purposes. The 
screen was considered “unsightly” when nothing was being projected onto it, as it reminded cinema-goers of the transgressions 
of space it would enact. Amir Ameri, “Imaginary Placements: The Other Space of Cinema” Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism 
69, no.1 (Winter 2011): 87.Hiroshi Sugimoto’s photographs are discussed in Anne Friedberg, The Virtual Window: From Alberti to 
Microsoft (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 150. 
36. McCarthy counters the philosophical focus on the television as spreading “placelessness,” which she states “makes us forget that 
television is an object and, like all objects, it shapes its immediate space through its material form.” McCarthy suggests a series 
of very place-bound relations in which the television is treated as a material object that expresses human social values and holds 
meaning. This ‘placed’ television is found through “bothering to think about the very basic and barely noticeable physical form of 
television.” Anna McCarthy, “From Screen to Site: Television’s Material Culture, and Its Place,” October 98 (Fall 2001): 96-7.
37. Common images of the ‘couch potato’, an escapist viewer, surround the television; the suburban window evokes images of nosy 
neighbours peering through curtains; whereas the smartphone carries with it images of public isolation as train passengers or 
dinner guests excuse themselves from their current temporality. In each of these cases the form of the screen is related to a type 
of interaction.
38. James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2015), 119. Originally published 
1986.
The subject that affects
If the screen is considered in terms of the subject that affects, different sets of screenic 
properties become available. Screens are often associated with specific uses, systems and modes 
of interaction.37 The screen, in each of these cases, holds forms and behaviours that ‘allow’ these 
relations. That is, the screen is defined as ‘that which allows a person to…’. To contextualise this 
statement in terms of Ihde’s categories of relation, the screen introduces a change of personal 
abilities by being absorbed into the body schema. Such embodiment relations mean that the 
screen can be used to achieve tasks that cannot be achieved without it, such as accessing new 
forms of space or information. To determine the screen as relatum in this scenario means 
assigning properties that allow a person to affect the world through the screen. That is, the 
screen in this sense will hold certain properties that allow people to undertake certain actions 
and effects. I will briefly discuss the framework of affordances as a way of tying object properties 
to the ability of the subject to affect, before demonstrating that this approach poses problems 
when attempting to generalise from the individual encounter.
Affordances
The framework of ‘affordance’ relies on the parameters of a relata-based analysis to connect 
distinct properties of an object to particular reactions, behaviours and understandings in 
a subject. James Gibson, in his founding of the term, describes affordances as an ecological 
phenomenon, stating that “the affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, 
what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.”38 He goes on to describe a horizontal, flat, 
extended and rigid surface that would, by virtue of these properties, afford an animal support; 
taking care to note that such physical properties must be measured relative to the animal – 
in other words, as the properties of a relatum. The suffix used by Gibson to describe such a 
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relatum is ‘-able’. The same surface might by “climb-on-able” or “fall-off-able” or “bump-into-
able”depending on the intent of the animal.39 Gibson thus outlines a strong link between the 
properties of the relatum and the relation, though hold that this relation is driven by the intent 
of the animal toward its environment. In each case, the present-at-hand observations of the 
surface remain the same but the properties of the relatum change, driven by a change in the 
relation between the surface and the body. The theory is not limited to environmental features, 
but can also encompass objects, other animals and people.
Gibson sets out some observations in regards to the affordances of objects. Firstly, he states 
that objects must have a similar size to the animal to be able to afford behaviour. Graspable 
objects must have a size and form factor that can be accommodated by the hand. Graspability, 
elongation and weight, states Gibson, afford wielding as an “extension of the arm.” Graspability, 
compactness and weight, instead, afford throwing. Graspability, elongation and flexibility, by 
contrast, afford joining such as knitting or weaving.40 Importantly, affordances rely more on 
vision than tactility: it is more important whether an affordance be recognised or perceived, 
as this allows the intent of the animal to be fulfilled or not. That is, the object has to be able to 
express itself in a way that makes its role in any potential relation clear.
The affordance framework is particularly useful to design, as it accommodates a predictability 
of effect based on design decisions; a determined connection between what things look like and 
do on the one hand and how they are understood and used on the other. This allows a qualifiable 
connection of design intent to design outcome. Affordances have been pursued in the fields of 
architecture and design.41 Don Norman popularised the idea in the field of interface design, where 
affordance is interpreted as a method to instil an object with the ability to communicate its own 
use. The aim is to make the resulting object ‘intuitive’, in that it leverages already developed 
behaviours, gestures and understanding to make its operation as easy to learn as possible. 
Norman reflected on his approach later by narrowing his scope to “perceived affordances,” where 
the emphasis is not on what the object allows by virtue of its materiality or physical form, but 
on what the “user” perceives as a “meaningful, useful action.”42 
39. Gibson, Ecological Approach, 120
40. Gibson, Ecological Approach, 125
41. See, for example, Jonathan R. A. Maier, Georges M. Fadel and Dina G. Battisto, “An affordance-based approach to architectural 
theory, design, and practice,” Design Studies 30 (2009): 393-414; and Ioannis Xenakis and Argyris Arnellos, “The relation between 
interaction aesthetics and affordances,” Design Studies 34 (2013): 57-73.
42. Don Norman, “Affordances and Design,” accessed August 10, 2017, http://www.jnd.org/dn.mss/affordances_and.html.
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“I now suggest that what we perceive when we look 
at objects are their affordances… what the object 
affords us is what we normally pay attention to.” 
James J. Gibson43
“It seems necessary and impossible to rewrite the 
default grammar of agency, a grammar that assigns 
activity to people and passivity to things” 
Jane Bennett44
Mover: The unreliable object
Objects are ‘for’ things, and they communicate this 
use to me as an affordance. An object is reliable, it 
has a static materiality and a set of uses, which I may 
pick from according to the problems that arise in my 
perception. When new problems arise, and they are 
solved with an object I know, my idea of the object 
is updated to include this new solution. The object is 
additively overwritten like a text file – 1.0: this screen 
is for calling people. 1.1: this screen is for playing 
games and calling people. 1.2: this screen is for 
making video and playing games and calling people.
I watch the mover move. It tells me it’s going to move 
forward, and it moves forward. It tells me it’s going 
to move back, and it moves back. I think about what 
I could do with it. It’s small and covers a fair amount 
of territory, maybe it could clean the floor with a 
few modifications. But then it gets it wrong – it tells 
me it’s going forward, but it actually goes back, very 
quickly. It bangs into the wall, or zooms out the door. 
Can an object refuse? If I try to make video on my 
screen, and my screen won’t allow me to (this time), 
does it afford video-making? I’ve made videos with 
it before. The manual tells me that its software, 
hardware and interface have the capability to make 
video. But I can’t make video with it now. And if I 
can’t, the object isn’t able to either. 
What is afforded by the unreliable object? What do I 




It is clear that the affordance framework has a strong tie to the use relation, and to the subject 
recognising opportunities for action with, or through, the object. How effective the theory is as 
a predictor, however, rather than a descriptor, is somewhat unclear. Gibson’s original examples 
clearly already have the use value of particular items in mind when describing their properties. 
Norman’s description likewise relies on leveraging connections between appearance and use 
value that are assumed to be already known. 
Daniel Black offers comments on such assumptions underlying the affordance framework. In 
discussing the relations between people and ‘artefacts’ across tools, machines and ICT, he cites 
early examples in engineering which struggled with the integration of the human body and the 
machinic. Edison’s phonograph, which “toyed with the idea of providing the machine with a 
voice chamber modelled on the human mouth,” and Knauss’s early writing automatons, which 
eventually led to the invention of the typewriter, suggest an “initial vagueness” about how the 
body and machine should integrate.45 Black sees this exploration continue in the development 
of contemporary screen-based technology, particularly in the development of haptic feedback 
systems and the ‘natural user interface’, which attempts to create ICT devices that specifically 
work within embodied human action. 
Black frames the differences between a tool, machine and interface in terms of “the degrees 
of agency and attention associated with their productive occurrence.”46 This agency, for Black, 
belongs to the realm of the human subject. He maintains that differences between the three 
interactions come from a difference in intention and conscious direction, saying that activities 
such as operating a smartphone require a substantial amount of both. The natural user interface 
is then positioned as working against this in assuming that this ability has arisen from the 
“innate, evolved abilities” of human bodies. The NUI field is interested in making ICT devices 
that are more quickly embedded into the body schema by specifically emulating and perpetuating 
the body as it interacts.47 Robert Rosenberger demonstrates such an approach when he poses 
the use of “abstract relational strategies” as a tool for approaching (and developing) interfaces.48 
Although Rosenberger acknowledges these strategies as learnt rather than innate, such an 
43. Gibson, Ecological Approach, 134
44. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 119.
45. Daniel Black, “Where Bodies End and Artefacts Begin: Tools, Machines and Interfaces” in Body & Society 20 (2014): 32.
46. Black, “Where Bodies End,” 37.
47. Black, “Where Bodies End,” 45.




approach allows a transference of understandings and bodily behaviours developed in using 
one device for a particular purpose to another device used for another purpose.The implications 
given for recognising such strategies as relevant include a shift in design strategy – away from 
interfaces that are assumed to be ‘intuitive’ and towards the acknowledgement and ‘exploitation’ 
of the strategies already recognised in the user group.
However, by fixing certain relations, which may then become defunct, Black asserts that “the 
NUI becomes something ‘given’ by the machine to a body.” The problem with this approach 
arises because “there is no natural, originary dimension to these things that arises purely from 
within human bodies in isolation,” rather these abilities arise from “the interaction of our bodies 
and material features of our environment.”49 
Black argues against the naturalisation of embodied human behaviours, saying that gesture 
arises from the relation between the body and the material. In the first instance, he maintains 
intentionality as a natural agency belonging to the human subject. When a challenge is raised 
to this construction in the form of a machine that ‘gives’ behaviours to the subject, it is argued 
against as being antagonistic to the subject, as restricting the generative freedom of human 
gesture. Thus, although specific gestures should be free to develop within the body-material 
world relation, the process of developing them should itself remain fixed within individual 
human intentionality. That is, Black maintains that the subject should control their individual 
encounter with the screenic device, not the device. Once observations of how people interact 
with devices are codified into the design of future devices, they no longer allow the subject 
this freedom. It is important to the relata-based analysis that, although the objects in question 
suggest certain behaviours and understandings, they do not force them. The subject alone 
chooses whether to use the object and to what end.
Expression and choice
The object, within this paradigm, expresses its potential for use, which the subject then chooses 
to take up. Affordance theory considers subject—object relations primarily in terms of use as 
this is the relation that allows subject primacy within this paradigm. In expressing its potential 
for use, the object materially expresses its role in the subject—object relation. It is in this sense 
that it affords certain uses, by calling them to the subject’s perception. In regards to the ontology 
of the screen, then, the emergence of an object as a screen relies on the thing affording ‘screenic’ 
uses. In the sense that presentation as such is linked to the material properties of the object, 
there must be aspects of the form and behaviour of the material object that suggest ‘screenness’.
49. Black, “Where Bodies End,” 50; 56.
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This lattice belongs to the architectural envelope; a 
large, planar, punctured wall. I didn’t put it there. 
It is fixed, I can’t move it without destroying the 
enclosure, it doesn’t respond to me. It is always 
there, it will probably outlast me. It forms part of 
my enclosure. I see it is made of apertures, repeated 
over the surface. When I look through it, I see a 
space like mine, things like mine, people like mine; 
all happening at the same time as mine. I can see this 
space, hear it, smell it.
I threw out my old CRT the other day, and got a big, 
flat-screen tele that sits on a bench in the corner. The 
television is still smaller than the lattice, less planar. It 
can be moved, with some effort I can push it around 
or pick it up. It is separated from the enclosure, it is 
enclosed with me. It is solid in a sense, I can’t see 
‘through’ it, there are no apertures. Instead, I turn 
it on and off when I want to. When it’s on, I see a 
space like mine, I hear it. But I can’t interact with it, it 
happens without me.
I pick up my new phone instead, I had to throw the 
old one out because it was too old. It is yet smaller 
than the television, it usually sits next to me on the 
couch but I carry it with me when I leave the room. I 
barely ever turn it off. It is manipulable. It responds 
to my commands and I can use it to interact, to vote 
on the show I’m watching. It is enclosed by me. The 
space I see through it isn’t so much like mine, it is 
mostly text and still images. I can still see it and hear 
it, I can touch the screen, but its composition isn’t 
the same, it has a different architecture.
A matrix of screenic 
properties and impacts
If I wanted to connect the properties of screens to 
their impacts, I would need to make a comparative 
study, to consider different screens and how my 
experience of them changes. I might begin to 
categorise these changes, perhaps considering the 
form of the object, its behaviour in screening, my 
perception of it, the actions I can perform. I could 
then assemble these changes into a matrix to line 
them up, to draw connections between the changes. 
This would show a correlation, imply a causation, 
demonstrate an affordance.
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In order to find what these are, links would need to be drawn between the form and behaviour 
of screens, and their uses, intended or otherwise. Were the project of affordance to be pursued in 
regards to the screen, it would be possible to compile a matrix of the physical properties of screens 
and their corresponding effects on ‘perceivability’ of impact. Such a list might consider properties 
such as scale, form factor, longevity, context, temporality and fidelity; and correlate these to 
uses such as enclosure, mobility, separation, manipulability, graspability. Any consideration of 
what the screen ‘is’, then, would be generalised from this understanding of its individual forms. 
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I could draw a number of conclusions from such a 
matrix. I notice that the changes in physical form 
and my actions on screens happen in the same 
place. Perhaps these physical forms afford these 
actions – that large, planar screens do not afford 
graspability, that small, three-dimensional screens 
are manipulable and graspable. Likewise, I could say 
that the ability of the television to represent space 
affords its perception as a portal. Or else I could nest 
these into more complex affordances:
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The scale of a screen is inherently bound in a 
comparison to the body. A screen that is much larger 
than the body affords a sense of enclosure or barrier. 
It becomes part of the ‘environment’ in the sense 
that it isn’t easily acted upon. A screen that is similar 
in scale to the size of the hand, however, affords 
grasping and manipulation by means of being able to 
be picked up. Such a screen is more likely to become 
an extension of the body as it can be used in an tool-
like way toward the world.
The ability of the television to turn on and off affords 
an interruption of the continuity of space and time. 
As temporality is intrinsically bound in spatiality, the 
introduced space is perceived as an ‘elsewhere’ and 
the screen as a portal to this space.
Could I then use these statements to design screens 
that did things, specific things, to the perceptions 




The expression of the ‘for’ in these object properties relies on the screen as an ontological entity 
being somehow constitutive of its parts, of each individual example of a screen’s materiality. A 
problem is presented here: the stronger the generalisation, the more difficult it is to retain the 
materiality of the object and the agency of the subject; and thus to retain the distinct sense of 
the object affected by the subject. 
For example, screens are commonly discussed as boundaries to be transgressed. Jacqueline Jung 
notes that the materiality of the choir screen is pivotal to its ritualistic impact. She cites the 
screen’s opacity and depth as responsible for defining two separate spaces and a boundary that 
“is to be crossed.”50 To use the language of affordances, the screen appears because an opaque 
and deep structure separates space and affords transgression. The ontological importance of 
screens as barriers and boundaries is more readily apparent in architectural screens such as 
the lattice, but other types of screens show similar affordances. Friedberg notes Romashyn’s 
treatment of the window as “a boundary between the perceiver and the perceived.”51 Here it 
is the window’s visual transparency and material rigidity, that create a boundary. She also 
notes Cavell’s treatment of the cinema screen as a barrier to the world – here the temporal 
misalignment of the two spaces renders the viewer invisible to the world beyond. The idea of 
the barrier is entrenched in film theory; the act of transgressing the boundary of the screen by 
talking to the audience is codified by the term ‘breaking the fourth wall’. 
In this case, the properties of the material object become important only in their construction 
of the boundary, and it is clear that this boundary can be created using a myriad of physical 
properties. For the choir screen, these are opacity and depth; for the window transparency and 
rigidity. The condition of ‘boundary’ provokes the affordance of transgressing. In considering 
the screen in this way, the screen-as-object disappears again; present only as a condition, the 
boundary of a space. The role of the screen is to mark this space, to be apparent as a barrier that 
dissipates in the act of crossing. It is only with a small focus on an object or group of objects with 
a strong sense of cohesiveness that relata properties can be linked to effects. That is, affordances 
rely on individual encounter. Even then, this is not an exclusive domain – other properties 
may be linked to the same effects, and other effects to those properties. Moreover, because this 
interaction occurs on an individual scale, any generalisation of the properties discovered begin 
to displace the effect from the screen. 
50. Jacqueline Jung, “Beyond the Barrier: The Unifying Role of the Choir Screen in Gothic Churches,” The Art Bulletin 82, No. 4 (Dec., 
2000): 631. 
51. Friedberg, The Virtual Window, 16.
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In the analysis of hermeneutic mediation, it became 
clear that the transformation of perception possesses 
a specific structure, which consists of amplification 
and reduction… A similar  structure can be discerned 
in the translation of action: artifacts invite particular 





Am I an active subject, presiding over passive 
objects?  Or does the object preside over me as well? 
Can it only afford, or can it assert?
Perhaps, instead of affording mobility, the phone 
suggests mobility. Perhaps it is not just that I can pick 
it up, but that I’m invited to pick it up.  Perhaps I’m 
even persuaded, or forced. I might find myself holding 
my phone out of habit, without any intentional 
action toward it. Why did I pick up the phone, my 
phone, instead of something else? Did it make me?
I might find that its positioning in relation to my 
body, “always accessible, ready to hand,”53 acts as 
more than an affordance. I can trust it, as it’s always 
near me. It responds to my requests in predictable 
ways, it acts for me in a space I can’t get to without 
it. It’s by my side and on my side.
Trust, response, action. Is this a ‘real’ change, or 
simply a change in language? It might be that the 
object is no longer passive, that it holds a sort-of 
agency.  Or at the very least that I perceive in it a sort-
of agency. And, if I do, would I then begin to treat it 
as some sort-of other, something that I might have to 
negotiate with rather ‘use’?
I acknowledge that my phone has a role in our 
relation. If I ‘give’ this role to the phone, though, it 
becomes less ‘mine’. It is removed a little from the 
relation of ‘use’, just by means of expressing its role 
in this use. Is it still a screen, then, if it is removed 
from our relation of use?
Fig 8. Cross-coding 1.
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The screen as object
Examination of the subject-object dichotomy within relata-based analysis reveals a doubling of 
the screen relatum into the nonmaterial screen that can act; and the individual, material screen 
that is acted upon. This internal split in the screen is needed to maintain the separateness of 
the dichotomous pairing along with the potential for a reciprocal relation. This split correlates 
to an embedded methodological difference between a screen as encountered and a screen as 
a generalised understanding. On the one hand, the screen is revealed as highly effectual – 
an effectivity which negates the materiality of the screen-as-relatum. The screen here is a 
nonmaterial container: a site, a repository, a mediator or, indeed, nothing but an effect itself. 
On the other hand, the screen acts as a suggestion of the use to which it could be put, triggering 
the subject into recognising potential needs and desires that could be fulfilled by the object. In 
this second case, the screen is considered materially; it is dissected into parts and expresses its 
role in the use relation by means of these parts. On the one hand, an effect without materiality, 
on the other hand a materiality without an effect. 
In discussing the subject—object dichotomy, agency and materiality have reoccurred as 
important to the ontology of the screen. These two relations will be considered further in the 
discussion of the second dichotomy pivotal to understanding the ontology of the screen: the 
virtual—real dichotomy.
52. Verbeek, What Things Do, 171.
53. Kirsty Best describes the “handiness” of portable devices such as smartphones as being linked to their success in the marketplace. 
The devices are “technical actors,” worn on and subsumed into embodiment relations so that they “easily become appendages.” 
Kirsty Best, “When Mobiles Go Media: Relational Affordances and Present-to-Hand Digital Devices,” Canadian Journal of 
Communication 34, no. 3 (2009): 404.
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The virtual and the real
The second dichotomy I will discuss is that between the ‘real’ and the ‘virtual’. I will begin 
by examining the screen’s role in mediating the real and the virtual before establishing the 
difference between the real and the virtual as a question of materiality. I will then examine two 
roles for the screen between these spaces – as a separator and a connector – and what each of 
these implies for screen ontology. 
Simulation and the threatened real
Jean Baudrillard notes the screen as having a distinct action on the ‘real’. In the opening of 
Simulcra and Simulation, Baudrillard describes Borges’ single-paragraph fable in which the 
Empire creates such a perfect map of itself that the meanings and effects of the thing and its 
representation collapse into a single form. Baudrillard is quick to point out that Borges’ tale 
relies on a direct relation between the ‘imagined’ map and its ‘real’ referent; one that he believes 
no longer underpins reference in his time. Simulation, for Baudrillard, threatens the real rather 
than describing or abstracting it; it “threatens the difference between the ‘true’ and the ‘false’, 
the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’.”54
Simulation, for Baudrillard is a technology or force that works upon society by ‘realising’ the 
imaginary and consequently threatening the ‘real’. The challenge that simulation poses means 
that the ‘real’ is unrecoverable, because the differences between this ‘real’ and the ‘imagined’ 
have been eroded through processes of realising the imagined, and vice versa. As Baudrillard 
puts it, “the impossibility of rediscovering an absolute level of the real is of the same order as 
the impossibility of staging illusion. Illusion is no longer possible because the real is no longer 
possible.”55 The dichotomy itself is what is at stake in this analysis – the loss of the other through 
which meaning is defined. Baudrillard anchors his conception of meaning in the determinate 
‘othering’ of one term with another, and takes the oppositions between these others as granted – 
the real is graspable because it is not imagined; the imagined is graspable because it is not real. 
But importantly, both the real and imagined pre-exist any interaction between them. When 
the imagined becomes realised (a term that is read here as materialised) as a simulacrum, the 
distinctions between the terms are negated and meaning is lost: “Nothing separates one pole 
from another anymore, there is a kind of… collapse of the two traditional poles into each other… 
an implosion of meaning. That is where simulation begins.”56
54. Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 3.
55. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 19.
56. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 31.
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Baudrillard looks upon this lack of distinction negatively– finding it untruthful in the face of 
a predetermined reality. Importantly, ‘realisation’ is only possible because the imagined, as 
a relatum, holds predetermined or innate qualities that make it imagined. ‘Realisation’ must 
therefore be an act of force, something that intentionally alters the relata from its innate 
position. This act not only threatens the imagined by not letting it remain imagined; but it also 
threatens the real through the loss of its other – “the real… is no longer really the real, because 
no imaginary envelops it anymore.”57 The ‘real’ has lost the other by which it is defined. 
Materialising the imaginary
So what role do screens play in this spatialisation and materialisation of the imaginary? 
Baudrillard discusses two types of screen media – TV and cinema – and takes a different view 
on their respective roles in simulation’s collapse of meaning. I say ‘screen media’ here because, 
following McLuhan, Baudrillard does not separate the screen from the systems that perpetuate 
it, the objects that hold it, nor from the content that is shown.
Television, for Baudrillard, reaches the limit of indeterminability in the “indifferentiation of the 
active and passive.” This same lack of differentiation is not apparent to Baudrillard in the more 
direct references of the cinema, which is said to retain an “intense imaginary.”58
Baudrillard conducts a strange discussion of the material here. The TV, an object placed in 
interior space, enclosed and three-dimensional, presents content that bypasses the imagination 
and, along with it, any sort of material engagement; either with image or object. In place of 
this engagement, a form of hypnosis. In this sense, in a similar way to Debord’s analysis, the 
material instance of a television is reduced to a support for the image, and the socio-political 
system that perpetuates it.59 The cinema, by contrast, whose screen consists only of incident light 
projected onto a plane, becomes material and ‘honest’ by virtue of retaining engagement with 
the imaginary, and so retaining the simple image-referent relation that Baudrillard establishes 
as primary. Technological materiality is concisely set up here as unconnected to material effect.
57. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 2.
58. Baudrillard writes: “It is necessary to speak of the cold light of television, why it is harmless to the imagination… because it no 
longer carries an imaginary and this for the simple reason that it is no longer an image. By contrast with the cinema, which is still 
blessed… with an intense imaginary – because the cinema is an image. That is to say not only a screen and a visual form, but a 
myth, something that still retains something of the double, of the phantasm, of the mirror… nothing of this in the ‘TV’ image, 
which suggests nothing, which mesmerises, which itself is nothing but a screen, not even that: a miniaturized terminal that, in 
fact, is immediately located in your head.” Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 31; 51.
59. Debord’s spectacle makes material the immaterial; but any materiality that supports it is merely a support, not tangible in its own 
right. In this sense, “the tangible world is replaced by a selection of images which exist above it, and which simultaneously impose 
themselves as the tangible par excellence.” Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 36. 
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Baudrillard makes this lack of definable materiality even clearer when discussing 
hypercommodities, where he also pulls this totalising relation into the screen per se: “no relief, 
no perspective, no vanishing point where the gaze might risk losing itself, but a total screen 
where, in their uninterrupted display, the billboards and products themselves act as equivalent 
and successive signs.” The screen qua screen is now shown anywhere the image lands, and its 
tangible properties (as relatum) are almost indefinable, such that “the hypermarket cannot be 
separated… from the whole town as a functional screen of activities.”60 In this sense, it is the 
image that is active. The power of the image to turn anything on which it lands into a screen 
negates the real, as the real object (as plane or commodity) that preceded the screen condition 
is rendered non-present. 
A negation
There are echoes here of the ‘disappearance’ of the screen that were found in the subject—
object analysis. However, the process described by Baudrillard is more active process. It doesn’t 
involve a perceptual mechanism but an active negation of material ‘realness’ by something 
nonhuman. The power to negate is given to the image, which overrides the materiality of that 
onto which it falls. The image negates the wall, the furniture object, the device by actively 
replacing their materialities with its own. The negation described by Baudrillard is well marked 
in the discussion of screens. McCarthy cites television particularly as central to debates about 
placelessness and virtuality in Modernity, with its impacts being described using terms such as 
“derealisation.”61 
Using this rhetoric, it is not only the screen-as-relatum negated by the virtual, but the condition of 
the material itself. The effects of the screen, then, are not limited to the subject—object relation, 
but are also concerned with spatial relations. The encounter now occurs instead through the 
screen and towards the spatial.
This distinction is, perhaps, an arbitrary one, as it could well be argued that space is a 
component of all interactions of people and things.62 Heidegger’s conception of Being involves 
an inseparable play of spatiality and temporality within the discovering of things within the 
world. Things, Heidegger states in his lecture “The Thing,” are disclosed in the bringing-near 
60. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 75-76.
61. McCarthy, “From Screen to Site,” 95.
62. Ihde’s discussion of technological relations always involve three entities rather than two: technology, person, and ‘world’ or the 
person’s external relations. This is the sense in which I use ‘space’ – spatial relations for the person are an external relation to the 
world, outside of an immediate person-object interaction. Heidegger speaks of three entities in his relation of perception: “the 
world and dasein and entities-within-the-world are the ontologically constitutive states which are closest to us.” Martin Heidegger, 
Being and Time, 134. 
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of the world. ‘Nearness’, here, is not intended in the sense of a proximity in extended space, 
but in an involvement in the world. Spatiality comes about within a concerned involvement 
with the world and its references. However, the screen makes spatiality specifically at issue by 
marking a difference in its constitution, separating spatiality from personal involvement. That 
is, spatiality is not generated as part of an ongoing involvement in the world, but something that 
happens to a person. 
Heidegger acknowledges spatiality being at issue with the screen in stating that “the peak of 
the abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached by television.”63 The qualities of the 
television that allow this impact on space is its severance of spatiality from the human. Rather 
than allowing distance to be brought near in circumspection, the television presents distance 
as closeness. It thus eliminates distance – not purely by means of showing it as close, but by 
means of taking the process of nearing away from the person, eliminating their spatiality. For 
Heidegger, the space disclosed by the television is not properly spatial, because it does not allow 
a person to draw the world near, thus revealing its references. The space given by the television, 
and the space which Baudrillard discusses, exists as a relatum before the encounter between 
person and screen. Although not quite a Cartesian space, its pre-existence to the encounter is 
what allows it to be fundamentally shifted as a result of the encounter. A ‘real’ space is ‘de-
realised’. The spatial is split through this derealisation, founded on a pre-existing sense of space 
– into the ‘real’ and the ‘not-real’, or the ‘real’ and the ‘virtual’. The fact of a difference between 
these spaces is then taken as granted.
Mediating the real and the virtual
The term ‘virtual’ is often used to refer to the image; a visual, digitally produced space. Rather 
than accepting the term in this contemporary usage, Friedberg follows the term’s origins in 
optics, arriving at an understanding of virtuality as a perceptual condition involving materiality. 
She defines ‘virtual’ as “of, relating to, or possessing a power of acting without the agency of 
matter,” noting that the term ‘virtual’ describes a representation that “’functionally or effectively 
but not formally’ of the same materiality as what it represents.”64 The real, then is according 
to its inverse – the ‘real’ becomes that which possesses a power of acting specifically through 
matter.
63. Heidegger, “The Thing,” 163. Nearing, for Heidegger, is a way of situating ourselves within our involvement. By drawing things 
near, things are revealed according to how they concern us. This reveals our concern along with the things, and contextualises 
us in relation to those things. It is in this sense that the spatial is generated – by drawing things near, a world unfolds as things 
distributed according to our concern.
64. Friedberg, The Virtual Window, 8, 11. Note here that Friedberg refers to the agency of matter rather than the subject per se. The 
concept of an agency that is decoupled from subjectivity is explored further in chapter two.
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GP2Y0A21YK0F is a distance measuring sensor unit, 
composed of an integrated combination of PSD 
(position sensitive detector) , IRED (infrared emitting 
diode) and signal processing circuit. The variety 
of the reflectivity of the object, the environmental 
temperature and the operating duration are not 
influenced easily to the distance detection because 
of adopting the triangulation method. This device 
outputs the voltage corresponding to the detection 





The Colourmapper uses a fixed wavelength of light, 
at 870nm, to read my face. It looks at me, and 
converts the angle and position of what it sees to a 
voltage. It maps this voltage (which corresponds to 
what I might call distance) to a different wavelength 
of light, somewhere between 700nm and 650nm, 
and shows this to me. The Colourmapper doesn’t 
touch anything, it takes some of the qualities of light 
and turns them into other qualities of light. Is the 
space it sees virtual?
When I look at the Colourmapper, the light bouncing 
off it and the light it emits is focused on to my retina 
by my cornea. The position of the beam, and intensity 
at which my different photoreceptor cells see it, is 
converted to a neural signal, which is mapped in 
my brain to such qualities as shape, colour, size. I 
know how far away the Colourmapper is because I 
can determine distance and size from these signals. 
But I also know how 
far away it is because 
it’s telling me. Are 
some of these signals 
real and others 
not? Is the colour 
the Colourmapper 
displays happening 
in the real or the 
virtual? Fig 9. Colourmapper.
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Difference and priority
The difference between spaces is more evident in certain types of screens than in others. The 
difference between the ‘virtual’ space of the computer screen and the ‘real’ space in which it 
sits, for instance, is quickly comprehended. Differences between the spaces to either side of a 
fly-screen hung over an open window, however, may be less readily apparent. It would even be 
questionable, in this case, whether either side of the screen would be called ‘virtual’ or whether 
other frameworks for discussion would be found. In each of these instances, however, the screen 
acts between two spaces. Given the variations in the differences between these spaces, in what 
terms can the nature of the ‘virtual’ be discussed? 
To follow Heidegger’s argument that the spatial can only be authentically revealed by drawing 
things near, the real must be considered primary. The screen, then, acts as a boundary, a thing 
that separates the space of embodied perception from the ‘false’ spatiality of the disembodied 
space. A different avenue of argument could be taken, however, to claim that the virtual has a 
higher perceptual priority. Such an argument could be based on Introna and Ilharco’s comments 
about the screen being a call to attention, or on mechanisms such as flow, where the viewer gives 
themselves over to the virtual in a desire to be immersed.67 In this case the virtual would become 
the primary relatum, and the role of the screen would be as a site of connection between the 
virtual and the real. I will now examine these two roles for the screen’s mediation.
The virtual, for Friedberg, is an “immaterial proxy for the material.”65 Friedberg relies on this 
distinction in materiality in order to show confluences and morphings between the screen and 
the window, both metaphorically and functionally. The term ‘virtual’ refers just as well to the 
image seen through the window pane as it does to the image appearing in cinema, or the image 
of a memory. The nature of this virtual image, and the way it interplays with the real outside of 
it, reveals the role of the screen for Friedberg. The screen—object, along with the window, again 
plays a mediatory role, this time between two spaces. 
65. Friedberg, The Virtual Window, 8. 
66. Sharp Corporation, “GP2Y0A21YK0F,” Data Sheet No. E4-A00201EN, Dec. 1 2006, 1.
67. Dant develops Raymond Williams’ concept of the flow of broadcasting to the experience of television. He highlights the nested 
spaces of television – shots within scenes, scenes within segments, segments within shows – as creating a immersive flow from 
which it is difficult to retreat. Dant, Television and the Moral Imaginary, 87-93.
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A spatial filtering: a 
hypothetical scenario
I am a receptor of discrete parcels of information; 
olfactory, visual, auditory, tactile, temporal. I am 
standing in a room. There’s nothing here. I can see 
the space, I can hear and produce sound, I can smell 
the paint on the walls, I can touch them and they 
touch me back. I can move about the room freely, 
and all of this happens in real-time. I do something, 
and I get a response. I am unmediated. 
But now I turn around and see a gridded lattice, 
like one that is used in a confessional or a bank. 
It’s dividing the room in two, and I am on one side 
of it. It’s a perforated physical surface, composed 
materially of repetitions of solid and void; it’s 
permeable, but I can’t get through it. Now, it has a 
few small apertures and I can see someone there by 
their movement. I can’t make out their face, but I can 
hear them. It’s cool on the other side of the room, 
there’s a soft breeze coming through from there, it 
smells like the sea. Now the lattice has many large 
apertures, and I can see the person clearly. I wave at 
the person and they smile. I poke my fingers through 
the holes, but can’t touch anything, just the lattice. 
I wonder why that person is there when I am here. 
Am I trapped?  Are they trapped? Which of us is on 
the inside?
Now I see one of those apertures growing, the rest 
shrinking, a plate of glass appears. The room is now 
divided by a wall, and in the wall, a window. I can 
see straight through the window, of course, but it’s a 
little brighter here than there and I see the ghost of 
my own reflection. My image is between me and the 
other person. I can’t hear them well, either, though 
they seem to be talking in muffled words. It’s a bit 
stuffy in here, so I open the window between us so I 
can feel that breeze again, and so we can talk freely. 
I guess I could climb through, now, but there doesn’t 
seem much point – I’m more or less already there.
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Separation: the barrier
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the screen as barrier in terms of a subjective transgression, 
a potential for ‘crossing’ as an expression of agency. I’d like to explore this relation further 
now, focusing on the embodied perception of space in the nature of the barrier, rather than the 
subject’s agency. Considering the spatial in terms of its embodied perception allows the screen 
to be examined in terms of its action in spatial filtering, particularly of the types and qualities of 
sensorial information allowed to pass through it. This supports a view of the screen as creating 
a perceptual distance.
As Giuliana Bruno notes in Surface: Matters of aesthetics, materiality and media, the term 
‘screen’ came into usage in English in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to describe a 
furniture piece, a sheet of cloth or paper caught within a frame and used to divide space.68 As 
a translucent divider of space, the screen is readily seen as a semi-permeable barrier. It is not 
solid and impenetrable like the wall, but offers sensorial permeability – the shadows of things 
behind, the sounds of others speaking, the smells of cooking. The screen here acts to filter the 
sensorial information available to the occupant from one side of the screen to the other, thus 
affecting their perception of space. This inherently spatial role of the screen can be used to explore 
media screens as well. James Ash, for example, in his examination of the computer screen as 
used in gaming, argues that screen-forms can alter the phenomenological field through their 
manipulation of spatial relations; including those of awareness and sensorial capacities. Dant 
likewise maintains that the perception of televisual space uses the “same perceptual apparatus 
with which the flow of the life-world is grasped.”69 
68. Giuliana Bruno, Surface: Matters of Aesthetics, Materiality and Media (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
69. James Ash, “Emerging spatialities of the screen: video games and the reconfiguration of spatial awareness,” Environment and 
Planning A 41 (2009): 2105-2124; Dant, Television and the Moral Imaginary, 101.
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As I shut the window it changes again. The glass in 
the frame is replaced with LEDs, and between them 
they’re showing the same scene that was in the 
window. There’s my friend, and now I can hear them 
clearly, though some instrumental music is floating 
on top of their voice as if to match its emotional 
content. I ask a question, but it’s a few minutes before 
I get an answer. Maybe they’re talking to someone 
else? I try to focus on their face, but I can’t bring it 
any closer – they remain at the same distance and all 
I see is pixels. I move back and stay still, trying to line 
up what I’m seeing with what is being shown to me. 
As I do so, the image changes, I can see close-ups of 
their pores, their hair follicles, the fall of their shirt. 
I feel like I’m touching them, but they don’t look like 
they’re being touched. 
I turn around and see the same screen, and now I’m 
not sure if the other side of the room is in front of 
me or behind me. I walk over and take the screen off 
the wall, holding it in my hands as I sit on the floor. I 
notice that the room is just one room again, though 
now this thing is in it as well as me. It looks like my 
friend has done the same thing as me, I can see them 
and hear them sitting on their floor with their device. 
The lag must have gone. I type as I talk, each finger 
hitting the screen on a letter icon, forming a message. 
I feel like I could pick that person up with a pinch of 
my fingers, a tiny force to lift a whole person. They 
seem so far away. Are we separated or connected?
Fig 10. A Spatial Filter. [Video, 00:44].
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Following Friedberg’s definition, a ‘virtual’ space needs to fulfil two requirements: it must 
possess a power of acting, and it must be immaterial. However, the ability of the screen—object 
to mediate and recombine sensorial information affects the fidelity and quality of the space to 
the other side of the screen, inasmuch as it appears to a person on this side of the screen. In each 
of these cases, the screen’s material effects these spatial changes, and so the screen-as-relatum 
must belong to the ‘real’. 
A material object filters sensorial information, resulting in a virtual space. Virtuality, then, is 
a sensorially ‘reduced’ space. Rather than look at the real and virtual as irretrievably divided, 
they could be seen instead as an issue of sensorial equivalency in the spaces across the screen. 
A perceptual distance is introduced by a lack of sensorial equivalency. As Black demonstrates in 
his discussion of peri-personal space, space is “perceived differently” if it cannot be “understood 
in terms of the possible movements and interactions that might take place within it.” In 
Heideggerian terms, the reduced space would disallow “attending to what is near.”70 
This distance is enacted differently in different types of screen.  The lattice still maintains a 
sense of the spatial possibilities of the other side. If a person could just step through the screen, 
they could enact movements similarly to their activities on their side of the screen. This set 
of possibilities, however, is not discovered through embodiment, rather it is overlayed on an 
understanding of spatial equivalence. The body that would interact on the other side of the 
screen is a projection. In this sense, the space behind the lattice is already virtual, because its 
distance requires a person’s possibilities for action to be projected in possibility rather than 
discovered in the material. 
70. Black, “Where Bodies End,” 44; Heidegger, “The Thing,” 164.
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When I touch you, this is an event of separation and 
differentiation: tactility is the material event of such a 
dehiscence – of, precisely, the ethical differentiation 
of the I/Other.
Dave Boothroyd71
I need some sort of gap to recognise a difference 
in space. Touchbuzzer might just buzz all the time, 
how would I know? I can only feel it reciprocating 
my touch when I touch it. Our spaces are reciprocal, 
contiguous.  What space is of Touchbuzzer and what 
is of me?
Camera obscura and other mechanical visual aids 
split the body off from a corporeal basis of sight 
while also claiming an undisputed truth value for 
what is seen through the apparatus itself.
Massey72
Is Touchbuzzer a screen? No. There is a distance 
between me and it, but I can only find this distance 
when I’m not using it. The second I touch it, the gap 
disappears. 
Is Pitchmatcher a screen? Is Mover a screen? No. 
Each does something to my understanding of space 
and my abilities within it, but they seem to return on 
me rather than creating distance. 
Is Colourmapper a screen? Perhaps. 
I could say, at least, that Colourmapper has a 
screen. It produces spatial information and displays 
it visually, as a colour space. Would Colourmapper 
be so screenic if it displayed distance as a pitch, 
or a series of movements? Space may be acoustic 
and tactile and olfactory, but the virtual is almost 
certainly visual73. Perhaps screening is a visual 
medium because it is a spatial medium. Or perhaps, 
as Massey suggests, the screen made space a visual 
medium because it needed to open distance.
Isn’t it always going? How is it a screen? 
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To counter this distance, and thus to make a projection of the possibility for effect more accurate, 
more and more spatial information is shifted to distance senses – primarily to vision. For 
example, windows allow multiple lines of sight, but no longer allow touch. The sense of touch 
is cut off at the window so that tactile information must be read through visual information. 
This visual sense of tactility is used well in cinema and television – graininess, moving focus, 
textural close-ups and the contrast of surface and depth are some filmic techniques used to 
trigger embodied responses similar to those triggered by touch, without the act of touch itself.74 
Distance is introduced between affect and effect, between that space and this one.
71. Dave Boothroyd, “Touch, Time and Technics: Levinas and the Ethics of Haptic Communications,” Theory Culture Society 26 (2009): 
342. 
72. Lyle Massey, Picturing Space, Displacing Bodies, (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University press, 2007), 71. 
73. Introna and Ilharco state that “the screen is first and primordially involved in seeing, watching, perceiving with the eyes,” and 
connect this seeing to the “ontological primacy of seeing” as a way of spatialising the world. Introna and Ilharco, “On the Meaning 
of Screens,” 68-9.
74. Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 7-10.
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‘The skin’ can no longer be presumed to have as its 
primary reference the biological-physical epidermis 
... rather, it should be rethought as the inter(sur)face 
of sensibility; of touching itself ... the term ‘skin’, I am 
suggesting, should be allowed to continue to stand 
as the name of the site wherein the event of contact 
takes place. 
Dave Boothroyd75
Touchbuzzer touches me as I touch it. I can be 
extended into the space beyond my skin, but only 
until I find a surface which belongs to another. This 
new surface might be my skin and the other’s skin at 
the same time – this is our boundary, one on either 
side. It happens at the edges of my space.
The razorblade scene in Luis Buñuel’s Un Chien 
Andalou touches me too, so violently that I cringe. 
But I don’t touch it, because it’s too distant from me. 
Can it be in my body but not in my space?
Touchbuzzer: haptic 
hapticity Fig 11. Touchbuzzer.
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If the screen-as-relatum acts as a marker that splits the ‘virtual’ from the ’real’, then, it does 
so in the sense of creating perceptual distance. The object of the screen exists in ‘real’ space as 
material, and creates distance by means of its materiality. As the distance between the two 
sides of the screen increases, a person needs to project themselves further to retain a connection 
between the spaces. This is not a task undertaken by the screen, but one which is undertaken 
by a person, to counter the distancing effects of the screen. As perception is focused more on the 
spatial difference, the screen, in creating this distance, disappears. 
The screen separates these spaces, but cannot be defined through them. As Martine notes, “the 
boundary that separates… is intelligible only in relation to the separation it is taken to denote. 
It is not itself something that has the definition of either of the terms that it stands between.”76 
The boundary cannot be taken out of its context and retain its meaning as boundary. It must be 
a boundary between things. As a boundary, the screen must be between the real and the virtual. 
The ‘real’, then, refers to the surrounding material environment, and the ‘virtual’ to the distant 
space being drawn in to this environment through immaterial means. The screen—object is held 
in stasis between the two.
Suture: the frame
Having shown the screen to disappear as a barrier that separates spaces, I will now consider its 
role in connecting spaces. Although these two roles may seem a contradiction, both can be seen 
in the definition of the screen. 
75. Boothroyd, “Touch, Time and Technics,” 338-9.




Fig 12. Filter and Suture.
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In the sense that is acts as a barrier, the screen marks a difference in space: an ‘inside’, in which 
the subject dwells in the phenomenological sense, drawing things near; and an ‘outside’ from 
which this process is restricted. In other words, two sides are present when encountering a 
screen – this side, and that side, the side that is screened. A lattice may separate this side from 
that side, but a smartphone brings that side to this side. Separation and connection are both 
modes of contextualising spaces.
Friedberg marks the condition of separation in the spatial device of the frame. She comments 
that the screen’s materiality is encountered as the fixed frame, which marks the delineation 
of a moving ‘view’. This delineation results in “a separation- an ‘ontological cut’- between the 
material surface of the wall and the view contained within its aperture.”77 Similar ideas of 
separation were encountered when discussing the boundary, and a similar rhetoric of inside and 
outside can be applied to the frame. However, the frame implies a different spatial relation. A 
barrier may not necessarily have perceivable edges, it presents in its ability to restrict the body. 
A frame, by contrast, is recognised in its edges – it is a circumscription, a complete bounding 
of planar space. The space bounded by the frame, in this sense, is held within the frame. When 
the screen appears as a frame, the virtual is seen in this frame. Two conflicting sense of ‘inside’ 
are presented by the screen as frame: the inside in which the person dwells (the ‘real’), and the 
inside of the contained space (the ‘virtual). The role of the frame is to contextualise these spaces, 
which both appear as an inside, and so both also correspondingly an outside.
In this second role, the frame acts as a fixed, ‘real’ context to an introduced ‘virtual’ space that 
is otherwise discontiguous with its ‘real’ surroundings. Connolly likewise notes the role of the 
screen-as-frame in galleries, noting that it might appear to “contain the image so that it is read 
‘centripetally’, like a painting,” or else to “connect the image to the gallery space” introducing a 
blurring or “spilling over” of the introduced space into to the viewing space of the gallery.78 As 
a point of separation, the screen contains the virtual inside itself; as a point of connection, it 
transposes new ‘outside’ spaces into the ‘inside’ of a person’s experience. 
The frame’s contradictory division of inside and outside make the screen a device of inclusion 
and exclusion. As Introna and Ilharco comment, the screen has “frames and edges that allow us 
to refer to that which is ‘on the screen’ as opposed to ‘off the screen’,” including and excluding 
certain spatial possibilities.79 For this reason, the frame’s transposition can never be complete. 
77. Friedberg, The Virtual Window, 5.
78. Maeve Connolly, The Place of Artists’ Cinema: Space, Site and Screen. (Bristol, UK: Intellect Books, 2009), 23-24.
79. Introna and Ilharco, “On the Meaning of Screens,” 68.
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When a surface condition is activated in this way 
on visual planes, it changes our notion of what 
constitutes the support of the image and its way of 
siting a medium. I want to demonstrate that this new 
form of materialism initiates a major transformation. 
In surface encounters, novel dynamics are generated, 
including an innovative form of materiality that is 
light, diffuse, flexible and permeable.
Giuliana Bruno82
Is the virtual an immaterial realm, unable to be 
touched? Or does the virtual have the materiality of 
the screen?
I can talk about the real as the space to my side 
of the screen, and the virtual as the space to the 
other.  When I’m texting on a phone, the differences 
between the spaces are obvious. They are composed 
of different architectures and outcomes. I can type 
and send a message, but I can’t materially interact 
with that space. I can’t use my body to pick up one 
plane of text and place it in front of another. 
But I can’t do this behind a lattice either. I recognise 
that I could, perhaps, shuffle things around if I 
could get through to that other side. But I can’t get 
through, that action remains only a possibility. And 
if I did somehow get through, wouldn’t that side be 
my side, and this side the other side? Is the other 
side of the architectural screen also only a space of 
immaterial possibility?
Perhaps, instead, I can talk about the real, material 
object of the screen and the virtual, immaterial space 
it presents. These two are obviously antagonistic – 
the virtual image overwhelms the ‘real’ phone so 
that it disappears in perception, it becomes a frame. 
The virtual violently negates the material screen.
I hand my phone to a friend to show them a video. 
If the image hijacks the material screen, what am I 
handing over? Is it the image that is having material 
effect in the hand of my friend; being turned about, 
swiped over and discussed like a tool? As the screen is 
touched, is the image touched also? Is she materially 
interacting with the virtual?
Cross-coding the real and 
virtual. 
Fig 13. Cross-coding 2.
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Any connection between the two spaces works to enforce their separateness – two relata cannot 
be connected unless they exist separately to one another to begin with. 
The impossibility of existing together can be acknowledged when considering the relation 
between the frame and viewing. As Friedberg writes, “the moment that the spectator becomes 
aware of the frame, the joissance/pleasure in an image is lost, reduced to an awareness of the 
enunciative presence of the apparatus.”80 As soon as the screen relatum is revealed in perception 
as a frame, its transposition of space loses effect. The relation between a person and a ‘virtual’ 
space becomes a relation between a person and a  material screen; perception is reoriented to 
the ‘real’. In so doing, the screen is revealed as connector, and the separateness of the two spaces 
becomes revealed along with the connection per se. The frame only works as a frame whilst it 
remains negated by the virtual space.
The description of the screen as a frame again suggests that it has no content of its own. The 
role of the screen as frame is to act as a ‘suture’81 – to transpose a space and stitch it in to the 
‘real’. The event of stitching is recognised at the border of the introduced space, at the frame. 
Importantly, this spatial disruption seems to conflict with and leverage off the screen—object in 
a distinct way. The ‘virtual’ content is discussed as being of a higher ontological importance than 
the ‘real’ object. The virtual, as the primary relata, is the focus of the analysis. The materiality of 
the object itself is only important in the sense that it supports the virtual, and so the screen-as-
relatum cannot appear in perception. As soon as the screen reveals itself as relatum, its support 
of the virtual space fails. 
The ‘virtual’ also becomes split, with implications for understanding the screen. The ‘virtual’ 
can be othered by the screen object as ‘real’ material, in which case the ‘real’ is considered 
as the material realm and the ‘virtual’ as the immaterial. The line between the real and the 
virtual then becomes a question of materiality. However, the ‘virtual’ can also be othered to the 
‘real’ space, or the space to ‘this side’ of the screen, in which case the ‘real’ becomes a matter of 
embodied interaction, and the ‘virtual’ of a representational engagement. The line between the 
virtual and the real then becomes one of agency, of bodies interacting with and manipulating 
space.
80. Friedberg, The Virtual Window, 81.
81. Suture theory arose in the 1960s and described the importation of a the film’s space into the immediate spatiality of the viewer, 
particularly the disjunctions between shots and perspectives. Friedberg, The Virtual Window, 81.




Relata-based analyses of the screen present a series of problems, some of which were 
demonstrated in the discussions of the subject—object and real—virtual dichotomies above. The 
screen’s unique position in raising these problems becomes particularly clear when considering 
theories that attempt to bridge these dichotomies. Examining these bridging strategies can 
reveal the commonalities that lie behind the differences. I would like to finish this section with 
a discussion of strategies used to bridge screen dichotomies, first for the subject and object, and 
secondly for the virtual and real.
In the discussion of the subject and object above, the two relata had to be held apart in opposition 
whilst remaining connected by a relation of agency. This separation resulted in an analysis that 
could only find the screen as agential in a de-localised sense, as a force of technology rather 
than a material instance. On the individual scale, screens were defined by their use, by being 
acted upon. The screen, in this case, formed a question about the constitution of the subject and 
object. Peter-Paul Verbeek challenges such changes of scale in regards to technologies. Verbeek 
holds that, as technologies mediate both perception and behaviour, they play a critical role in 
the determination of the subject. That is, “a technology does much more than realise the goal 
toward which it is put,” it shapes the actions and perceptions of those using it.83 Verbeek, in line 
with Grosz, Coole and others, begins to remap agency as a relation between things rather than 
a property of the subject.84 
Such an approach opens the possibility of mapping effects of individual screen forms on human 
behaviour and perception, similarly to the affordance framework, but then allowing the object to 
express these effects as agencies. The language of the affordance framework clearly preferences 
the primary relatum of the subject. Nevertheless, there is some subtle sense of agency attached 
to the object in the way it affords, allows or communicates certain uses. It would not be difficult 
to revise the language of the affordance framework to make this agency more accessible, though 
it might begin to threaten the parameters of the relata-based analysis. Verbeek suggests that 
objects might “invite” and “inhibit” behaviours rather than simply afford them.171 Verbeek’s 
active language might, however, be pushed further – perhaps individual screen objects could be 
persuasive, or even forceful, within individual relations.
83. Verbeek, What Things Do, 43.
84. Agency as a relation will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter two, along with the work of Coole and Grosz.
85. Verbeek, What Things Do, 171.
110
Fig 14.  Suture and Site.
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Nicholas Nova, Katherine Miyake, Walton Chiu, and Nancy Kwon begin to provoke these sorts 
of object-based agencies in their project Curious Rituals,which catalogues behaviours developed 
with screen forms. These behaviours range from personal interactions with devices, such as 
“thumb texting” and “the prayer reader,” through to group behaviours such as “the periscope.” 
Nova et al have two aims: to question the role of the body in the virtual; and to show that 
behaviours aren’t always designed, but arise out of uninstructed interactions.86 In cataloguing 
and naming a variety of everyday behaviours, Nova et al show various things as the common 
point of these actions. That is, people don’t intend these actions they undertake with screens, 
but there is something about bodies and devices that induces these common actions. Kirsty Best 
also suggests a repositioning of the affordance framework in her discussion of media on mobile 
devices, saying that “a technology’s affordance is a relationship it has with its users, rather than 
a static trait.”87 In this respect, an affordance isn’t a property of the object per se, but something 
that arises in interaction. Best uses this particularly relational view of affordances to examine 
people’s choices in using or not using the technological capabilities of their smartphones, showing 
that these uses are always contextualised within the (particularly social) worlds of the ‘user’. 
These studies start to break the dichotomy between the subject and the object by focusing on 
the object’s role in agency. They look with more focus at the unintended, and in so doing make 
a shift from a conception of agency that arises from the intentional subject toward a conception 
of agency that arises within a context, from between a subject, object and world. They explicitly 
look at the excess of the ‘for’ relation, that which slips outside of the intent of designer or user. 
Similar studies can be found in discussion of the real and virtual. The previous section found 
that the ideal of the frame, ontologically and materially, is its disappearance. If this sense of 
disappearance is pursued materially, allowing the frame to thin until almost invisible, the 
screen ceases to frame an introduced space and becomes instead a site for the virtual. As a 
site for the virtual, the role of the screen is to locate the virtual within the real. Introna and 
Ilharco discuss the screen as a mode of presentation, lending ‘presentation’ a spatiality in terms 
of “making present” and “locating activity.” The screen makes things present, it locates them 
within involvement, and in this way it sites the image. But it is unclear how, as a site, the screen 
can locate both itself and the virtual. Bruno explores the material of the surface as “a form of 
dwelling” that “can become a site of screening and projection.” The surface is presented as a 
location, “a form of siting and a space for the materiality of media,” and in this sense it is acted 
upon by the virtual, “plastically activated, and sculpted” by the immaterial.88
86. Nicolas Nova, Katherine Miyake, Walton Chiu, and Nancy Kwon, Curious Rituals: Gestural Interaction in the Digital Everyday, 
accessed February 23, 2016, https://curiousrituals.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/curiousritualsbook.pdf; 7-9.
87. Kirsty Best, “When Mobiles Go Media,” 403.
88. Bruno, Surface, 94;  108; 101.
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Fig 15.  Cinema.
113
Bruno is interested in the materiality of the screen, but takes this materiality in a specific way. 
The screen is shown in her text as a sum or overlay of the two materialities – a site plus an 
image – which together form a material surface. As Bruno writes, “this is why a prefer to speak 
of surfaces rather than images: to experience how the visual manifests itself materially on the 
surface of things, where time becomes material space.”89 Unlike Introna and Ilharco’s analysis, 
which takes place before the virtual reaches the screen and is separate from the content of 
the image, Bruno’s analysis happens with and after the virtual, as this is, for her, where the 
two form a material entity. Before the image reaches the surface, the surface is a materially 
different entity – a wall, perhaps, or a façade or canvas. Once the image reaches the surface, it 
overlays its own (im)materiality, which creates the material screen. The site is thereby integral 
to the materiality of the image – the screen arises as a confluence of site and image. The screen, 
as a site, is not entirely displaced by the image. Instead, a new entity is created between the 
screen—object and the image. 
Modes of projection, particularly cinema, provide one of the bases for Bruno’s establishment of 
the screen as a site. Changes in how images are projected indicate an increasing familiarity with 
the composite of virtual and real materials. The spatial organisation of the cinema theatre shows 
a distinct ordering of the ‘real’ in opposition to the ‘virtual’. Early cinemas reacted to the sense of 
distance introduced by the screen—as—barrier with attempts to ritualise the ‘journey’ between 
two distinct places. Amir Ameri comments on these attempts, saying that “the two [spaces] have 
to be conceptually, and for that matter, spatially and architecturally kept apart.” Architectural 
emphasis on the threshold, the exotic treatment of decoration in the theatre (or conversely, the 
design of the theatre room as ‘void’), all attempt to place the experience of watching a film at “a 
marked experiential distance from reality.”90 A boundary is maintained between the film and 
the ‘real’ using the cinema itself as a delineation between the introduced space and the space 
of everyday experience. In this sense, the architecture of the cinema acts as a frame that a 
person can step inside. The frame is echoed in this three-dimensional sense by the negation of 
its materiality within – acoustic management, colour schemes, sight lines, comfort and etiquette 
are all managed towards the disappearance of the cinema as a ‘place’.91 The architecture of the 
cinema is a shell, a three-dimensional frame which contains an introduced space. 
89. Bruno, Surface, 3.
90. Ameri, “Imaginary Placements,” 81; 82. Ameri notes that, with the introduction of sound, the edges of the screen could no longer 
be a suitable frame for the movie, as the experience of cinema filled the space acoustically. He positions the architecture of the 
cinema itself as fulfilling this role. Ameri, “Imaginary Placements,” 89. 
91. The immobilisation of the body is often discussed as a technique that encourages immersion in the image. Friedberg quotes 
Robert Smithson in this regard: “going to the cinema results in an immobilisation of the body ... All one can do is look and listen. 
One forgets where one is sitting ... Impassive, mute, the viewer sits.” Friedberg The Virtual Window, 149. Ameri remarks that, after 
the introduction of sound to movies, cinema design was to intended to create “a featureless path to an imaginary destination” to 
support this experiential immersion. Ameri, “Imaginary Placements,” 89.
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These strict boundaries between the virtual and the real are not, however, maintained in some 
recent projection techniques. Three-dimensional projection mapping challenges the separation 
of the real and virtual by dissolving the screen as plane. Projects that use projection mapping 
rely on the volume and texture of the object to create new materiality. Rather than overriding 
the empty plane of the screen with a planar image, projection mapping distorts the image in 
response to the object it will fall on to, creating the overall effect of a single-context confluence 
between material and immaterial.92 
Particularly interesting in this regard are projects such as 1024 Architecture’s Perspective 
Lyrique, which projects on to the architectural façade of Théatre des Celestins in Lyon.93 The 
building, which formed the screen in this installation, has a strong materiality as a static and 
familiar object in the public environment. Layering onto the façade an image that specifically 
dissolves the building envelope questions this familiar materiality. The imagery stretches 
and morphs the façade of the building into a singing face, which the public can then control 
by singing into a microphone. The ‘realness’ of the building is counteracted by the stretching 
image, which at the same time responds directly to the building. Once in its state as a face, the 
image also responds to people, drawing connections between their and the building’s actions 
in space. Once the sequence is finished, the building returns, unharmed. The screen, then, 
effectively ‘disappears’ once screening is no longer implemented. The suture of the virtual and 
real is so effective here that it is difficult to say where the screen-as-relatum might exist. The 
screen disappears into the building, becoming a particular expression of that building – wall—
as—screen, façade—as—screen. The materiality of the thing remains with this ‘other’ – the 
wall is hard and opaque whether or not it is catching projected imagery, and so hardness and 
opaqueness belong to the wall, not to the screen. But, following Bruno’s equation of the screen as 
site, the materiality of this other affects the material quality of the screen. The screen coincides 
with the object, but the object exists outside of the screen condition. 
The screen-as-site is an inversion of frame. The image is not ‘inside’ the frame, but acts as 
a skin, an outside. Bruno refers to this skin as a materiality that has “morph[ed] culturally, 
transmitting into another medium.”94
92. Anke Jakob; in “Light—Virtual Cloth and Digital Textile,” Textile 6 no.3 (2008): 254-260; discusses the interplay of material and 
immaterial surfaces in projection as “the employment of light in combination with material and texture influencing the shape and 
character of surfaces, garments, and buildings.”
93. 1024 Architecture, “Perspective Lyrique,” December 2010, http://www.1024architecture.net/en/2010/11/perspective-lyrique/.
94. Bruno, Surface, 7. The screen in Bruno’s analysis is a form of materialism in itself, an “innovative form of materiality that is light, 
diffuse, flexible and permeable.” Bruno, Surface, 5. Laura U. Marks likewise defines haptic visuality as a “translation… from one 
sense modality to another.” Marks, Touch, ix. 
116
117
The issues raised in the discussion above are all based on the screen and its actions and meanings 
to different contexts at different scales. Despite their potentially conflicting natures, they are 
all indicative of screen-ness in some way and can, together, reveal something about the role of 
the screen-as-relata. This analysis began with a doubling of the screen to present as a relatum 
in two distinct ways: the object that opposes the space of the screen, and the object that opposes 
the person. In the first case, the ‘object’ was understood as a physical, material residue and 
discussed in terms of the virtual and the real. In the second case, the ‘object’ was that which 
stood against subjectivity, and the screen was discussed in terms of the object and subject. 
This chapter has repeatedly come across disappearance and negation as central to the screen—
as—relatum. It is not, however, the screen that enacts this disappearance or negation, but the 
screen as relatum which disappears. Rather than any material property of the screen being put 
to use, it is its material disappearance – its condition as a frame or boundary – that is put to 
use. As a container, the role of the screen is to hold and express social forces such as attention, 
mores and community standards. As a material tool, the role of the screen is to be put to use 
by a person. As a barrier, the role of the screen is to separate; and as a frame, to connect. 
These roles hold the screen as a boundary between other things. Constructing the screen as a 
boundary causes a problem for understanding the screen as relatum because, as Martine notes, 
“a boundary does not have the character of the thing it bounds any more than determinacy has 
the same character as particular determinations.”95
In finding the screen as a boundary, the screen relatum is hidden rather than disclosed. The 
ontology being described is that of what arises in perception – the space or the person, not 
the screen. For this reason, the screen is not ontologically accessible as relatum – it is defined 
as a void, a line or an absence. The role of the screen as relatum is not its own role, but is 
an external force attributed to something else – the social, the intentionality of a person, the 
spatial, an image. The ontological basis of the screen, then, negates the screen-as-relatum. It 
is this something else which has relational value, and so the screen cannot appear as relatum. 
Moreover, with the negation of the screen, the ontology of the screen is called into question – if 
nothing other than the social or the spatial is seen, how can the screen appear in perception?
DISAPPEARANCE AND NEGATION: 
ONTOLOGY AND THE SCREEN-AS-RELATUM
95. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 49.
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Debord hints at the mechanism by which this might occur: the screen and the image ‘realise’ 
these external forces in the sense of making them tangible, locating them within everyday 
involvement.96 Though Debord draws the conclusion that the effects of a screen are contingent 
upon its ability to perpetuate a ‘realised’ social space, this is only part of the screen-relata’s 
role. He glosses over the screen’s making tangible, the process of realisation. The screen acts as 
a support for these spaces, a ‘real’ locator for something intangible, and as such must itself be 
tangible. Although the materiality of the screen—object is often lost amongst a concern for the 
‘virtual’ (the space that is being anchored by the frame or site of the screen) the ‘realness’ of the 
object is inextricably bound within its role as relata. In other words, the screen anchors ‘virtual’ 
spaces, but it does so only by virtue of being an anchor, a material, ‘real’, thing. This is the crux 
of a paradox in regards to the screen-as-relatum: the screen relies on a material instance to 
locate virtuality and subjectivity within the everyday, but this instance must dissolve in order 
for these entities to be properly located. An unusual ontology surfaces: the screen generates its 
own other.
The screen acts to contain or divide, an action that generates and expresses a difference between 
entities. This difference occurs as dichotomous pairings: the subject against the object, the real 
against the virtual. The screen is, in this first instance, implicated by its role in splitting these 
pairs, by making them perceptually available. But this role tells us nothing about the screen per 
se. Rather, it tells us about the relata of the created opposition: that the real is real because it is 
not virtual, and vice versa. To discover more about the screen as relatum, it needs to be referred 
back to its relation in a way that makes it perceptually accessible. This means referring to the 
screen in relation to the entities it generates: the screen against the subject, the screen against 
the object, against the real, against the virtual. The screen, however, cannot be the primary 
relatum in this relation, because it is always the effect  that is of interest. The screen is always 
the ‘other’ to the virtual, real or the subject.
The tension between what the screen is for and its materiality is important to understanding 
the ontology of the screen. The difference between the screen’s materiality and use and that of 
other objects becomes clearer if this role of the screen is compared to a tool-like relation.97 In 
the example of the hammer, the materiality of the thing and its ‘for’ relation gives us an ‘out’ for 
the relata-based analysis. The hammer is ‘for’ driving a nail. This relation depends on a variety 
96. Debord writes that “the spectacle cannot be understood either as a deliberate distortion of the visual world or as a product of the 
technology of the mass dissemination of images. It is far better viewed as a weltanschauung that has been actualized, translated 
into the material realm  a world view transformed into an objective force. Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 4.




of nested relations, for example, to the hand and to the nail. In each of these, there is a direct 
correspondence between the hammer as it others and the hammer as it is othered. The hand, 
as opposed to the hammer, is soft, is flexible, can grasp; the hammer, as opposed to the hand, 
is hard, rigid and graspable. The nail, as opposed to the hammer, is small, light and sharp; the 
hammer, as opposed to the nail, is large, heavy and blunt. The relation is lineal, from the person 
to the hammer to the nail. In focusing on each opposition within this relation, the relatum of 
the hammer can be identified by its useful properties: it is hard, rigid, graspable, large, heavy, 
blunt. Like the screen, in defining the hammer in opposition to the nail, or the hand, different 
relata are revealed. Unlike the screen, these relata are not mutually exclusive. 
According to the parameters of the analysis, the screen splits space into the real and the virtual. 
Rather than a lineal relation, a triad is formed in which the virtual others the real, and the 
screen others both the virtual and the real. This relation cannot be closed. For example, if the 
real is defined as ‘not-virtual’, and the screen is also defined as ‘not-virtual’, the screen must 
coincide with the real. Likewise, if the virtual is defined as ‘not-real’ and the screen as ‘not-real’, 
the screen must coincide with the virtual. In trying to establish the linear relation required by 
the analysis, the two screens (the not-real and the not-virtual) must be conflated. Despite being 
situated in the same perceptual stimulus of the relatum, the material object, the properties of 
the two screens as relatum are at odds with the other.
It should be evident from this discussion that, in each case, the screen is defined as relatum in 
relation to what it is not, but these others were revealed by the screen in the first place. The 
screen is not real and not virtual, but if real and virtual are opposites, the screen is unable to 
be defined as relatum in this relation.98 The screen has nowhere to go – it cannot be defined as 
an otherto the real, and it cannot be defined as an other to the virtual. Thus the screen is called 
out of the relation – it disappears or is negated. Moreover, it disappears into or is negated by 
something that it itself made perceptually available as an entity. The screen thereby establishes 
a gap. But this is not in the sense of a separation – a gap between the real and the virtual or the 
subject and the object as predetermined entities. Rather it is a gap within – within the system 
of meaning that generates these as alternatives in the first place. The separations between the 
subject and space, between the subject and the object, and between the real and the virtual are 
98. This problem is characterised by Martine in his discussion of determinacy: “If water is to become determinate, there must be 
some Other that can give ‘not-water’ a meaning. But if we try to turn fire into such an other, and suppose that we have discovered 
the internal structure of fire by characterising it as ‘not-water’, we will encounter the sort of problem discussed previously. Fire… 
then, must be both something in itself and ‘not-water’ to allow further development of the account… must appear both as 
something determinately in itself and something indeterminately but meaningfully distinct from water.” In defining the screen by 
what it is not, the definition only references itself. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 56.
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Everything that we say about the objects that we 
had initially taken to be prior calls our attention 
to the relations in which those objects stand to 
the other objects around them. We find ourselves 
having to describe these ‘prior’ things by means of 
relational frameworks of one kind or another, and 
in the process, the possibility of seeing the relations 
themselves as prior emerges as a serious one.
Brian John Martine99
I divided the screen into parts, and I found that the 
screen wasn’t in any of these parts. This was hardly 
surprising, as I had only a few parts, and they didn’t 
add up to a whole. My inexhaustive approach ensured 
that my project was incomplete. I wondered, at the 
beginning, whether these little cuts would send my 
relata flying away from one another, overpowered 
by the force of the opposition. Would the real and 
the virtual stand on their own, separated?  Would 
the screen and I bear off in opposite directions, 
becoming present-at-hand entities for observation?
It seems, rather, that we all collapsed in on one 
another. The Behaviour Boxes began to express their 
roles in our relation, and in doing so, gained a kind 
of alterity. This wasn’t the alterity of an object that 
is merely the focus of my intentionality, though, it 
was the kind of alterity that gained my attention. I 
recognised in it a slight agency. This agency did not 
seem so different to mine.
In gaining my attention, the Behaviour Boxes refused 
to disappear into the ‘virtual’. Their virtualities, the 
non-material ways in which they expressed space, 
appeared with a sense of materiality when housed in 
these recalcitrant boxes. These expressions of space 
resulted from and were held by material things, and 
they seemed no less virtual that the mechanics of my 
sight. Our spaces did not seem so different.
Perhaps it is not so much that the project is 
incomplete, that more parts would reveal the screen. 
Perhaps it is more that the project is, by nature, 
incompletable. If so, the relation between these 
relata, the ways they all come together, is stronger 
than the opposition between them.
Towards, not away.
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a function of the analysis rather than an act of the screen. The screen fits awkwardly into the 
relatum-based framework, exposing the restraints of this understanding. It could be argued that 
this gap is opened within every interaction between a person and a thing, that there is always 
something that escapes the relatum. This is, of course, true. What is unique to the screen, 
however, is that it makes this gap ontologically available. This gap can be recognised in the 
desire to provide transgressive methods of pulling the subject and the object, or the real and the 
virtual, together.
99. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 4.
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Terms like ‘separation’ and ‘connection’ reveal a role for the screen in producing a gap. The gap 
produced is experiential in that it exists as a difference between things – between the subject 
and the object, the real and the virtual. However, it is also a function of the divisions put in 
place by the analysis – the tendency towards dichotomisation and the stress of difference over 
commonality. The bridging mechanisms mentioned above act in a certain way towards the 
gap opened in analysis. They begin with a separation: a barrier between dichotomous pairs. 
They then transgress this separation in the form of connection, to show that the real and the 
virtual, for instance, can be related to one another spatially, as in the case of the frame. The 
act of connection is then covered over so the separation is almost invisible – so that it no longer 
possible to see where the real ends and the virtual begins.
The bridging techniques introduced to blur the lines between the dichotomies rely on the 
dichotomy itself to create the bridge. They acknowledge the gap between the real and the 
virtual, the subject and the object in attempting to bridge it using its own terms. To talk about 
a transmutation of materiality is to think first of materiality as belonging to the ‘real’. Likewise, 
to talk of haptic visuality is to think of touch as belonging to the skin. Such approaches do not 
seem to get around the primacy of the subject, or the real; or around the negation of screen-as-
relatum and what it is that is negated. That is, the gap can never be closed, it persists during 
interaction as the basis of the interaction. 
The outcome of relata-based assessment is intrinsically dependent on the way its assumptions 
were crafted. Relata were found within interaction. These relata were given relation properties 
based on assumed relations, most particularly the relation of use. If the relatum properties are 
relational, and the set of possible relations is defined by these properties, the analysis becomes 
caught in a logical loop. The relation and the relata are competing for primacy in perception. 
This does not pose such a problem in the tool relation, as the materiality of the tool is often 
directly connected to its use. This suggests an exit from the relata-relation loop, as it gives a 
relational understanding of the object that can be located within the object itself. But in the 
case of the screen, the use relation isn’t a matter of the screen’s materiality, but its behaviour in 
opening and closing space as a barrier or connector. As a result, the screen relatum disappears 




Martine notes that “for centuries now, we have been accustomed to assume that things occupy 
a status both ontically and epistemically prior to that of relations among things,”100 and this 
assumption leads to certain outcomes in analysis. Given that the gap that the screen creates can 
only be ‘closed over’ under these assumptions, how might more be revealed as to the ontology 
of the screen? The key lies not in trying to close over a pre-existing gap, but in finding how that 
gap was generated and changing the assumptions of the argument to avoid generating it in the 
first place. This means re-thinking the starting point of the analysis.
The screen establishes a gap, and it does so because this is the relation that produces it. The 
screen is a barrier, it is a frame, it is a force and a tool. But it is also none of these things, as 
each is preceded by a set of relations that generates this understanding. The next section will 
concentrate on this indeterminacy by inverting the primacy of relata and relation. It will focus 
on the relations of materiality and agency in the provocation of the ‘screen’ in perception. In 
other words, it will assume that the world is composed of relations, and that these relations 
generate relata.
100. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 4.

A STRETCHED PLANE
Relations and the ontology of the screen
CHAPTER TWO
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Moubie and Gaze Returner sit between me and my space, always in excess of the screen.1 In a way, they are 
screens, but more accurately they have screens, and they use these screens against me. They explore and 
expose material agency, influencing the ways that ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are brought about. Each uses the 
screen as a site of display for its own point of view, but they have different forms and behaviours, making 
them more or less active or passive, more or less agential, more or less friendly. They assert themselves over 
me and my spatiality differently.  They’re not screens as I know them, but they’re not machines or animals 
either, they’re a little hard to place and hard to know how to respond to.
Moubie and Gaze Returner
Gaze Returner looks so passive, a black screen framed in a black box. 
As I move closer, though, this passivity changes. The black screen 
becomes redder and redder, until it glares brightly and suddenly shuts 
off. I wonder for a moment what he’s doing until I see myself, my own 
image, on his face.
Gaze Returner’s circuit is composed of a camera, an ultrasonic distance 
sensor and a small LCD. He reads the distance sensor and converts 
the signal to a colour value, which he then displays, as if in warning. 
Once a threshold is passed, he returns my gaze by photographing and 
displaying my face as I look at him, the face I reserve for objects, now 
looking at me.
Moubie is much friendlier. He’s moving around on the floor, occasionally 
bumping in to things. He always tells me which direction he’s going to 
go, so I can get out of his way if I need to. He doesn’t show me my face, 
but he shows me what he sees. Every few seconds he’ll show me his 
point of view. I start to follow him, looking down at his back so I can see 
through him and out to his space.
Moubie’s form is encased in a wooden skeleton. He has a set of wheels 
driven by a servo motor, a camera, a small LCD and a set of LEDs. He 
determines a direction of movement, indicates this direction with the 
LEDs and moves forward a fixed distance. He then photographs his 
space and displays this image on the LCD mounted on his back for me 
to see.











































1. See appendices E and F for circuit diagrams and code.
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The previous chapter focused on the relata 
of screen interactions and revealed the 
screen as something which is negated. The 
screen produced a gap, a gap which is put 
to use in screen-person interactions. The 
screen becomes ‘for’ introducing, dividing 
or contextualising space – uses that are 
dependent on the way it creates a spatial gap. 
But this gap was something that happened 
to the screen as well as from it, in that the 
materiality of the screen-as-relatum had to be 
negated in order to properly create the gap. 
There was also something in excess of this 
negation, something which had to be negated. 
Alterity was introduced as a mechanism by 
which to provoke this excess. The Behaviour 
Boxes expressed their role in the relations they 
established, as part-roles of the screen. As they 
did so, they started to establish themselves as 
something more than screen—objects. They 
did not appear as screens as they did not 
create a spatial gap. Instead, their responses 
were social and expressive. A tension was 
thus discovered between the use of the screen 
in its production of a spatial gap and a set of 
ancillary behaviours which drew attention to 
the screen itself as the material anchor of this 
gap. Rather than strengthening the role of the 
screen-as-relatum by purposefully expressing 
the screen’s role in the interaction, these 
ancillary behaviours interrupted the way the 
object was revealed as ‘screen’. 
STRUCTURE OF A RELATION-BASED ANALYSIS
This tension indicates that a different mode 
of analysis is needed to explore the screen. 
Although the relata-based approach could 
explain what the screen represents, it could 
not explain the gap generated between what 
the screen is and what it does. This chapter 
will address the tension between the screen’s 
use and its object by exploring the screen from 
the perspective of relations. It will establish 
materiality and agency as productive forces 
and key mechanisms in the revealing of the 
screen, discussing the screen-bearing object as 
provoking two contexts: the ‘for’, as the use-
context that underlies the revealing of the 
screen; and the ‘not-for’ or ‘for-itself’, which 
interrupts this use-context and reveals the 
excess of the screen. This chapter looks at 
the ways in which materiality and agency as 
processes can support or contest screening.
A relation-based approach has a different 
structure to a relata-based approach. This 
section will begin by qualifying the position 
of the relation in this analysis, particularly 
as it involves the context of use. It will then 
discuss this positioning against the screen’s 
disappearance, and define the relations of 
materiality and agency, rather than use, 
as responsible for defining the differences 
between screen relata. The section will 
conclude by defining the figure of the analysis.
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In this analysis, the primacy of the relata and 
relations in analysis will be inverted. In the 
relata-based analysis of the previous chapter, 
the relata were held as a priori entities that 
enter into a relation. In this way, the relata, 
by means of their properties, determine 
the relation. A relation-based analysis will, 
instead, focus on the qualities and peculiarities 
of the relations – it will look between the relata 
rather than at them. These relations, however, 
will no longer be considered reflexively as 
the product of discrete relata, but instead as 
generative of the relata themselves.2 This 
constitutes an inversion of priority – the last 
chapter looked at relata as producing relations, 
this chapter will look at relations as producing 
the relata. The relation here comes before 
the screen emerges in perception, so that the 
screen-as-relata is a perceptual ‘reaction’ to 
the relations discovered.
Chapter one found that the relation of use 
had a large part to play in how the properties 
of relata are defined, but that the screen’s 
material lay in conflict with its use. The use 
relation, then, is not the most appropriate for 
finding a relational ontology of the screen. 
This tension can be explored further using the 
concept of the ready-to-hand. 
Heidegger gives a definition of things according 
to their relation of use and the context in which 
they arise, as zuhandenheit or readiness-to-
hand. In discussing equipmentality in Being 
and Time, Heidegger notes that equipment is 
always in relation to other equipment. Things 
do not show up on their own, rather they are 
discovered according to an “arrangement” 
of equipment; a context of other things to 
which they refer. A room, states Heidegger, 
is encountered as “equipment for residing,” 
a hammer as equipment for hammering. 
The room itself, or the hammer itself, is 
encountered within this relational context, so 
it is discovered in accordance with the uses 
and contexts to which it refers: “it is in this 
that any ‘individual’ item of equipment shows 
itself. Before it does so, a totality of equipment 
has already been discovered.”3 
Heidegger indicates here that the relation 
between things occurs a priori to the things 
themselves. However there is a difference 
between the ready-to-hand and the type of 
relational approach that will be demonstrated 
in this analysis. Readiness-to-hand belongs 
specifically to the context of equipment, 
and more specifically to the context of use. 
2. In considering relations as prior to relata, this chapter 
focuses on indeterminancy – it tries to find meaning before 
the determination of relata. Brian John Martine outlines that 
such an approach conflicts with the “determinately biased 
models” of common understanding, but that this does 
not mean that indeterminacy is unintelligible. He suggests 
that better understandings can be gained from “making 
a place for a certain indeterminacy.” Brian John Martine, 
Indeterminacy and Intelligibility (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1992), xiii-xiv.
3. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarie 
and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Collins , 1962), 
98. Heidegger writes: “this kind of Being which equipment 
possesses – in which it manifests itself in its own right – we 
call ‘readiness-to-hand’. Only because equipment has this 
‘Being-in-itself’ and does not merely occur, is it manipulable 
in the broadest sense and at our disposal… When we deal 
with them [things] by using them and manipulating them, 
this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by 
which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires 
its specific Thingly character.”
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The hammering does not simply have knowledge 
about the hammer’s character as equipment, but 
it has appropriated this equipment in a way which 
could not possibly be more suitable.
Martin Heidegger4
I don’t use it like I use other things. If I pick it up, it becomes something else – a phone, a  computer. If I look 
at it, it becomes something else – an image, a filter. If I dissect it, it becomes a myriad of things – a wall and a 
motor and a light source and a strip of film or a series of binary notations compressed into an array. I can run 
the motor, I can contemplate the wall, I can touch the phone or type on the computer or look at the image; 
but what is the screen for?
What is a screen for, 
anyway?
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its use in the same way as a tool. The screen 
in its context seems to show a different kind 
of relation to use than the ready-to-hand tool. 
To explain this difference more thoroughly, I 
refer back to the tool relation. The withdrawal 
of the tool into its relation of use – or, perhaps 
more consistently with the structure of a 
relation-based analysis, its failure to surface 
as a thing separate from the use to which it 
is put – is part of human directedness toward 
the world.5 The tool is seen through as intent 
focuses perception on the task at hand – the 
product of the relation. The negation of the 
screen is of a different order – it is not only 
looked through (as the hammer is toward 
the hammering of a nail), but looked at (as 
the smartphone is while held in hand). The 
more the tool is looked at rather than used, 
the less we know of it.6 At this point the tool 
becomes accessible as a relatum – a thing with 
properties that determine how it is useful. 
But this is not so for the screen. Looking at 
the screen is part of its use, and the more the 
screen is looked at, the more it is negated: the 
perceptual terminus remains in the object 
and the space at the same time. Hammering 
Equipment has a type of being related 
specifically to its use and responsible for its 
use. It is because a thing can be used that it is 
called it a thing. In other words, the thing is a 
material expression of the use context in which 
it arises; it is something ‘for’ something. Using 
things thus helps us discover the world of our 
involvement, and, along with it, ourselves as 
involved and equipment per se. Heidegger 
describes readiness-to-hand as a withdrawal 
of the thing from perception in order to be put 
to use.
4. Heidegger, Being and Time, 98.
5. Heidegger outlines the nature of equipment as “something 
in-order-to…” so that a “totality of equipment is constituted 
in various ways of the ‘in-order-to’, such as serviceability, 
conduciveness, usability, manipulability.” The use context 
thus constitutes the thing itself in perception: “In dealings 
such as this, where something is put to use, our concern 
subordinates itself to the ‘in-order-to’ which is constitutive 
for the equipment we are employing at the time.” Heidegger, 
Being and Time, 97-8.
6. “No matter how sharply we just look… at the ‘outward 
appearance’… of Things  in whatever form this takes, we 
cannot discover anything ready-to-hand.” Heidegger, Being 
and Time, 98. 
The ‘disappearance’ of the screen was 
discussed in similar terms to ‘withdrawal’ 
in the last chapter, as a negation. In this 
sense, readiness-to-hand could be considered 
as the relation that allows the screen to be 
contextually placed. The ‘withdrawal’ of the 
ready-to-hand could explain the negation of 
the screen relatum. However, it was not clear 
from chapter one that this is how the screen 
withdraws. The various impacts and actions 
identified in the last chapter mean that what 
the screen is for is not reflected in its material. 
It is not clear that the screen withdraws into 
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In order to be present, any being must persist in time. 
This means the form of the thing – that which makes it 
actual – must be identifiable as the same throughout 
all possible repetitions. But this iterability implies 
that any presence is in its very constitution always 
riven by a radical alterity that makes it impossible 
even as it makes it possible.
Pheng Cheah7
Relata arise from an encounter as the pulling out of a ‘thing’ from a relational field, then referring it back to 
that field – something that happens momentarily, continuously and iteratively. This is a kind of reversal of the 
construction of the object, a bottom-up move where relations spawn things. 
Meaning is carried by these things, and the shared terms that describe them: ‘virtual’, ‘real’, ‘subject’ and 
‘object’. Meaning persists in the sedimentation of the field of relations, the things begin to stand in for the 
field out of which they arose. This is a top-down move where relations happen between pre-existent things. 
If the relata are pulled out, what is left behind?  How are things when they are just their potential?
Design has a strange task in this a-posteriori-a-priori perceptual process ‒ the thing I am interacting with 
arises out of the interaction itself, but has to be brought back in to the beginning of that interaction to form 
Relational design
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exists between the body, hammer, and nail. 
Screening exists within the screen, as the 
screen-as-relatum and space-as-relatum are 
held by the same object anchor. In other words, 
the hammer never becomes the nail; it becomes 
a part of my intentionality toward the world. 
But a television can become a landscape, or a 
building, or another person through which I 
move and to which I respond. In other words, 
the screen always shows what it is not – what 
it shows is outside of its own context.
The implications of  considering the screen 
as ready-to-hand are that it can be used, 
within the context of equipment, towards a 
human aim. But when the screen is ‘used’, it is 
conflated with the space it produces, which lies 
outside of its equipmental context. The human 
is displaced from this production of space. The 
screen does not reveal the world of concern for 
a person, but for itself. 
What relations, then, reveal the screen? 
Looking at the character of the relations entered 
into by relata cannot reveal the character of 
the screen in a relation-based analysis. The 
use relation too easily slips into a reflexive 
relation in which I use something. Although 
the use relation can potentially occur in both 
directions (from the subject to the object, and 
from the object to the subject), it could only do 
so by virtue of the pre-existence of points of the 
relata. An a priori relation needs to be capable 
of generating the very directionality that 
is defined by the relata. The qualities of the 
generative relation will occur in all directions 
at once – not as a multi-directionality of things 
caught in a network and acting toward each 
other, but in the sense that directionality 
surfaces from within relations themselves. 
7. Pheng Cheah, “Non-dialectical Materialism” in New 
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics ed. Dianna 
Coole and Samantha Frost (London: Duke University Press, 
2010), 74. 
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its basis in the first place; just as I do, as the reflexive subject. But if I am designing a thing for someone else to 
interact with, I am trying to fix this process for them. I am trying to call forth a thing for them, and am giving 
the thing itself the task of communicating this intent.
Design is, conventionally, a relata-based discipline. I design for the form or function of a thing, and so I assume 
a predetermined subject, object and space. I have already overtaken the point at which the thing is effectual. 
How can I design for generative relations?  Is there a role of design in finding the excess of the thing?
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a space. Within this first distinction, a second 
doubling occurred – into the screen effective 
and affected, and into the screen subsumed 
into the virtual and the screen stubbornly 
real. Rather than being an action unique to 
the screen and its ontology, this doubling was 
connected to the method of analysis, which 
the screen made uniquely apparent. Distance 
was introduced between relata by virtue 
of finding these relata across a difference. 
When considered in terms of the screen, this 
distance had a certain character. In both of the 
dichotomies discussed, issues of materiality 
and agency defined the difference between 
relata. But this distance was part of the 
assumption of the analysis; it was taken for 
granted.
Rather than approaching distance as an a 
priori entity, a process of distancing can be 
found which corresponds to the creation of a 
difference within relations. The last chapter 
discussed Baudrillard’s idea that simulation 
threatens the relata-based system of 
meaning – of defining a relata according to its 
dichotomous other – by collapsing the real into 
the virtual. Baudrillard seems to approach 
this as a negation of pre-existent difference, 
a difference that itself accounts for meaning.8
If the relation pre-exists and constitutes 
the relata, then the relata are revealed by 
the relation together. The relations that are 
responsible for the screen appearing as such 
in perception, then, need to be able to generate 
the subject and object, real and virtual 
concurrently. The relation is, in this sense, 
a difference out of which the two poles of the 
relata are generated. 
Finding what creates this distance involves 
considering how the relata of the previous 
chapter were different from one another, then 
looking for how this distance is created. Two 
differences repeatedly arose in descriptions 
of the oppositions of relata – agency and 
materiality. This section will carry these 
relations forward and understand them as 
generative. That is, rather than approaching 
agency and materiality as properties of relata, 
they will be considered as forces which produce 
a difference, thereby distancing and defining 
relata. 
The first step in this process is to find how 
the difference between the relata is defined. 
The previous chapter found that the screen-
as-relatum was doubled, then doubled again. 
This doubling first occurred into a screen that 
opposed a subject and a screen that opposed 
8. Baudrillard remarks that the TV must be conceived “as an 
effect in which the opposing poles of determination vanish, 
according to a nuclear contraction, retraction, of the old 
polar schema that always maintained a minimal distance 
between cause and effect, between subject and object: 
precisely the distance of meaning, the gap, the difference… 
irreducible under pain of reabsorption into an aleatory 
and indeterminate process whose discourse can no longer 
account for it.” Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 
trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994), 31.
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Here, of course, the underlying assumption was that 
they had some fundamental characteristics that 
could be described independently of their relations 
to one another.
Brian John Martine10
Relata are defined by what they are not. But I can never know this thing that things are not. All sorts of things 
are not a screen – coffee cups, water, hammers, Pluto. But what is a non-screen? 
Determinacy makes the indeterminate its own abstract entity. I have no access to this entity. The otherness 
of the screen, all the things it is not (and so, conversely, what it is) is not accessible in its own right.  I can 
meet a sort-of screen, something that looks like a screen or acts like a screen or has a screen along with other 
things. These aren’t really screens, but they have screen-like tendencies. They are close to the screen, they 
are related. The screen is defined by what it is not: the non-screen. But everything that others the screen is 
related to it. 
I can never meet a non-screen.
Similarity and difference
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However, if the directionality of this statement 
is reversed, if the pre-existence of the “distance 
of meaning” is questioned, the television could 
instead be considered as refusing to reveal 
this distance simply. The distance between 
relata in screenic ontology is revealed in many, 
often contradictory, ways so that dichotomies 
cannot be simply resolved. Baudrillard sees 
this as an abolition of the relation because 
it calls causality into question.9 It could 
instead be approached as an expression of the 
relation’s power – not the reflexive relation of 
causality, but the generative relations out of 
9. Baudrillard writes that “indeterminacy is ... the abolition, 
pure and simple, of the relation.” Baudrillard’s relation is 
a reflexive relation. It relies firstly on determination as the 
origin of cause and effect, and thereby meaning. With the 
television, however, “there is no longer the transversal of an 
effect, of an energy, of a determination.” Simulation begins 
in this movement as value is no longer held in the relation 
between things; and without things as origins of cause and 
effect, the world is unintelligible . Baudrillard, Simulacra and 
Simulation, 31.
10. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 1. 
which the relata are formed. Distancing, as a 
relational process, could be seen as so effective 
in this scenario that distance is revealed 
simultaneously in contradictory directions.
In this sense, the relational context presents 
itself as an effective device by which to 
examine screen ontology. To do so, materiality 
and agency – the terms by which the distance 
between the relata of subject and object, 
virtual and real are defined – will need to be 
re-defined as processes, of means of creating 
difference and thereby creating relata.
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Fig 20. A Stretched Plane.
145
Viewing relations in this way presents a 
different kind of figure to the axis. Without the 
points of definition of the relata, relations begin 
as a plane or a surface. The qualities of these 
relations are not defined or quantified as they 
are indeterminate, existing only as relational 
possibilities. Generative relations resist 
determinability because they cannot easily be 
assigned to a particular object or form. They 
belong to a processual rather than formal code 
of understanding. In this sense, the plane is 
homogenous. There is no determinate thing 
presented, because there is no difference by 
which that thing might be defined. As Martine 
comments, “no determinate position of any 
kind can be marked out without an intelligible 
other.”11 
If the figure of relations is left here, it is 
impossible to say anything meaningful about 
the screen’s ontology. It is impossible to say, 
in fact, that there is a screen, or indeed, 
anything at all.12 However that does not mean 
that this relational surface is inaccessible 
or unintelligible. The relational surface is 
not be phenomenally knowable; it is unable 
to be seen or touched. Moreover, the screen 
relatum cannot give access to the relations 
that produce it. This surface does remain 
accessible, though, through difference. Once 
a disturbance is made in the plane, qualities 
can be identified through the differences 
between them. Such a disturbance can reveal 
the nature of the relational surface – that is, it 
can show how difference arises as well as the 
difference per se.
This disturbance needs to be performed in 
a particular way. Drawing up of the surface 
at certain points would only reveal the same 
relata – points within the surface would be 
selected for consideration, and the relational 
surface would fall back into the background. 
The intentional nature of an action of drawing 
out would interfere with its aims.13 To keep 
hold of the relational surface, it should 
instead be pushed at points of tension. Such 
a move would stretch the surface, allowing it 
to react and throw relata back in response to 
provocation. In this way, “the indeterminate 
comes to the fore as the ground out of which 
the determinate systemic account has arisen 
in the first place,” and the nature of the 
relations can be better understood.14
The figure of the relational surface has 
a temporality that was absent from the 
figure of the relata. It involves a moment of 
movement and reaction. The intent of this 
chapter is to explore points of tension in the 
relational surface, and to push a reaction; to 
provoke new sets of relata from the relational 
plane. As these new relata are revealed, 
11. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 22.
12. Relata only arise after determination. Determinations are 
made by referring one thing to its ‘other’. This process is 
reliant on difference. If determinations are made across 
differences in the relational plane, a still and homogenous 
plane cannot produce relata. 
13. Drawing out relata would mean “re-separating – for reflective 
inspection – a logical element from a larger framework to 
which it nonetheless continues to be bound.” In making this 
selection, the larger framework cannot be revealed, and it 
becomes “all too easy to treat a term so abstracted as if it had 
a genuinely independent character.” Martine, Indeterminacy 
and Intelligibility, 49.
14. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 16.
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The task before us is not simply to make things or to 
resolve relations into things, more and more minutely 
framed and microscopically understood; rather, 
it may be to liberate matter from the constraint, 
the practicality, the utility of the thing, to orient 
technology not so much to knowing and mediating 
as to experience and the rich indeterminacy of 
duration.
Elizabeth Grosz15
What is designed in an object? Is it that object’s purpose, its use, and a form that allows this to take place? Is 
it the screen-bearing object that is designed, that which allows the ‘screen’ to be revealed? A designer makes 
a form makes an effect. The thing becomes a vehicle for the designer’s intended experience. But how can this 
show us a relational field?
There are four causes, four ways in which things are created – the material of the thing, the form of the 
thing, the end to which a thing is put, and its means of production. Together these ‘cause’ the thing.16 If the 
thing is made in these causes, then what does the designer do? Do they set themselves outside this process, 
controlling it externally? To access the thing as it is not, rather than the thing as it is accepted to be, asks for a 
displacement of design intent. The process can’t be fixed, it can’t be driven purely from outside.
Gaze Returner and Moubie are an interrogation.  They strike at a particular point in the screen’s relational 
field while having very little to do with it, stretching it a little so that it might produce something else, some 
alternative relata that is almost a screen, but not quite. These alternative relata might not be ‘screens’, 
nevertheless they emerge from the field of possibilities that defines the screen. In trying to describe the 
relation more fully, they forbid themselves from emerging as the screen. They show a non-identity with the 
screen.
Gaze Returner and Moubie use three strategies to design from the inside: an anti-function, an anti-aesthetic 
and a limited intent.
Designing to stretch
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so too might something be revealed of the 
relational plane itself. Discursively, this will 
be done by exploring definitions of agency and 
materiality as processes and using these to 
discuss the screen as something that arises 
in perception. That is, the relata of the screen 
will be positioned as a perceptual reaction to 
a point of tensions in material and agential 
processes. Two created things, Gaze Returner 
and Moubie, will work within this structure as 
moments of deformation in the ontology of the 
screen. 
15. Elizabeth Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, 182-3.
16. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger outlines 
poesis: “there are four accepted causes – the materiality out 
of which a thing is made (causa materialis); the form of the 
thing (causa formalis); the end to which a thing is made/ its 
use (causa finalis); and the way it is brought about/means 
of production (causa efficiens).“ Martin Heidegger, The 
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, Trans. 
William Lovitt, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 6. The 
four causes responsible for the appearance of the thing as 
itself and are united in poesis. The role of the craftsman in 
this is as one who “reveals what is to be brought forth.” Ibid, 
6.
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Anti-function steers away from use and towards function’s excess. Otherness, alterity, cuteness and incidental 
engagement are created, and these contest the “for” of screening. These ancillary behaviours of the object 
interrupt the way that the screen is revealed by showing different relations – between screen and body, and 
screen and space. Gaze Returner is driven by sight lines – its own and that of the interactant. Functionality is 
considered in terms of these new relations only, not in terms of achieving an intentful aim. 
However, a lack of functionality doesn’t imply a formal emphasis. Aesthetics are not so far from a function 
in themselves. An anti-aesthetic approach is also taken, so that the form of the object is steered by its own 
requirements. The orientation of components and the materiality of processes drove Moubie to look as he 
does, his minimal skeleton a support more than an enclosure. 
I am trying to limit the impact of my design intent. I certainly have reasons behind making these objects. They 
are intended in the sense that they need to do certain things. But in keeping them as simple and unformed as 
possible, I am hoping they can’t be ‘read’, that they can’t fall easily into the assumptions of a known relatum.17 
I am hoping that, in not intending them to be taken in a certain way, intending them for human use or human 
desire, they will be able to express themselves. I hope to “let the jug’s void be its own void.”18 If a thing is as it 
is made, an indeterminate design process should produce an indeterminate thing. For this reason, my intent 
is to negotiate, so that the developing object can have its own role in the design process. 
In this way, the screen thing might remain open enough to suggest a host of new relations, and the limits of 
‘screen’ might emerge differently. The non-screen, the field of relations that throws the screen out as relatum, 
might be glimpsed in something that is a screen, but is also not a screen. But it is a paradox – designing out 
the designer, willing a lack of intent, creating for another’s self-creation. 
Is indeterminate design possible? 
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17. This approach is intended to keep open the determination 
that comes quickly in knowing an object ‘type’. Grosz holds 
that determination is necessary to provide for action: “The 
possibility of action requires that objects and their relations 
remain as simplified as possible, as coagulated, unified and 
massive as they can be so that their contour and outlines, 
their surfaces, most readily promote indeterminate action” 
Elizabeth Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, 172. By 
keeping objects simple, the scope of use is broadened, and 
can be explored rather than assumed.
18. Martin Heidegger, “The Thing” in Poetry, Language and 
Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1971, 169.
Fig 22. Self Dimensioning.






Fig 23. Difference and Order.
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REVEALING THE SCREEN 
19. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, “Introducing the new 
materialisms” in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and 
Politics ed. Dianna Coole and Samantha Frost  (London: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 1-2.
Approaching materiality and agency as 
generative forces rather than the properties of 
discrete relata requires a change of definition. 
These entities can no longer be seen as static, 
determinate things, fixed to the object and the 
subject respectively; they must be approached 
as processes. I will now explore materiality 
and agency as processes to come to an 
understanding of how material and agency (or 
to use more processual terms, materialisation 
and agentialisation) might generate the 
ontological condition of the screen. This 
exploration will begin by reframing materiality 
as a process that generates ‘inert’ material, and 
the impact of this conception of materiality on 
screen ontology.  It will then perform a similar 
task for agency, reframing agency as a process 
that is able to generate an agential material 
rather than discrete subjects. These relations 
will then be examined in terms of the relata 
they generate – that is, how the screen can 
be determined from agency and materiality 
as processes. The exploration will end with 
a discussion of what is left in excess in this 
determination, and the role of the use-less in 
provoking screenic relations.
Materiality, materialisation and the screen
Chapter one found that the subject—object and 
virtual—real dichotomies were both reliant, in 
part, on a difference in materiality. The screen 
acted upon materiality and was acted upon as 
material. I will try to show a different sort 
of materiality here, one that generates the 
screen rather than belonging to it as action or 
property. This section will begin by looking at 
the distance introduced by materiality. It will 
then use ideas from Diana Coole and Giuliana 
Bruno to discuss materialisation as it relates 
to the screen, and introduce Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s conception of embodiment to relate this 
process back to the generation of the subject-
object dichotomy. The section concludes with 
a discussion of the impact of this conception of 
screenic materiality on agency. 
Material distance
The materiality of things is difficult to attend 
to. As Coole and Frost observe, “there is an 
apparent paradox in thinking about matter: as 
soon as we do so, we seem to distance ourselves 
from it, and within that space that opens up, 
a host of immaterial things seem to emerge.”19 
These immaterial things, amongst which Coole 
and Frost list subjectivity and agency, are 
then taken as “fundamentally different” from 
matter because they arose from a distance 
with it. This spacing was shown in the relata-
based analysis: as the material screen was 
considered in terms of its effects, it began to be 
understood instead according to nonmaterial 
properties – social forces, representations and 
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so on. Moreover, because of this spacing, the 
material screen could only be seen as inert 
and static. The distance that opens around the 
screen is equal to the distance between active 
intent and passive material. 
This distance, however, did not quite work in 
providing an understanding of the screen. The 
relata-based analysis found that the screen 
impacted matter by ‘de-realisation’, a taking-
away of matter from the subject’s use. Yet this 
dematerialisation happened to the screen at 
the same time as the screen performed it. A 
material difference that happens both to and 
from the screen suggests that the screen has 
a role to play in generating materiality at the 
same time as being generated by materiality. 
The material difference that opens around the 
screen is bidirectional, it happens to and from 
the screen at the same time. This suggests 
that the materiality of the screen may be more 
complex than the relatum-based definition of 
matter implies.
To explore material according to the 
assumptions of a relation-based analysis, the 
familiar world of inert things, ready to be put 
to use, must somehow arise in perception. 
There must be an underlying relation that 
reveals inert matter, a relation that itself 
would be both hidden and generative. Diana 
Coole describes materiality in such processual 
terms. I will use her essay “The Inertia of 
Matter and the Generativity of Flesh” here 
to redefine the materiality of the relata-based 
chapter as a generative relation.
20. Diana Coole, “The Inertia of Matter and the Generativity of 
Flesh” in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics 
ed. Dianna Coole and Samantha Frost  (London: Duke 
University Press, 2010), 104.
21. Merleau-Ponty traces the distinction between natura 
naturans and natura naturata to Averroes, an Andalsuian-
Arab philosopher. Coole, “The Inertia of Matter,” 97. Spinoza’s 
discussion of the terms as substance and cause (naturans) 
and effect and mode (naturata) are said by Deleuze to be 
immanently connected: “the cause remains in itself in order 
to produce… the effect or product remains in the cause.” 
Gilles Deleuze. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert 
Hurley (San Franciso: City Lights Books, 1988), 92-3.
Generative materiality
Coole notes that the generation of this 
familiar material world is not often accessible, 
as “we rarely pause to consider the contingent 
processes through which our familiar, visible 
world comes into being.”20 Coole addresses 
this generative relation, which she refers to 
as the “creative contingencies of perception” 
firstly by introducing a distinction between 
natura naturans and natura naturata. This 
distinction arises in Spinoza’s philosophy 
as distinguishing between process and 
product, between nature naturing and nature 
natured.21 Although the terms have been 
used as a differentiation between the organic 
(self-generating) and inorganic (inert) stuff of 
nature, Coole develops these active and passive 
senses of nature into a definition of materiality 
as an active process. The distinction between 
naturans and naturata effectively questions 
the assumption that matter is inert, indicating 
that the process of matter’s production is an 
active materiality.  
Coole attempts to reunite the process and 
product of matter, and focuses particularly 
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generative force of naturans in a material 
way. Rather than introduce a generative 
materiality as a mystical and unknowable 
force aligned with theology; Merleau-Ponty 
grounded materiality within immanent, 
everyday life. A focus on embodied perception 
allowed Merleau-Ponty to propose a subject 
that is enmeshed in materiality, and a material 
world that generates this subjectivity. 
I will return shortly to consider the role of 
Merleau-Ponty’s embodied perception in the 
material relation more thoroughly. Firstly, 
though, I would like to note that the materiality 
described by Coole shows a significant change 
in the direction of the argument. In chapter 
one, the object and subject produced a 
material relation. Here, the material relation 
arises across a difference in materiality, and 
generates the subject and object according 
to this difference. Materiality generates the 
relata of the ‘active’ subject and the ‘inert’ 
material with which they interact. Thinking 
of materiality as a process that generates 
relata poses problems for understanding the 
screen. The screen was found as relata only in 
its perceptual negation – it lacked an ‘inert’ 
material. For the screen to be generated by a 
process of materiality, materiality as a process 
would have to be capable of generating this 
lack of material as well as the static material 
of objects. 
Inert screens and ongoing screening
One way of addressing this conflict of 
materiality is to refer to the active form of 
the screen – the screen in screening. The verb 
has implications of sorting and ordering, of 
allowing certain things through and others 
not. Last chapter, this aspect was defined in 
terms of the screening of sensorial information. 
This approach relied on a conception of 
sensory perception as the reception of relata – 
discrete packets of sensorial information that 
pass through a filter. Such a definition is not 
appropriate in a relation-based analysis as it 
frames perception as passive.
Giuliana Bruno, on the other hand, suggests 
that screening has a generative form, in that 
it produces a new materiality from something 
else. Although she presents this as a reflexive 
process, a “mediation between subjects and 
with objects,” there is a sense in which Bruno’s 
screening materiality is generative, in that it 
“involves a refashioning of our sense of space 
and contact with the environment, as well as 
a rethreading of our experience of temporality, 
interiority and subjectivity.”22 Bruno’s screen 
‘screens’ the senses by refashioning spatial 
experience. It shapes materiality in a way that 
suggests it is itself inside material processes, 
that it has a role to play in bringing about 
‘inert’ materials.
Understanding the screen as generating 
materiality requires a particular view of the 
‘inert’ material as relatum. Bruno’s screen is a 
composite of the ‘real’ material of the surface 
and the ‘virtual’ materiality of the image. 
22. Giuliana Bruno, Surface: Matters of Aesthetics, Materiality 




‘Material’ is thus defined as a condition 
rather than a property. It is not the texture 
or composition of the surface that is regarded 
as material, but the surface as “activating 
material relations.”23 This reveals a potential 
mechanism for the screen’s negation – the 
screen reveals a reorientation of materiality, 
and brings into focus materiality as a virtual 
process. 
The material of the screen is not ‘virtual’ in 
the sense that it ‘belongs’ to the immaterial 
image as the relata-based analysis found; 
rather it is virtual in the sense that the 
process of materialisation exists as a set of 
relational possibilities.24 If materiality is a 
relational process that brings about material 
‘things’, then the relation ends in an act of 
determination – in the formation of relata. 
Before this determination, materiality is 
indeterminate, it is the possibility of things 
rather than the things themselves. The screen 
participates in generating materiality at this 
point, before the determination of relata. 
It is only in performing the determination 
that these possibilities become actualised.25 
The generative relation of materiality is, 
in this sense, a virtual condition. This 
may be the sense in which Bruno declares 
that “in the digital age, materiality can be 
reactivated, because it was always a virtual 
condition.”26 Materiality in this generative 
sense hides behind the clearly defined relata 
that it generates, as these are what remain 
accessible in perception. But the screen resists 
determination as a relatum, and so draws 
23. Bruno, Surface, 8.
24. The term ‘virtual’ will be used in a number of ways in this 
chapter – to refer to the relatum of the virtual, to refer to 
possibilities for action, and to refer to things as we perceive 
them. In this case, the term ‘virtual’ refers to an underlying 
possibility that has not (yet) been enacted. The term is thus 
used here in a similar sense to Manuel DeLanda, as a set 
of “dispositions, tendencies and capacities that are virtual 
(real but not actual) when not being currently manifested or 
exercised.” Manuel DeLanda, Assemblage Theory (Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 108.
25. Determination involves the drawing out of relata as a 
set of properties. In the action of “making-determinate,” 
boundaries are established around things and they become 
‘actual entities. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 
32-37.
26. Bruno, Surface, 8.
attention to the process of materialisation by 
refusing to become static material. The ‘inert’ 
material of the screen can only be seen from 
outside the generative material relation in 
which it participates.
The screen participates in an ongoing 
materialisation at the same time as it lies 
outside of this process. In as far as the 
screen generates materiality and refuses to 
become material, screening becomes an act of 
materialisation in itself. This understanding 
leads towards a conception of the screen that 
defines it according to its mode of production – 
the spaces it produces rather than how it itself 
comes about in perception. That is, we lose 
sight of the experience of the screen again. 
How can the screen be generated from within 
materiality even as it generates it?
Material reciprocity, person and screen
Questions about the role of the screen 
in materiality prompt an exploration of 
reciprocity within material relations. So far, 
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this chapter has reframed materiality as a 
process, and found that the screen relatum 
surfaces from an ongoing material relation as 
an ‘inert’ object, but it also participates in the 
ongoing material relation. Referring back to 
the assumptions of the analysis, materiality 
as a process needs to be capable of generating 
the subject relatum from these relations at 
the same time as the object relatum. The 
dual positioning of the screen as both inside 
and outside materiality introduces a paradox 
for the subject: materiality brings forth the 
object and the subject as relata at once as an 
active material relation. But the screen also 
materialises spaces and materials as part of 
what it produces. The subject must be found 
alongside these materials as well. Screenic 
materiality asks for a perceptual split, so that 
the ‘subject’ as relatum can be found alongside 
the static object of the screen at the same time 
as it is found alongside the material produced 
by the screen.
Just as the material screen is found outside 
of materialisation as a static object and inside 
as an active process; so the materiality of the 
subject, the embodied person, needs to be 
found as the static, external subject and from 
within an active process of materialisation. 
To establish a mechanism for this dual 
subjectivity, I will return now to Merleau-
Ponty’s ideas about embodied perception, and 
its role in materially situating people. Rather 
than consider the person who finds themselves 
alongside these screens as an immaterial 
subjectivity based on agency or intent, I will 
consider this person in terms of embodiment.
27. Merleau-Ponty writes: “To say that it is still me who 
conceives of myself as situated in a body and as furnished 
with five senses is clearly only a verbal solution; since I am 
reflecting, I cannot recognize myself in this embodied I, 
since embodiment then remains in principle an illusion and 
the possibility of this illusion remains incomprehensible.” 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 
trans. Donald A Landes (London: Routledge, 2012), 221.
28. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 84; 95.
Embodiment inside and outside materiality
Merleau-Ponty sees the body as the locus of 
material relations. He shows the body as 
something generative as well as something 
found reflexively, saying that a knowledge of 
the body as one’s own materiality is different 
from the experience of embodiment itself.27 
The body that spatialises and perceives 
within material relations is not the body that 
is known or found from these relations. The 
first is a body that “is the unperceived term 
at the center of the world,” the second a body 
of which a person is conscious “through the 
world.” The body within material relations, 
then, is unknowable. The body per se or body—
as—relatum are found reflexively as an “object 
of the world”; but the body within material 
relations is a “means of communication” with 
the world.28 If this first body is within the 
relation of materiality, it is cast out of it as 
the second, stable and reflexive body. In this 
sense, the embodied subject is found along 
with the material, as a casting out of the 
material relation. Merleau-Ponty makes a 
point of holding these two conceptions of the 
body apart. 
When considering the screen in terms of the 
body inside and the body outside of materiality, 
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it becomes apparent that the reflexive body 
found facing the screen may be a different sort 
of body to the one that was directed toward 
the screen in the first place. Holding these two 
bodies apart can provoke an uncomfortable 
experience. 
Lynda Benglis’ On Screen (1972), for example, 
comments on the ways that bodies are found 
within and outside of the screen. Amelia 
Jones discusses the work in “Televisual Flesh: 
Activating Otherness in New Media Art.” She 
describes a televisual work in which the camera 
telescopes out from various images of the artist, 
each nested within the others, “until, in the 
end, we realize we are watching two (or three?) 
televisual screens embedded in the monitor 
hovering in our space.” This disruption of the 
frame, claims Jones, persuades the viewer to 
“begin to feel that we ourselves might be at 
any moment ‘turned off’ as part of an even 
larger televisual transmission, framed by a 
monitor we weren’t aware of until now.”29 The 
nested bodies and spaces of the work threaten 
the situatedness of the viewer, who is finding 
their ongoing material embodiment against 
constant shifts in spatial situations generated 
by the screen. At the same time, the viewer 
is aware of their situated and stable body 
outside of these constantly shifting material 
relations. The reflexive body found by the 
viewer of Benglis’ work is unstable, threatened 
by nested interactions within the space of her 
image and the space outside of it. Benglis’ 
work exacerbates the process of finding the 
reflexive body against the ongoing process 
of materialisation of the other side, to such 
an extent that it unsettles the pre-reflexive 
directedness of self toward world. 
This discussion has shown that embodiment 
has a dual role. As the perceptual centre, it 
plays a role in bringing forth materiality. 
This first role for the body is a “corporeality 
that is privileged as naturans”; a generative 
embodiment through which “productive 
difference and agentic capacity emerge.”30 
The body is active in this sense, constantly 
participating in the process of materiality by 
enacted engagement with the world.31 There 
is also a sense of the body as a reflexive 
recognition of a person’s own ‘inert’ or situated 
materiality. The body in this second sense 
acts as a material residue which positions and 
places the self. The body is present both as 
a reflexive materiality and as separate from 
other reflexive materialities. A difference is 
opened that reveals the body at the same time 
as it reveals the body’s excess. 
29. Amelia Jones, “Televisual Flesh: Activating Otherness in New 
Media Art,” Parachute 113 (Jan. 2004): 72.
30. Coole, “The Inertia of Matter,” 102.
31. Hayles has an interesting take on the role of human 
embodiment in materiality. She states: “Materiality for me is 
also a hybrid. But it’s a hybrid between human cognition and 
physical characteristics.” N. Katherine Hayles and Stephen 
B Crofts Wiley.  “Media, Materiality, and the Human: A 
conversation with N. Katherine Hayles” in Communication 
Matters:  Materialist approaches to media, mobility and 
networks, ed. Jeremy Packer and Stephen B Crofts Wiley 
(London: Routledge, 2012), 18. Cognition, for Hayles, is 
not separated, Cartesian function, but a “much broader 
cognitive function depending for its specificities on the 
embodied form in acting it.” N. Katherine Hayles, How We 
Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, 
and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 
xiv. In this way, Hayles defines a relation between materials 
that generates materiality.
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Fig 25. Split Embodiment.
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Body and screen, screen and body
The dual role of embodiment is contingent on 
material processes in the same way as the ‘inert’ 
material of the object. Merleau-Ponty notes 
the contingent relation of body and material 
in saying that the world becomes available as 
an ambiguous relationship “between beings 
who are both embodied and limited and an 
enigmatic world… in which every object 
displays the human face it acquires in a 
human gaze.”32 The discovery of the material 
thing occurs alongside the discovery our own 
materiality. The material body, then, is one 
side of a difference in material relations. This 
conjoined nature of body and material is more 
than the body ‘being made of’ material – the 
body can only surface because the material 
world does, and vice versa.
An interesting complexity arises when 
considering this material reciprocity in terms 
of the screen. Whether a lattice or television, 
the ‘other’ side is generated as the screen 
surfaces as relata. With the lattice, this ‘other’ 
side is discovered as being divided; with the 
television, it is discovered as being produced. 
But neither pre-exists the discovery of the 
screen. The generative body finds two material 
relations – the material object of the screen 
and the materiality of the ‘other’ side. The 
object of the screen, the support or frame that 
has been cast out as relatum, appears as static. 
The reflexive body is found alongside this fixed 
object, which can easily become a perceptual 
relic of materialisation in a similar way to 
any other object. But the ‘other’ side continues 
to materialise as its static support remains 
unchanged. The movement of this produced 
space ensures it continues within the process of 
materialisation. The body remains generative 
within this space, it remains engaged in the 
process of materialisation. Yet the material 
object of the screen, and the reflexive body 
that arose with it, works against this ongoing 
materialisation. It sits outside of this relation 
at the same time as producing it. 
The matter of the screen is in competition with 
the screen’s ongoing use because it divides off 
a stable, fixed body from an embodiment that 
continues to be involved in a generative process 
on the ‘other’ side of the screen. The materiality 
of this produced and producing space counters 
the materiality of the static screen object (and 
so the fixed and stable body it corresponds 
to), constantly replacing it with a new relic 
of materialisation (each corresponding to 
a new body). This split between the static 
and the constantly refreshing needs to be 
remedied within perception, so that the person 
engaging can find a stable, situated reflexive 
embodiment. The body is found from within 
this second, ongoing materialisation at the 
same time as remaining outside of it with the 
screen—object.33
32. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception, trans. 
Oliver Davis. (London: Routledge, 2004), 69-70. 
33. Vivian Sobchack describes this experience in cinema saying 
that the film, as an Other, stands both with and against the 
viewer. With, in the sense that the camera stands in for the 
eye of the viewer in joint experience; and against in the sense 
that there is something always missing that reminds the 
viewer of their lack of access. Vivian Sobchack, The Address 
of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 9-10.
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Material competition and the screen
The ways in which these two reflexive and 
ongoing materialities are resolved into a single 
‘object’, and a single embodied context along 
with it, is dependent on how they arise and 
interact. Bruno’s remapping of materiality 
approaches this kind of active materialisation 
across the television. She states that the 
materiality of stone, for instance, can be 
transferred to other mediums, such as film.34 
Experience suggests that the right image of 
stone can produce an emotive affect similar 
to the presence of the stone on the body.
The perceptual mechanisms by which these 
two materials are found are similar. But it 
remains that the materiality of a virtual stone 
is supported by a different materiality.35 This 
second materiality corresponds to a second 
reflexive body. Whether this difference results 
in a qualitatively ‘different’ materiality of 
stone, or whether this materiality can remains 
as ‘stone’, relies heavily on the context of the 
second materiality – it relies on the interaction 
between reflexively-found materialities of the 
screen. If this second materiality is, itself, 
active; if it does not disappear into the first 
materiality; it becomes harder to approach the 
materiality of the image as though it were the 
very thing it represents.
Niklas Roy delicately expresses the tension 
between the screen as ‘inert’ material and its 
role in generating ongoing materialisations 
in the space it separates in My Little Piece of 
Privacy (2010). Rather than fixing a standard 
privacy curtain across his workshop window 
34. Bruno wirtes: “The material of stone does not disappear 
with the new media of modernity. Stone can have a different 
presence: its materiality can be transferred into the virtual 
forms of the photographic and the filmic. The physicality of 
the thing one can touch does not vanish when the tectonics 
of stone is gone, or when the time of celluloid has passed; 
it can morph culturally, transmuting into another medium.” 
Bruno, Surface, 134.
35. Haptic visuality in this sense is defined in relation to optic 
visuality rather than touch itself. The materiality of the 
stone-image would, for example, be significantly different 
from that of the tectonics of stone, assuming Bruno is using 
the word in its architectural sense, should the person-stone 
encounter involve the making of a blunt instrument for 
hunting. Similarly, it is unclear whether an emotive effect 
such as ‘solidity’ or ‘coldness’ relies on stone’s historical 
materiality – that is whether, if stone had always only been 
present as an image, ‘solidity’ and ‘coldness’ would present 
themselves as affective meanings.
36. Niklas Roy, My Little Piece of Privacy, accessed August 31, 
2017, http://www.niklasroy.com/project/88/my-little-piece-
of-privacy/.
to obscure the workshop from passers-by, Roy 
began to explore the relation of screening by 
obscuring the passers-by from the workshop. 
He did so by installing a “small but smart” 
curtain that uses a servo motor, surveillance 
camera and Processing to move along a 
track, following passers-by as they cross the 
window.36 The installation disrupts a simple 
relation of the use of screening with a clear 
bias, deliberately expressing its use in an 
unexpected way. It inverts the idea of static 
screening by making a privacy curtain active. 
The screening is for the space rather than 
the passer by – the activity of the sliding 
curtain makes it clear that Roy’s workshop 
is screening out passers by rather than being 
screened from them.
The object of Roy’s curtain is no longer slow and 
fixed, but engaged with the body of the passer 
by. The ongoing materialisation in which 
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embodiment is engaged is no longer within 
the space beyond the curtain, and beyond the 
window it sits in, but with the curtain itself. 
Roy reflects on this relation, saying that the 
curtain has failed because it is too engaged 
in its task, and that attracts attention rather 
than protecting Roy’s privacy.37 The curtain 
makes clear to the passer-by that they are 
a situated body by expressing an active and 
reciprocal materiality, which places itself 
alongside them. It is because of the curtain’s 
activity that the materiality of the curtain 
comes into question. Because the second 
‘inert’ material appears more actively than the 
ongoing materialisation of Roy’s workshop – 
the space to the other side – it holds a greater 
influence over the ‘subject’ that is reflexively 
found within this relation.
A separate place?
Chapter one discussed the relata of the real 
and virtual as fundamentally different. The 
‘real’ space to this side of the screen was 
separate from the ‘virtual’ space to that side of 
the screen. Considered in terms of the relation 
of materiality, however, both this side and that 
side of the screen are resolved into a single, 
reflexive situatedness. If the body is considered 
as a form of placement and positioning, and 
is found alongside the screen—object as well 
as alongside the screen—image, can these 
be considered as separate places? It makes 
little sense to discuss a spatial divide from 
within the material relation, as the ‘virtual’ 
arises from the same relation of materiality 
as the ‘real’. The ‘virtual’ and the ‘real’ can 
37. Roy writes: “In the end, it does not protect my privacy at all. 
It seems that the existence of my little curtain is leading itself 
ad absurdum, simply by doing its job very well. My moving 
curtain attracts the looks of people which usually would 
never care about my window… My curtain is just engaged. 
And because of that, it fails.” Roy, My Little Piece of Privacy.
38. The term ‘virtual’ is used differently here to our last 
encounter with it. In the first case – where the virtual refers 
to a generative space – the term is used to hold the same 
meaning as chapter one: of Friedberg’s definition of the 
virtual as “possessing a power of acting without the agency 
of matter.” Anne Friedberg, The Virtual Window: From Alberti 
to Microsoft (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 8. In the second 
case – where the virtual is a projection of an underlying 
process – the term ‘virtual’ refers to things as we perceive 
them, to relata. The term is used in this second sense in a 
similar sense to Grosz’s assertion that the real is constituted 
of a “plethora of vibrations and processes,” and that this real 
is “carved out” into objects on which we can act. Elizabeth 
Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, 175.
be considered at the same time from opposite 
directions. Is the static world of determined 
relata – the reflexive body and the material 
screen – the real, and the generative space 
behind it the virtual? Or is the space divided 
off by the screen real because it persists in 
ongoing relational engagement, and the fixed 
material screen merely a virtual projection 
of this real process?38 The screen as an object 
and the screen as a produced space are both 
real, both virtual, because their materiality 
is in both cases a matter of perceptual and 
relational engagement. 
Considering the body as a person’s materiality 
also has some interesting implications for 
generative materiality. Rather than the human 
being the centre out of which the material 
world is created, embodiment is placed on 
equal standing with the material. This is 
not intended to deny the role of embodied 
interaction in phenomenological worlding, but 
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“Even the humblest forms of matter and energy have 
the potential for self-organisation”
Jane Bennett43Autopoesis
Can objects form themselves? What are they before they form themselves? Autopoesis is a mechanism 
reserved for the lively, things that develop and maintain themselves. Cells respond to hormone gradients 
and differentiate to form organs. They make more cells and remain cells, but they remain cells of organs. The 
autopoetic thing uses its environment for its self maintenance and self growth, it organises itself.44
A thing that shows autopoesis is for-itself, has a stake in bringing itself about. Does the designer interrupt the 
thing in wilfully swaying it away from itself, in causing it to develop it differently?
Moubie wasn’t exactly brought about by me, though I asked certain things of him to begin with. I asked him to 
express and communicate his own relation to space. Moubie’s ‘organs’, his components, were determined from 
these requests: wheels to move, a motor to drive them; a camera to see, LEDs and an LCD to communicate. I 
Fig 26. Thing-driven Aesthetic. [Video, 00:16].
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instead frames this role as itself contingent on 
a relation of materiality. As well as bringing 
forth the world, the body is brought forth along 
with the world. As Bennett succinctly states, 
“what is manifest arrives through humans but 
not entirely because of them.”39 The embodied 
human, as the epicentre of the world, does 
bring forth the world as relata by ordering. But 
ordering can only happen across a difference.40 
The relational world of generative materiality 
first brings forth this embodied human as a 
difference, and the world which is available to 
be divided into relata is brought forth along 
with it.
Lively materialities
Through this discussion, materiality has 
been positioned as having a productive force, 
in that material differences produce distinct 
forms of the material from within material 
relations. For Coole, this productive force 
is generative in its self-organisation – she 
39. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 17.
40. DeLanda equates ordering with a holding apart of difference, 
remarking that temperature difference is a result of a highly 
ordered distribution of molecules: “that is, they are neatly 
sorted out into two parts, one hot and the other cold. At 
the end of the process the entire population is uniformly 
warm and this order has disappeared.” Manuel DeLanda, 
Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic 
Reason (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 8.
connects generative materiality to a “lively 
process of self-formation” that arises from 
an “immanent and irreducible relationship 
between creating and created.” Coole does not 
make a clear distinction between nature and 
materiality in her discussions, occasionally 
conflating the terms into the hybrid “nature/
matter.”41 Her use of terminology makes 
clear that her approach is not to distinguish 
between the organic or inorganic, nor between 
the lively and the unlively when discussing 
the generativity of matter. Bennett adopts 
a similar stance in her description of “thing-
power,” which she believes “draws attention to 
an efficacy of objects in excess of the human 
meanings, designs or purposes they express 
or serve.” The generativity of matter is not 
limited to the human, or even to the ‘alive’, in 
Coole’s and Bennett’s views, but comes from a 
materiality that “is as much force as entity, as 
much energy as matter, as much intensity as 
extension.”42
41. Coole, “The Inertia of Matter,” 97-8.
42. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 20.
43. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 7.
44. Heidegger indicates that things always have a role in bringing 
themselves about, he defines the “essence” of things as 
the way in which they “hold sway, administer themselves, 
develop and decay.” Heidegger, The Question Concerning 
Technology, 30.   
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asked him to be slightly bigger than my hands, and to have bilateral symmetry. I asked these things because 
they seemed to work toward a screen-for-itself, a screen that had some form of agency that arose from its 
material directedness toward space.
These components then developed into Moubie’s form. Each component had its own directedness toward 
space – a camera that pointed forward, LEDs and an LCD that pointed upward toward the human eye, wheels 
that contacted the ground and a motor that sat above them. They were organised along an axis of symmetry 
and supported in their orientations by a skeleton, which held each of them in the closest possible relation to 
the others.  
The size of Moubie’s LCD formed his depth at the peak as well as his length. The axle length between his 
wheels arose from the motor’s turnplate and formed his width at the base. His skeleton then developed from 
layers of lasercut 3mm ply. As these pieces began to lock into each other, the thickness of his skeleton was 
formed, along with the aesthetics of his appearance. Moubie is made out of an antiaesthetic. He is driven by 
his components and his skin remains unformed and unfinished. His form is simplified and open-ended. 
My initial requests were oriented toward a thing that expressed tendencies of being for-itself. I am not absent 
from this process, my design decisions influenced the coming about of Moubie. However, there are moments 
in this process where I was used, where the orientations of Moubie’s components and relation to space had 
a larger stake in his coming about than my desires for his form and function. Are these moments a form of 
autopoesis?
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Things have a capacity that is separate 
from the intentionality of humans, that 
has “propensities” and “tendencies” of its 
own.45 Bennett borrows Hent de Vries’ term 
“recalcitrance”46 to describe this excess of 
materiality, a term that is particularly apt 
due to its almost wilful, stubborn overtones, 
and for its strong sense of material substance. 
Things gain this recalcitrant capacity through 
materialisation, just as humans gain their 
capacities for action through this same process. 
LAb[au]’s Framework 5x5x5 (2011) expresses 
this type of screenic recalcitrance well. The 
screen is composed of five modules of a fixed 
five by five grid frame. Within each frame, two 
rotating frames also move – the outer rotating 
vertically and the inner horizontally. The 
grid is conceived as the screen’s resolution, 
its capacity for carrying information. The 
information it carries, however, is not directed 
toward human intent in the traditional sense. 
The inner frames, lacquered black and white 
on opposite sides, rotate between these binary 
states like the opened and closed logic gates 
of electronic technologies. Each frame is 
additionally side-lit with LEDs that can show 
red or white. The result is a complex pattern 
created from simple binary states: open and 
closed, moving and still, on and off. The screen 
does not carry information for use, but is “the 
expression of digital logics through an artistic 
and sculptural vocabulary.” The screen acts to 
translate the material directedness of screens, 
the “language of technology,”47 into a human 
language. The screen asks to be understood by 
the people with whom it interacts – it displays 
the way it is directed toward the world. The 
result is somewhat ominous – the screen 
appears as a large, ordered and complex form 
that asks something of us, but what it asks is 
undefined.
45. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, viii.
46. Hent de Vries uses the term ‘recalcitrance’ as a signifier for 
the absolute, for “what no speaker could possibly see, that 
is, some-thing that is not an object of knowledge.” Bennett, 
Vibrant Matter, 3.
47. Lab[au], “F5x5x5” in A Touch of Code (Berlin: Gestalten, 
2011), 193.
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Actually, a fourth mode of ’breakdown’ should be 
added to Heidegger’s threefold of conspicuousness, 
obtrusiveness, and obstinacy. Certainly in times of 
rapid technological change and development we 
are quite often confronted with this. One might call 
it ‘unfamiliarity,’ and we’re forced to deal with this 
phenomenon head-on each time we start using a 
new or unfamiliar tool or technology. Sometimes 
this goes quite easily… other times it involves a lot of 
painstaking hours in front of a user’s manual. 
Yoni Van Den Eede48
The unfamiliar extends the time spent in relational flux, as we try to collapse the indeterminate into something 
determinate. When you first see Moubie, you might ask something like “so, what does it do?.” You might try 
to resolve its purpose, its form and behaviour, toward your own intent. To see it as something to be used. 
Screens act towards humans and toward human environments. They mediate spatial relations for humans in 
a way that benefits them – that allows them access to other spaces or defends a space they call their own. 
We desire them to do this. It is difficult to resolve this intent for Moubie. He seems to have some of his own 
intent, a kind of directedness toward space. He moves at a certain pace and in a fixed, habitual way. But he 
is also trying to communicate something, he is making his directedness clear to you. How can this be used?
Perhaps, instead, he stands apart from use, his main role is in communicating. Perhaps he’s interacting with 
the environment of his own accord and trying to express himself to you. In this case you might ask how he 
avoids things, or how he decides to move backward or forward. But I know that he doesn’t really decide or 
avoid. He doesn’t act for himself, for you or for me. Moubie isn’t a screen or a tool or a communicator. Just a 
thing.
What does it do?
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48. Yoni Van Den Eede, “In Between Us: On the Transparency and 
Opacity of Technological Mediation” Foundations of Science, 
16 (2011): 143-4
49. Coole and Frost, “Introducing the new materialisms,” 7.
50. Coole and Frost, “Introducing the new materialisms,” 10.
Material agency
Generative materiality also helps to develop a 
processual approach to agency. If materiality 
itself is generative, then agency exists before 
the subject and object, between different 
materialities. If the primacy of the generative 
material relation is to be taken as the basis of 
analysis of an engagement between a person 
and a screen, then it follows that both the 
person and the screen have their own stake 
in this engagement. As both are the product 
of a process of materialisation, each is wholly 
dependent on the other, not simply reflexively, 
but generatively. However, it also means that 
the materiality of both the screen and the 
person will be reconstituted, and constituted 
differently, in each encounter as the process 
of materialisation recurs anew. In as much as 
the process is generative, it makes no more 
sense to say that a person can ‘use’ a screen 
than it does to claim that the screen ‘realises’ 
a person – that it exhibits an influence over 
the way that the person is realised through 
material relations. In this way, the screen 
in its materiality is “both self-constituting 
and invested with – and reconfigured by – 
intersubjective interventions that have their 
own quotient of materiality.”49 The screen 
object can reshape bodily being, introducing 
new gestures, actions and understandings, 
just as a person can reshape the materiality of 
the screen object.
Material arises as an active process of 
materialisation, not a “massive, opaque 
plenitude,” but as “constantly forming and 
reforming in unexpected ways.”50 This is 
an effective process, it causes material to 
happen, and simultaneously brings about 
people, contexts, references and opportunities 
for action. This effectivity suggests a type of 
agency to the process. Although materiality 
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and agency are held separately in a relata-
based analysis, from within relations material 
itself is agential – it generates and affects. It 
is unclear, however, whether this material 
agency can be considered in the same terms as 
the political agency of the subject as relatum; 
whether it is the sort of agency identified with 
alterity, or something of a different kind. To 
resolve the role of material agency more fully, 
I will now turn to a reframing of agency along 
the same lines as this discussion of materiality 
– agency as a generative difference.
Agency, agentialisation and the screen
Agency was also held as a fundamental 
difference in relata-based analysis – a 
difference that expressed the separation of the 
subject from the object. Agency was a property 
that defined the subject and was refused to 
the object, showing a clear directionality. 
This section will define a different sort of 
agency as it belongs to screens. It will begin 
by using Coole’s article “Rethinking Agency,” 
which poses a de-individualised political 
agency based on agentic capacities. It will 
then discuss these agentic capacities against 
screenic examples to define the qualities of a 
processual agency that can generate active 
materiality as well as active subjectivity. It 
will conclude with a discussion of prolonging 
the moment in which agency is determination 
to reveal an active, agential screen.
51. Diana Coole, “Rethinking Agency: A Phenomenological 
Approach to embodiment and Agentic Capacities,” Political 
Studies 53 (2005): 124-5.
52. Coole, “Rethinking Agency,” 125.
Capacities for action, not intent
Coole posits political agency as a spectrum of 
scaled emergences – of capacities for action. 
She insists that these “agentic capacities” 
are not the properties of the subject per se, 
but “are only contingently, not ontologically, 
identified with rational, individual agents.”51 
She defines three attributes – potency, 
reflexivity and motivation – which she uses 
as agential markers “while denying that 
such agentic properties entail a specific 
ontological assumption as to whom exercises 
them.”52 Potency, reflexivity and motivation 
are concerned with the ability to bring about 
effects, be concerned with their nature, and 
to show an attitude towards these effects 
respectively. Coole then demonstrates these 
capacities across three scales – pre-personal, 
singular and trans-personal – to show agency 
as it arises within these contexts.
Coole’s schema is intended to demonstrate 
that agency is not a by-product of subjectivity 
– that it does not ‘belong’ to the subject. The 
agentic spectrum she describes implies that 
agency arises out of situations, it is a process 
rather than a property. Although Coole does 
effectively demonstrate the de-individualised 
nature of political agency, thus loosening 
agency from issues of intent and will, she 
retains a sense that agency belongs to the realm 
of the human. In her aim to decouple issues of 
intent from action, she retains a particularly 
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“Things… [signal] the moment when the object 
becomes the Other,  when the sardine can looks 
back, when the mute idol speaks, when the subject 
experiences the object as uncanny and feels the need 
for what Foucault calls ‘a metaphysics of the object’” 
Jane Bennett54
Gaze Returner is noticing something about his relation to space and to me. He is reflecting on this relation 
and forming an opinion. He is communicating this opinion to try and bring about an effect. Gaze Returner 
is warning me. He knows I’m here, he knows I’m getting closer and he’s trying to stop me. What does this 
warning mean? 
The warning is a strange kind of interaction. It is both an acknowledgement and a denial, passive and active, 
a communication and an effect.  It indicates a desire that is not being met, an action that must be fulfilled by 
another. But Gaze Returner is just a screen flashing different colours at me. It isn’t a warning, it has no intent.
Warning signs
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human intonation to agency – she outlines 
an agency that is “irremediably embodied.”53 
The pre-reflexive and situated nature of 
embodiment opens questions in regard to such 
reflexive capacities as subjectivity. However, 
if agency is considered as a generative force 
in the context of the screen, it needs to be able 
to generate the agentic object as well as the 
subject; or, more generally, it needs to be able 
to generate agentic material. 
53. Coole, “Rethinking Agency,” 127.
54. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 1.
55. Coole, “Rethinking Agency,” 140.
56. Peter-Paul Verbeek, “Artifacts and Attachment: A Post-Script 
Philosophy of Mediation” in Inside the Politics of Technology: 
Agency and Normativity in the Co-Production of Technology 
and Society, ed. Hans Harbers (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2005), 129.
potency, reflexivity and motivation need to 
be considered in terms of the material rather 
than the political. Coole’s discussion of trans-
personal agency gives some insight into how 
this framework might be extended into the 
material realm to look at agentic capacities 
that emerge within objects. 
Potency and efficacy
Coole remarks that the potency of 
the transpersonal domain lies in its 
“transformative efficacy,”55 its ability to 
generate effect without individual intent. Of 
the three of Coole’s agentic capacities, efficacy 
is perhaps the most directly applicable to 
material agency. Ihde and Verbeek have 
shown in detail the capacities of objects to 
affect change “by virtue of their materiality: 
their concrete ‘thingly’ presence.”56 The use of 
tools, particularly, shows the ability of things 
to bring about material effect. In this sense, 
the material efficacies of the screen can be 
recognised in the ability of its material to 
support its function. In this case, the lattice’s 
actions as a barrier can be assigned to the 
strength of timber and its ability to be carved. 
The television’s actions in representing space 
can be seen as a by-product of the pixel and its 
ability to translate information into coloured 
light.
To apply this schema to an understanding of 
the screen, emerging agentic capacities need 
to be recognised as material rather than 
embodied. In the last section, the body arose as 
a pre-reflexive generative entity with a certain 
directedness alongside other, nonhuman 
entities with similar types of directedness. 
Materialisation was seen as an interplay of 
these undefined material capacities. Agency 
could be defined similarly if agentic capacities 
could be seen as arising from pre-reflexive 
materialities rather than purely from human 
bodies. To develop the idea of material 
agency further, Coole’s agential capacities of 
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“To qualify as a ‘real’ actor in the drama, the agent 
has to be able to preserve its own identity and 
defend itself against encroaching foreign elements. 
The winners are those actors who can subvert and 
co-opt another’s agency while keeping their own 
intact” 
N. Katherine Hayles58
As I share space with Moubie, I find myself more interested in what he’s doing.  His movements, his flashing 
lights and his simple repetitions of process engage my attention. He seems to be trying to communicate with 
me, to tell me things about what he is doing and what he sees. I put my head down and follow alongside him 
for a while; watching his screen as it updates, seeing what he sees. 
When I look up, I notice that I’ve been seeing from his point of view and at his pace of seeing, because 
I’ve returned now to my point of view and my pace of seeing. His demeanour has very quietly hijacked my 
relation to space, persuaded me to see things from his perspective. I’ve been attending to him as a person, as 
something which sees, reflects and communicates.
Hijacked perception
Fig 27. A Different Perspective.
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While it is fairly accepted to claim that things 
affect things materially (this is, after all, why 
they are useful), Bennett likewise notes “the 
capacity of things… to impede or block the 
will and designs of humans” with a “not-quite-
human capaciousness”57 that is independent 
from subjectivity. The material of things can 
act against people or independently from 
57. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, viii; 3.
58. Katherine N. Hayles, “Desiring Agency: Limiting Metaphors 
and Enabling Constraints in Dawkins and Deleuze/Guattari,” 
SubStance 94/95 (2001): 150. Hayles is speaking here of 
Richard Dawkin’s conception of agency in The Selfish Gene. 
people as well as for them; in this sense, 
material shows an efficacy independent from 
the subject. Such a material efficacy can be 
found when the remote control no longer 
changes the television channel or when the 
computer suddenly displays a blue screen of 
death – these are signs that the screen is no 
longer working for the human.
180
Fig 28. Scales of Action.
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Reflexivity and reciprocity
The adaption of reflexivity as a material 
capacity provides a greater challenge. The 
capacity for reflection is strongly linked 
to subjectivity. Coole remarks that the 
transpersonal domain is reflexive in the sense 
that it shows “a certain… interiority, where 
collective life turns back on itself.”59 Agential 
matter, then, should be able to ‘turn back on 
itself’ to contribute to its context in a way that 
creates interiority. 
Daniel Rozin’s series of works Mechanical 
Mirrors demonstrates such an understanding 
of materiality reflexivity. Rozin’s earliest piece 
in the series, the Wooden Mirror (1999) relies 
on the reflection of light on a tilting plane to 
compose an image. A series of wooden tiles 
organised in an array are connected to motors 
which tilt them up and down to reflect an 
external light source. A camera mounted in 
the front of the mirror feeds an image to an 
external processor, which is processed into 
greyscale and mapped to an angle, so that 
white pixels correspond to a thirty degree 
tilt upwards toward a light source, and black 
pixels to a thirty degree tilt downward and 
away from the light source.60 The resultant 
image is mediated specifically by the timber’s 
materiality: its ability to cast shadow and 
reflect light, as well as the natural colour and 
size of the wooden pixels, affect the fidelity of 
the image. Rozin has translated this system 
into other materials, all of which mediate the 
image differently. PomPom Mirror (2015), 
one of the most recent of the set, relies on the 
compressibility of wool to pull black and beige 
“fur” pixels past each other. The resultant 
image is of a different kind because the 
materiality of the pixel is distinctly different.
Although these pieces are called ‘mirrors’ they 
are not reflective in the traditional sense. Yet, 
the person interacting with these mirrors is 
shown to themselves in a way that is translated 
by the specific materiality of the pixel and the 
workings of the system behind it. In separating 
what is received from what is displayed, the 
system turns back to itself to present a person 
to themselves in a different material form. The 
mirror’s turn back into its context generates 
new capacities of action – people test their 
movements against the mirror, and in turn the 
mirror recomposes their movements in wood 
or fur. The mechanical mirrors see and reflect 
upon the materiality of bodies by reciprocating 
those bodies with their pixel’s materiality. The 
mirror reciprocates the action of the person 
with its own action.61 
59. Coole, “Rethinking Agency,” 140.
60. Rozin discusses the technological system behind the mirrors 
in a video entitled “Interactive art with wooden mirrors’, 
accessed 30 August 2017, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=BZysu9QcceM.
61. Reciprocity of action lends a particular reading to the ability 
of things to turn back on themselves, but the generation of 
action from action is well noted. Grosz conceives of freedom 
as the “the ability to act and in acting to make oneself even as 
one is made by external forces.” Elizabeth Grosz, “Feminism, 
Materialism, and Freedom” in New Materialisms: Ontology, 
Agency and Politics ed. Dianna Coole and Samantha Frost 
(London: Duke University Press, 2010), 142. In doing so, she 
identifies a multidirectional role in acting and being acted 
upon, making and being made.  Allen notes similar themes 
of reciprocity in the agencies of Foucault and Arendt; and 
Bennett discusses the same in Deleuze’s work. 
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The kind of material reciprocity shown in 
Rozin’s work constitutes a reflexive turn in the 
sense that it ensures that anything that acts is 
also, simultaneously, acted upon. Reciprocity 
ensures that actions are, in a sense, never 
without consequences – that a system that acts 
towards its environment is always acted back 
at. The contextual changes that arise from this 
dual action affect the possibilities for further 
action. In this sense, reciprocity can define a 
material reflexivity: actions made turn back 
on themselves by altering their environments, 
affecting the scope for further action.
Motivation and directedness
The last of Coole’s agentic capacities, 
motivation, is usually considered in terms of 
will or intent when linked to the subject. In 
her analysis, Coole states that, although the 
transpersonal domain does not show intent 
in the individualised sense of the word, it 
does show a “contingent sens because it is 
an intersubjective domain where desires and 
refusals meld and congeal.”62 She uses the 
term ‘sens’ to mean a form of direction or 
directedness. Although Coole’s trans-personal 
domain does not display a cogent or singular 
intent, it is directed towards certain actions 
and aims. Within the material realm, a 
similar directedness could be found in a form 
of material intentionality. 
Don Ihde discusses the material directedness 
of technologies in terms of technological 
intentionality, saying that “technologies, by 
providing a framework for action, do form 
62. Coole, “Rethinking Agency,” 140.
63. Don Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to 
Earth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 141.
64. D. R. Wier, “Light Shows: A Kinetic Art Technique Using 
Chemicals,” Leonardo 2, no. 3 (July 1969): 254.
intentionalities and inclinations within which 
use-patterns take dominant shape.”63  Although 
Ihde applies technological intentionality 
toward the use context, the statement indicates 
that technological intentionality arises from a 
form of material directedness.
Wier, for example, introduces a screen with 
specific material directedness in a 1969 issue 
of Leonardo. Wier describes a kinetic art 
technique based on chemicalical interactions, 
in which a watch glass containing a “starting 
solution” is placed on an overhead projector. 
The starting solution is slowly infused with 
various chemical solutions which, when 
interacting, produce coloured patterns. These 
patterns are projected onto a white wall as a 
moving image. Wier’s screen and its effects 
rely on the specific material directedness of 
the chemicals used and the relations between 
them. As Wier states, knowledge of chemistry 
is essential to the operating of his screen: 
“an operator should… learn the nature of the 
chemical reactions that can occur between the 
starting solution and reactive additives, in 
order to choose the type of effects he wishes 
to produce.”64 As the chemical reactions take 
place, motion is generated within the solution, 
creating a screening that is intensely material.
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“If the holding is done by the jug’s void, then the 
potter who forms sides and bottom on his wheel 
does not, strictly speaking, make the jug. He only 
shapes the clay. No- he shapes the void… From start 
to finish the potter takes hold of the impalpable void 
and brings it forth as the container in the shape of a 
containing vessel.” 
Martin Heidegger67
“There are many practical and conceptual obstacles 
here: How can communication proceed when many 
members are nonlinguistic? Can we theorise more 
closely the various forms of such communicative 
energies? How can humans learn to hear or enhance 
our receptivity for ‘propositions’ not expressed in 
words? 
Jane Bennett68
Things exhibit their own intentionalities. But if the design process is predicated by designer intent, how can 
design access the intentionalities of things? How can I start at the end of a process of materialisation, with a 
sedimented idea of the object and its use, and work in to the relational field? 
It is difficult to access this momentary field, these relations in flux, which may be in contrast with the reflexive 
relata. The role of design and the intent of the designer are challenged by such an aim. Perhaps the best I can 
do is negotiate – recognise the unintended as the thing designing back, communicate with the developing 
object as it brings itself about.
Making with Arduino is like communicating with the thing as it develops. A text-based interface is provided 
for carrying meaning between human and microchip with a grammatical structure similar to that of human-
human languages; where individual morphemes are combined into statements according to a syntax. The 
microchip performs acts of semantic translation on this communication to carry it forward to networked 
components, using fluctuations in voltage over time to ‘read’ and ‘write’, producing action and information.
Unintentful design
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65. The affordance framework discussed in chapter one shows 
how material directedness of things can be co-opted for 
human purposes, to expand and alter human capacities for 
action. 
66. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 139.
67. Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” 167.
68. Bennett,  Vibrant Matter, 104.
Determining agency 
Material directedness is not necessarily at 
odds with human intentionality.65 Having 
shown confluences between the embodiment 
and the object as recognitions of materiality 
or placedness, Merleau Pontys description 
of morticity or pre-reflexive movement as 
“original intentionality”66 makes clear that 
bodies, too, show material directedness. 
Bodies are composed in a certain way that 
renders them directed toward certain things 
prior to reflection.
If material agentic capacities are considered in 
terms of efficacy, reciprocity and directedness; 
it becomes possible to see the screen as an 
agentic thing. This agentic screen is not 
considered as ethicopolitcal structure, but as 
a form of material efficacy. That is, it is not 
the sociopolitical consequences of its actions 
that are under consideration, but the material 
consequences of those actions. Agency, in 
this sense, is contingent not only on the 
material, but on differences in materiality. 
Such an approach separates any resultant 
agency—as—relatum from belonging purely 
to the domain of the subject. It allows material 
agency to be revealed, but it does not disallow a 
subject-bound agency from appearing. In other 
words, the process of agentialisation arises 
across a difference in material directedness, 
generating reflexive things that are considered 
to have, or lack, agency. 
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These communications are not hierarchical and unidirectional. The microchip is not the mediator between the 
human’s intentionality and the action performed: human to microchip to components. The communication 
between microchip and components (which can be both written to and read from) is not so clearly directional. 
The language of effect, whose morphemes are voltage and time as well as words, lies between components 
and microchip. Action too carries meaning that feeds back in to the communication process, between 
actuator and designer. Words, voltage and action become morphemes form a system of communication in 
which spatial effects occur.
Coming to know the machinic syntax, and the ways in which meaning is produced using it, is a process of 
actively listening to machinic intentionality. Not a (human) design intent, but its ways of doing, its ways of 
communicating. This syntax is clearly directed toward the world in a particular way, a way that I have to come 
to understand. The links between basic units of meaning; words, voltage and action; are left exposed in the 
Arduino interface. Mistranslation can occur. These are not distinct and defined entities – human, microchip, 
component– using three distinct communication systems.  They are a material directedness. In the iterative 
process of designing with Arduino; actions, electron differentials and words are all instructions and effects. 
Humans, microchips and components are all effectors, translators and mediators. 
Fig 29. Negotiations. [Video, 00:10].
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Although not entirely grounded in the agency 
of material, Takayama’s discussion of agency 
in human-robot interactions might show how 
such a nonhuman agency could be recognised. 
Takayama approaches object agency as a 
quality held in immediate, “in-the-moment”69 
human perception; not as an intrinsic quality 
of the object itself, nor as a summative or 
reflexive meaning that informs the conditions 
of possibility of an object. She states that 
it is the perception or recognition of agency 
that influences a person’s actions toward an 
object regardless of the existence of agency 
as such. Such an approach suffers from the 
assumption that agency is something granted 
by an individual subject rather that being itself 
generative of subjectivity. Takayama seems to 
note this in denouncing ontology, stating that 
“while it is possible to argue at length about 
the ontological status of an entity’s agency, it 
is also possible to define agency as something 
that is perceived.”70 Despite addressing 
agential materiality through subjectivity, 
Takayama’s approach indicates a reflexive 
overwriting of experience, where objects 
reacted to “in the moment” as if agentic will 
later be denied agency in reflexive thought. 
She seems to recognise agentic material 
capacities, even if they are subsequently 
overwritten by reflexive human intent. The 
reflexive process that Takayama posits can be 
likened to the process of determining relata. 
If, before this moment, agential material 
may be recognised, and afterward it may 
not be, this is the moment in which agency 
is determined as the property of a relatum. 
It thus also corresponds to the moment at 
which the subject and object are determined 
as relata, as being able to hold properties. 
Before this moment of reflexive thought, the 
subject and object are indeterminate and 
agency remains as an ongoing process in 
which efficacy, reciprocity and directedness 
are differentiating into entities.
The subject-like agency of things is 
demonstrated well by Random International’s 
Audience (2008). The installation suspends the 
moment of finding the subject and the object 
even as the subject is presented to themselves. 
The piece is composed of a “horde” of small 
mirrors, arranged at floor height on metal 
feet and motors that allow the mirror face to 
69. Leila Takayama, “Perspectives on Agency Interacting with and 
through Personal Robots” in Human-Computer Interaction: 
The Agency Perspective, ed. Marielba Zacarias and  José 
Valente de Oliveira (Berlin: Springer, 2012),  196.
70. Takayama, “Perspectives on Agency,” 195.
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tilt and turn. Without a human interactant, 
the mirrors move in a seemingly unorganised 
fashion. As a person approaches, motion 
tracking software informs each mirror of their 
position, and each mirror turns to focus on the 
person. The movement includes the titling of 
the plane toward the person’s face, so that the 
person is confronted with their own image at a 
variety of distances. 
Audience allows the human interactant to 
see themselves reflected even as they are 
reminded of what is doing the reflecting – 
linking the image of the self to the object. The 
“inquisitive, synchronised gesture” with which 
all the mirrors turn at once toward the person, 
and their smooth “sense of abstracted, human-
like behaviour”71 suggest an efficacy and 
directedness; and the individuality with which 
they react to the person as their focus suggests 
a sense of material reciprocity. The Audience 
expresses a subject-like agency. This agency is 
not properly located within any of the mirrors, 
nor perhaps in the mirrors as a whole, but 
somewhere behind what might otherwise have 
become the subject and the object. Although 
the human is presented to themselves as the 
focus in becoming the subject of the artwork, 
they come to objectify themselves within their 
own gaze. The mirrors in this context cannot 
wholly be seen as objects, either, as they have 
borrowed the gaze of the viewer, who “becomes 
the subject of their own gaze and that of the 
artwork.”72 The effectiveness of Audience as 
a performance lies in its ability to suspend 
the moment of subject-object collapse. Agency 
71. Random International, “Audience,” accessed August 30 2017, 
https://random-international.com/work/audience/
72. Random International, “Audience.”
is revealed here as a non-directional process 
that can reveal an agential object as well as an 
agential subject. 
Materiality agency and the body
In the sense that the screen arises from 
generative material and agential relations, 
it is not something which stands against a 
person as an object against a subject; rather 
it arises with the subject, and does so in a 
way as to highlight situatedness. Although 
the determination of subject and object is an 
unavoidable, if complex, perceptual process, 
it is also reflexive – based on a process 
of finding agencies across differences of 
material capacities. The screen surfaces as 
new possibilities for action in space become 
apparent, agencies that are themselves 
contingent on the material capacities of the 
particular screen. These agencies not only 
influence how the screen appears and is 
negated by the materialities it produces, but 
also how the efficacies and materialities of the 
person appear within the relation.
The material agencies of the screen appear 
similarly to a person’s embodiment – as a 
certain directedness in generating material 
and agencial relations – only to be overwritten 
later by a reflexive object called a ‘screen’. In 
this sense, there is a directedness or fixity 
belonging to each screen which influences 
materialisation and agentialisation – the 
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The surface of the screen as a hybrid material ... 
renders and accrues the discontinuity of time, the 
surface gives us back not only the experience of 
temporality but of subjectivity, and that such a space 
of experience is a foundation of the materiality of 
media. 
Giuliana Bruno74
What are the material intentionalities of screens? Each screen has a different material, a different way of 
coming about. Can there be something in common to these materials that reveals a directedness?
Screens are spatial, they are directed toward space. But they are, more particularly, a recognition of a 
difference in space, a spatial difference that they are intimately connected to. The screen, in use, remaps 
distance, time and materiality. But this use is indicative of a particular directedness, a particular intentionality 
towards the ordering of space.  
Moubie orders space within a repetition of time. He sees and displays in regular cycles. His ordering of space 
is bound to his pace, and this reveals space as it is for-Moubie, a space screened through Moubie’s pace. His 
reordering of space, then, is bound not only in his seeing but in his processing and communicating. Gaze 
Returner also orders space, but does so in terms of a relation between himself and you. His space is ordered 
in terms of the distance between you, it is a space that orders approach into colour and image. What remains 
as ‘screen’ in these things is not their agencies or their impact on the subject, not their ability to threaten or 
distract, but the spatial ordering that they undertake.
What of more familiar screens? Televisions and phones hear electromagnetic signals, re-order them into visual 
signals and communicate them as light. Cinema reorders chemicals laid on film into coloured light, lattices 
order continuous space into a marked division. Order is seen strongly within the composition of screens. 
Lattices gains their directedness from the repetition of apertures, cinema from the pace at which the frame 
moves through the projector, televisions from pixels fixed in an array.
Screens are found in order and out of order, directed towards space in the ways that they order it.. 
A screen’s directedness
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screen helps set relations in place. Echoes can 
be found here of descriptions of the screen as a 
frame, but also in its role in enframement. The 
two terms are linked in a type of processual 
fixity, the first a reflexive acknowledgement 
of material influence and the second a pre-
reflexive process which fixes the way material 
comes about.73 
73. In framing, space is effected by the frame’s material efficacies 
as the screen produces the image according to a fixed, 
material process. The pixel, in this regard, has a different 
mode of spatial production to the aperture or film. 
74. Bruno, Surface, 108.
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THRESHOLD
Fig 30. Perceptual Thresholds.
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Thinging and relata
Having established materiality and agency as 
processes that affect how the screen arises, I 
will now consider the mechanism by which the 
screen is defined as a thing – that is, how these 
generative processes are turned into discrete, 
determinate relata like the screen. This section 
will begin by establishing a contradiction 
between generative relations and the screen 
as a relatum. It will then discuss how the 
screen relatum might be determined from 
these relations, before defining its excess; an 
excess that is screenic, but does not belong to 
the screen per se.
So far, this chapter has found that the 
material and agential properties of the screen 
are reflexive characteristics generated by 
active relations. Their reflexive differences 
are rooted in the subject-object dichotomy. 
Conventionally and reflexively, the property 
of agency  belongs to the subject, to my 
ability to act (intentionally); whereas a 
passive materiality belongs to the object, to 
be acted upon. However, the emergence of 
materiality and agency – materialisation 
and agentialisation – hold much akin if 
looked apart from this reflexively imposed 
dichotomy. Materiality and agency are 
determined together from within processes 
across differences, so that what arises is what 
it is, what it can do; and what I am, what I can 
do – both inherently situated and contextual. 
Agentialisation and materialisation result 
in the contemporaneous emergence of the 
material and the agential as properties, and 
along with them the subject and the object, the 
real and the virtual. From this perspective, 
viewing materiality (and, indeed, screens) as 
inert or inagential segments off and ignores 
part of the very process by which a thing is 
called a thing.
Relational disappearance
The screen of the last chapter, which 
disappeared into the subject or the space, can 
now be approached from within the relations 
of materiality and agency to find a mechanism 
by which it can disappear. Perhaps the most 
immediate apparent explanation for the 
screen’s material absence is that it never 
surfaced as a relatum– that materialisation 
and agentialisation resulted in the real and 
the virtual, the subject and the object, without 
the ‘screen’ at all. But such an approach would 
again leave questions of what it was that 
disappeared, and of what it is that is called 
the screen in the first place. Some screenic 
recalcitrance persists against these claims. 
Instead, it may be the presence of some sort of 
fundamental contradiction between the screen 
as it surfaces in perception and the accepted 
collapse of materialisation and agentialisation 
into materiality and agency that can explain 
the screen’s negation. The ontology of the 
screen resists itself, implying that the 
screen is produced from materialisation and 
agentialisation in such a way that its active 
materiality interferes with determining an 
‘inert’ object: the boundaries drawn around 
its effects do not allow it to be seen as inert 
material, but as a productive force. 
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To explore this contradiction further, and to 
find an avenue by which to understand the 
screen closer to its generative relations, I will 
discuss two similar but varying positions on 
the coming about of things from relations: 
Heidegger’s 1950 lecture “Das Ding,” 
translated as “The Thing” in 1976; and Grosz’s 
2001 essay “The Thing,” which, although it 
does not reference Heidegger’s essay of the 
same name, shows similarities in approach, if 
not outcome.75
Finding things
In “The Thing,” Heidegger approaches things 
according to the process by which they arise. A 
thing is a setting in place and setting of place, 
a gathering of spatiality and temporality.76 
The thing, in this sense, is a process rather 
than something static; it unifies and reveals 
the world by drawing the world near. Grosz 
considers the thing in similarly processual and 
spatiotemporal terms. She makes particularly 
apparent the mutual dependence of person and 
thing as “inaugurated at the same moment” 
– the thing as “the resource for the subject’s 
being and enduring.”77 For both, the finding of 
relata, of ‘things’, in perception is an act that 
orders the world along certain lines. Embodied 
perception, as a form of human material 
directedness, is immersed in a relational 
flux, which it then orders according to our 
intentionality. This ordering reveals things. 
Things, then, are revealed from relations 
in line with human intentionality; they are 
revealed according to how they are of concern 
for us. 
The way that things are determined as relata 
is contingent on this process; things are 
revealed in perception as they are of concern to 
our contextual involvement. Heidegger refers 
to this process as ‘drawing near’. Nearness, 
here, does not mean proximity: “the thing is 
not ‘in’ nearness, ‘in’ proximity, as if nearness 
were a container. Nearness is at work in 
bringing near, as the thinging of the thing.”78 
The ‘near’ of the thing is not its proximity 
in Cartesian space, but its nearness to the 
interest or directedness of the world. In this 
sense, nearness can equally present things as 
far, as long as they are contextualised within 
human concern.
This process of drawing near has its own 
reciprocity. In this directedness, thinging 
reveals the person to themselves, in the way 
that space and time are ordered for them, as 
much as it reveals the material. Directedness 
is revealed at the same time as the thing 
towards which that directedness is pointed. 
Hence the object, that which is drawn near, is 
found alongside the subject, “that-which-lies-
before, which, as ground, gathers everything 
onto itself.”79 But this  process is only authentic 
75. Grosz’s essay appears as a chapter in Architecture from the 
Outside.
76. Heidegger’s ‘fourfold’ of earth and sky, divinity and mortals, 
have distinctly refers to spatial and temporal implications. He 
writes: “The thing things world. Each thing stays the fourfold 
into a happening of the simple onehood of the world” 
Heidegger, “The Thing,” 178.
77. Grosz describes things as “the point of intersection of space 
and time, the locus of temporal narrowing and spatial 
localisation that constitutes specificity or singularity.” Grosz, 
Architecture from the Outside, 168-170.
78. Heidegger, “The Thing,” 175
79. Heidegger, Being and Time, 128.
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In the strict sense of the German word bedingt, we 
are be-thinged, the conditioned ones. 
Martin Heidegger83
I am caught as an object within an object. Gaze Returner very suddenly asserts himself over me – there is a 
moment when I see my own face as I look at a thing I can’t place. What I thought was a passive object becomes 
active, and I can see that I have acted differently toward it than I would have, had I known it saw me too.
The camera can only catch “the deadness of the eyes that confront the machine”84, it cannot return our gaze 
as a true other, the other through which we need to pass to know ourselves. The eye that puzzles over the 
screen is overstimulated and numb, receiving impulse but not understanding. It is this ‘dead gaze’ that the 
Gaze Returner reflects and returns in the moment of showing my face. At that point I look at myself, looking 




if the situation is unforced – to  have access 
to what a thing is, we need to let it be as it 
is; arising from its own process of thinging, in 
which we are always implicated.80
Drawing the screen near
Considering the screen in these terms is not 
straightforward: what of the screen is a ‘thing’ 
in this way? And, is this the same enitity that is 
drawn near to reveal human concern? Chapter 
one identified a series of screenic relata – the 
object, the image, material and effect – which 
of these entities reveals human directedness?
Heidegger explicitly excludes technology, and 
particularly the television, from thinging.81 
For Heidegger, the television  is an instrument 
of transposition – it does not allow things to 
arise from within their contexts. In this sense, 
televisual things cannot be drawn near, and 
cannot be found within the context of human 
80. Heidegger writes: “if we let the thing be present in its thinging 
from out of the worlding world, then we are thinking of the 
thing as thing. Taking thought in this way, we let ourselves be 
concerned by the thing’s worlding being.” Heidegger, “The 
Thing,” 178.
81. Heidegger writes: “the peak of the abolition of every 
possibility of remoteness is reached by television.” Heidegger, 
“The Thing,” 163.
82. Closeness and nearness are not the same thing for Heidegger. 
Nearing can reveal things as close and far, so long as they are 
revealed as a perceptual process centred on concern in the 
world: “What is nearness if it fails to come about despite the 
concern – rather, they are transposed by the 
device. In other words, the television has its 
own directedness, its own mode of production. 
The television generates materiality and 
agency: it is a production that produces, 
a second order production. The television 
viewer, no longer involved in situating 
themselves throught drawing things near 
in concern, becomes passive alongside the 
actively situating television.
Images produced by the television may be 
close, but they cannot be near for two reasons: 
the process of drawing nearing is not entered 
into by the person so cannot be made within 
their interest, and the television cannot reveal 
things and spaces as differentially distant 
because it places the two spaces within one 
another.82 The screen as a fixed material object 
may be drawn near, but what it produces 
cannot be. 
reduction of the longest distances to the shortest intervals? 
... What is nearness if, along with its failure to appear, 
remoteness also remains absent?” Heidegger, “The Thing,” 
163-4. 
83. Heidegger, “The Thing,” 178-9. Heidegger uses the term ‘be-
thinged’ to describe the dependency of people on things.The 
thing is brought forth out of the world, and at the same time 
it reveals the world to us. We rely on things in this way, to 
reveal our directedness toward the world to us.
84. Susan Buck-Morss uses this phrase in describing the 
Benjamin’s ‘anaesthetic’. Susan Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics 
and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay 
Reconsidered,” October 62 (Autumn, 1992): 18.
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85. Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, 176; 169; 177.
86. Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, 170; 171.
87. Lucas D. Introna and Fernando M. Ilharco, “On the Meaning 
of Screens: Towards a Phenomenological Account of 
Screenness,” Human Studies 29 (2006): 63.
88. Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, 183.
Grosz too notes technologies as “the production 
of things that produce things,” but this poses 
less of a problem to her analysis. Grosz’s 
focus on the thing as a “provocation to action 
and … itself the result of our action” allows 
technology to stay within the realm of the 
thing, as it “increasingly facilitates ... Wider 
possibilities of acting, more action.”85
The thing and the human
Heidegger relies on the thing as ‘real’, as it 
stands for the sum of references and intents 
that brought it about. Technologies like the 
television conceal the ‘real’ by predetermining 
these references and intents in their modes 
of production – by expressing their material 
directedness and efficacy. But for Grosz, the 
thing is a “carving out the real” – a process 
in which the real is conceptualised as a 
indeterminable flux of relations – to produce 
things: stable, divided and divisible entities 
that reflect intent. Grosz defines the thing as 
“a compromise between the world as it is in 
its teeming and indeterminable multiplicity… 
and the world as we would like it to be: open, 
amenable to intention and purpose, flexible, 
pliable, manipulable, passive.”86 For Grosz, 
technologies are things because they are more 
than their prescribed functions and modes of 
production – they are open to slippages and 
repurposing. 
This discussion has implications for how 
the relations that generate the screen can 
be accessed. Technology may restrict or 
define references and intents as Heidegger 
suggests, but bodies do too. The difference 
between human directedness and the material 
directedness of the screen arises from a 
generative material agency. If the screen 
“finds itself already implicated in the ongoing 
activity,” 87 it does so in the sense that it arises 
across a difference of material directedness 
and efficacy. 
Grosz’s analysis explicitly recognises that this 
difference belongs as much to the thing as to 
the person. In this sense, her assessment of the 
thing is well placed to provoke the relational 
plane of the screen. Her recognition of the role 
of the thing occurs because she is less focused on 
what technologies are for, and more concerned 
with how they can be experienced. She wishes 
to “orient technology not so much to knowing 
and mediating as to experience and the rich 
indeterminacy of duration,” writing that this 
might be achieved through developing “an 
acquaintance with things through intuition”  
rather than intellect – by taking note of the 




Not for: outside the screen
Given this mechanism of finding relata 
from relations, the role of the screen’s use in 
its ontology becomes clearer. In looking at 
materiality and agency as relations, ‘use’ is 
presented as only one possible relation among 
emerging materialities. The focus in relational 
analysis is not on materiality and agency in 
terms of what I can do with the screen, but 
on materiality and agency as processes that 
exist before myself and the screen and give 
rise to each of us together. Use is only one of a 
myriad of possible agencies and materialities 
that can arise from these relations. Focusing 
solely on the use-context of an object sets a 
directionality to our analysis that needs to be 
avoided. This last section will frame the role 
of the use-less in provoking screenic relations, 
and the particular types of reactions that 
emerge from this provocation.
There is a fundamental contradiction here: 
calling a thing a ‘screen’ already implies its 
use in the world to which it refers. That is, 
things are called screens because they behaves 
in a screen-like way, they have screen-like 
material and screen-like effects. The use of a 
thing and its naming and ontology are closely 
tied through perception. Grosz quotes Bergson 
on the ontology of things in regard to use, 
saying that “our perception outlines, so to 
speak, the form of their nucleus; it terminates 
them at a point where our possible action upon 
them ceases, where, consequently, they cease 
to interest our needs.”89 When a name is used 
to identify a thing, what it is and what it does 
have already been presupposed. This reflexive 
determination relies on human intent, human 
concern toward the world, and the material 
intents of the thing.
Use and material
The use context is essential in determining 
the screen as screen, but it does not allow 
access to the relations that brought it to 
surface as such. Nor does it seem to allow 
access to the screen in itself because, as a 
mode of production, the efficacy and material 
of the screen are determined to lie in what it 
produces – the ‘other’ side of the screen. Use 
will not give access to ontological relations of 
the screen because it enforces a determined 
and active subjectivity, just as it enforces a 
passive objectivity. 
Screens with a strong sense of use make 
defined relata. The lattice, for example, is 
easier to understand as an object than the 
television because its use as a barrier is 
perceptually supported by its materiality. 
By contrast, viewing televisual images 
contradicts the perception of the television’s 
materiality, despite these images are clearly 
a product of this materiality. Even with the 
lattice, however, there remains an excess to 
this relation of use. The lattice, as a screen, 
has screen-like behaviours tied directly to its 
reflexive materiality. The relation that brings 
about this materiality brings about a bodily 
condition of containment at the same time. 
89. Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, 174.
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The impermeability of the screen surfaces at 
the same time as the inability of the body to 
permeate it. The determination of the screen 
as being ‘for’ containment is simply resolved 
within the materiality of the object itself. But 
the excesses of this relation become far more 
obvious with televisions and smartphones.90 A 
simple way to think of this excess is the ability 
to turn the screen off. The ability to turn a 
screen off lends a person control over removing 
the screen’s mode of production, and thereby 
its use. Such control accentuates this use on 
the one hand and leaves the screen less open 
to non-useful or unexpected engagements. 
When the television is switched off, its use is 
removed from the material relation and an 
excess is revealed.  The thing is still there, but 
it is unable to be watched. It is now something 
that has to be worked with or worked around 
rather than worked through. 
The excess of the relation between the ‘inert’ 
material of the screen and its use can be seen 
even while the screen is on. Jim Campbell’s 
Home Movies (2006-8) achieves such an effect 
by obscuring the mode of production of the 
screen so as to reveal its excess. Part of a 
series of low resolution works, Home Movies 
uses LED strips to produce a degraded, back-
projected image.91 The work emphasises the 
screen as produced and producing – the ‘black 
spots’ of the LEDs hide the image behind 
so the image is composed only of an aura 
around these dead, but yet still effective, 
pixels. The mechanism of projection in the 
works deliberately obscures the fidelity of the 
90. Paul Frosh writes that it is the material of the television, the 
box that ‘contains’, which supplies its uncanny effect: “It is 
this idea of a backstage location behind the screen whence 
the pictures come that supplies some of the uncanny effects 
of television as a separate, horrifying world that is more 
than merely virtual.” Paul Frosh, “The Face of Television,” 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 625, no.1 (Sep. 2009): 96. 
91. Jim Campbell, “Portfolio: Low Resolutions Works,” accessed 
August 28 2017, http://www.jimcampbell.tv/portfolio/low_
resolution_works/.
92. Richard Shiff, “Look to See by Looking” in Jim Campbell: 
Material Light, ed. Steve Dietz (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 
2010), 73.
image and draws attention to the screen as it 
projects, ensuring that “the apparatus adds 
its own degree of expressiveness, affecting 
the emotions of the viewer, if only by creating 
obstacles to receiving a single channel of 
denotation.”92 This awareness of the screen-
as-object as it both produces and interrupts 
the screen-as-image puts the production into 
direct conflict with the product. Screen and 
image become conflicting things, and within 
this conflict a new engagement is found. The 
materiality of the screen thing is brought into 
appearance by obscuring the fidelity of the 
produced space, making clear the material 
process by which the screen is formed.
With, not through
If the ‘for’ and the ‘thing’ are implied in 
one another, ideas of ‘screen-ness’ are 
predetermined: without a use or intent, the 
screen will not be revealed as such. However, 
use is not the only context in which things 
appear in the world. Use-less things are also 
encountered in the world – things that are 
not approached primarily according to their 
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The ATMega328 is a small processor with limited space, but image processing is memory intensive. Gaze 
Returner had some trouble trying to receive and display images. Images are commonly stored as JPEGs, a 
file format which uses a lossy compression to generalise and compile pixel data into a smaller file. This file is 
then unpacked at the display end into an uncompressed pixel array which is ‘pushed’ to the screen pixels as 
a location and a value. Gaze Returner doesn’t have enough processing power to compress and decompress 
images on board. He also lacks the memory to hold an uncompressed image; making image processing a 
difficult task. 
Gaze Returner has an Arducam OV2640 interfaced with an Adafruit 1.8” TFT display breakout with SD 
card reader, both of which have independent pixel-addressable buffers to store a bitmap. Problems in the 
interfacing of these components result in mistranslations, and distinct changes in his spatial interpretation. 
The first of these mistranlations had to do with voltage. Although the ArduCam and display can both run at 
3.3V or 5V, they can only run at the higher voltage by means of a voltage shifter integrated into their breakout 
boards. The SD card on the TFT breakout, however, is integrated before the voltage shifter. Writing from the 
ArduCam’s buffer at 5V to the SD card at 3.3V is like shouting very quickly at the SD card. This meant that Gaze 
Returner could hear the quiet, dark pixels; but the loud pixels showed up as waves of grainy colour.
The second mistranslation had to do with the amount of information used to record the pixel. A bitmap 
codes the location and colour value of each pixel using a particular number of bits. The ArduCam records 
at RGB565 – 5 bits for red, 6 for green (split across the byte boundary) and 5 for blue, resulting in 2 bytes 
of information.  The TFT displays at RGB888, which requires 3 bytes of information. The data received from 
the ArduCam had to be bit-shifted and padded out to be readable by the display. Although this bitshifting 
should work in a predictable way, they produced a duotone bias in Gaze Returner’s sight, with purple or green 
glows in saturated or unsaturated areas.  Every change to this translation – inverting high and low byte read 
Can it hear itself?
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use value.93 This may explain why alterity 
interrupted the context of screening in the 
previous chapter: in expressing its role in 
the relation of use, what the screen began 
to express was its own mode of production, 
the sense in which it was active prior to its 
interaction with the subject. This activity lent 
the screen a sense of subjectivity or sociality 
along with it – a relation that lay in excess of 
the use to which it can be put. In claiming its 
own mode of production, the screen has to be 
worked with: it declares what of it lies in excess 
of human intent even as it directs itself toward 
this intent. Rather than the thing becoming 
invisible in its use, or divorced from this use 
context entirely, the screen expressed what it 
does. The material efficacies of the thing are 
made clear and need to be negotiated with it.
93. Heidegger differentiates particularly here between the 
relation that people take towards others and the relations 
they take to things. Rather than being approached in 
concern (in which use and intentionality play a large part), 
people approach other people with an attitude of solicitude 
(characterised as being-with-others and expressing self). 
Heidegger, Being and Time, 157. Heidegger also find the 
‘useless’ within our “concernful dealings” – when tools are 
damaged, missing or “stand in the way of our concern.” 
These things retain their connections to their contexts, but 
cannot be put to use. Heidegger, Being and Time, 102-3.
Figure 32: Shouting. 
A series of images taken during 
writing from ArduCam to SD card.
Figure 33: Spatial Translation.
 A series of images taken during 
testing bit shifting and write orders 
in translating RGB565 to RGB888.
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order, inverting most and least significant bit order, trialling different RGB write orders, altering shift values – 
changes the way Gaze Returner sees.
The ways that Gaze Returner was seeing, however, were not the way that I was seeing. To find a more human 
representation in Gaze Returner’s spatial interpretation, I had to communicate with him as he communicated 
with himself, understanding the ways in which open and closed gates were organised into information across 
different structures. Finding a common ground between Gaze Returner’s seeing and my own was a negotiation 
across this language. The complexity of these translations revealed Gaze Returner as something complex, as 
a collection of more individual things that needed to communicate amongst themselves. In any image, a 
difference between the space that was represented and my own way of seeing of space could be the result 
of any number of factors – of the speed and volume with which the components talked, of the order in which 
they read, the order in which they wrote, of the pieces of information they understood as meaningful or 
unmeaningful. Unless all of these factors were consistent, Gaze Returner’s bits acted independently of the 
others, resulting in non-human spatial perceptions.
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Screen things that express the ‘for’ relation 
for themselves also stress the indeterminate, 
the relations that escape use. These act as 
a provocation to the use context and arise 
as an thing-bound agency: as capacities for 
action that are not bound to subjectivity. For a 
person to find intent within this pre-expressed 
capacity for action, they need to acknowledge 
the thing’s role in the relation of agency. As 
Sean Bowden states, a person finds intent by 
identifying within an event “the content of 
one’s intention – the meaning and purpose 
of one’s action – in its nonisolatability from a 
shared expressive medium.”94 
Structures such as intent and use, according to 
the assumptions of a relation-based analysis, 
allow the constant tide of relations in flux to 
become fixed, resulting in stable things and 
stable selves. When the ‘for’ is not resolved 
as expected from familiar relata, a disconnect 
occurs between human intentionality and 
the material intentions of the thing. Events 
are surprising.95 Materiality becomes less 
a matter of material properties and more a 
matter of material directedness – a materiality 
that works apart from use and apart from 
subjective intent. This in turn makes clear the 
differences between my material directedness 
and ‘intent’ as an act of will. By expressing 
their material directedness outside of their 
use, things appear disinterested in people. 
That is not to say that things stand against 
people, but rather alongside them. Their 
actions and material are revealed as not-
quite-for humans, and in this way the human’s 
relation to their context – and, along with this, 
their ability to easily determine relata – is 
interrupted. Things become for-themselves, 
rather than for use.
94. Sean Bowden, “Human and Nonhuman Agency in Deleuze” 
in Deleuze and the Non/Human ed. Jon Roffe and Hannah 
Stark. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 76.
95. Bennett uses Latour’s phrase the “slight surprise of action” to 
refer to “an effectivity proper to the action itself, arising only 
in the doing and thus in principle independent of any aim, 
tendency, or characteristic of the actants” Bennett, Vibrant 
Matter, 27.
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The computer system, with its keyboard, display 
screen, pointing device ... and selection buttons 
... affords pointing, touching, looking, and clicking 
on every pixel of the display screen. Most of this 
affordance is of no value.
Don Norman96
My design intent with Gaze Returner had in mind a different kind of thing. The intention I lent to Gaze Returner 
was to take and record a picture, which would allow him to show pictures of a variety of people with whom 
he had interacted. After interaction with me, my picture would be shown to others, I would be surveilled and 
shared as an object  among other subjects. Gaze Returner’s intent developed differently. 
An image is a large file. Even at 320 x 240 pixels (the resolution of the ArduCam’s sensor), an image takes 150kB 
of storage space. The image can’t be stored on-chip – remebering the scene meant transcribing the image to 
an external SD card pixel-by-pixel as a string of data, a process that takes twelve seconds. This resulted in a 
twelve second silence between Gaze Returner’s warning and his retaliation. Twelve seconds of unreciprocated 
interaction misaligned Gaze Returner’s interest from human interest. His material directedness, the things 
he can do quickly or slowly, gave me long enough to assume a completion, to lose interest and to leave. To 
maintain an effective interaction, Gaze Returner instead loads the image directly from the ArduCam buffer to 
the screen. The load takes 1.5 seconds to complete, a slow reveal of the self. The slow intentionality of this 
image load shows me as I am being constructed by Gaze Returner.
Gaze Returner’s components – his processor, his camera, and his LCD – have their particular material 
restrictions that reveal particular effects in interaction. I had intentions for him, but he had his own.
Intent and intent
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96. Don Norman, “Affordances and Design,” accessed August 10, 
2017, http://www.jnd.org/dn.mss/affordances_and.html. 
97. United Visual Artists, “Triptych,” accessed 30 August 2017, 
https://uva.co.uk/works/triptych.
An animist’s attitude
Discussing things as self-expressive, 
acknowledging, and disinterested lends an 
agency to things that is perhaps beyond 
conceptions of material efficacy. To consider 
the screen as ‘disinterested’ implies that 
it could have an interest in the first place – 
that it could be involved in its context. The 
screen—thing becomes an ‘other’ through 
strong expressions of its material agency; and 
within this expression, finds a different kind 
of agency, in expressing its own relations to 
the world, or by acting between the person and 
their world.
United Visual Artist’s Triptych (Paris, 2007) 
expresses just this kind of relation. Standing 
within urban space, three large LED blocks 
project a soft blue light and soothing sound. 
Coupled to motion sensors, the blocks respond 
to the approach of people, emitting harsher 
sounds and an intense red as interactants move 
closer and closer. The effect is a suggestion 
that the piece “has a temperamental and 
powerful presence within,”97 that it expresses 
a specifically subjective form of agency.
Pieces such as Triptych lend themselves an 
almost animistic quality – their activity seems 
lively and intentful. The term ‘animistic’, 
however, is inconsistent with a relation-based 
analysis. ‘Animism’ and ‘anthropomorphism’ 
already assume the location of agency within 
the human subject and its ability to grant this 
agency to the nonhuman. Within a relata-
based analysis, this must be a flawed position 
– agency is a subject-bound quality. Such a 
position is seen as naïve in that it disavows the 
role of human intent. Within a relation-based 
analysis, animism is not the subject’s granting 
of agency to something that is incapable of 
holding it, but the recognition of generative 
aspects of agency that occur before the subject 
and object. Animism acknowledges that 
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Is it a he?
I didn’t name Moubie. He was named by another, as a baby mouse. He was designated he by another. The 
active object is a difficult thing to express in a personal pronoun. Can Moubie be lively as an it? Does the term 
lend itself to animism? Perhaps, as in a mouse you were about to trap, as in “it’s running across the floor, 
quick, get it!,” there is a recognition of liveliness in it. But it is the recognition of a liveliness that can be put to 
your own ends – a liveliness that can be manipulated, used, squished. 
A personal pronoun
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the role and capabilities of an object are the 
result of underlying relations that generate 
subjectivity along with objectivity. Bennett 
comments on the effectiveness of such a 
technique, saying that anthropomorphisation 
can shift understandings by “revealing 
similarities across categorical divides.”98 
A broken screen
Animism surfaces as the thing reveals its 
recalcitrance, as it fails to act for the human 
and begins to act alongside the human – for 
itself. Another specific relational reaction 
occurs in brokenness. In breaking, as in 
animism, the ‘for’ of screen, the screen as 
available for use, is interrupted by the ‘not-
for’ to the extent that the use context breaks 
down. The screen thing, in refusing to be a 
screen, becomes conspicuous, obtrusive, or 
obstinant.102 This obtrusiveness reveals a 
thing that is not working as expected – as this 
obstinant object is found, so too is what it was 
that was expected. 
98. Bennett writes: “a touch of anthropomorphism, then, 
can catalyze a sensibility that finds a world filled not with 
ontologically distinct categories of beings (subjects and 
objects) but with variously composed materialities that form 
confederations. In revealing similarities across categorical 
divides and lighting up structural parallels between material 
forms in ‘nature’ and those in ‘culture’, anthropomorphism 
can reveal isomorphisms.” Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 19.
99. Anna McCarthy, “From Screen to Site: Television’s Material 
Culture, and Its Place,” October 98 (Fall 2001): 97.
100. Smith refers to the annual report of the Coal Utilisation 
Council for 1955 to demonstrate this point, where she 
suggests that the headline “Television Versus the Fireplace” 
conveys concern and alarm over the role of the television 
in the home. Kathryn M. Smith, “Domesticating Television: 
Changing Attitudes in Postwar Britain” in Interiors  3, no. 1–2 
(2012): 30.
101. Ameri remarks that film and ‘reality’ have been “conceptually, 
and for that matter, spatially and architecturally kept apart” 
throughout cinema’s history. Amir Ameri, “Imaginary 
Placements: The Other Space of Cinema” in Journal of 
Aesthetics & Art Criticism 69, no.1 (Winter 2011): 81.
102. Heidegger writes conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and 
obstinancy as three ways that the “ready-to-hand loses 
its readiness-to-hand in a certain way… It does not vanish 
simply… in the conspicuousness of the unusable. Readiness-
to-hand still shows itself, and it is precisely here that the 
worldly character of the ready-to-hand shows itself too.” 
Heidegger, Being and Time, 104.
Animism can act as a denial of the static 
material and, more widely, of fixed relata. 
Invoking animism can affirm the efficacy of 
the screen outside of the relation of use, and 
thereby the efficacy with which the relations 
behind the screen are being provoked. 
McCarthy recognises this possibility in 
“wondering why people often decorate TV 
sets ... why they cover them with cloths as 
if televisions are precious icons.”99 Design 
historian Kathryn Smith also notes televisual 
agencies in mid-century concerns that the TV 
was replacing the fireplace as the focal point 
of the home.100 Rituals of use carry similar 
possibilities, from Amir Ameri’s discussion 
of separating the space of cinema from its 
surrounds in the early twentieth century, to 
concerns about compulsive smartphone use in 
the early twenty-first century.101 These actions 
of homage and fear signify a strongly effectual 
relation that borders on liveliness.
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What does it mean to make something broken? There is a moment where Gaze Returner is silent, after he has 
warned me, when I step just a little closer. This is a stressful moment – I’m not sure what he is doing, or why 
he has suddenly stopped interacting. I think he might be broken. I move around to change my line of sight to 
the silent screen, maybe I just can’t see it properly anymore, or maybe I have to re-manoeuvre myself so that 
I can continue to interact. There’s no response. As I’m about to walk away, he shows me to myself, and I see 
that he was planning this all along. 
Making broken things
Is it possible to reveal a material agency in the screen? Can we see the screen as agential and material at 
the same time? There is a kind of competition between the screen as a material thing and the screen as an 
effector. The otherness of Moubie and Gaze Returner renders them less screenic. It draws away from the use-
context and towards something else, something lively and not of objects. The silent materiality of the thing is 
interrupted by its expressions of itself, toward space and toward others.
 
The contexts of the ‘for’ and the ‘not for’ might reveal the screen as an internally competitive whole, as 
a point of agential and material tension. Does the screen surface as a recognition of such a competition 
between materiality and agency? Or does this tension belong again to the form of analysis, to the way that 
relata are drawn out of relations?
An internal competition
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presented. As it does so, it also reveals the 
assumptions themselves –insight is gained 
into the world before relata. As Hayles 
comments, we can never find what things 
are, only whether the way we have modelled 
them is consistent or inconsistent with the 
way things are.103 In the cases above, the 
broken screen reveals something of the 
screen itself and of our involvement with it. 
The broken screen, like the animised screen, 
allows us to see what was expected in how 
these expectations have not been met. In so 
doing, the onus of interaction between person 
and screen is shifted. The screen—thing is no 
longer a thing for use, directed towards the 
world in the same way as me, but something 
that must be negotiated with.
103. Hayles writes: “The best we can do is determine if our models 
are consistent with the unmediated flux as we experience 
it… in determining this consistency or lack of it, constraints 
play a special role. Inexpressible in themselves, they cannot 
speak the truth; they cannot say ‘Yes, this is how reality is.’ 
But they can work to allow us to see that certain modes are 
not consistent with the unmediated flux; they can say ‘No, 
this is not how reality is.’”  Hayles, “Desiring Agency,” 145.
Obtrusiveness may be seen as a material fault, 
as the screen no longer being fit for purpose, 
such as when a phone becomes immersed in 
water, or ‘dead spots’ appear on an LCD. Such 
faults open up the relations between people 
and things and how things are relied on. Or 
obtrusiveness might reveal how things such 
as the phone can be incorporated into the 
body, or how its material interacts with the 
environment differently to our own. It might 
draw attention to the composition of a space 
which is approached as whole and immersive, 
as being constituted of individual pixels, each 
prone to failure independently of the others. 
Breaking works to reveal an inconsistency 














Fig 34. Intent and Directedness. 
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The agential and material relations that reveal 
the screen have a peculiar volatility that leads 
to a resistance to being situated. The screen 
per se is difficult to attribute agency and 
materiality to as these qualities seem against 
the screen, leading to the prioritisation of 
the image or the frame. But the screen does 
have a specific material agency – firstly as a 
mode of production, and secondly as the excess 
of this mode of production. The television, 
for instance, occupies a particular material 
agency in the way it produces space. But it 
also has a material agency when switched off. 
This second state of the screen is an uncanny 
one, in that it makes clear that the actions 
of the screen, now absent, are more than its 
mode of production. It becomes difficult to 
resolve a use for this screen—switched—off, 
at which point it becomes difficult to call it a 
screen at all.
This chapter focused on the excess of screenic 
determinations in order to reveal something 
of the plane of relations that generates the 
screen. This revealed a strong contradiction 
between the screen’s material and its use, one 
that was generated by a force of materiality.
The screen was found to have a strained 
relation to its own use. The screen was not 
found within a tool relation as something to 
be directly and intentfully used to produce 
ORDERING AND THE ONUS OF INTERACTION: 
ONTOLOGY AND THE SCREEN-AS-RELATION
things. Rather, it was found to be a mode of 
production in itself. 
The screen produces material relations. 
In this sense, materiality is ontologically 
fundamental to revealing the screen, even 
if a stable, reflexive material is not. In 
other words, the screen presents materially 
in an indeterminate and unresolved way, 
leaving materiality accessible as a relational 
possibility. The screen is, in this sense, 
materially active: it acts materially to bring 
things about. More than simply presenting 
materially, the screen produces materiality – 
the screen is itself a process of materialisation, 
it orders space in a particular way so as to 
express material relations.  
The recognition of the screen as a screen lies 
in the way it generates material. Because the 
screen acts materially to produce space, it acts 
as a form of spatial ordering. On the one hand, 
this spatial ordering is for humans. This is, 
after all, how the screen is useful for us. But 
the ordering that the screen undertakes is not 
a human ordering, rather it is something that 
happens alongside the human. In finding a 
‘screen’ within the world, a person is finding a 
difference in the way that space is ordered. The 
way that this ordering takes place is different 




The screen’s production of materiality is, 
of course, contingent on the material of the 
screen itself.  The composition of the screen is 
itself ordered in a particular way. The LCD is 
ordered as an array of pixels, but each of these 
pixels is also dependent on an ordered array of 
information. The screen’s ordering of space is 
produced not only by the ordering of its pixels 
(or apertures) and the relations between them, 
but also by the ordering of the information 
that reaches them. The screen orders space 
in a particular way, at certain paces and a 
variety of scales that are directly related 
to its material composition. This material 
directedness produces spaces differently to 
human space. Distance, orientation, and 
other forms of human spatiality concern the 
material directedness of the body. This new 
ordering is found alongside the human, in the 
material directedness of the screen.
The body, then, has to be found on both sides 
of the screen: the reflexive body that interacts 
with the screen thing, that is available to order 
the object of the screen as it sits in space; and 
another body, one that is still caught within 
the generative material relations to the other 
side, that is being ordered by the screen. 
The activeness of the other side allows the 
embodied split to be resolved with a negation 
of the screen—as—object. The body is then 
found amongst the generative relations of the 
‘other’ side. If the screen’s material becomes 
too obviously active, however, this screening 
relation is challenged: the generative body is 
pulled from the other side to this side, where 
it interacts with a material thing, no longer a 
screen. The ‘screen’ as relata is abandoned in 
this state, the thing needs to become something 
else – a piece of furniture, a window hung on 
the wall, an icon; or else something hidden 
within a cabinet or behind a curtain. 
The ways in which the screen produces 
material disconnects its own, object—
like material from its use. In some ways, 
producing material is what the screen is for, 
but the sense of activity with which the screen 
produces means this relation cannot reveal the 
screen as a tool – the screen’s own, reflexive 
material counteracts  its use context whilst at 
the same time producing it. The same force of 
materiality that is responsible for recognising 
the screen acts on the material of the screen 
itself, which cannot surface.
The screen remains materially active, but 
cannot declare itself as such. If this material 
efficacy is pushed further into a more obvious 
expression of agency – an agency that shows 
reciprocation and a sense of directedness as 
well as an efficacy – the screen disappears and 
becomes something else. 
Directedness and reciprocation are the very 
basis by which the screen can be recognised, but 
the screen relies on them remaining implicit. 
We ask for a passiveness from the screen’s 
material for this reason. When the screen’s 
use context becomes difficult to resolve, or its 
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material too active, other relations become 
more clearly accessible. Broken things, things 
that are express their roles or interact with 
their environments disturb the revealing of 
the ‘screen’. Different perceptual attitudes are 
used towards these things. Animism, breaking 
and other expressions of agency shift the onus 
of interaction, counteracting the passiveness 
of the screen. 
In this condition, the screen is no longer 
something that is fit for purpose – something 
that can be worked through. Instead, it 
becomes something with which a new relation 
must be found, a new materiality negotiated. 
This reflexive shift between subject and object, 
from for to with, also reveals something of the 
generative relations from which the thing 
emerged. In not being what was expected, it 
becomes clear what was expected.
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Considering the screen as surfacing from a 
plane of relations leads to the finding that 
materiality and agency – considered as 
separate mechanisms at the conclusion of the 
last chapter – are actually not so separate. 
Rather, they show up in a kind of competition 
in revealing the screen, each dependent on but 
opposed to the other. That is, although these 
relations arise from the same plane, the ways 
that they are resolved into relata mean that 
one or the other tends to be ignored. The screen 
occupies a particular point of tension between 
and within agency and materiality. The 
materiality and agency of the screen contradict 
one another. The screen can be  materialso long 
as it isn’t effectual.  Converesly, the screen can 
have an agential effect, but this effect needs to 
be held apart from its material. The alterity 
that interrupted the screen coming about, in 
this chapter and the last, did so in terms of 
expressing a form of agency. The material 
object,  as relatum, cannot be properly resolved 
whilst it is expressing its own directedness. 
Agency, in this sense, seems to be in an 
internal competition with materiality. 
This chapter introduced another dimension to 
the figure of the analysis. Rather than focusing 
on a line between relata, it introduced a plane 
of relations. But this plane was ‘resolved’. By 
noting a tension in agency and material, these 
became connected antagonists – materiality 
on the x axis of the plane and agency on the 
ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
y axis. The screen emerges from this plane 
as a point of tension. This approach does 
not achieve the effect of describing, or even 
encountering, the relations of the screen; 
rather it has just transcribed larger relata. 
The difference between this set of relata and 
the last is a matter of scale. 
This chapter has discussed a process by 
which the screen comes about – a process that 
fixes relata at the same time as remaining 
generative. This processual approach 
extended into creative practice, which began 
to look at how things came about as well as 
what they are. The further that this relation-
based analysis has proceeded, the more it has 
become apparent that very little can be said 
absolutely about these relations. Written 
language, which served well enough in the 
previous chapter, does not work so well when 
discussing what lies behind determinations 
and before the reflexive. In other words, it 
is very difficult to say what the screen is 
when the screen is viewed within a constant 
state of becoming. At any point within these 
generative relations, language serves to freeze 
what is experienced, it pulls the screen out of 
the relation as a distinct relata.
For this reason, relations can only be 
discussed using iterations of language and 
nested of relata. In this way, this chapter has 
talked about material that is generated by 
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Are these screens? I can say, at least, that they have screens, that they are screen-bearing things. Moubie and 
Gaze Returner each use a screen in their interactions with me. But they use this screen are differently. The 
screens, then, must be different – they respond differently to me and to the space around them, they screen 
space differently. But the screens are the same, both 1.8” Adafruit TFT LCD displays.
What gets included in the term ‘screen’? The term might, in Moubie’s case, include the camera which takes 
the image that the LCD displays, as this is what communicates Moubie’s relation to space. But he can only 
have this relation because of his wheels and motor – these are what allow the spatial relation to be produced 
so it can be communicated as an image. Moubie, though, as a whole, is not a screen. What does it mean when 
Moubie surfaces as an agential other rather than a material object, or vice versa?
Boundaries are drawn differently around the material and the effectual in different situations. McLuhan might 
say that the medium is the message, that the ‘television’ is not an image but a system of people and cameras 
and politics and space and time. Where are the boundaries of the screen drawn? What’s in a name?
What’s in a name?
Fig 35: Screen?
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materiality, which then goes on to enter new 
material relations (out of which, of course, 
new material is formed). Certain terms within 
the language, such as “material directedness,” 
were used as a way of looking just prior to 
what was being discussed. The material 
directedness of the screen before it becomes a 
screen might refer to what pixels are and how 
they work. But the material directedness of 
pixels might refer to voltage fluctuations and 
logic gates. In using these techniques, it has 
become clear that the language of relations 
is always contingent on a scale, on drawing 
a boundary around a thing and referring to 
what came before that boundary.
When boundaries are drawn around the 
screen—thing in perception, they seem to be 
drawn in a way that maintains this balance. 
The way screens are described according to 
what they are and do varies significantly across 
the range of things called ‘screens’. The screen 
might be an array of pixels, or a repetition of 
apertures. It might be something that involves 
an external processor to map a point-cloud of 
data to a surface. It might be something that 
relies on electromagnetic waves and signal 
towers, or on chemical deposits and projected 
light. The boundaries of the screen are both 
larger and smaller than a single surface. 
To maintain the screen as a point of tension 
in generative materiality and agency, the 
screen becomes a composite of the smaller and 
larger things that occupy this point. The next 
section will explore the idea of the screen as an 
assemblage of ordering. It will pay particular 
attention to the ways that the boundaries 
around the screen are drawn and redrawn. 
In other words, it will assume an inseparable 








The previous chapter focused on the relations that generated screen 
relata and revealed the screen as a point of tension and balance in 
materiality and agency. Following from chapter one, a sense of use 
remained quite essential in revealing the screen, but could not account 
for what the screen is. The screen did not disappear into its use like a 
tool, as its materiality seems to work against its use: once the screen’s 
materiality became apparent, the screen was no longer useful. The 
screen does have a sense of activity, though, in that it acts materially 
to bring things about. The screen arises in perception as the recognition 
of an ordering of space that is outside of the human. This ordering 
is dependent on the material directedness of the screen – on how it 
produces space through its own material properties. The material 
directedness of the screen produces this ordering, at certain paces and 
certain scales that are directly related to its material composition. 
Chapter two concluded in recognising that the material directedness 
of the screen resulted in a form of spatial ordering that sat alongside 
human spatiality. If this material directedness is expressed by the 
screen, however, it does not surface in perception as a screen. The screen 
relies on its material directedness remaining implicit. In altering the 
balance between agency and materiality, ‘screens’ were not produced. 
Rather it was a screen-bearing object, or a quasi-subject that arose in 
perception. These things worked alongside the human, acting at paces 
and scales that interfered with human spatial ordering. In response 
to deforming this point of tension, the screen became available as a 
composite of the smaller and larger things that occupy this point of 
relations. These things might include apertures, pixels, light, casings, 
framings, objects, and political meanings – all of which are ordered in 
their own way. But describing the screen in this way does not allow us 
to encounter the relations of the screen, it only transcribes smaller and 
larger relata with which we can interact. 
STRUCTURE OF RELATIONALITY
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Some Assembly is not a screen, though it is screenic. It crosses over critical 
thresholds in the experience of a screen so as to help reveal what this experience 
is. Some Assembly has a group of sixteen identically composed and programmed, 
self-contained ‘bots’ that inhabit a television.1 They sit and roll over a moving 
image similar to a test pattern, an environment spatialised in colour. The bots 
have responses, four different ways of situating themselves in this environment. 
Each of these has a speed, an order, a density; each is connected to the ontological 
condition of the screen. 
The bots are made in the same way.  They each have wheels, and servo motors to 
control them. They have ultrasonic distance sensors – eyes – and a servo motor 
to turn them. They have a colour sensor, and an RGB programmable LED to see 
and display colour; an RF transmitter and receiver to communicate with. And, of 
course, they have the same behaviours. But they’re all a bit different.
Well, not so different, at first. They start out in a structured grid, an ordered array 
of bot-pixels, doing a simple colour read and display. The stationary bot translates 
the changing environment of the image, taking the colour and displaying it on 
his back. The bot’s display outlives the initial trigger, so that the grid of colour 
below is transferred to a grid of colour above. But the bots don’t stop here, they 
begin to look around, to find the edges of their environments. Sixteen small bot-
pixels looking around – in-time, but out of step. They’re not such an ordered pixel 
array now. They’re still acting en masse, they read and display colour at the same 
time. But they’re doing something else too, something seemingly for their own 
purposes. They’ve got two states: a ‘display’, a production of the image, and a 
‘looking’, an agency of their own. 
One of the bots falls out of line with the others and the grid is broken. This little 
bot, rotated in spot, out on his own – probably an uneven power distribution to 
a servo motor. Soon after, the bots begin to ‘back out’ of the array. One by one, 
more or less, each flipping states on his own. They’re not backing out evenly 
though, they have bias in certain directions, and move at different speeds. Bots 
who have seen a lot of dead patches, who ‘display’ black more often, are keenest 
to get out of the grid.  Now, when they display, they are doing something new. The 
Some Assembly
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colour they’re displaying isn’t a mimicry of the grid below them, it’s interpreted 
between them. The screen on top of the bots, the one made by their backs, starts 
to explain the spatial relations between them. These two guys are side-by-side, 
this guy hasn’t moved very far at all. They’re still displaying in-sync, but it’s harder 
now to tell the two states of movement and display apart – these states begin 
to rely on one another. The bots are different to one another, they move faster 
or slower, go to the left more or the right more, but when they display, they’re 
cooperating. Not a mass anymore.
Then one bot turns around, does a full 360 and starts moving forward. He’s 
looking with intent now, seeing walls and other bots and purposefully avoiding 
them, navigating around the environment. The others follow suit before too long. 
Bots begin to approach one another, face-to-face. Some lock horns and push each 
other around the place. Some chase others around.  Some get stuck in corners 
or surrounded by packs of bots. They seem so pre-occupied with themselves, in 
fact, that they don’t all hear their trigger. Some bots are still vigilant, displaying 
their colour on time, but others wait a while, not wanting to display just then. 
Others just refuse to display and keep moving about, pushing the vigilant bots off 
their squares. It’s really hard to call this a screen, now – more like a group of bots 
punctuating their movements with party lights.
Fig 36: Some Assembly (Short). [Video, 03:51].
1. See appendix G for circuit diagram and code.
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This chapter will explore the scale at which the screen arises by 
considering it as an assemblage. It will pay particular attention to the 
ways that the boundaries around the screen are drawn and redrawn in 
perception.  In other words, it will take as its assumption that relations 
and relata are caught within and emerge from a perceptual structure.
Chapters one and two discussed the relational framework by forming a 
hierarchy. Each established one of the relata and relations as prior to 
the other – in chapter one, the relata was considered prior, in chapter 
two, the relation. Each introduced a hierarchy in which its prior term 
was causally linked to the emergence of the second term. This chapter 
will attempt to flatten this hierarchy by noting the scales at which 
they emerge. Relata and relations are approached in this chapter as 
different but equivalent structures. Both the relata and relations are 
seen as symptomatic of a larger structure – a structure that is not 
about the determinate concrete thing, or the relations that connect and 
generate them, but about the mechanics of perception. This chapter 
will continue with ideas of materiality and agency, but rather than 
these being set up against each other, they will be shown as surfacing 
from within the same structure. 
Materiality and agency have been addressed as both reflexive 
characteristics (in chapter one) and generative mechanisms (in 
chapter two). In chapter one, agency was linked to the subject and 
materiality to the object. In chapter two, the object and subject were 
generated from within materiality and agency as unbalanced products 
of these relations.  Chapter two argued that the screen may arise from 
materiality and agency in a more balanced way, somewhere close to 
a midpoint between these forces as a thing that shows substantial 
amounts of material agency. This balance resulted in a thing that was 
difficult to make into either an object or subject. Attempts to qualify this 
point of balance by shifting it slightly resulted in an understanding of 
the screen that showed materiality and agency as being in competition, 
as antagonistic. 
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Material and agential emergences, however, hold much akin. Materiality 
and agency are both questions of substance and action – of what it is, 
what it can do; and what I am, what I can do. By placing emphasis on the 
relata, materiality and agency could only be understood as properties of 
a relatum, and so could not be interrogated separately from the thing. 
But in placing emphasis on these as processes, their separateness was 
too strong. That is, they were looked at from outside the screen, as 
processes that produce the screen and so must be separate from that 
which they produce. Understanding materiality and agency as part of 
a relational structure allows a view of the screen as a relatum on the 
same ontological level as the processes that produce it.
‘0 and 1’, that’s the same as ‘Yes and No’ isn’t it? ... As opposed to the ‘bit’ as the 
smallest data unit that computers we are using in daily life work with, the unit 
the quantum computer operates with is called ‘qubit’ (quantum bit). The qubit 
represents not ‘0 or 1’, but a superposition state of ‘0 and 1 at the same time’… 
suggesting a state of things that even the best scientists cannot describe, and 
that no-one is able to perceive.
Ryoji Ikeda2
In my daily interactions I am happy to describe the world as a subject to objects. 
I turn on the television, I watch a video. But this description is a contradiction. 
The objects of reflexive experience butt heads with the relations that bring about 
these objects, that bring me along with them. If relations produce objects, then 
these objects have to be brought back into my interaction before they have 
occurred. If they aren’t, I don’t have anything to interact with. I don’t have an I 
to interact with. The television, the video have to be reflexively recognised as the 
pre-existing basis for the interaction. 
 
In other words, the object arises out of our relation. But the object becomes 
recognised as pre-existing the engagement because I have to have engaged 
Structure of perception
2. Ryoji Ikeda, “Ryoji Ikeda — Supersymmetry,” interview by Kazunao Abe, Yamaguchi Centre for Arts 
and Media, April 2014. Accessed November 13, 2017, http://special.ycam.jp/supersymmetry/
en/interview/. 
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with it. An interaction demands things that interact – I know I was me before 
the interaction, surely the object was too? Is the object of before, the thing with 
which I interacted, the same as the object of after, the thing with which I have 
interacted?
Relations are in context. Every shift in context, the passage of time and space, 
changes the relations. Every time I interact with the world, the object and subject 
are both fundamentally changed. The relations that produce this television 
and this video are different to those of yesterday, so the television and video 
are different to what they might have been yesterday. The television of after is 
different to the television of before. So how are they the same television? What 
differences are allowable amongst what stays the same? What is the structure of 
this difference, from where I can find a television again and again?
I said before that design has a strange task in this a-posteriori-a-priori perceptual 
process ‒ the thing I am interacting with arises out of the interaction itself, but 
has to be brought back in to the beginning of that interaction to form its basis 
in the first place, just as I do. But now the thing I design will never be what is 
brought out, nor what is brought back. It has already formed its own alliances 
and taken its own direction. The structure out of which this designed thing falls is 
updated to account for it, this new thing is now a possibility.
This chapter looks at the screen according to its structure of relationality; 
according to how relata and relations fall in and out of each other in 
perception. This non-directional structure allows relata and relations to 




























present in terms of whether relata or relations are a priori. The screen 
is addressed here as a series of relations and relata with a focus on how 
they become perceivable as such. To consider the relata and relations 
as ontologically equivalent structures requires another change in the 
way perception is understood to be structured. The process of ‘thinging’ 
introduced in the previous chapter will be approached in this chapter 
as iterative – as a matter of drawing perceptual boundaries around 
relations to produce relata at different times and at different scales 
as materialities and agencies change. The major assumption of this 
approach is that the relata and relations are bound within a larger 
structure, one which keeps them together in possibility without any 
individual instance necessarily being enacted. This structure is the 
basis of the screen, out of which relata and relations can be concurrently 
and contextually generated. 
Chapters one and two each held the relata and relations apart, 
considering them as mechanisms on different scales. This resulted 
in distinct problems in the argument in these chapters, problems 
deeply embedded in the nature of their aims. The more that relata 
and relations were held apart in a hierarchy – one generating the 
other – the more impossible it became to discuss the primary term 
without reference to what it generated, or the secondary term without 
talking about what generated it. Brian John Martine comments on the 
inseparability of relata and relations, remarking that attempts to place 
one of the determinate or indeterminate aspects of experience as prior 
to the other are always ontologically flawed: “problems arise only when 
we begin to insist from some reflective vantage point that one or the 
other of these manners of being related must take pride of place.” Both 
the determinate and the indeterminate are important structures of 
knowing, but moreover, it is their interplay that is of most importance.3 
3. Brian John Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1992), 3-4; 18-21. Martine notes that determinacy and indeterminacy are inextricably 
linked. Determinacy needs indeterminacy: “It is not possible to separate the determinate 
dimensions ... from their necessary relation to the indeterminate dimensions of experience” 
Likewise, indeterminacy needs determinacy: “The indeterminate dimensions of experience are 
ontologically bound to sameness, limitation and determinancy.  Hence it is just as dangerous 
to deny the place of the general principles, laws and structures that are grounded in sameness 
as it is to abandon ourselves to the unrestricted hegemony of the Absolute.” Determinacy and 
indeterminacy are ontologically reciprocal. 
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Neither relations or relata alone could explain the contradictions that 
define the screen. Understanding the contradictions of the screen 
requires considering the screen’s relata and relations together, as a 
relational structure. This presents a different figure to the axis and the 
plane. If the axis of the relata and the plane of the relations exist on the 
same ontological level, the structure that produces them must be able 
to support both of these emergences: points of definition, as well the 
stretched and rebounding surface of the relational; the determinate, 
and the indeterminate. The figure of this structure is presented in this 
chapter as a field of possibilities. The field is a loosely bounded region, 
constantly changing and held together in flux. 
There are some identifiable points within this field, a cluster of relata 
that have been drawn out of similar fields on other occasions. However, 
the relations cannot be plotted in the same way. Locating relations as 
points in a field would be a move that bounds them – a determination of 
these indeterminate entities. All that can be found when looking at the 
relata is the distribution of points; that is, how the relata are positioned 
within the field. As with the figure of the plane in the previous chapter, 
an intervention is needed in the field to reveal the relations at the 
same time as the points of the relata. This intervention now needs to 
interfere with the distribution of relata as well as the relational plane. 
This intervention amounts to a twist, a provocation in the field that 
brings about a remapping of the points on the relational plane. 
Fig 38. Twisting a Field.
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Always follow the rhizome by rupture; lengthen, prolong, and relay the line of 
flight; make it vary, until you have produced the most abstract and torturous of 
lines of n dimensions and broken directions. Conjugate deterritorialised flows. 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari4
Design is usually determinative. It takes a field of possibilities within its aim, 
it extracts these possibilities as ideas, tests them, actualises them in different 
forms. The diagrams, drawings, words, models and objects that are made are 
determinations of the field of possibility, they take some of what is possible and 
represent it in material form.
The screen is a field of its possibilities. Some of these possibilities I know: the 
points of the televisions I have watched in my life and the contexts they arose 
from, the clusters of computers I have typed in to and why and how I did so. Some 
of the not-possibilities I also know: Moubie is not a point of screenic possibility, 
but a form built around a screen. Touchbuzz and Pitchmatcher show me that 
Designing to twist
4. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minneapolis Press, 1987), 11.
Such a move allows the content of the field to remain intact, but 
remaps its structure. As this remapping takes place, different points 
will be stressed and others de-stressed, allowing the screen to emerge 
in different ways. Moreover, stressing the field in this way will reveal 
thresholds – critical points at which one relatum becomes another. 
The sense of temporality present in the figure of the relational plane 
is strengthened here: it is not just a matter of seeing the ‘before’ and 
‘after’ of the move, but of watching the move take place. Discursively, 
this twist will be performed by addressing the screen as an assemblage 
of heterogeneous components. This cluster of components, each 
considered as a relatum, will be shown to differentiate from and re-join 
to the field of possibilities of the screen. Within this discussion, Some 
Assembly will work to twist the topology of the screen’s relational field, 
causing a critical transition from one relatum to another and revealing 
something of the relational structure of the screen.
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reciprocity of interaction isn’t a part of the screen’s possibilities, at least not on 
its own. The screen happens at a certain scale and in a certain way. What I don’t 
know is where the bounds of screenic possibility are – where is the threshold of 
the differences that are allowed?  
I can design from the points of the field I know, in which case I will get more 
screens, similar screens. This can tell me how screens are alike. I can design 
from the points of the field I know are not, in which case I will get more not-
screens. This can tell me how not-screens are alike. By comparing the two, the 
similarities between screens and the similarities between not-screens, I might 
narrow in on the difference between what is a screen and what is not a screen. 
But the moment of transition will remain obscured. Instead, I can twist this field 
of relations at an accessible point. Some Assembly attempts this, it sits within the 
field of possibilities of the screen and expresses part of this field differently over 
time. In this way, Some Assembly is more of a performance than an object. At any 
time, the sum of its objects are either individuals or a whole. But really they are 
both, expressed differently in time.
Some Assembly is actualised, of course. It is a group of sixteen small, theoretically 
identical bots; an arena; a television; a recording device. But it is actualised in a 
different sort of way to a diagram or paragraph, which remains as it is for longer. 
My aim with Some Assembly is not to make a screen or a not-screen, but to make 
something that is at one point a screen and at another not. The twist it performs 
is to find itself as the possibility of two things at once, to isolate a moment of 
change between two things. Each bot is both itself and a part of a collective. Both 
of these possibilities are encased in its material, enacted differently over time. 
Mostly, design creates things that are judged successful or not according to intent. 
The object itself has its own directedness, as does the person who uses it. The 
designed thing is, at the least, these three contexts together – intent, material, 
use… meaning. To design a twist is to account for the contexts of the thing, to 
allow it to change; twisting, rupturing, “cutting across a single structure.”5
How can a thing be designed that is two things at once? 
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Considering relations as primal to relata introduced a problem that 
a relational structure can help resolve.  Specifically, considering the 
screen from the point of view of the primacy of relations gives rise to a 
problem of temporality and anticipation: if things are not permanent, 
but are drawn from a relational plane, how can they remain meaningful? 
When I say the word ‘screen’, what makes that word hold meaning if 
not its referent, the thing to which it refers? These questions relate to 
the continuity of the thing and how things are found in perception – 
how a thing can hold meaning and form even as this meaning and form 
is being developed.
One technique for addressing the continuity of the thing has already 
been introduced in the transcendental essence. However the essential 
properties that have been encountered in phenomenologies of the screen 
do not fit well within a non-hierarchical relational structure. The screen’s 
‘essence’ is an irreducible quality that sits outside of the thing itself, on 
a different ontological plane.6 This poses a problem when considering 
relata and relations as part of a structure. Essential properties become 
fixed and permanent, existing separately (and before) the thing itself, 
and so are removed from any possible experience of the thing. Although 
the essence of the screen can tell us what of the experience of a thing 
remains the same, it cannot tell us how internal differences appear, 
or how conceptions and understandings of screens, as well as screens 
themselves, can change over time. The screen described by essential 
properties is unable to change without contradicting its definition – 
it becomes conceptually fixed. A conception of the screen that allows 
change needs instead to stay with the experience of the thing, noting 
its differences as well as commonalities. 
MAPPING THE SCREEN
5. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 9.
6. DeLanda comments that “when the properties of a given whole are taken to be brute fact, and 
listed as the unexplained characteristics that the whole must possess in order to be an entity 
of any given kind, the list of necessary properties swiftly becomes an essence. Essences belong 
to a different plane of being from the entities whose identities they define.” Manuel DeLanda, 
Assemblage Theory (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 12.
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This exploration will begin by comparing the ways that the screen 
holds meaning, as an individual experiential entity and a universal 
class of thing, to define the screen as a population of immanent screen 
experiences – of these screens. It will then move to examine the role 
of scale in the ways that boundaries are drawn around screen relata 
as assemblages, maintaining at each scale a sense of the individual. 
The exploration will next define the screen according to a relational 
structure – a field of possibility from which the relata and relations 
of screen experience emerge – before establishing that the screen’s 
relational structure can be mapped and concluding with an examination 
of the parameters which define the screen’s map.
Shifting boundaries and persistence of meaning
The screen occurs at more than one scale – it is decomposable into its 
constituent parts, but it is also part of a larger whole. There are two 
senses of the screen at issue here: this screen as a specific experiential 
instance, and its compositional materiality of pixels and apertures; 
and the ‘screen’ as a general class noun or concept comprising specific 
instances of screen experiences. In a relational structure, the term 
‘screen’ as designating a general class is as important to the screen’s 
ontology as any instance of the screen, as it provides a measure of 
what the screen is across its contexts.7 As such, this section will begin 
by discussing the linguistic concept of the screen and changes in the 
meaning of the term, before establishing that these linguistic changes 
also correspond to material changes in screens. It will then turn 
away from the idea that the term ‘screen’ references a set of intrinsic 
properties, focusing instead on the term as a collection of experiential 
images – a population of individual screens in their contexts, which 
together define a screenic ‘region’.
239
7. Brian Massumi describes these kinds of general terms as “invisible yardsticks” of experience. 
Brian Massumi, Parables of the Virtual: Movement, affect, sensation (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2002), 169.
Fig 39. Telephonic deconstruction: Layers of the screen.
240
Language and material
The meaning of the term ‘screen’, and the referents to which it applies, 
have certainly changed over time. The origins of the term in Middle 
Dutch, Frankish and Proto-Germanic languages suggest a form of 
protection: as a shield (scherm) or partition (skrank); a barrier to something 
unwanted. Chapter one showed that ‘barrier’ was still a part of the 
meaning of ‘screen’ today; but also showed that the inverse, a suturing 
or connecting, was part of this meaning. Introna and Ilharco categorise 
the present-day significance of ‘screen’, saying that the “plurality of 
meanings can be brought together along three main themes: projecting/
showing (e.g., TV screen), hiding/protecting (e.g., fireplace screen), and 
testing/selecting (e.g., screening the candidates).”8 The diverse set of 
meanings of the term ‘screen’ are, in many ways, responsible for the 
problems inherent in analysing it. It is difficult to account for the 
similarities amongst screens, when the actions and materialities of the 
term are so varied.
These changes in the definitions of the term are accompanied by changes 
in the materiality of the screen. The term references a variety of, 
sometimes contradictory, material instances. Bruno acknowledges that 
‘screen’ is a condition that can be conflated with architectural conditions 
such as the wall – a solid and opaque component.9 Friedberg favours 
the conflation of screen and window, noting that the transparency of 
glass “performs a visual dematerialisation,” but also that “the material 
barriers of glass also isolate the other senses.”10 Materialities of the 
screen are wide-reaching: from woven cloth or pressed paper, to a series 
of apertures carved from solid material, to transparent glass, to photons 
falling on a solid surface, to light emitting diodes in an array. The way 
that each of these screens appear in perception is startlingly different, 
yet the term used to describe them remains the same. 
When the term ‘screen’ is used, it does not necessarily refer to any 
particular instance of a screen in its context. To allow generalisation, 
to allow the term ‘screen’ to have a transferrable meaning, the context 
of the experience needs to be generalised, if not simply ignored. As 
DeLanda notes, it is “only when its ‘elements’ are wrenched from 
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8. Lucas D. Introna and Fernando M. Ilharco, “The Ontological Screening of Contemporary Life: 
A Phenomenological Analysis of Screens,” European Journal of Information Systems 13, no. 3 
(September 2004): 8.
9. Bruno notes that, “we must reflect on the ‘superficial’ relation between the form of canvas, 
wall, and screen…the interrelation of these forms is changing on the surface, and as distinctions 
collapse a form of conflation ... is taking place.” Giuliana Bruno, Surface: Matters of Aesthetics, 
Materiality and Media (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 75.
10. Anne Friedberg, The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 
117.
11. Manuel DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2011), 164.
12. Massumi remarks that the tendency of science and other absolute disciplines toward “reduction 
of the whole to the variable sum of its dissociated parts”  creates a misconception where “the 
‘conceived separately’ slips into ‘conceived as existing separately’. The extracted variable is 
mistaken for an objective part.” Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 165.
their singular situation does the absolute become generalizable.”11 
The danger of forming generalisations by removing things from their 
contexts is that this linguistic act might be mistaken for an actual one: 
that because something can be isolated from its context in thought, it 
can also be isolated from its material context.12
Words can be transferred from one context to another. Ontology, in computer 
science, is not a coming into being or the revealing of the world. It is not 
philosophical. The ontology of robots doesn’t ask why, but what. It is a system of 
naming, of carving up and compartmentalising things for a program to call upon. 
The Behaviour Boxes, Gaze Returner, Moubie, the bots of Some Assembly – all 
of them rely on this sense of ontology. Not only is data signified in certain ways 
(the red channel of the display colour, for instance, is named “rd”), but certain 
behaviours are signified too (the sequence of activities by which colour is displayed 
involves pushing three bytes of data to a series of LED in order, this behaviour is 
called “colourdisplay”). What these things are called is inconsequential, it’s just 
a way for the bots and I to communicate. Carving up the program like this means 
that colourdisplay can be triggered by different inputs, that rd can hold different 
values at different times, and that I can always ask what they are.
One of the bots of Some Assembly sees a colour. I ask, what is this colour?  It 
analyses the colour, breaks it apart – “Well, it’s mostly red, but maybe a little bit 
orange. It’s very bright. If I had to tell you, I’d probably say rd 255, gd65, bd 0. 




If this operation of separation is performed, if continuity of meaning is 
looked for in what stays the same outside of context, the most reasonable 
conclusion to arrive at is an essence. But this thesis has shown that the 
continuity of the screen is not removed from the individual experiences 
of its materiality, and so does not exist separately from it. Screens are 
highly specific things, but the term ‘screen’ is not. 
Language and properties
Instead of looking at the screen as separate from its contexts, a screen 
could be found that looked at individual, contextually embedded 
screens across their contexts. The resultant ‘screen’ would not be seen 
as a force, a “reified generality”13 as found in, for example, Baudrillard’s 
analysis. The screen could instead become an assembly of these screens, 
a kind of population of individual, contextualised instances. I’d like to 
demonstrate the difference between these approaches using an example 
put forward by William Goosens in his discussion of the ‘relevant 
properties’ of objects.  A ‘relevant property’, for Goosens, is something 
that “gives us information about whether or not a term applies to objects 
that have the property.”14 Goosens’ discussion challenges Putnam’s 
structural realist conceptions, saying that the meaning of words is 
malleable because “properties associated with underlying trait terms 
are almost never a part of their meaning.”15 Words work, instead, by 
reference to experience and linguistic context.
Goosens begins by outlining Putnam’s thesis that terms hold meaning 
in four ways: in their linguistic context, their association with more 
general terms, their association with properties, and their extension or 
material encounter.16 He then introduces a speaker, S, with knowledge 
of the term ‘toad’ according to the first three forms: that ‘toad’ is a noun, 
that toads are a kind of animal, and that toads have specific qualities 
such as being warty, lethargic, awkward. Goosens then posits a disease 
responsible for the toads’ specific qualities, and a new mutation that 
provides resistance, so that toads are no longer warty, lethargic and 
awkward. He claims that, once all the relevant properties have been 
counteracted, the speaker would have to treat the new animals as ‘non-
toads.’17 This logical conclusion, claims Goosens, is nonsensical.
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13. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 14. “Reified generalities” is the term DeLanda uses for things that 
act as conceptual placeholders; or things removed from any specific context in which they occur: 
“the weapon,” “the tool,” and, I would add, ‘technology’.
14. William K. Goosens, “Underlying Trait Terms” in Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, ed. 
Stephen P. Schwartz (London: Cornell, 1977), 134.
15. Goosens, “Underlying Trait Terms,” 145.
16. Goosens, “Underlying Trait Terms,” 146.
17. Goosens states: “S may still call these animals toads because he realises that ‘warty-looking 
skin’ and ‘awkward’ were never logically necessary, and because the animals still have the other 
properties associated with ‘toad’. But we could easily augment the story to argue against the 
other associated properties ... S would then eventually have to treat these new animals as non-
toads.” This conclusion, he claims, is flawed because the properties are not part of the essential 
meaning: “the properties associated with ‘toad’ change… not in spite of our conception but 
because of it.”Goosens, “Underlying Trait Terms,” 147-8.
18. Goosens, “Underlying Trait Terms,” 148.
In this way, Goosens reframes the term ‘toad’ away from the properties 
common to all examples, and toward the differences between them. 
These differences are part of the condition of meaning: “that the 
properties associated with ‘toad’ change… is completely predictable… 
but this predictability is exactly a criterion of constancy in meaning.”18 
If I test the term ‘screen’ to see if it can remain independent from its 
context, I find mental images of particular screens appearing, and of 
particular materials and objects caught within the field of the screen. 
Some of these are residues of my own interaction with screens – some of 
them are surprising, and others everyday. The term screen allows the 
thing to be recognisable as itself even as it changes in both materiality 
and function. The term, in this case, acts as a kind of placeholder for a 
population of experiences involving a certain thing.
The screen as a population of these screens
Merleau-Ponty discusses this changing materiality on the scale of a 
specific instance of a thing, rather than across a general class. In this 
way, he can help address the schism in scale between direct individual 
experiences of the screen (the phenomenological) and the continuity 
of meaning held by the concept of the screen (the structural). The 
screen, as a term that stands for a class of things which shows internal 
difference, includes a variety of material and relational instances that 
confuse its ability to be recognised as “the same throughout all possible 
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repetitions.”19 However, Merleau-Ponty shows that continuity of form 
needs to be established even for an individual object: things present to 
us as discontiguous images, and it is only together that these images 
make the thing.20 Such an understanding of a specific, individual thing 
shows it as a composite – a collection of parts that are themselves 
different, but add to a sum of understandings that hold meaning as a 
whole. Merleau-Ponty’s house seen from the street, the river, and the 
inside, still form the house; even though these are strikingly different 
perceptions. The same could be said of any individual screen, as well 
as the screen as a general term. A lattice, a television and a phone 
each contributes to an understanding of the ‘screen’ despite being very 
different things. The meaning held by the term does not sit separately 
from these individual instances but alongside them. Later in his 
analysis, Merleau-Ponty revises his definition of the house as being 
“seen from nowhere,” preferring instead an understanding of the thing 
as being seen “from everywhere,” from “all times just as it is seen from 
all places, and by the same means.”21
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis indicates that the thing persists in time, as 
well as in space, as a sum of experience. Some of these experiences are 
based in materiality and embodied perception, others as communicative 
representations; similarly some exist in the present, others in the past 
or the anticipated future. To explore the relational structure of the 
screen, we need to understand these scales of experience as coexistent 
– as contributing significantly to a greater relational field. 
Such an understanding holds the thing, and the term that refers to it, 
as a population of experiences. It is a thing populated by individuals 
on one scale, and able to act as an individual on another. None of these 
understandings have priority over the others: “taken in itself – and as 
an object it demands to be taken as such – the object conceals nothing: 
it is fully spread out and its parts coexist while our gaze skims over 
them one by one; its present does not efface its past, and its future will 
not efface its present.”22 Merleau-Ponty’s house, then, can be seen as 
a field. This field includes a composite of the possibilities of the house, 
from all experience that have been had, and from all experiences that 
might be anticipated.
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19. Pheng Cheah writes that “in order to be present, any being must persist in time. This means the 
form of the thing – that which makes it actual – must be identifiable as the same throughout all 
possible repetitions. But this iterability implies that any presence is… impossible even as it ... [is] 
possible.” Pheng Cheah, “Non-dialectical Materialism” in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency 
and Politics ed. Dianna Coole and Samantha Frost (London: Duke University Press, 2010), 74.
20. Merleau-Ponty writes: “our perception ends in objects, and the object, once constituted, 
appears as the reason for all the experiences of it that we have had or that we could have. 
For example, I see the neighboring house from a particular angle. It would be seen differently 
from the right bank of the Seine, from the inside of the house, and differently still from an 
airplane. Not one of these appearances is the house itself. The house, as Leibniz said, is the 
geometrical plan… that includes these perspectives and all possible perspectives; that is, the 
non-perspectival term from which all perspectives can be derived; the house itself is the house 
seen from nowhere.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A 
Landes (London: Routledge, 2012), 69.
21. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 71.
22. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 73.
23. Heidegger remarks on the role of individual experience in naming: “The naming of the 
substantive itself always occurs on the basis of a pointing-out. This is a ‘demonstration’, exhibiting 
the encountered and the present-at-hand. The function of naming, which is performed in the 
demonstrative, belongs to the most primordial way of speaking in general.” He maintains that 
‘this’ one is “somehow included in every naming as such.” Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing?, 
trans. WB Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch, analysis by Eugene T Gendlin (Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Company, 1967), 25.
The meaning held by the whole remains grounded in individual 
experience, rather than being the conditions for that experience.23 
Persistence of meaning in this sense can be seen as a mechanism, a 
process of mapping regions of experience into meaningful wholes. 
The ontology of the screen belongs such a region of experience. The 
meaningful whole of the screen is composed of experiences of things, 
each able to exist independently that form a larger whole. Yet the 
screen is not reducible to these individul experiences. The meaning of 
the ‘screen’ as a population is different to any individual instance of 
it, just as the meaning of these instances is different to any individual 
elements that make them up. Moreover, the screen’s ontology relies 
on these differences. Meaning is held at a certain scale of interaction, 
where a region of experience is delineated, perceptually bounded into 
something called a ‘screen’. This region might contain spaces, objects, 
subjects, real things and virtual things as points within its field, but it 
also relies on generative processes of materiality and agency in the way 
the region is bound and escapes its binding. A screenic topology allows 
individual things and experiences to sit side-by-side and to become one 
another – concept to experience, word to object, virtual to real.
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How do we draw boundaries around the screen to call it a screen? What does this 
boundary include?
Do we start with the material? The screen is a plane on which light falls, or a 
system of repeating voids.  It is light emitting diodes in an array.  It is the LEDs and 
the wires that connect them. Or the LEDs, the wires, the glass on which they sit, 
the plastic that protects them. Or all of these and the invisible electrostatic grid, 
actualised by the current flowing through human skin so to allow the recognition 
of touch. Or these and the mouse, the keyboard, the radio frequency transmitter 
or the WiFi connection.
Or is it how the screen behaves? The screen is a projector of light, a filter of 
sensorial information. The screen is fast or responsive, it reciprocates social 
behaviour and holds social meaning. The screen is visual, aural, it recognises 
touch. The screen is virtual, real, subject, object.
Or perhaps the screen is all of these – a frame and an image, an object and a space. 
Pixels and an object and a space. Pixels, objects, spaces, symbolic meanings.
If these are the parts of the screen, then how do they give the screen as a whole?
Boundaries
Parts and Wholes
Approaching the screen according to its relational structure shows 
that the screen is a malleable entity. Screens are materially and 
conceptually decomposable to parts – they are made up of smaller 
things. These smaller things can be quite different from screen to 
screen – from apertures to photons to light emitting diodes. But these 
are not, in themselves, screens. Rather, it is how these things are 
composed in relation to one another, their ordering, that reveals the 
screen. That is, the properties of the screen come from the confluence 
of these parts non-additively. DeLanda notes that, in order to explain 
this observation, some concept of emergence is required.24 A concept 
of emergence allows pixels and apertures to hold properties at the 
same time as the relations between them generate new things with 
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new properties. This section reframes the region of screenic experience 
found in the last section in terms of the emergent assemblage. It begins 
by looking at the relation between that whole and the parts of the 
screen at different scales, and introduces the idea of the assemblage 
to account for how different relata can appear for the same screen in 
different contexts. It will conclude with a discussion of how boundaries 
are drawn around screen experiences and territorialised into screenic 
things at different scales.
Decomposable and irreducible
Emergences allow properties to develop from within things, so that 
“the whole exists alongside the parts in the same ontological plane.”25 
Emergence allows the properties of things to remain immanent rather 
than transcendent. In this way, the screen can be made up of smaller 
things, but have properties and capacities that belong to the whole 
per se. The screen can also hold properties of its own within the larger 
whole of the social realm, or the technological realm. The screen can 
remain alongside the pixel and the aperture, and alongside the larger 
environment of which it is a part. Each of these scales can then be 
incorporated into the screen’s relational structure.
In this way, the screen is decomposable, in the sense that smaller parts 
can be found within it. But it is also irreducible in that these smaller 
parts do not simply ‘add up’ to the whole.26 If the whole is decomposed 
into its parts, its properties cease to exist.27 That is, although the screen 
24. Properties, then belong to emergent wholes, and can arise and dissipate along with these 
wholes: “if properties are viewed as produced by the interactions between components, and 
their existence and endurance explained by the continuity of those interactions, then the 
properties are contingent: if the interactions cease to take place the emergent properties cease 
to exist.” DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 12.  
25. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 13.
26. Heidegger explored concepts of decomposability and irreducibility, saying “the interior is always 
again an exterior for the smaller and smaller particles.” In his example, a piece of chalk can be 
cut and cut again until it is powder, and even then smaller components can be identified through 
molecular analysis. But what is left is now “is no longer our chalk, i.e., we can no longer write 
with it on the blackboard.” Heidegger, What is a Thing?, 20.
27. The thing is defined not by its properties, but by the emergence of properties at particular 
scales and the contextual relation between scale and property. The thing is explained through 
“irreducibility and decomposability, a concept that makes the explanation of synthesis and 
the possibility of analysis intelligible.” DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation, 184. In this way, 
removing one part destroys the whole, but each part retains its capacities as an individual.
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is materially reducible to pixels in that these smaller things ‘make 
up’ the screen, it is not effectually reducible in the same way. The 
screen is lost if all that appears is a collection of pixels. The Behaviour 
Boxes showed the importance of this relation. Although the Behaviour 
Boxes each expressed some of the relations of the screen, these were 
decomposed into parts that were disconnected from one another. The 
effect of the screen, the whole to which the parts were parts, disappeared 
with this disconnection.28 
Redrawing boundaries
The screen is not malleable solely because the term ‘screen’ is malleable 
as a component of language. There are certainly slippages and side-
steps in how the term refers as individual referents move in and out 
of its population; but there is also an ontological malleability to the 
experience of the screen. If regions of experience are bounded as a 
perceptual process, then the way these boundaries are drawn is open 
to change as experience changes. As these boundaries are drawn and 
re-drawn, what is and is not included within the field of ‘the screen’ is 
itself open to slippage. 
Ryoji Ikeda’s Supersymmetry (2014) demonstrates the ways in which the 
boundaries around the screen can be manipulated. Ikeda’s installation 
begins with a dark room and a beeping sound similar to that of a radar. 
The installation is in two halves. 
The first, “experiment,” is presented as three tables, each composed of a 
backlit tray, a set of clear or metal ball-bearings, and a scanning arm. As 
the backlit tray is put into subtle motion, the ball-bearings move across 
its surface, flocking in unpredictable ways. This movement releases 
its own sound, which is picked up and projected through the space. 
The flocking ball-bearings act as information, producing pattern on the 
surface. As a planar, information-carrying surface, each of these tables 
is, quite comfortably, able to be called a screen. Then the backlight 
flickers and disappears, and particles of red light begin to move across 
the plane in lines. The materiality of the screen’s information changes: 
from the metal and plastic ball-bearings, to patterns of light. The 
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sound changes along with it – from the radar beep to the sound of 
improperly connected audio equipment, like plugging a speaker jack 
into a computer as an audio file is playing. The material of the screen 
has fundamentally changed, but is still located in the same space. The 
scanner arm then moves across the surface and the tilting stops. The 
beeping starts again, but the ball bearings lay still.
The second part of the installation, “experience,” consists of two banks 
of screens, one to either side of a central walkway. Each bank is itself 
composed of multiple screens: a continuous projection behind, on 
which messages are being decoded; and sixteen smaller, individuated 
monitors in front that depict a vertically moving sequence. Each of the 
monitors is discrete, but they appear to be working together. They also 
appear to interact with the continuous projection behind – they change 
frame and sequence as the projection appears to ‘finish’ a task. Flashes 
of white light then begin to move across the continuous projection, the 
scanning sound stops again. The monitors and continuous projection 
show footage taken from the table trays of ball-bearings. The sound of 
this rolling fills the room. 
Ikeda writes that “one central theme that I have always been keeping 
in mind when creating works is ‘continuation and discretization.’ Even 
things that seem to be continuous are certainly all composed in a discrete 
fashion. Continuation is just an illusion produced by the scales of things 
as we perceive them.”29 Supersymmetry, the result of Ikeda’s residency 
at CERN, challenges the pre-existence of the discrete. The boundaries 
of the stable, fixed ‘screens’ in Ikeda’s installation are constantly being 
redrawn. The ‘screen’ shifts from the table-screen (each of which has 
two materialities), to the monitor, then to the series of monitors, which 
seem to have a singular intent in screening. The screen then shifts 
to the continuous projection, and then to the entire bank of screens. 
In the end, the synchronicity between the banks of screens and the 
28. It became “an aggregate in which the components merely coexist without generating a new 
entity.” DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 12.
29. Ryoji Ikeda, “Ryoji Ikeda — Supersymmetry.” Ikeda continues to say that Superposition, the work 
on which Supersymmetry is based, deflects the idea  that continuity is an illusion. He refers to 
the quantum computer in this respect – where the discrete 0 and 1 of binary code – on or off, 
yes or no – is replaced by the qubit, which is a superposition: both 1 and 0 at the same time.
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tables are emphasised by the soundscape, and the ‘screen’ moves to 
include the entire room, immersing the visitor. Moreover, each of these 
screens at different scales coexist with the others – the screen is both 
continuous and discrete, in all of these places and between them. A 
relational structure needs to take account of how these boundaries 
become redrawn – how one screen is enveloped by another, or how one 
fixed relata can become another.
Strata to assemblages, assemblages to strata
DeLanda, in his discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage, 
defines things according to two extreme states – the strata, and the 
assemblage. Stratification occurs through a dual process, which 
Deleuze and Guattari referred to as a “double articulation.”30 The 
first is a filtering process of “loosely sorting the raw materials into 
sedimentary layers.” This is an act of making homogenous. The second 
is a process of consolidation, of “cementing those layers into a more 
enduring whole.”31 This is an act of unification and making permanent. 
The processes by which stratification occurs are terriorialisation, a 
bottom-up effect of finding boundaries; and coding, a top-down effect of 
regulating boundaries once formed.32 The strata that result represent a 
coalesced mass with maximum homogeneity. To consider the screen as 
a stratum is to approach it as a homogenous entity, a generality with 
a transcendental essence. The ‘properties’ of the screen—as—relatum, 
such as its division of the real and the virtual, its displacement, and its 
attention-grabbing, result from looking purely at this generality. 
The assemblage, however, acts as a counterpoint to the strata. 
Assemblages are gained from strata by deterritorialisation and decoding 
– by re-introducing difference within the strata whilst maintaining it 
as a whole entity. Parallels can be drawn between these mechanisms 
and the effects of breaking and alterity in the previous chapter: 
these two behaviours destabilised the stratfied screen, introducing a 
difference that threatened the identity of the whole.  Screenic effects 
were still present in the face of these behaviours, but the whole was 
less able to be considered as a screen. Though Deleuze and Guattari 
approach the strata and the assemblage as separate, opposed forms, 
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DeLanda suggests a modification to show them as the same form 
expressing different values of territorialisation and coding. He sets up 
territorialisation and coding as paramters of an assemblage. DeLanda 
stresses the ability to move between strata and assemblages by turning 
‘knobs’ corresponding to values of territorialisation and coding.33
One of the ‘knobs’ in in DeLanda’s conception is territorialisation, 
“a parameter measuring the degree to which the components of the 
assemblage have been subjected to a process of homogenisation, and 
the extent to which its defining boundaries have been delineated and 
made impermeable.”34 Adjusting the degree of territorialisation in a 
stratum or assemblage means increasing or decreasing the sameness 
within the relatum; extending or reducing its boundaries (or, perhaps 
more accurately, increasing or decreasing the permeability of these 
boundaries). To find an assemblage from a stratum, then, means finding 
the heterogeneity within the thing, and the points at which it changes 
into something else. DeLanda thus describes strata and assemblages 
as “phases, like the solid and liquid phases of matter.”35 
Territorialisation, as a process, “refers not only to the determination of 
the spatial boundaries of the whole… but also to the degree to which… an 
assemblage homogenises its components.”36 Although territorialisation 
30. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 47.
31. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 103.
32. Territorialisation is a bottom-up mechanism, a means of drawing boundaries, of making 
experience into things. Coding, however, happens in the opposite direction. It refers to “the role 
played by special expressive components in an assemblage in fixing the identity of the whole” 
DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 22.  Coding is a top-down mechanism, a type of ritual restraint 
of the whole on the parts. In this way, strata are “acts of capture,” once formed, they maintain 
themselves, “striving to seize whatever comes within their reach.” Deleuze and Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus, 40. This chapter focuses on territorialisation more than coding because it 
defines a way of linking perceptual shifts to the shifts between relata.  
33. DeLanda writes: “if one member of these dichotomies can be transformed into the other then 
the oppositions can be replaced with a single parametrised term capable of existing in two 
different states. This yields a different version of the concept of assemblage, a concept with 
knobs that can be set to different values to yield either strata or assemblages (in the original 
sense).” DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 3. DeLanda’s ‘knobs’ imply a degree of human control 
over the process over stratification and destratification.
34. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 3.
35. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 19.
36. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 22.
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is not dependent on humans, when looking at assemblages of which 
the human is a part, it is not difficult to see territorialisation as a 
quasi-autonomous perceptive process in which things are ‘sorted out’ 
into homogenised groups.37 Territorialisation involves the emergence of 
boundaries around regions of similarity, and the reduction of difference 
within this region until presented with a homogenous whole. 
Territorialisation starts with an assemblage – a “heterogenous 
population of sense impressions, and of the low-intensity replicas of 
those impressions (ideas),” which undergo sorting and assembling 
“through habitual application of certain operators to the ideas.”38 
DeLanda’s use of the word ‘habit’ implies a personal nature to the way 
these processes are enacted, and a sense of repeatability or iteration in 
time. In his discussion of the formation of the subject, DeLanda notes 
habit as an important part of this process, as a mechanism that has 
propensity towards drawing boundaries in a certain way.39
Habit is the “main form of territorialisation” in the formation of 
the subject, as it is “the process that gives the subject its defining 
boundaries and maintains those boundaries through time.” The 
application of habit in drawing boundaries around things in perception 
gives rise to relata at the same time as giving rise to subjectivity. This 
is a perceptual process that is part of the human relation to the world 
(and to ourselves). Particularly, habit projects toward the future in 
anticipation of similar occurrences. In this sense, DeLanda’s ‘habit’ is 
akin to a material directedness, but can also account for continuity of 
meaning across differences as it anticipates changing experiences.40 
Massumi’s description of the “implicit form” of a thing, for example, 
establishes a sense in which the thing is continuous across different 
experiences of it. He describes implicit form as “a bundling of potential 
functions” – a description of “the effective presence of a sum total of a 
thing’s interactions minus the thing.”41 This generalised understanding 
is a potential thing: it is built on experiential encounters in anticipation 
of the next encounter. Anticipation can shape an understanding of the 
screen that is both material and immaterial, both specific and general.
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37. Deleuze and Guattari use many non-human examples of territorialisation. Of the becoming-
orchid of the wasp and the becoming-wasp of the orchid, they write “each of these becomings 
brings about the deterritorialisation of one term [orchid or wasp] and the reterritorealisation 
of the other; the two becomings interlink and form relays in a circulation of intensities pushing 
the deterritorealisation even further.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 10. It is not 
just the terms that are de- and re-territorialised – the material of the wasp becomes orchid as it 
carries pollen, the material of the orchid becomes wasp through formal mimicry.
38. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 26.
39. “A subject crystallises in  the mind through the habitual grouping of ideas via relations of 
contiguity; their habitual comparison through relations of resemblance; and the habitual 
perception of constant conjunction of cause and effect that allows one idea (that of the cause) 
to always evoke another (the effect).” DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 26.
40. Habit “yields a determinate duration for the lived present of the subject” and “generates a sense 
of anticipation” of repeatability. DeLanda lists both the “routine mental labour” of assembling 
wholes as well as the “biological machinery” of sensation as material components of habit. 
DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 27.
41. Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 34-5.
42. Manuel DeLanda, “Material Complexity” in Digital Techtonics, ed. Neil Leach, David Turnbull and 
Chris Williams (London: Wiley Academy, 2004), 19.
[H]omogeneous and closed ... these materials hide from view the full repertoire 
of self-organizing capabilities of matter and energy. On the other hand, if the 
material is far from equilibrium ... or if it is complex and heterogeneous (that is, if 
the differences among its components are not canceled through homogenization) 
the full set of singularities and affects will be revealed, and complex materiality 
will be allowed to manifest itself.
Manuel DeLanda42
At the scale below the screen, there are ordered arrays of things – light emitting 
diodes, apertures, or a uniform thickness of chemical deposits on a surface.  The 
emergence of the screen relies on the sameness of these things.  
All pixels are the same. They are made of the same things, they respond in the 
same ways. Or maybe it is more that any difference between them doesn’t matter 
– that any difference needs to be downplayed because the screen is an effective 
whole. When I notice a pixel, it’s just one of many... until it isn’t. A reduction in 
the sameness of pixels, stressing the difference between these identical things, 
means the disappearance of the screen and the re-emergence of the pixel in its 
own right.
All pixels are the same
Fig 41. Distributed Pixels.
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Screens rely on an expression of difference across pixels, too.  Each pixel holds a 
different place in the array, each holds a different colour value at any given time. 
Without this difference, patterns can’t form, information can’t be carried.
Some Assembly’s pixels, its bots, are all the same. Each holds the same components 
– a colour sensor, an ultrasonic detector, wheels, motors, chips, wires, lights. Each 
has the same capacities – void evade(), void goForward(), void goBack(), void 
testDistance(), void coloursense(), void receiveColour(), void colourdisplay(). But 
many differences arise between them. In the beginning, the difference between 
the bots is temporal and spatial, it is about position and speed, much like an 
LCD. Something like a screen arises from this condition. But as the difference 
increases, the screen falls away. The bots are individualised, each individually 
expressive. The scale of emergence is changed – from whole to part.
Moving between strata
In other words, things are made from other things through a process of 
emergence, through which properties are created that do not belong to 
any one part but to the new collective as a whole. Once these properties 
have emerged, they start to form identities: these in turn become 
reinforced through processes of territorialisation and coding. The 
homogenised and sedimented strata appear to us as concrete things, 
and are the means by which continuity of meaning can be found. But in 
revealing things this process conceals movement between strata; how 
smaller parts can be assembled into larger wholes.
43. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 13.
44. Massumi’s ‘event-space’ is similar to a field of possibility: it is a non-Euclidean space defined 
by the changes and movements that occur within it. Massumi describes these spaces as 
“intercoporeal” and “abstract,” and continues to define Euclidean space as a ‘fixing’ of event-
space: “[w]hat we think of as Euclidean space is a mutual holding in relational stability of 
incorporeal event-spaces, relative to kind of movement, scale, and speed.” Massumi, Parables 
of the Virtual, 204.
45. Massumi writes: “potential… is a modification of a space. The space is the literal field, the ground 
between the goals. Any and every movement of a player or the ball in that space modifies the 















“Historical explanations are inevitably shaped by the ontological commitments of 
the historians who frame them. These commitments may be roughly divided into 
two classes… depending on which of the terms of these binary oppositions are 
favoured: ‘the individual versus society’,  ‘agency versus structure’, ‘choice versus 
order’. Taking the side of the first terms in these dichotomies yields narratives in 
which the actions and ideas of persons, typically ‘great men’, are the main factors 
shaping events” 
Manuel DeLanda43 
Some Assembly was an ordered effect, a community of bots, a system, a 
functioning whole. Each individual bot working together for the greater good, 
each with their own place, a cog in a well-oiled machine.
One fateful cycle, one bot grew tired of his place and began to turn out of it, 
facing a different direction, changing views. The Turner, as he came to be known, 
changed the very nature of the whole. The patterns exhibited by the group were 
morphed, skewed. No longer a tight-knit community, the bots lost faith in the 
whole. They began to back out of their places, looking around the field for new 
interactions. The whole was lost, but new individual freedoms were found. 
Or perhaps the change was inevitable, hard coded in to the very structure of the 
system. Perhaps it was only a matter of time before the whole tended towards 
disorder, no longer able to maintain its codes and structures of control.
A great man
(a misreading)
Massumi discusses changes in event-space in similar terms to shifting 
strata within the field of possibility. 44 He writes of the event-space 
of a football game as being defined by potential, where the players 
modify the ways that the field can be enacted by placing the ball and 
their bodies.45 He then looks at how this potential is changed when 
viewed from home on the television. Massumi notes that, within the 
event-space of the game, the individual actualisations of the game (the 
game events) fold back in on the game’s potential (its event space). The 
event-space of the game folds back in on itself, with every movement 
Fig 43. Hero Shot.
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restricting and opening new possibilities for movement. This he sees 
as a form of coding – the game becomes reproducible by the way that 
possibilities for movement emerge and disappear, and is considered 
“the ‘same’ by virtue of occurring in what has become a recognisable 
space.”46 The physical space of the field becomes a typology through the 
reproducibility of the game.
By contrast these same events reach outward when broadcast – 
manipulating and changing other events within a new possibility 
space. Through broadcast, the event of the game if ‘freed’ from its event-
space of the field by acts of “isolation, defamiliarisation, distancing, or 
decontextualization.” The action of broadcasting the game on television 
transmits the game into a new event space: “this proliferation crosses 
a qualitative threshold… [w]hereas self-referentiality has to do with 
reproduction, event-transitivity has to do with differentiation.” When 
the game is transmitted, it changes nature. When it comes into the 
home, it changes nature again.47
For this reason, Massumi denies that television is a mode of access 
to things, that it is a “window on the world.”48 The new event-space, 
in which the game is being watched from home, includes the content 
of the home as well as the content of the screen and the content of 
the game per se – the assemblage has been re-inscribed to include the 
social and material relations of the home. The unfolding of the game 
within the field is now inseparable from the unfolding of domestic life. 
The events that arise in this situation – along with the determinations 
made within them – are fundamentally different. The television, in 
this sense, could be thought of as a deterriorialisation machine – a 
way of disturbing existing strata and introducing new possibilities to 
restratification.
Parallels can be drawn between the sedimented strata and the 
conception of the relatum developed through the previous chapters. 
To follow the logic of a relata-based understanding the strata are 
what is visible, what is present to the perceiving body, and what 
persists in time. These unified wholes are indivisible in this way, 
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46. This folding-back corresponds to a coding: “coding and codification are forms of event self-
referentiality – the folding back of the event onto itself, toward its repetition. The folding back, 
the self-referencing, is what converts the event into an event-space.” Massumi, Parables of the 
Virtual, 83.
47. “In the media interval, the event is material but incorporeal immanence (an electron flow) 
moving through a dedicated technological milieu. When it is analogically reexpressed in televisual 
images, its conditions have drastically changed. Its substantial elements have been homogenised 
and reduced to fit sound speaker and screen.” Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 84.
48. Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 84-5.
49. Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 81.
50. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 50.
they are an apparent reality. Relata hold the same role in this form of 
understanding. Massumi’s example looks at how the television allows 
the unfolding of one event-space into another, affecting the abstract 
space of movement as an entity in itself. His choice of the television is 
a fitting stratification, though not the only one he makes in regards to 
the transduction of event space. He comments that “[t]he images are 
also transducers. And they contribute to the catalysis of the domes-
tic event. The television set combines sign, part-object, and part-
subject functions.”49 The movements between strata occurs within the 
television as well as outside of it. From these movements, stable re-
lata are deterritorialised, and the screen emerges as something else: on 
scale above the screen (such as Massumi’s domestic territory), or below 
the screen (as image, object or pixel).
The relations formed by these relata are reflexive because of the strata’s 
reliance on the things it exists between. Deleuze and Guattari note the 
reliance of any stratum on those that surround it, saying that “it would 
be a mistake to believe that it is possible to isolate this unitary, central 
layer of the stratum, or to grasp it in itself, by regression. In the first 
place, a stratum necessarily goes from layer to layer.”50 Likewise, relata 
can only be defined in terms of their others, and their relations to those 
others. The logic of the relation-based understanding can come to the 
same conclusion – both relata and strata are drawn out of a relational 
flux and made into homogenous wholes. Accrued experience has tested 
these relata and solidified them in processes of territorialisation. More 
than this, once found and sedimented, the relata begin to act downward 
on the field of possibility, coding the way it is approached. This was 
seen in the relata-based analysis, where to maintain the integrity of 
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subject and object relata in dichotomous relations, other relata needed 
to be split off and sedimented – a subject-bound agency, and an inert 
materiality.
Assemblages and scale
When considering the relational structure, scale becomes particularly 
important. Just as the strata move from one layer to the next, parts and 
wholes are always nested. Individual instances of screen experiences 
make up ‘the screen’ as a whole, which has properties different to any 
one of those instances; but these screen instances are themselves reliant 
on an ordered relation of pixels and apertures for their consideration 
as a whole. The ‘screen’ is generated through a “recursive application 
of the part-to-whole relation,”51 and may enter into other assemblages, 
such as the screen-bearing objects of chapter two that denied being 
screens themselves.
Scale is an important issue for the relational structure of the screen in 
regard to how it persists as meaningful. The assemblage is always an 
assemblage of other assemblages, so that the screen – which is now a 
collection of pixels, and now a barrier, and now a connection, and now 
a space, and now a thing in my hand – does not change through these 
iterations. The ‘screen’ is one individual amongst this cluster of other 
individuals, each a different entity defined in relation to the others. 
This cluster constitutes the screen’s field. It is only where the borders 
are drawn that shifts, and this is a matter of scale. 
The relations between the whole and the part are nested within 
other wholes and parts. The thing is simultaneously its whole and its 
parts – it exists alongside its parts, not above them or separated from 
them. Using the term ‘nesting’ in this sense might be misleading as it 
implies a hierarchy of interiority. The term as used in this chapter is 
not intended to denote a hierarchy, but a reliance of parts on wholes 
and vice versa. The screen is reliant on pixels and apertures as parts 
just as pixels and apertures are reliant (at least in part) on the screen. 
The effect of screening happens across pixels; across the repetition of 
apertures.
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51. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 70.
52. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 2.DeLanda defines intrinsic relations as those where the identity 
of the role is determined by the relation. Importantly, the way this relation plays out is socially 
coded. He uses the example of filial relations in this regard – a person cannot be a parent 
without a child and vice versa, and the role of both parties carries certain social meanings and 
obligations. Extrinsic relations, by contrast, do not constitute the identity of the related parties – 
they allow them to remain heterogenous. DeLanda uses the example of political alliances in this 
regard. The way a political alliance plays out is not as strongly coded – the actions it prescribes 
are determined within the alliance itself (and thus by the assemblage). A parent is still a parent, 
whether or not they are fighting with their child; but parent and child may not remain allies.  
53. DeLanda writes: “it is important to distinguish two different ways in which technical objects may 
be characterised: by their properites and by their capacities.” The properties of an object are 
actual – material expressions. Capacities, however, are either currently occurring as an event, 
or potentially occurring at another rpoint in time. The event is double, “because the capacity to 
affect must always be coupled with a capacity to be affected.” DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 73. 
54. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2010), 13.
More particularly, it is the ability of these pixels and apertures to behave 
differently, to be different, that gives rise to the overall effect. DeLanda 
notes particularly that intrinsic relations, those which constitute 
the identity of their relata, “cannot respect the heterogeneity of the 
components, but rather tends to fuse them together into a homogenous 
whole.”52 Rather, extrinsic relations belong to the assemblage, relations 
of difference and symbiosis in which each part maintains an identity 
alongside a whole that establishes its own identity. 
This means that it is not just the properties of the thing that define it 
at its scale, but also its behaviours; or, more accurately, its potential 
behaviours. DeLanda defines these as ‘tendencies’ and ‘capacities’.53 
The effects of the screen belong to the assemblage of pixels or apertures, 
each of which maintains a heterogeneity. In this sense, the agency of 
the assemblage also belongs between these parts, so that “the efficacy 
or effectivity” to which the term ‘agency’ traditionally refers “becomes 
distributed across an ontologically heterogenous field.”54 The ability 
of the thing to affect – its tendencies and capacities – belong to the 
difference between its parts. It is also responsible for the assemblage 
being stratified at a particular scale. That is, the scale at which an 
effect is perceptually whole is the scale at which it becomes bounded: 
if a difference is recognised between two distinct spaces, the screen 
arises in perception as responsible for this difference. If one of these 
spaces is improperly rendered or sensorially restricted, the pixel that 
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arises in perception as affecting the quality of spatial representation. In 
each case, an individual is defined that generates and effect. DeLanda 
comments that “as an ontological category, the term ‘individual’ has 
no preference for any particular level of scale.”55 None of these effects 
belong to an indivisible individual, but to different assemblages at 
different scales, each considered, at that point, as an individual. The 
differences between the components of an assemblage make them able 
to relate to one another, and this is how the effect arises across them.
I’m trying to keep a hold of the screen, to see Some Assembly as a whole, across 
its pixels rather than in them. But I keep getting thrown off, waylaid by the bots. 
They’re cute, and it poses a problem for the screen. 
There’s a group of three chasing each other around the board. Here, two bots 
face off against one another, locking horns and circling around the field in an 
aggressive display. One of the bots is a loner and a bully – moving over to different 
groups, trying to pick fights. Other bots seem keen on each other, trying to get 
ever closer or moving along side by side. 
How can the screen appear in the face of these creatures, in the face of their 
interactions with each other, their affect and expression? 
Perhaps the screen should be menacing, intimidating and closed. Black-boxed so 
the everyday goings-on of the pixels can’t be seen.

























55. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 140.
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The individual group
In terms of this project, the assemblage shows that relata are always 
composed of other, nested relata; and it is the difference between these 
constituent relata that are responsible for the larger relatum. But in 
the appearance of this larger relatum, the differences between the 
smaller relata are downplayed – the smaller relata are homogenised 
to strengthen the unity of the larger relatum; to make it more actual, 
more concrete. If the pixels appear to be acting toward a common goal, 
they are transcribed together as a unified relatum of the screen. Any 
differences between pixels are homogenised. If the differences in the 
actiona of the pixels passes a critical threshold, the screen stops being 
a screen and becomes a collection of individual pixels. If the television 
‘breaks’ by forming deadspots, then the relation between pixels become 
apparent, and the dependency of the emergent whole on these relations.
Nesting ensures that processes of territorialisation and coding happen 
both from without and within, from the parts to the whole, and from 
the whole to the parts, so that the way that assemblages develop and 
dissipate “will be partly autonomous and partly influenced by the 
environment, created by the larger assemblage of which it is part.”56 The 
dead pixel affects the image as the whole of which it is a part, forcing a 
deterritorialisation at the scale of the screen, and a reterritorialisation 
at the scale of the pixel.
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At any given level causality operates in two directions at once: the bottom-up 
effect of the parts on the whole, and the top-down effect of the whole on its 
parts.
Manuel Delanda57
I am part of two very different assemblages with Some Assembly. As I watch it 
perform, I exist with it at a certain scale, where its behaviours affect my experience. 
As its designer, I belong with it at a larger scale, as part of the environment which 
shapes it. 
My design intent for Some Assembly is an environmental factor, something which 
restrains the system’s autonomy as it shapes its behaviours. I codify as I code, 
programming rituals and sequences that restrict what can emerge from the bots. 
These rituals and sequences, in turn, are restricted by the materiality of the 
components, the grammar of the script.
Once Some Assembly is made, our relation changes. The system exercises some 
autonomy over and above my intent. From the materialities and ways of workings 
of the components that make up the pixels emerge behaviours I didn’t expect – 
lagging responses to the environment, individual differences in movement. From 
the code which drives each pixel emerge eccentricities in timing—points where 
the bots can get stuck or think (erroneously) that nothing is in front of them. 
Perhaps I try to help them out, turning them around so they can move out again, 
keep the system moving.
From the bottom up and the top down.
Designer as environment
Assemblages, then, are each an individual as well as being comprised of 
individuals. Although they occur at different scales, they occur alongside 
one another, their ontological status is the same. Because the ontological 
status of the whole and the parts is the same, they can interact even 
if they have a different scale. I can interact with the community of 
which I am a part, and the pixel can likewise interact with the image it 
produces.  This means that the components of an assemblage retain a 
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59. Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 150.
sense of autonomy and a capacity for difference. Deleuze and Guattari 
describe this structure using the language of strata, saying that “in 
short, the epistrata and parastrata are continually moving, sliding, 
shifting, and changing on the… unity of composition of a stratum.” 
The relational structure of the screen is found in the move from one 
assemblage, and one relatum, to another; in how the strata “are swept 
away by lines of flight and movements of deterritorialisation” by 
perceptual mechanisms that allow them to be “shaken by phenomena 
of cracking and rupture;”58 so that other perceptual differences can be 
reterritorialised at different scales. 
The object ‘constancy’ at the basis of cognition is not so much a persistence in 
existence of unitary things as it is ratio between perceptual variations: the ratio 
between habit (pattern of reaction) and the sea of chaos in which it swims.
Brian Massumi59
As I stand and watch the bots perform, there is only so long I can keep a hold 
of the screen. The patterns that I see – the synchronised responses of the bots 
to their environment, the distribution of colour across the field – start to decay. 
There’s a moment where I can no longer attend to the patterns presented there. 
In the beginning, the darkness carried information and effect, the lightness 
interrupted it. Now the opposite is true. The darkness interrupts the light. It no 
longer matters what colour the bots show me or how synchronised their response, 
the information is carried elsewhere. The pattern is now in their interactions with 
each other – their groupings, actions, and movements towards one another.
The bots have limits to their pattern attendance too. As one bot lands on the 
borderline between a zone of blue and a zone of red, he can no longer process 
what he’s seen. He takes a guess at purple.
The limits of pattern
Fig 45. Regional Specificity.
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The relational structure relies on things emerging from other things. 
As such, the potential of a relatum, the ways in which it can take part in 
other things, becomes just as important as the properties it is currently 
exhibiting. Instead of being understood solely in terms of properties, 
any scale of assemblage also has tendencies and capacities, abilities 
that can be manifested even if they are not currently being manifested. 
These unmanifested (relational) capacities and tendencies from which 
new wholes emerge define the relational structure of the thing.60 In 
other words, the relational structure exists in how one thing moves to 
become another, as a sort of field of possibilities.
Persistence in time and the relational structure
Rather than focusing on how the term ‘screen’ retains a continuity of 
meaning, a commonality of screen-ness across a variety of forms, the 
focus is now how the field of the screen’s possibilities can include a 
variety of forms and capacities across temporal and spatial distributions. 
As DeLanda notes, “assemblages are characterised by enduring states 
defined by properties that are always actual… But in addition… 
assemblages also possess dispositions, tendencies and capacities that 
are virtual (real but not actual) when not being currently manifested 
or exercised.”61 The meaning of the screen is not defined by common 
properties, but by the field of possibility that generates each instance of 
the screen. That is, the screen is defined by a tendency that belongs to 
the assemblage of ‘screen’ as a population, which includes all possible 
instances of the screen. This section will begin by establishing that 
the different scales of the screen are held together by a relational 
structure that defines the field of possibility of the screen. It will look 
at tendencies and capacities as virtual entities that define regions of 
screen possibility, before concluding by establishing that the screen’s 
possibility space can be mapped.
What isn’t there
Unlike properties, the tendencies of the screen do not have to be 
currently manifested in order to remain real, they only need to be 
part of the screen’s field of possibility. The capacity of the television 
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60. DeLanda defines the possibility of capacities as having a concrete structure: “the part of the 
explanation of emergence that depends on mechanisms involves the actual manifestation of 
tendencies… and the actual exercise of capacities ... The mechanism-independent component 
of an explanation, on the other hand, demands clarifying the status of tendencies and capacities 
when they are not actually manifested or exercised. We could, of course, characterise that 
status as that of a possibility but that would be too vague: an unmanifested tendency and an 
unexercised capacity are not just possible but define a concrete space of possibilities with a 
definite structure.” DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation, 17.
61. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 108.
62. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 73.
63. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 73.
to broadcast, for instance, does not cease to exist once the television 
is switched off. Although it properties have changed – for example,  in 
terms of the light and sound it emits – its capacities remain the same. 
The capacity for the screen to screen is “not an enduring state,” rather 
an event that happens at some times and not at others.62 That is, it 
needs to be possible for screening to happen at a point in time. Whether 
or not that point of time is now does not matter. 
Moreover, it is these tendencies and capacities that define the relational 
structure of the screen. The screen, then, may be embodied by its 
materiality, in that it has material properties that belong to it as a 
‘screen’, but the ‘screen’ is also expressed by this materiality. DeLanda 
uses the example of a knife to demonstrate this point. The knife has an 
actual sharpness, which is a material property of the blade’s edge. But 
it also has the capacity to cut, which is still there whether or not cutting 
is happening. Moreover, the capcity to cut is contingent, because “the 
capacity to affect must always be coupled with a capacity to be affected” 
– that is, the knife cannot cut without something that can be cut.63 
The capacity to cut is expressed by the materiality of the blade, its 
sharpness, but the knife must enter into a new assemblage to exercise 
this capacity. The knife’s cutting, then, is just as immaterial as it is 
material. Likewise, the capacity of the screen to screen is expressed 
by its material make-up – the order of its pixels and the ordering of 
information – but this is not the sum total of its screening.
(Im)material
In looking for the confluence between the screen as an object and the 
screen as a space, for how these two materialities interact, I have now 
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arrived at an idea of materiality that turns materiality itself into an 
expression of the immaterial. I am looking for the screen not in the 
physical but in possibility, the virtual. But this is not a virtuality that 
is opposed to reality – Delanda makes clear that the tendencies of the 
screen belong to the real (just not the happening right now). This is a 
virtuality that is a part of reality, a potential for being which is as much 
‘real’ as the actuality of the thing. In looking at the relational structure, 
materiality has become a tendency, not just a series of properties 
held by this screen in the present moment, but also a more general 
directedness toward acting. The ‘real’, then, includes the potential as 
well as the actual because it includes the process of materialisation; of 
turning the potential into the actual.
The terms ‘virtual’ and ‘possible’ have been used in these last few 
paragraphs in a different way to their previous appearances. In the first 
chapter, the ‘virtual’ was used to refer to an entity that belonged to an 
ontological plane different to that of reality. That is, the ‘virtual’ in the 
relata-based analysis could never become real; there was no potential 
crossover between the two because of the underlying assumptions by 
which they were defined. The screen posed a peculiar problem to this 
definition because it existed in two places at once: the material of the 
screen and the image it displays overlap in space and time. This overlap 
was unallowable as it directly challenged the understanding of space as 
a grid in which things are positioned. To allow this space to continue, 
the ‘virtual’ was moved to a different experiential plane, and the screen 
became a portal to this plane.
In the present discussion, the virtual is being conceptualised as a part 
of the real, the two now being understood on the same ontological plane. 
The virtual and the actual now coexist in the real; the actual being that 
which is currently manifested, and the virtual being that which has 
the capacity to be manifested. This change has strong implications for 
understanding the screen. The conclusions of chapter one, which place 
the screen as creating a gap through framing or suturing, have to be 
abandoned. These roles for the screen rely on a separation of the real 
and virtual rather than their coexistence. Instead, it seems the screen 
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64. “The virtual must be defined as strictly part of the real object… the reality of the virtual consists 
of the differential elements and relations along with the singular points which correspond to 
them. The reality of the virtual is structure.” Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul 
Patton (London: Continuum, 2004), 260.
65. “An unmanifested tendency and an unexercised capacity are not just possible but define a 
concrete space of possibility.” Following from DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation, 17, the term 
‘possible’ is not used in relation to a single potentiality, but in relation to a structural space that 
defines what is and is not allowed within a territory. The temporality of the possible arises from 
its non-presence – from the variations of the thing’s potential through time.  It is not important 
that these tendencies and capacities are not currently actual, only that they are actual at some 
point in time. Because ‘at some point in time’ is indefinable (we cannot say with surety that a 
certain tendency will never be actual), tendencies and capacities form a space of possibilities.
might play a role in the actualisation of possibility – not in transposing 
the virtual to the real, but in expressing inaccessible elements of the 
real.
The key to deciphering the role of the virtual in the real, for the purposes 
of this project, lies in structure. Deleuze and Guattari hold that “the 
reality of the virtual is structure.”64 That is, it does not matter that 
some elements are not actual, so long as they have defined structural 
relations to elements that are. Such a structure allows them to become 
actualised at some point, and this ability to be actualised is what makes 
them real, whether or not it ever actually happens. Like DeLanda, I take 
a temporal reading of this relation, using the term ‘possible’ to describe 
this structural space.65 The screen as an assemblage includes not just 
all previously instated instances of its materiality, but also all of the 
materialities it might at one point in time include and display. These I 
refer to as its possibility – a cluster of actual relata and potential relata 
(that may be actual at some other time) that sit within a structure. This 
structure is the means by which the screen persists in time and retains 
a continuity of meaning.
The possibility space of the screen
The process of territorialisation, along with the lines of escape from 
territories that cause a deterritorialisation, define a thing which is 
malleable and scalable. The pixel belongs to the screen just as the 
aperture does because the screen emerges from their interaction. The 
point of rupture (where the pixel becomes the screen and back again; 
or where the screen becomes the space and back again) is the most 
revealing. This point is where the thing reaches the limits of its field 
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of possibility. This phenomenon is similar to the one described in the 
previous chapter in the screen’s ‘breaking’. The broken screens of 
Moubie and Gaze Returner were broken in the sense that they could not 
appear as screens, they were beyond the limit of the screen, they were 
past its point of rupture. But what these things didn’t capture was the 
process of de- and re-territorialisation. This sense of transformation, 
of the coming together and moving apart of assemblages, is how the 
topology of the field of possibility can be discovered. 
In other words, the relational structure needs to include both the 
nesting of strata, and how they move in assemblages – it needs to 
look at the relata from within their spatiotemporal relations to other 
relata. This structure is itself not directly accessible. But as Massumi 
states, its inaccessibility does not “preclude figuring it, in the sense of 
constructing images of it.” Such an image is created through an overlay 
of events and possibilities, so that the structure can fleetingly appear 
“in the cracks between and the surfaces around the images.”66 The 
image that Massumi discusses is what I am referring to here as a map, 
an overlay of possibilities that reveal something of the structure which 
ties them together.
Constructing a map 
The relational structure of the screen, then, can be imaged. But care 
must be taken in assembling this image. In examining the screen from 
how it is experienced, the space of possibility of the screen is being 
reverse-engineered – the virtual is being inferred from what is actual. 
In this sense, the image shows what is probable, not the full scope fo 
the screen’s possibilites. The structural space, as imaged, will always 
fall short of the full structure of possibility for the screen.67 More than 
falling short, however, imaging possibility spaces runs a risk. Hélène 
Frichot discusses the work of the Deleuzian diagram, a work she 
describes as “a sometimes violent exertion of thought in the face of the 
unthought.” She writes that imaging a relational field “is always at risk 
... it risks falling again into mere opinion, habit and cliché and fixing 
on channels of knowledge that lead us through nothing but old routines 
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completeness with the ideal “which participates with other parts of objects in the Idea (other 
relations, other singular points), but never constitutes an integral whole as such. What the 
complete determination lacks is the whole set of relations belonging to actual existence.” In this 
sense, what is actualised is only part of the object, but that part is fully determined.  Deleuze, 
Difference and Repetition, 260-1.
68. Hélène Frichot, “Drawing, Thinking, Doing: From diagram work to the superfold”  Access: Critical 
Perspectives on Communication, Cultural & Policy Studies 30, no.1 (2011): 1; 7.
69. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 260.
70. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 113.
and repetitive refrains.”68 The diagram – whilst actively drawing and 
destroying connections as a generative tool – can also sediment them, 
prodcuing artefacts of knowledge that may be treated as fact. This 
has a clear disadvantage: the diagram’s purpose is to explore what 
is indeterminate rather than determinate. However it also has an 
advantage: it allows the image to enter into the very assemblage whose 
movements it is trying to describe. 
In imaging the known instances of the screen, a structure arises between 
these instances. Approximating the virtual from this structure means 
approaching the possible not as individual instances but as a topology 
– a space of possibility with a characteristic shape, distribution, and 
movement. It is clear that the relata form part of the map of the screen. 
These are the “differential elements” and the “singular points which 
correspond to them.”69 But it is also necessary to look at the relations 
between the points – how and when one can be made into the other. 
The map should include, then, the things that stay the same and the 
changes that are allowed. This section will discuss how the relational 
structure of the screen can be mapped by identifying areas of persistence 
and change. It will then examine the parameters of the screen’s map, 
identifying order, density, and speed as defining the possibility space of 
the screen as it has been theorised in this thesis.
Invariance and transformation
The two concepts of persistence and change (or invariance and 
transformation as DeLanda refers to them) characterise the region 
of possibility. Invariance is “a property’s capacity to be unaffected by 
a transformation.”70 Immanence differentiates an invariance from an 
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essence: invariances are contextually bound – they belong to particular 
transformations at particular scales. The screen’s map needs to cover 
these zones of invariance: the particular relata that occur as stable 
tendencies within the population of the screen.  Outside of these stable 
tendencies, however, is an environment subject to change. Changes in 
the environment (the specific context of the screen, the larger whole of 
which the smaller relatum is a part) can introduce thresholds which, 
once crossed, “destroy” these invariants, shifting the screen toward 
another zone of invariance. Invariance and transformation thus 
“capture the structure of a possibility space.”71
The structure of the field of possibility includes the points of the relata 
as they are related to one another, but it is more difficult to locate 
the relations themselves. Once relations are anchored spatially, they 
become determined – themselves relata. A similar problem arises in 
this discussion as was discovered in chapter two, which found that the 
relational plane could not be accessed without a disturbance. When 
the relational plane was stretched, it gave access to a different set of 
relata related to the last, not the relation itself. When trying to map 
transformations per se this same problem arises in a slightly different 
manner: the fixed points of the relata can be located, but how can the 
relations of transformation be mapped? 
DeLanda suggests that what should be mapped is the residue of the 
relation, the points at which one thing become another. These are the 
thresholds between strata; the critical points of transition. They are 
the limits of quantitative change in the relata, after which the thing 
changes qualitatively. After passing through a threshold, the thing 
changes in to something else: a screen becomes an inert object, or a 
collection of pixels assemble into a screen.
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One travels by intensity; displacements and spatial figures depend on intensive 
thresholds of nomadic deterritorialisation (and thus on differential relations) 
that simultaneously define complementary, sedentary reterritorialisations. Every 
stratum operates in this way…”
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari73
The apertures of the lattice show a range of difference in their sizes and 
distributions. There’s no hard and fast limit to how many of them there are, or 
how often they repeat, or how large each hole is. But there are bounds outside 
of which the lattice stops being a screen. One aperture is just a hole. Pinpricks 
through bricks are just a wall. Within a region, the size, number and distribution 
of apertures can change without qualitatively changing the screen. But if one of 
these parameters strays too far, the system is no longer a screen.
The bounds of the lattice in the distribution of its apertures might overlap with 
that of the television in the distribution of its pixels. One pixel is just a light, one 
pixel per person is just a locator. 
Can an aperture change into a pixel? The critical transition here is probably not 
about distribution or size, but about material. Where is the point where an array 
of voids becomes an array of solids? Where points of transmitted light become 
points of emanating light? I might find myself thinking again of the spatial filter, 
of information and its connection to materiality. The threshold between the 
aperture and the pixel is found by looking at different parameters to the threshold 
between the pixel and the screen. This transition happens on a different map, a 
different part of the field of possibility of the screen.
Aperture to pixel
71. DeLanda uses the example of state space diagrams to illustrate the move from one stable 
tendency to another, such as from water as a liquid to water as a gas. He writes “state space 
diagrams provide an explanation for the recurrent nature of these states or regimes: they recur 
because they are stable tendencies… what about the intensive thresholds? These appear in 
the other space, the control space in which dimensions are assigned to parameter values… a 
particular distribution of attractors is a topological invariant of state space: it does not matter 
how we fold, stratch, rotate or project this space, the distribution reins unchanged. But crossing 
thresholds in the associated control space destroys invariants.” DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 
120.
72. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 113.
73. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 54. 
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An assemblage’s lines vary in their degree of rigidity, some more territorialised 
than others… and we can follow the less territorialised one in thought, pushing 
their deterritorialisation to the limit, until we reach the most deterritorialised 
component, the diagram.
Manuel DeLanda77
There is a difference between twisting and breaking.  A break is sudden, it leaves 
two states – the thing as it might have been before the break, and the broken 
Twisting and breaking
The structural space of the map is created by “assigning to each 
dimension of a space the possible variables or parameters a phenomenon 
can have,” where the variables are “the properties of the phenomenon” 
and the parameters are the “properties in its immediate environment.”74 
A topology is then generated by finding the critical thresholds at which 
change occurs. These critical thresholds sit a dimension below the map, 
in the same way that a plane acts as a threshold between two volumes, 
or a boundary line separates two territories of a surface. In a lineal map, 
the critical threshold is a point; in a planar map, the critical threshold 
is a line; in a volumetric map, a surface.
The map of the screen, then, maps its relata (the real and the virtual, 
the subject and object, person, space) onto an environmental field, 
establishing relations between changes in the relata and changes in the 
environment.75 Such a map can capture both bottom-up effects (changes 
in small relata affecting change in the larger relata) and top-down 
effects (changes in the larger relata affecting change in the smaller 
relata), as well as effects that have no discernible direction. The map 
of the screen is the image of this structural space of persistence and 
change; it represents the connectivity of a situation, and the properties, 
tendencies and capacities that may or may not arise from it. It is also, 
in some sense, the thing itself. More particularly, this map becomes a 
part of the thing; it overlaps with the possibility space of the screen by 
virtue of representing it in part. The map is an image of the object as “a 
systematic stockpiling for future use of the possible actions relating to a 
thing, systematically thought out on the general level of abstraction.”76
273
74. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 119.
75. “We need to establish relations of dependency in the way the variables (and parameters) 
change.” DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 119
76. Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 94.
77. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 115.
Variables and parameters
Now that what is being mapped has been identified, the next step is to 
identify how to map it. A map is a spatial depiction, a representation 
of a phenomenon by spatial means. In order to map the screen, then, 
the abstract qualities of perception and the properties, tendencies and 
capacities that emerge from experience need to be spatialised and 
used to define territories of invariance at certain scales, along with the 
boundaries between these territories.
Bernard Cache performs a similar mapping for the city of Lausanne. 
He uses the critical issues of Lausanne at different points in history 
to represent the landscape according to a series of folded planes. At a 
point of history in which the valley is at issue as dividing two growing 
communities, the vector describing the valley becomes the image of 
the city’s topology. At a point in which the peak is of concern as the 
siting of the cathedral, the vector describing this peak and the issues 
surrounding it becomes the image of the city. Cache can, in this way, 
describe the city as a series of folded planes distributed in a politico-
Cartesian space, overlapping in time. He composes a “sort of cubist 
sculpture” from “the combination of these four basic figures: cone, prism, 
thing afterwards. A twist is slow, it has many states. It takes a known structure 
with known points and begins to remap it into something else. Twisting places 
stress on the thing, turning it from one thing to another, exposing a point of 
rupture and allowing it to reveal a boundary.
Some Assembly takes the screen and twists it into a series of individuals, bots 
that can together be a screen, but can also be something else. It crosses a critical 
transition between these strata – screen and pixel – at a pace that allows me to 
watch the transition. I territorialise and stratify what I’m seeing iteratively across 
this change – now a screen, now a screen, now a screen, now a…  
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dihedral and plane,”78 each of which express the ‘nature’ of the city as 
it was at issue at different times. These vectors are not intended as a 
succession, but as a structure – a mapping of the possibility of the city. 
That is to say, Cache’s mapping does not just take different features 
of the city and recompose them into a map. His mapping reconstructs 
the city behind the city-as-it-is-experienced, overlaying material and 
geological structures with structures of thought and language. The city 
emerges from these vectors as a whole, and from the movement between 
them. The ‘nature’ of the city lies in a “solution of contiguity between 
these four geometrical figures,” the structure made from the virtual 
cities of Lausanne, encountered as material and conceptual actualities 
at different points.79 Cache’s project constructs a space of possibility 
for the city from how it has been actualised at various times – a map 
of its possibilities. However, Cache has the distinct benefit of working 
with a Euclidean space. That is, his vectors are spatially distributed as 
if located within the city itself in the traditional form of the map; with 
height corresponding to the y axis, length to the x and depth to the y; 
so that the vectors that result can be superposed within these planes. 
Such an option is not available for the screen.80
One can, for example, determine the rate at which the curvature of a space 
changes at a given point and use this instantaneous rate of change to identify it ... 
When we do this space ceases to be a set of coordinate addresses and becomes a 
field of rapidities and slownesses, the rapidity or slowness with which curvature 
varies at each point. 
Manuel DeLanda81
Calculus shows spaces as rates of change, as movements rather than locations. 
Some Assembly uses sound and time as a measure of space.
The ultrasonic distance detector comprises an ultrasonic transmitter, receiver, 
and a circuit. It sends out pulses of sound at 40Hz and waits to hear a reflection. 
This reflection is returned as a pulse width band heard on the receiver, the width 
of which corresponds to the time taken to hear the signal. Time is then converted 
Space and sound
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78. Bernard Cache, Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories, trans. Anne Boyman, ed. Michael 
Speaks (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 11.
79. Cache claims that the identity of the city lies in the structure between these vectors: “one 
must learn to read a space of ‘transistance’ that allows us to pass from one vector to another. 
Throughout the ages, the identity of Lausanne has not so much changed, or repeated itself, as it 
has lived with itself under the determination of these four sorts of vectors” Cache, Earth Moves, 
14.
80. Although the Euclidean space in which Cache is working does provide advantages, it also makes 
the resultant map less abstract and more signifying, which somewhat interferes with the aims 
of the diagram.
81. DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation, 18.
82. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 119.
to a lineal distance, by multiplying it by the velocity of sound (in cm/microsecond, 
negating time) and dividing it in two (to measure just there and not back).
Sound becomes time becomes distance. This procedure is accurate between 
distances of 2cm (a 150us pulse) and about 4m (a 25ms pulse). At more than 
about 4m, the receiver times out and stops listening, returning the maximum 
value of 38ms. At less than 2cm of this range, the return signal comes too quickly 
for the receiver to hear it, and the receiver times out as if nothing were received. 
In the sound space of Some Assembly, extreme closeness sounds like extreme 
farness. High impact collisions and the persistent ramming of barriers may result. 
But in face-to-face situations, other bots sound a lot closer than they are. The 
distance calculated from another bot’s transmitter is halved even though the 
distance between them is not. Closeness is not necessarily nearness. Bots shy 
away from approaching each other face-to-face – stopping and looking around 
to see if there’s other ways through. Banging their heads against the wall seems 
perfectly acceptable, though.
To perform such a mapping operation for the screen, the first thing that 
needs to be done is to set axes, the parameters of the map. These parameters 
will “stand for the properties in the immediate environment”82 onto 
which screenic variables (somewhat counterintuitively, the invariants 
of the screen, which become variables in their multiple possibilities) 
can be mapped. But unlike Cache’s topographic topology, the space 
of the screen’s possibility has no intrinsic spatial structure. DeLanda 
discusses this problem, saying that such a space can have order imposed 
on it “as long as this is justified by reference to the mechanism… and 
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as long as it serves to reveal the structure of possibility space.”83 He 
performs this ordering based on minimal difference, arranging spaces 
of homogeniety and heterogeniety. DeLanda uses the example of an 
artificial intelligence (AI) trained to recognise and gender human 
faces to illustrate this point. He states that the AI, when presented 
with images of people and asked to classify whether they were male or 
female, used an unexpected method to perform the task. Rather than 
categorisating the whole image as a spatial distribution of points, the 
AI approached the task as an exercise in mapping similarity. In this 
way, the AI arranged images into a space of similarity and difference, 
and tested new images against different regions.84
The number of ways in which ‘similarity’ is measured determines the 
dimensionality of the possibility space as imaged. Each of these ways of 
measuring similarity corresponds to a parameter that defines the space. 
Finding these parameters means understanding where the boundaries 
of the screen lie at different scales, and about what movements might 
provoke a shift across these boundaries. This thesis, as it concerns the 
screen, has already begun to identify some of these transitions, which I 
will now reframe here as parameters.
Order
Chapter two found the screen to be a particular point of tension between 
materiality and agency, and found spatial ordering to be implicated 
within this tension, both as an action of the screen itself and as an 
action of the pixels from which the screen emerged. This sense of order 
was found once its limit was passed. Moubie, particularly, implicated 
ordering as a screenic process by interrupting human directedness in 
ordering space. But Moubie also presented not as a screen himself, 
but as a screen-bearing object. The ‘screen’ portion of Moubie was 
ordered in a way that the rest of him was not, and this provoked a more 
localised territorialisation of this portion of Moubie as a screen. The 
screen’s ability to order space is dependent on its own material order, 
as shown in its directedness as an array of its pixels or repetition of 
apertures. The ordering at this scale – before the screen emerges as a 
whole – affects the properties, capacities and tendencies of the screen 
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83. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 50. In his example of genetic mutation, DeLanda identifies 
a problem with mapping abstract things in that the spatiality of the map has to be applied. 
He states: “unlike state space that is a continuous topological space with well-defined spatial 
connectivity the space of possible rules is a discrete combinatorial space possessing no intrinsic 
spatial structure: all the possible rules simply lie next to each other.” DeLanda, Philosophy and 
Simulation, 29. This applied structure cannot be arbitrary, however, it needs to make apparent 
the regions of persistence and change. The applied structure is based on what needs to be 
known about the thing.
84. “The secret is the mapping relations of similarity into relations of proximity… That is, objects 
that resemble each other become neighbouring points in the internal possibility space, and vice 
versa, objects with a higher degree of dissimilarity (faces and non-faces) end up as points that 
are far away from each other in the space of possible activation patterns” DeLanda, Philosophy 
and Simulation, 98.
85. “At the start of the process the existence of a temperature difference means that the water 
molecules are distributed with a high degree of order, that is, they are neatly sorted out into two 
parts, one hot and the other cold. At the end of the process the entire population is uniformly 
warm and this order has disappeared” DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation, 8.
as it emerges. Order is taken as an appropriate starting point to define 
the parameters of the screen’s space of possibility.
In his discussion of state space in phase transition diagrams, DeLanda 
introduces the idea of the gradient as a measure of order. Through 
the example of mixing two separate bodies of water, held at different 
temperatures. The temperature gradient that is established the 
moment two separate bodies of water begin to interact is highly ordered, 
according to DeLanda, as the whole is present as two sets of molecules 
with vastly different energies. That is, there is a diversity of properties 
distributed unevenly across the whole.85 
The tendency of this whole to move toward temperature equilibrium is 
manifested as the ordered system moves toward disorder. Considering 
this process in the terms of assemblage, the two separate bodies of water 
exist as strata – stable entities at equilibrium. The moment they are 
mixed represents a deterritorialisation, an unsorting of a stable entity 
to form an assemblage. From this new whole emerges a new tendency: 
to move toward equilibrium. The body of water that is produced after 
this tendency has been manifested represents a new stratum. Order, 
in this example, is a measure of heterogeneity of physical properties 
across a gradient.
The concept of a heterogeneous distribution presents a view of order 
somewhat counterintuitive to the experience of the screen.  The ordering 
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of pixels, as it was addressed in chapter two, is a spatial ordering that 
relies on homogeneity. The screen as a pixel array emerges because 
the capacities of pixels are distributed evenly across a spatial array. It 
relies on the regularity of the spatial interval between pixels, and on 
their spatial equivalence as nodes. This difference can be accounted for 
by involving the human in the screen assemblage as an observer. 
The process of territorialisation is itself an ordering process, one that 
divides up heterogeneous mixtures into homogeneous wholes. Massumi 
expresses this relation in terms of movement and stasis. In his example 
of calculating the trajectory of an arrow, he notes the operation of 
inserting points along the arrow’s flight path as a retrospective ordering 
that allows the arrow to occupy space as it moves. Such retrospective 
ordering is an easier operation the higher the level of perceptual 
homology.86 Ordering the trajectory of the arrow is easier if it takes a 
single, predictable flight path. The predictability of the flight path aids 
in whole of the ‘flying arrow’ emerging in perception.  Likewise, the 
whole of the screen emerges more easily if its constitutive parts can be 
ordered in a predictable fashion. Although pixels that are distributed 
unevenly show more order as a system in themselves, they are less 
amenable to the ordering of reflexive perception. 
The grid
[T]he line of the Outside is not a fixed limit but ‘a moving matter’ ... Beneath 
this line there is sheltered a strategic zone ... and beneath that again the strata 
or collected archives of knowledge, where habit, opinion and cliche come to be 
sedimented.
Hélène Frichot87
The orchestrated effect of the screen begins to decay as the bots introduce new 
behaviours and begin to communicate. The order that I can impose on the system 
through perception is altered as the system begins to order itself. 
The grid, a homogenous spatial ordering, helps me recognise the screen. The 
screen emerges easily when the bots are in a regular array, the points of light are 
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distributed evenly over a field. But this emergent effect is overpowered by the one 
below it. The two layers of the screen – the television screen at the base of the 
field and the screen that emerges across the bots – carry the same information. 
But the density of the information below the bots is much richer. If the second 
emergence is seen without its environmental trigger, a screen emerges for me. If 
I see both in succession, the second emergence becomes less screen-like.
There is, I think, a stronger moment of screening. Just after the bots have begun 
to turn out of the array, the effect that emerges across the bots begins to hold 
new information. This screen tells me something that the screen below it doesn’t. 
It tells me about how the bots have moved and where they’ve gone.  
At this point, the bots are still responding directly to their environment at regular 
intervals. They’re still relatively synchronised, their behaviours still strictly timed, 
but their movements alter spatially as they express tendencies peculiar to their 
materiality. One bot might have a centre of gravity slightly to the right, causing 
it to favour one direction over another. Another bot might have a less effective 
battery, meaning it doesn’t move as far as another.
As the bots begin to order themselves spatially on the individual level, while 
remaining temporally synchronised in the way they work together, they 
communicate their own difference using a medium-in-common. They are 
somewhere between ordered and disordered, between homogenous and 
chaotic. They allow me to order them as they order themselves.
86. Massumi states that “retrospective ordering enables precise operations to be inserted along 
the way, in anticipation of a repetition of the movement – the possibility that it will come again” 
Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 10.
87. Frichot discusses here Deleuze’s diagram of the fold, made in his volume on Foucault, which 
draws a relation between the ‘Outside’, stratification and the subject. Hélène Frichot, “Deleuze 
and the Story of the Superfold” in Deleuze and Architecture, ed. Hélène Frichot and Stephen Loo 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 86.
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Density
When considering the interaction of the ordering of the screen and 
the ordering of human perception, another parameter comes to light: 
communication. To compare the example of the screen with DeLanda’s 
example of water equilibrium, the separate containers of water with 
the property of a particular temperature value might be replaced 
with a group of light emitting diodes, each with the property of a 
particular colour value. If these LEDs are mixed together, they will 
form a difference of colour across the whole. However, as it stands, no 
new tendencies spontaneously emerge from this ‘whole’. The whole is a 
collection, not an assemblage. A screen is unlikely to emerge from this 
scenario, because the de-territorialisating move of mixing heterogenous 
components cannot be resolved by the system as it stands. In order 
for an assemblage to arise from this collection, the LEDs will need to 
be networked so that they can communicate. The water molecules of 
DeLanda’s example do this spontaneously by exercising their capacity 
to collide, thereby transfering energy. Energy transfer between LEDs, 
however, requires additional components: a source of channelling 
energy into the system, a manner of distributing this energy across the 
system, and a means of addressing each LED as part of a whole. Once 
this communication is established, new capacities may emerge across 
the array – a capacity to react simultaneously, for example, which 
requires a similarity of speed and distance amongst the components. 
This capacity can then provoke a re-territorialisation of the LED array 
as a screen. 
   
The most ‘assemblage-like’ moment of the screen of this example is when 
communication is established across the LEDs. The same may be said 
for the screen of the lattice, where the establishment of communication 
between apertures occurs when a relation can be established between 
them in terms of their repetition and distribution across a surface. This 
communication allows the differences of the LEDs (their specific colour 
values) to be expressed in a way that allows a re-territorialisation in 
perception to a different scale of entity: a screen.
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Communication forms its own space. Radio Frequency units transmit and 
receive data across the bots, allowing each individual to be identifiable within 
the collective. Each bot has a name (int myID = 6;) and a place to recognise the 
name of another (int oppID = 0;). Bots can introduce themselves on meeting 
by transferring a data structure involving their names over a 433 MHz radio 
frequency, using the other to make decisions about their actions. 
If I, bot with myID == 6; meet you, bot with myID == 1; I’ll tell you my name. If you 
hear me, you’ll tell me yours. We can compare our names to make determinations 
about actions.
void RFpingpong(){
mydata.pingID = myID;  //I am me
mydata.pongID = 0;  //I’m not talking to anyone in particular
oppID = 0;   //and don’t remember anyone’s name
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++){  //five times in a row, I will
vw_rx_stop();   // stop listening
ET.sendData();   // start talking
delay(15);
vw_rx_start();   // then start listening again
delay(500); 
if (ET.receiveData()){  //if I hear something
if (mydata.pingID == myID){ //and it’s a reply for me
oppID = mydata.pongID;  //I’ll hear your name and remember it
break;
}
The space of communication
If the assemblage, and the reterritorialisation it provokes, can only 
be created through additional mechanisms, then the possibility space 
of the screen will need additional axes to account for the emergent 
effects. Along with order as a measure of the heterogeneity of the actual 
properties of the system, it will need a measure of communication 
across the assemblage. 
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else if (mydata.pongID == 0 ){  //if I hear something that’s not a reply for   
    me, but you haven’t identified anyone else
oppID = mydata.pingID;  //I’ll remember your name







If we get this far and the loop hasn’t broken, then I’m probably telling my name 
to something that can’t speak. You’re probably a wall. But if you’re not a wall, we 
can decide which of us will move out of the other’s way. 
if (oppID < myID){ //If you’re higher in the hierarchy than me
evade();  //I’ll move out of the way
}
else {
delay (500);  //If not, I’ll wait for you to move.
}
I can’t listen for you at the same time as speaking, or else all I’ll hear is myself. The 
RF receiver needs to be shut off in order to transmit information. In fact, I can’t 
do anything else while listening. The RF receiver is power intensive, and running 
other processes at the same time interferes with the signal. I can only listen for 
so long before needing to get back to my other activities, to contributing to the 
whole.
We all work together, but we are each individually identifiable within the social 
space we have created through individual acts of communication. Because we 
can only listen to each other for so long, I might not hear you when you speak – 
perhaps I’m trying to negotiate a corner of the field at the time. Or worse, perhaps 
you’re talking into a wall, or into another bot. Your message will be blocked by the 
materiality of the environment. 
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The space of communication is interrupted by the relative positions of bots in the 
field. A stronger spatial order is linked to stronger communicative connectivity. 
When the same RF mechanism is used to communicate trigger events, alerting 
the bots to read the environment and display their colours, spatial ordering and 
communicative connectivity translate into the efficacy with which the screen 
appears. As space becomes less ordered, communicative connectivity decreases 
and fewer bots respond to the call to display. The screen does not appear.
In terms of the emergent whole, the communication between pixels and 
apertures is measured as a degree of connectivity. It is the connectivity 
between pixels, their ability to align their colour values in meaningful 
ways, that allows the screen to emerge as a whole. DeLanda discusses 
a degree of connectivity in regards to a community’s density and the 
capacities that emerge from it.88 In this discussion, density is not so 
much a spatial connectivity as a connectivity of communication – 
although the two are not necessarily separate. For a community of 
people, tighter communication means a higher level of consistency in 
ethical codes. Density, in this manner, can be seen as a measure of 
homogenisation. The community is more effective at enforcing norms 
if it is more homogenous in its intent towards defining these norms, 
and towards enacting appropriate enforcement techniques. Such a 
community is more strongly stratified, it represents a solidified whole. 
However, this homogeneity does not erase the differences between each 
individual. It exists alongside this individuality at another scale. 
In a similar way, the density of a collection of pixels or apertures is 
often described spatially. The capacities of steel cladding screens are 
described in terms of aperture size and percentage of open space. The 
resolution of Liquid Crystal Displays is determined by how many pixels 
are present across a plane measured in Cartesian space. Although 
described in terms of these properties – open space, dots-per-inch or as 
the absolute size of the array – these resolutions are important because 
they describe how much information the screen can hold as a whole, 
88. “The property of density, and the capacity to store reputations and enforce norms, are non-
reducible properties and capacities of the entire community, but neither involves thinking of it 
as a seamless totality in which the personal identity of the members is created by their relations” 
DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 11.
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Individuation and orchestration
Arborescent systems are hierarchical systems ... In the corresponding models, an 
element only receives information from a higher unit ... This is evident in current 
problems in information and computer science, which still cling to the oldest 
modes of thought in that they grant all power to a memory or central organ. 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari89
There are instead always a swarm of vitalities at play. The task becomes to identify 
the contours of the swarm and the kind of relations that obtain between its bits.
Jane Bennett90
Is the screen an orchestrated effect? Does it have to be processed from outside, 
or can it emerge from an inside? 
Most examples of screens rely on a centralised form of processing. Images are 
taken, digitalised, laid into an array in an external processing unit. This array is 
then pushed to a display, where each pixel is addressed by its location and an 
instruction. In a television this is done through broadcast. In Rozin’s mechanical 
mirrors, by computer and wire. Pixels don’t interact with one another, they 
interact with the processor, the information mastermind. Information is shipped 
as a layer and presents as a layer, settling on the pixels as separate from them. 
Non-digitised screens also seem to work this way. The information on the other 
side of the lattice does not emerge from the apertures, even if the ‘other side’ is a 
function of the lattice as a whole. The information of cinema is layered on to film, 
which orchestrates the pattern as it falls on the wall.
If the whole of the screen could come from inside the pixels rather than happening 
to them from elsewhere, the information it could carry might be different. The 
screen could talk about itself, about the differences of the pixels as they went 
about their business. Perhaps the image could change as pixels moved from one 
across these individual pixels and apertures.  Screen resolution is more 
a measure of information density than spatial density – of the capacity 
of the whole rather than the physical distribution of its components. 
Density, then, is a measure of the connectivity of the individuals, the 
homogeneity of purpose or intent in contributing to the whole.
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89. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 16.
90. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 11-12.
91. DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 75.
92. Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 6; 30.
93. Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 66. DeLanda expresses a similar idea of stasis as a 
‘backformation’, saying that all things exercise a speed, even the things we take for granted 
as concrete and foundational. He writes: “if we consider that the oceanic crust on which the 
continents are embedded is constantly being created and destroyed (by solidification and 
remelting)… the rocks and mountains that define the most stable and durable traits of our reality 
would merely represent a local slowing down of this flowing reality. It is almost as if every part 
of the mineral world could be defined simply by specifying its chemical composition and speed 
of flow.” Manuel DeLanda, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 
258. In light of Massumi’s discussion of speed; ‘stopping’ things can be seen as a perceptual 
process, an assumption of rest where other contexts might imply a slow movement.
Speed
Connectivity has a particularly temporal aspect when it comes to 
the screen. Pixels and apertures that act together do so in time, in 
synchronicity. Speed plays a role across screen forms as well as within 
them, defining differences in capacities and tendencies. Of all the 
properties that define an assemblage at a particular scale, DeLanda 
holds that speed “can be singled out as one of the most significant,” as 
it is an intensive quality which causes qualitative change at critical 
points, resulting in qualitatively different capacities. 91 Massumi also 
highlights the role of speed in how things appear, stating that the thing 
is “when it isn’t doing” – that is, it is only when a thing is in a state of 
arrest that it can be seen as a thing, rather than a movement. Quick 
things, for Massumi, cannot be actualised, they remain in the realm 
of the virtual: “Something that happens too quickly to have happened, 
actually, is virtual.”92 The actual is stopped, whereas the virtual is in 
flux. Movement cannot result in ‘things’ without being slowed down, 
or artificially stopped as a “back-formation” of movement. In this way, 
stasis becomes “a special case of reiterative movement: that allowing 
recognition.”93 Cessation actualises the thing from its movement, it 
introduces a temporal persistence to materiality.
end of the screen to the other. Perhaps the image could represent how well pixels 
talk to each other, or how well they’re listening. If this were the case, the image 
that emerged would be a screen that was about a screen. The screen would be a 
whole comprised of an assembly of individuals, each acting for itself but together 
generating an effect that belonged properly to the whole.
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Just as speed has a role in the recognition of material things, Bennett 
notes the role of speed in the understanding of action and agency, saying 
that “in the long and slow time of evolution… mineral material appears 
as the mover and shaker, the active power.” At this long time-scale, 
quick actions seem inconsequential; they are not sustained long enough 
to have effect. The material is actual; it is slow and fixed, proceeding “at 
a speed or level below the threshold of human discernment.”94 Agency 
is virtual, fast and moving. Considered in terms of the cinema or 
television, a difference in speed could account for the split between the 
frame or wall in its slowness and the fastness of the image it displays, 
as well as the association of this image with an effect over the slower 
materiality of the thing.
A television, cinema, a lattice… the object in these cases moves slowly, the space 
it supports moves quickly. The space is matched to my pace, my ordering. It takes 
my attention as a try to keep up with it. The object doesn’t ask for such attention, 
it’s unlikely to change while I’m looking.
Some Assembly works in a similar way. Its pixels are large and cumbersome, sitting 
still in a field while images move above and beneath them. As the bots begin to 
look around, they start to express a speed. One by one they join in to a collective 
movement, a pace that arises between them in-time but expresses a movement 
out-of-time – when  one bot is looking left his neighbour may be looking right, but 
the speed and sequencing of the movement is similar. The images remain above 
and below, but an interstitial layer of movement arises, segregated in time. Here 
I see the bots looking around but no image, here I see the image appearing and 
the bots are still. The speed of the two is similar.
The segregation between these phases starts to decay. One bot begins to move as 
the image is presented, then another, then another, until a whole group of bots 
seem to be ignoring the image altogether. Their movements, now, are quicker, 
more forceful, more varied. The speeds with which they move into one another 
and away from one another seem greater than the speed of the image. The image 
is less reliable. Fewer and fewer pixels respond, and the timing of their response 
is varied. The image is now large and still, the bots quick and responsive.
Inverted pace
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94. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 11; 18.
For pixels to act together, they must show a similarity in speed. From 
this similarity emerges the whole of the screen. The screen can be 
identified, in this case, because the response of the group of pixels in 
relation to its environmental context shows a similarity of rapidness. 
Likewise, the analytical split between the object and space of the screen 
could be described as a difference of speed. A space and a screen are 
seen as separate entities here because they work at different speeds in 
relation to their environmental context. Speed, as a property, impacts 
the scale at which a whole can be found in relation to its context. 
The moving image becomes an image-bot, becomes an environment-response, 
becomes a social interaction as the speed and differentiation of the bots increases. 
The pace of the system has been inverted. The pixels are pace-matched to my 
pace, the image is no longer responsive.
Lagging
The image appears below and the bots respond. Some stop moving, others don’t. 
One lights up, then another, then another. The image below disappears. As the 
first bot switches off his light, a new bot, over in the corner, lights up. The others 
switch off, begin moving again, but the bot in the corner remains lit until his time 
is up.






















Parameters of screenic space
Three parameters thereby present themselves as appropriate axial 
conditions given the explorations undertaken in this project. The 
order of the screen, measured as a degree of material and behavioural 
difference across individuals in the population; the density of the 
screen, measured as a degree of connectivity across its components; 
and the speed of the screen, measured as its rapidness of response to 
environmental change, including informational change.
These parameters represent the degrees of freedom of the screen’s 
possibility space, the regions of similarity and difference that can arise 
in screening. Each variable can then be located within this space as a 
combination of values as “an instantaneous state of the process being 
modelled.”95 From these parameters and variables, the individual 
instances of the screen within their relevant context and the relations 
between changes in context and changes in state, the field of possibility 
of the screen emerges.
In site writing there are two analytical objects: the artwork that lies between the 
critic and the artist, and the critical essay or text, which is located between critic 
and reader.
Jane Rendell96
Some Assembly is a performance, a group of material things, a written response, 
an analytical paradigm, a series of photographs and a series of videos. Each of 
these things is a communication. Each lies between me, who has a position to 
communicate, and you, who is being communicated with. 
Whether any of these are representations of more originary events is a matter 
of opinion. Do the photographs re-present moments of the performance (bot 
– photograph – reader)? Does this paragraph interpret the way the bots they 
behave (bot – situated writing – reader)? Have other paragraphs communicated 
the design intention behind the bots (designer – situated writing – reader)? Do 
the bots re-present moments in the analytical paradigm (analysis – bot – reader)? 
Another screen
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The stacking of these modes of communication is, for the most part, neither 
here nor there. Or, at least, they can be taken together in any order to produce 
meaning. But there is one mode that becomes a bit more problematic – using 
another screen.
Some Assembly uses video to introduce new speeds that can’t be reached with 
the materiality of the bots. There are two scales of pace at play – the consistent 
pace of the material, and the variable pace of the video. Frames of video, recorded 
at the time of the material, were cut up, sped up, assigned new timeframes. 
Intervening frames were deleted until a ‘pure’ condition is met, one in which a 
field of lights move across a surface at 25 frames per second. This pure condition 
was shown on another screen – the screen the video was played on.
But, in the move from one to another, the pace of the material is also a part of the 
video. The changing conditions of speed, order and density – responsible for the 
decay of the screen into a field of bots – require for communication a screen that 
will continue to be a screen. The non-decaying screen communicates the decay 
of the screenic condition.
The screen in Some Assembly is both an object of analysis and a mode of 
communication. This analysis can’t happen outside the screen. The screen is 
included once, below the bots as an environmental trigger; twice, in the condition 
that emerges from the bots; and thrice in the screen above, where the video 
composition is watched. Between the first and third screens is an interstitial layer 
of non-human activity, which sometimes matches these screenic conditions, 
sometimes keeps them separate, and sometimes twists one into the other.
95. The parameters define “the dimensions of the possibility space,” “the relevant ways of changing 
for an assemblage, that is, its degrees of freedom.” DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation, 189; 
19.















The location of the thresholds between these instances can be found 
by watching the transitions as they happen. This event of transition is 
incomplete; it is the “image of the movement of the actual’s appearing… 
it is necessarily analogic, incomplete at any and every particular 
conjunction.”97 Critical points of transition are the movements between 
fixed relata. If the moment of shifting is not observed, these relata 
might look unconnected. If the movement between relata is not seen, 
it is easy to assume these relata are fixed and static, rather than being 
caught within a shifting relational structure.
Where is the critical transition between the screen and the pixel?
Is it when the bots start looking around from their places? Does that first 
expression of speed at the scale of the pixel interrupt the screen?
Is it when the first bot catches his eyestalks on the bot in front of him, forcing a 
rotation until he falls out of array? Does that first moment of disorder interrupt 
the screen?
Is it when the bots begin to back out of the grid? Does that change in density 
interrupt the screen?
Is it when the bots turn to face each other and navigate their environments, 
moving toward and away from each other at different times rather than in unison? 
Is it when the other behaviours of the bots begin to interrupt their light display? 
When they become more concerned with their responses amongst themselves? 
When they become stuck in corners and forget to listen for the trigger? When 
they fall out of time with their responses, lighting when the others are dark or 
turning a blind eye to the colours?
Or are the pixel and the screen always present as possibilities? Is the system 
actualised in different ways as it moves through critical transitions of speed, 
density and order?
When does it stop being a screen?
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97. DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation, 19. 
98. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 32.
99. Heidegger writes: “Man puts the longest distances behind him in the shortest time. He puts 
the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before himself at the shortest 
range…What is least remote from us in point of distance, by virtue of its picture on film… can 
remain far from us.” Martin Heidegger, “The Thing” in Poetry, Language and Thought, trans. 
Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 163.
 When discussing issues of perceptual change and the space of possibility, 
the temporality of perception becomes particularly apparent. Deleuze 
and Guattari maintain that assemblages are defined by their speeds. 
Using the analogy of the wolfpack, they write that “the wolf, wolves, 
are intensities, speeds, temperatures, non-decomposable variable 
distances,” and it is in these speeds that they form an assemblage.98 
The heterogenous individuals of the wolves, each with their own speed 
and intensity, assemble into a pack which is characterised by the 
confluence of these individual speeds and intensities, as well as their 
spatial distribution. 
Whether the wolves are perceived as a group of wolves or a pack; whether 
the television is seen as a group of pixels or a furniture piece or an 
image or a ‘screen’; is a matter of how the assemblage is territorialised. 
At one scale of the screen, this is an assemblage between the individual 
pixels which make up the whole. But at another, it is between a person 
and the pixels. At yet another, it is between this person and this screen. 
Each of these occurs within a different context.
When considering territorialisation as a perceptual process, the critical 
points of transition between any of these contexts are always critical 
points in the assemblage of which a perceiving person is a part. Such 
an understanding of perception implies that humans have, in their 
directedness, a certain speed and order; a matter-movement that 
belongs to them. Heidegger shows an aversion to changes in distance 
and speed in his opening to “The Thing.” His disagreement with the 
television is based in it interfering with human perceptual methods by 
rendering all distance equal.99 The same could be said of televisions’ 
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actions on time.  The idea of ‘liveness’100 holds that television has 
the ability to present things that are temporally distant as just now 
happening, similarly to its transposition of the spatially distant to the 
proximal. 
The relational structure of the screen, though, involves more than 
speed as a measure of distance in time. It also involves ordering and 
connectivity of constitutive parts from which the whole emerges; a sense 
of sameness that repeats across a diverse, heterogeneous collection 
of individual pixels or apertures. The synchronicity with which 
pixels react to their context is distributed across an ordered array of 
difference in material properties. The screen emerges from perception 
as a combination of order, density and speed. These parameters 
allow screens to appear as (and at) a pace. The screen results from 
a distribution of timing over space rather than solely a rate at which 
distance is covered.
A person has a certain pace within an assemblage too, one related to 
their directedness and context. Just as the pack is characterised by the 
speeds and spaces of its wolves, so too might the assemblage between 
a person and a television set be characterised by their similarities 
and differences of pace. Put more plainly, the pace at which a person 
approaches the world and the pace at which a particular screen occurs 
are different. This difference in pace affects how that assemblage (the 
interaction or engagement between person and screen) occurs. The 
television—as—space is found in perception at a different pace to the 
television—as—object. The pixels work at another pace again. The 
consistencies between these speeds may affect how easily a person can 
territorialise and actualise things from an event, which in turn affects 
the relata drawn from the engagement. Pace matching in the screen 
assemblage might influence what arises and what does not – how 
easily a person as an individual can interact with any particular scale 
of screenic whole – as a pixel, as an object, or as an image.
The image is, in the case of the screen, perhaps the most suited to the 
pace of human directedness, and so the more likely territorialisation to 
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100. Anna McCarthy writes of ‘liveness’ as an ideology that allows the translation of “perceived 
temporal simultaneity” into spatial collapse. However, she maintains that ‘liveness’ is not an 
ontological condition of the television; that it doesn’t determine screen experience. Rather, it 
is the “temporal ideology” of television that allows televisual spaces to be constructed.  Anna 
McCarthy, “From Screen to Site: Television’s Material Culture, and Its Place,” October 98 (Fall 
2001): 98.
101. “It becomes apparent that the slowest of movements, or the last to occur or arrive, is not the 
least intense. And the fastest may already have converged with it, connected with it, in the 
disequilibrium  of a nonsynchronic development of strata that have different speeds and lack 
a sequence of stages but are nevertheless simultaneous.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, 172.
102. Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 150.
be performed and the more likely relatum to surface. The voltage gates 
by which a pixel receives a signal open and close at a pace too fast to 
be properly bounded by human perception. They remain virtual – part 
of the possibility space of the LCD, but not actualised in experiencing 
the screen. The plastic which bounds these pixels as a frame, and the 
plastic and metal from which the pixels are themselves made, are too 
slow to be of interest. They are unlikely to change during interaction. 
The slowness of the plastic is revealed as a lack of agency when 
compared to the fast pace of space generated by the screen, and the 
effectual changes in the space behind the screen are what hold interest. 
Just as Bennett’s geological context rendered the small, quick actions of 
humans ineffectual; the context of human perception renders the slow 
changes of steel or plastic ineffectual. However, the increased speed 
with which the screenic space – its image – is found does not imply 
that this is the more important part of the screen; nor does it mean it 
is primary to pixels or apertures that project this image, nor the frame 
that surrounds it. As Deleuze and Guattari state in their discussion 
of the body as an assemblage, the speed of strata are not connected to 
their intensity.101
The slowness of the material is what is responsible for the screen-as-
object’s constancy, its persistence of meaning. The persistence of the 
screen object is in its “ratio between perceptual variations: the ratio 
between habit (pattern of reaction) and the sea of chaos in which it 
swims.”102 What is important in the relational structure of the screen 
is to note the connectedness of these different speeds (actualised as 
different ‘things’) and mark how they can be turned one into another – 
in other words, to map their possibilities and transitions. The screen—
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as—object and screen—as—space are not parts of the screen able to 
be added back together again,103 but are different lines drawn around 
the same phenomena – an event that occurs with a certain pace. The 
ontology of the screen as a relational structure lies in the variations of 
this event, the different ways in which the ‘screen’, as well as a screen, 
or a group of pixels or apertures, can be actualised.
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103. Deleuze and Guattari write of the abstract machine of the face: “any approach based on stages in 
ontogenesis is arbitrary: it is thought that what is fastest is primary, or even serves as a foundation 
or springboard for what comes next. An approach based on part-objects is even worse; it is the 
approach of a demented experimenter who flays, slices, and anatomises everything in sight, and 
then proceeds to sew things randomly back together again. You can make any list of part-objects 
you want… it’s still Frankenstein.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 171. 
This chapter addressed the screen as a relational structure. It began by 
finding a mechanism by which to flatten the hierarchies between the 
relata and relations present in previous chapters, so that these could 
be considered as part of an iterative, immanent process. This allowed 
the persistence of meaning of the term ‘screen’ to lie with a diverse 
population of screen experiences, rather than with an unchanging 
essential characteristic. The screen as a whole could then be seen 
as emerging at different scales – as a population, as an individual 
experience, as a collection of pixels. 
The emergences of the screens were linked to structures of perception, 
particularly to the process of territorialisation as a form of drawing 
boundaries around experiences to form ‘things’. This was approached 
as a way of homogenising regions of an experience so their similarities 
could be expressed. This process was shown to occur at different scales 
at different times, so that different relata were found within experience. 
The screen, then, was found between these differences – across its 
relata rather than in them. This represented the relational structure of 
the screen, its field of possibilities.
This chapter then set up a structure for mapping this field of 
possibilities, by defining appropriate axes and ways of locating a 
transition from one relatum (a screen) to another (a group of pixels) 
along these axes. This transition was used as an example of the kinds of 
critical transitions that the screen might undergo, and the factors that 
might be important in these transitions. The resulting map represented 
a part of the relational structure of the screen. It is noted, however, 
that there are differences between this relational structure or field of 
possibility of the screen and what the thing is. As DeLanda comments, 
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the conceptualisation of a thing is separate from any of its instances.104 
In arguing that the screen exists as a virtuality, a relational structure of 
nested relata and relations, a difference has been established between 
any particular screen and the population of the screen as a term. But 
there is a difference between the thought of the screen – the ‘map’ as it 
has been constructed here – and the screen itself. 
Massumi’s idea of the ‘image’ of the relational structure was brought up 
earlier in this chapter as a way of revealing the virtual, but it should be 
clear that this image does not coincide with the virtual. The relational 
structure is inaccessible; it cannot be experienced. As Massumi states, 
the dimension of the emergent “can only be analysed as a continuous but 
highly differentiated field that is ‘out of phase’ with formed entities.”105 
The virtual cannot be reached, because it cannot be actualised – 
anything actualised becomes determinate, another stratum at another 
scale, and this is the way that experience accesses things for people, as 
a series of determinations. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, “behind each 
stratum, encased in it, there is always another stratum.”106 Everything 
that is revealed is actualised, and everything actualised is determinate.
Rather than being a point of access, the image of the relational structure 
works in a particular way: it takes what is actual and infers a relational 
possibility from it. It accesses the virtual by networking the actual into 
a series of relations. The problems of this approach are made clear in 
Massumi’s arrow example, cited earlier in this chapter: if the arrow 
occupies a point along the path of its flight, it is unable to move to the 
next. At any point, the arrow is stationary.107 The flight of the arrow 
cannot be recovered from the points in which it is actualised, but at the 
same time, the flight is only accessible as this series of points.
In mapping or imaging the relational structure of the screen, the thing 
is being reverse-engineered from actual to possible. The things there is 
experiential evidence of – the things that actually happen – are assumed 
to be the most probable, and these come to define the structure of the 
field of possibility. Moreover, the relational structure must be left in 
order to achieve this: any image is a determination, it fixes in place of 
something that is in flux. This determining move has been made across 
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all of the ways of thinking presented in this project, and it is common 
to many disciplinary paradigms.108
In what sense, then, does this relational structure become useful? 
Primarily, its usefulness relies on the foundational principle of its 
immanence. As immanent, the relational structure of the screen sits 
alongside the image or map of the structure that has been made, though 
at a different scale. The thought of the structure (in this case, the image 
or map) and the structure itself have a structural overlap – that is, 
the map of the screen becomes a part of the population of screen’s 
assemblage.109 This overlap is always incomplete. The axial parameters 
restrict the space which the map can cover, and the selection of mapped 
relata sway the critical transitions that can be found. The more these 
relata are challenged, the more parameters are considered on the map, 
the richer the image becomes. 
The map is a reduction, but one that relies on the same ontological 
assumption as the thing itself, and so can be superposed with it. 
Mapping the screen in this way, then, remains a different exercise 
to finding a screenic essence because it makes an effort to refer back 
to what it does not know and does not show. The foundation of the 
relational structure of the screen is what is not found on the map.
104. “It is important to keep the concept [of the assemblage], with its material and expressive 
variables and its territorialisation and coding parameters, apart from actual cases, with their 
material and expressive components, and the articulatory processes that select, sort out, link 
and stabilise those components. The distinction… forces us to confront the question of the 
cognitive relation between the concept and the actual cases” DeLanda, Assemblage Theory, 138.
105. Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 34.
106. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 159.
107. Massumi explains that “the problem is that between one point on a line and the next, there is an 
infinity of intervening points. If the arrow occupies a first point along its path, it will never reach 
the next – unless it occupies each of the infinity of points between ... The arrow gets swallowed 
up in the transitional infinity” Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 6.
108. Massumi links this way of finding meaning as common to the major paradigms of this thesis. He 
writes: “taking pregiven terms, extracting a permutational system of implicit positionings from 
their form, projecting that system to a metaphysical point before the givenness of the terms, 
and developing the projection as a generative a priori mapping – these moves are common, 
in varying ways, to phenomenological, structuralist and many poststructuralist approaches.” 
Massumi, Parables of the Virtual, 70.
109. DeLanda writes: “a mathematical model can capture the behaviour of a material process 
because the space of possible solutions overlaps the possibility space associated with the 
material process” DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation, 19.
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This thesis has examined the screen across three modes of thought, using a variety of methods. 
In doing so, this thesis was able to generate an understanding of the screen across different sets 
of assumptions and different material biases. What arises is a conceptualisation of the screen 
– not a screen per se, but a way of working and a new understanding that was generated from 
that way of working.
This thesis began with a brief exploration of screen analysis. It discussed published findings 
on the screen and the methods used to produce those  findings. It noted the screen’s ubiquity, 
its pervasiveness in structures of thought and communication, and its diverse materialities. 
It showed that the screen has been defined through commonality as well as through the 
fundamental change, through what it represents as either the imagery it bears or the social 
meanings it holds – but not so often according to its materiality. It also noted that a focus on 
materiality was an important part of being able to translate screen experiences into designed 
objects.
Then the thesis moved to addressing what the screen is, its ontology. This did not involve setting 
out to answer the question of the screen’s existence by isolating common features of screens, 
either materially or conceptually. Rather, it meant approaching the screen from within the 
mechanisms of perception, as a relational device. Particularly, it meant exploring the ways in 
which the screen surfaces in perception, and connecting the resulting understandings of the 
screen to the structure of the arguments that produce them. 
This approach resulted in a survey of screen understandings. However, this research reaches 
beyond reporting the ways that the screen is understood. By understanding the connections 
between what is found and the way it is found in each case, two interconnected and important 
understandings were allowed to surface: firstly, that each set of screen understandings had a 
position in regards to the others; and secondly, that there was always something that escaped 
the mode of thought – an excess to screen experience that cannot be positioned within any 
individual mode of understanding. These understandings allowed the generation of a map of 
the screen. Looking across the different constructions of the screen allowed the identification of 
things that reoccur, and things that escape entirely.
This conclusion will discuss the insights and impacts of this research and what it has been 
able to say about the screen. It will begin by discussing the research aims, and the conclusions 
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that were drawn against each chapter. It will then move to discuss its own way of working and 
the impact of the methods on what was found out about the screen, and will conclude with a 
discussion of the limitations of this research and its potential impacts on the field of design.
Answering questions
The aim of this research was to describe an ontology for the screen, in the hope of understanding 
the individual material nuances that present themselves within this ontology and the different 
kinds of effects of screens on daily life. This drew out some specific questions: one, what does it 
mean to see a screen as a screen; and, two, what is the role of materiality in the screen’s ontology? 
I will now discuss how the thesis addressed each of these questions before summarising the 
ontology of the screen as it was found.
What does it mean to see a screen as a screen? 
There are two parts to the question of what it means to see the screen as a screen: the object of 
discovery (the screen) and the discovery itself (the act of seeing). Although previous studies had 
discussed the object of the screen in various ways, this thesis’ development and contribution 
lay in connecting these understandings of the object of discovery to the process of discovery 
– the way of looking.1 This was achieved by isolating three ways of looking at the structure of 
relational ontology: the first held the relata as ontologically primal, the second held the relation 
as ontologically primal, and the third bound the two within an immanent structure of relations. 
The ways in which the screen could be understood through the relational encounter were the 
subject of the three chapters, and each generated a different understanding. In this way, a series 
of discoveries were made about the screen. Chapter one approached the screen by holding its 
relata as primal. It looked at what could be determined about the screen, and examined two major 
screen dichotomies – the subject and the object, and the real and the virtual – as they played out in 
screen experience. Using this structure, chapter one concluded that disappearance and negation 
are the ontological basis of the screen, and that this negation leads to an understanding of the 
screen as creating a gap. Chapter two considered the screen by holding relations as generative of 
and primal to relata, thus inverting the priorities of chapter one. It looked at the indeterminate 
of the screen and examined materiality and agency as generative relations that result in screenic 
relata being determined in perception. Using this structure, chapter two concluded that the 
screen has a material directedness that works alongside humans to order space, and that this 
leads to the screen being recognised as a particular point of tension in agency and materiality. 
Chapter three approached the screen as an immanent relational structure, in which relata and 
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relations are bound and from which they emerge at different scales. It positioned the screen 
as an assemblage of different material and conceptual individuals, which could be revealed at 
different times. Using this structure, chapter three concluded that the ontology of the screen 
is reliant on the parameters of speed, order and density; as these define regions of stability for 
screenic relata, and boundaries where critical transitions take place between relata. 
Each of the chapters has a different answer for what the screen is. The screen as a gap between 
the real and the virtual or the subject and the object is a different kind of screen to that which 
shows as a tension between materiality and agency; which is different again to the screen as a 
particular region of speed, order and density. Each of the chapters, therefore, showed a different 
aspect of the screen. Each of these ways of looking carried its own assumptions and logical 
structures that gave a particular understanding of the screen. In order to contextualise these 
different explanations, the discoveries of each chapter were connected back to the assumptions 
that structured the mode of enquiry. 
In holding the relata as ontologically primal, chapter one gave preference to determinate 
entities. As such, it described the screen in a highly ordered way; as one part of an interaction of 
dichotomous pairs. The analysis found, however, that there were slippages in these dichotomous 
pairings. To maintain the integrity of the analysis, the screen had to be split and split again – 
indicating that the screen did not quite ‘fit’ conceptually with the order by which it was being 
described. This chapter particularly noted the importance of material and agency in interrupting 
the ordering of the screen. Importantly, chapter one aligned the discovery of the screen as a gap 
or negation to the creation of gaps and negations within the structure of the analysis. 
This gap was then examined more thoroughly in chapter two by focusing on the relation. The 
chapter looked at materiality and agency as generative relations in order to examine how 
contradictory screen relata can surface differently in different contexts. In this way, it focused 
on the indeterminate, the parts of the screen’s ontology that are not highly ordered. In doing so, 
the analysis found that the screen participated in an ordering itself, one that was at odds with 
the system of determination demonstrated in chapter one. In changing the way it looked at the 
screen, chapter two allowed some resolution of the excess of chapter one’s screen. It particularly 
notes the importance of time and scale in revealing the screen. However, without modes of 
determination, there was little that could be said about the screen. That is, the indeterminate 
focus of the analysis found indeterminate outcomes.
1. Martine comments: “There must be meaning. That this search is worthy ...surely stands, if anything does, without argument. 
However it cannot be carried out intelligibly without constant reappraisal of the extent to which the character of the search itself 
affects what we find.” Brian John Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 15.
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Chapter three took ideas of the production of difference from chapter one, and of time and 
scale from chapter two to develop a relational structure of the screen. The relational structure 
provided a manner of connecting determinate and indeterminate aspects of screen experience 
by establishing each relata as an assemblage – a region of screen experience that exists at a 
certain scale, with possible transitions between. Chapter three then established that this virtual 
region could be imaged, or mapped, by defining its topology. It overtly discussed the positioning 
of chapters one and two and, from this, developed the axial parameters of order, density and 
speed. The map, however, is always bound by the parameters that define it; and so the image 
that is produced is defined by the choice of parameters.
In short, this thesis found that seeing a screen as a screen was less about the screen itself, and 
more about the mode of seeing.2 To put it simply, what we find is how we look. If enquiry asks 
about the screen’s impact on the virtual and the real, an answer will be found that establishes 
the virtual and real as separate, so as to allow the screen to mediate between them. The initial 
assumption – the pre-given separation of the virtual and real – defines the outcome of mediation. 
If a screen is to be seen as a screen, it needs to be seen across a number of frameworks in a way 
that allows each conceptual structure to remain alongside the others. 
Unfortunately, this precludes any sort of definitive answer to what the screen is. Any answer to this 
question would involve a reduction, a homogenisation of conceptual and perceptual structures. 
After all, experience is not wholly determinate and neither is thought:  “the indeterminacy of 
our beginning reaches through the process to colour and shape the whole in such a way that our 
reflective labour must always remain, at least in this sense, incomplete.”3 Although this thesis 
has not provided an answer to what the screen is, it has given an indication of a range of screen 
experiences and the role of perception in finding the screen within these experiences. In this 
sense, it has traced a topology of screen experiences, and allowed an understanding of what it 
means to see the screen as a screen.
What is the role of materiality in the screen’s ontology?
I will turn now to the second question regarding the role of the material in the ontology of the 
screen.
The relata-based analysis looked at the material of the screen from the universal, the screen, 
and the individual, a screen. When the materiality of the screen was approached from the 
universal, it began to take on distinctly nonmaterial properties. Although individual screens 
have materiality, the screen as universal does not – it dissipates into a type of force that acts on 
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the embodied and/or social being of the subject.  If properties were sought that allow the screen 
to affect subjectivity in these ways, the screen must be approached on a different scale – these 
properties cannot be described without individuating the encounter. As a general relatum, the 
screen becomes a mediator, a repository, something that demands attention; but these qualities 
cannot be linked to its material form.
When the materiality of the screen was approached through the individual encounter, distinct 
material properties belonging to an object could be connected to particular reactions, behaviours 
and understandings in a subject. This understanding relies heavily on the relation of use and 
the recognition of objects as being materially fit for a specific human purpose. In regards to the 
ontology of the screen, the emergence of an object as a screen relies on the form and behaviour of 
the material object suggesting ‘screenness’. But this reflexive relation of material and ontology 
could only be generalised so far before it introduced contradictions – before dichotomous pairs 
such as opaqueness and transparency could both result in a screen. Instead, these material 
qualities need to be homogenised – an undertaking that resulted in losing the material qualities. 
Opaqueness and transparency both create a barrier, and it is the barrier condition that is 
responsible for the screen. The stronger or broader the generalisation, the more difficult it is to 
retain the materiality of the object.
The materiality of the screen is compromised within this form of analysis, and cannot be held 
responsible for the emergence of the screen in perception. The specific materialities of the 
screen had a minor role in determining the ontological condition of the screen in the relata-
based analysis. The screen was connected instead to a lack of materiality, the disappearance 
or negation of the material, both to and from the screen. But this material nullity is intimately 
connected to determination. In trying to keep the subject separate from the object, and the 
real separate from the virtual, the materiality of the object was removed from its effects. The 
screen was split so that it could have an individual, inert material but no impact; or a universal, 
forceful lack of material.  
Or, to look at the matter another way, materiality was integral to revealing the screen in 
perception. Materiality and agency are put at odds, one belonging to the subject, the other to 
the inert object; one to the real and the other to the virtual. The difference responsible for these 
relata is itself a material difference, a difference that the screen is very good at challenging in 
2. Heidegger notes the inseparability of these two notions in What is a Thing: “The question  [of what is a thing] has been characterised 
in two essential respects: What is put to question and how it is questioned.” Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing?, trans. WB Barton, 
Jr. and Vera Deutsch, analysis by Eugene T Gendlin (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1967), 53.
3. Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, xv.
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its roles of barrier, frame and site. Negation and disappearance imply that there is something 
to be negated, but rather than the specific properties of what is negated defining the identity of 
the screen, it is the negation itself that is important. The material of the screen is both itself and 
something else – it is what it is not. 
The relation-based analysis made the importance of the screen’s material clearer by redefining 
materiality as a generative process. The screen acted materiality and was acted upon as material, 
resulting in a material difference that happens both to and from the screen. This suggests that 
the screen has a role to play in generating materiality at the same time as being generated by 
materiality; that the screen participates in an ongoing materialisation at the same time as it lies 
outside of it. This introduces a paradox for the subject, who also needs to be found both within 
and outside of ongoing materialisation – alongside the static object of the screen at the same 
time as it is found alongside the material produced by the screen. The material reciprocity of the 
screen and the subject (as a thing and a body) means that the body remains generative against 
the space of ongoing materialisation, the space of movement to the other side of the screen. 
Yet the material object of the screen, and the reflexive body that arose with it, works against 
this ongoing materialisation. The materiality of the screen is in competition with itself – not 
in generative terms, but as a result of a person attempting to find a stable, situated reflexive 
embodiment – to determine the ongoing relation into static relata.
The interaction between these ongoing and static materialities results in nuances in the ways 
that screens present materially, because it influences the ways that relata can be determined from 
the material relation. In this sense, materiality itself exhibits agency.  The screen has a material 
directedness – a particular style of effecting and reciprocating other materialities – that results 
in an agency. This directedness in dependent on the screen seen from other scales – on pixels 
and apertures and on informational structures. It is only on determination, a reflexive process, 
that this agency is severed from the material. Material directedness introduces a fundamental 
contradiction in that the active materiality of the screen interferes with determining an ‘inert’ 
object: the boundaries drawn around its effects do not allow it to be seen as inert material, but 
as a productive force. The screen’s material directedness can only be accessed by delaying intent 
and relying less heavily on use as a major relational framework. By looking at the use-less, 
the interaction is less readily determined, the indeterminate hangs around longer, or different 
determinations are made which produce different relata.
The idea that the same relation can produce different materialities implies that the materiality 
of the screen may be larger than its individual instance. Chapter three looked at the role of this 
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aspect of materiality in the ontology of the screen – as a relational structure that allows a view 
of the screen as a relatum on the same ontological level as the processes that produce it. This 
immanent structure meant looking at the role of the material in the concept of the screen as well 
as its individual instance, in finding the material in the ‘screen’ as a general class noun or concept 
comprising specific instances of screen experiences as well as its compositional materiality. 
Changes in the meaning of the term ‘screen’ are accompanied by changes in its materiality – the 
term references a variety of material, and sometimes contradictory, instances. The material 
of the screen is itself decomposable into smaller things such as apertures, photons, and light 
emitting diodes. The term ‘screen’ does not necessarily refer to one of these materialities; just 
as the term, as a class or universal, does not always refer to a particular instance of the thing. 
If materiality is to be considered in terms of the general, however, this universal has to sit 
alongside the individual context. 
The immanent framework of the assemblage allows this to happen: meaning is held at a certain 
scale of interaction, where a region of material experience is delineated, perceptually bounded 
into something called a ‘screen’. This region might contain spaces, objects, subjects, real things 
and virtual things, but it also relies on generative processes of materiality and agency in the way 
the region becomes bounded. The screen thus arises where material difference is found, where 
the strata can no longer be homogenised and have to break apart into another scale. Rather than 
holding meaning in particular material properties, the screen’s ontology comes from this region 
of possibility – a mapping of all material instances on to one another at the appropriate scale. 
So, in looking for how the materialities of the screen interact, materiality is turned into an 
expression of the immaterial, the possible. But it also remains as the static ‘material’ of the 
relata, and the generative relation of material difference. In this sense, materiality is the very 
structure of the screen, it defines how the field of possibility is actualised. Imaging this region 
– making a map – revealed the materiality of the screen as it is found in a possibility structure 
across its individual material instances. The individual material instance of the screen both 
embodies the screen at this larger scale, as well as expressing it materially.
The role of materiality in the screen’s ontology is, therefore, complex. It is, again, highly 
dependent on the conceptual structure with which the screen is approached. In other words, 
the ontology of the screen either relies heavily on materiality, or not at all, depending on how 
materiality is defined. And this materiality itself might be determinate (as the timber of the 
lattice or the plastic of the television set) or indeterminate (as the data encoding the signal 
or a possibility structure of the pixel). The materiality of the screen at one scale challenges 
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its materiality at another. Again, no definitive answer can be drawn as to what the screen 
is in regards to its materiality. However this thesis has outlined some dependencies between 
materiality and the ontology of the screen: firstly, that the screen generates material as well 
as being composed of it; secondly, that the material of the screen is dependent on an interplay 
between material difference and sameness; and thirdly, that the material of the screen changes 
dramatically depending on the scale at which it emerges. 
The ontology of the screen
In describing the ontology of the screen as it relates to material difference, it seems most fitting 
to describe the screen according to the structure of its relationality. This structure allows both 
relata and relations to be considered, and best addresses the role of the material in the screen’s 
ontology. To simplify the matter, an answer to the question “what is the screen?” might read 
something like:
The screen is a structured region of possibility which is actualised at different scales, in different 
ways, at different times. The screen is structured along questions of order, speed and density; 
and includes determined material entities – such as pixels, apertures, information structures, 
lattices, televisions, and smartphones – as well as indeterminate relations and excesses – such 
as sociocultural forces, identities and generative material interactions. These sets of entities are 
structured in relation to one another, but this structure can never be fully determined: any mode 
of determination relies on restrictive assumptions to generate understanding, and something 
will always escape these assumptions. 
This may not seem a very useful kind of statement for those wanting to design screens, or design 
with screens or through them. But it is effectual, in that it outlines a territory to be explored 
and limits of exploration – both in terms of the limits of the ontology of the screen, and the 
limitations of ways of exploring. The contribution of the ontology of the screen that this thesis 
presents will be discussed later, but first I would like to focus on the impact of the methodology 
this thesis used in defining this ontology.
Impact of methodology
The three major methodological moves of this thesis were dividing the analysis along the different 
ways of looking; approaching these ways of looking according to a making-and-breaking using 
different methods of interrogation; and figuring each in a way that allowed the analysis to be 
understood diagrammatically. Each of these methodologies contributed to the understandings 
drawn from this thesis in a particular way.
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Dividing the analysis
The analysis was divided into the three frameworks or perspectives of relata, relations and 
relationality; and these three ways of looking were held apart as long as possible – both spatially, 
in separate chapters, and conceptually by means of separating their assumptions and ways of 
working. This resulted in a strained analysis at times, particularly in the first two chapters. 
Holding these ways of thinking apart meant that individual concepts were isolated from their 
contexts. In this isolation, many of these concepts changed, even to the point of a naïve reading. 
This was particularly noticeable for those theorists that reoccurred across the frameworks. This 
move is not intended to disrespect the oeuvre of works of these theorists, or to misread their 
contributions. Instead, this isolation performs in a similar way to the bots – it intervenes to 
‘break’ the analysis, and thereby to show the structures of thought behind it. The isolation 
of a particular concept from its context can be jarring for the reader. This is, however, the 
exact task that examinations of the meaning of screens often carry out: both technological and 
social determinist views of the screen generalise from specific instances to the point of losing 
the context of the analysis. By holding these modes of thinking apart and leaving the jarring 
moments unresolved, this thesis performs the task that it critiques with self-awareness; making 
clear the assumptions that allow these slippages of meaning to be constructed.
It is clear, in the end, that these modes of thought cannot be held apart. Relata cannot be 
discussed without reference to relations, nor relations without reference to relata. Assuming 
one as ontologically prior to the other misses the point of their interdependence. But discussing 
them together – homogenising them into a single understanding – would mean priorities 
would have to be determined and concepts debated on unequal ground. If they had been folded 
into a single framework, the contradictory definitions and understandings would have to be 
immediately resolved.  Leaving a contradiction as a contradiction for a little longer instead 
opens an indeterminacy in analysis. In making clear the assumptions that perpetuate the 
separateness of these modes of thought, and discussing the impact of these on the conclusions 
drawn, a new understanding is found across the modes. These modes of thought produce 
different, contradictory understandings. They are allowed to exist in heterogeneous multiplicity. 
4. Martine comments: “when we treat analysis as the single most significant method of investigation, presupposing as we must 
that the world is made up of discretely meaningful bits and pieces, the conceptual structures in terms of which we articulate the 
relations among those pieces…are predestined to take on the same character as the pieces that we set out to look for in the first 
place.” Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 15. 
5. “If for no other reason than that in each case some other end is possible at least in principle, the claim that the determinations 
we have come upon at the end of the process are not really ideal structures that were undergirding the process (together with 
everything else) from the outset seems more and more reasonable.” Martine, Indeterminacy and Intelligibility, 15.
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Making-and-breaking
Martine notes that determinist frameworks are self-perpetuating in that they cannot accommodate 
any mode of understanding outside of analysis.4 In other words, the way we interrogate a 
phenomenon restricts the possibilities of what we might find it to be. Analysis disregards the 
indeterminate because it cannot account for it. In this sense, he claims, determinism creates 
things rather than discovers them, a premise in direct conflict with the aims of determinist 
agendas.5 He then suggests that, if we focus on the “pervasive character” of the indeterminate, 
it seems as though the determinate is an incomplete expression of an essentially indeterminate 
world, rather than the other way around. 
The making-and-breaking approach to analysis found the limits of a particular structure of 
thought and helped to clarify the assumptions behind each mode. In this way, the conceptual 
and written ‘making’ of the screen – which tends toward the universal and the determinate 
– was challenged by a ‘breaking’, which intervened at particular places to find excesses and 
individual context. This involved three forms of creative practice: amateur robotics, animation 
and personally situated writing. The works played a significant role in the development of 
the project, and contributed to the analysis by providing an alternative access point to screen 
relations. Together, these methods challenged the conceptual analysis by finding and provoking 
the limits of the mode of thought. 
The thesis performs between these modes of ‘making’ and ‘breaking’. The two halves were 
established in varied spatial relations, resulting in a thesis that changed presentation in 
response to the content it was covering. The relata-based analysis of chapter one favoured the 
determinate, and bent the indeterminate around the structure it presented. The text of the 
‘making’, then, was presented within this chapter as a single column emphasised in red; and 
the ‘breaking’ as two columns manipulated into this structure. As the ‘breaking’ increased in 
density, it began to interrupt the flow of ‘making’, cutting the analysis into physically smaller 
pieces. The relation-based analysis of chapter two favoured the indeterminate, and attempted to 
bend the structure of analytical writing to discuss excess and between-ness. The priority of the 
two halves is inverted, and so too is their presentation. The ‘making’ in this chapter is broken 
into two columns, and the ‘breaking’ presented as a single flow of vignettes, emphasised in blue 
to position it as the opposite of the previous chapter’s emphasis. Chapter three approaches 
the ‘making’ and ‘breaking’, the determinate and indeterminate, as equivalent modes caught 
within a structure. The text reflects this by combining the two streams into a single flow and 
introducing a third colour, green, to complete the RGB colour system. 
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Figuration
To emphasise the interconnections across the thesis, each of the chapters was conceived as 
a figure, which depicted the conceptual structures of the written analysis and the way that 
the creative practice interrupted this structure. These figures were analogistic, but they were 
also performative. Within the chapters, assumptions were made and connected back to the 
conclusions that had been generated. Each time this happened, another dimension was made 
in the figuration. Chapter one’s figure was presented as an axis and a cut, chapter two as a 
stretched plane, and chapter three as twisting a field.
These figures generated understanding of the ways in which the ‘making’ and ‘breaking’ worked 
in each chapter, the dimensionality with which they interacted, and they allowed the findings 
to be diagrammed spatially. These diagrams could then be used to connect findings across the 
chapters, and to depict the topology of the screen as it had been discovered through the thesis.
Methodology summary
Together, these methodological moves provided a number of different structures across which 
commonalities and differences of understanding could be found. Each of these different structures 
had implicit assumptions and ways of accessing understanding that influenced what was found. 
Any ontology is situated. That is, we only ever have access to a thing through our own access, 
and this access has a bias. If the screen is to be found from its ontology, it needs to be clear what 
belongs to the bias of access and what belongs to the screen.6 
The possibilities of the screen, in both its material and conceptualisation, exist across these 
ways of looking and provoking. By allowing a set of understandings to remain alongside each 
other, to remain multiple, it becomes apparent what of the outcome belongs to the conceptual 
structure and what belongs to something else, something outside. The multiplicity of these 
understandings allows us different foci at different times – to express differences or similarities 
as needed, to understand the full scope as well as particular contexts and details. 
Limitations
Each of the modes of thought analysed in this thesis bore assumptions that impacted on its 
conclusions. This thesis is no different, and the research presented herein is by no means a 
6. Deleuze and Guattari write “[t]he multiple must be made, not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather… with the number 
of dimensions one already has available – always n-1 (the only way the one belongs to the multiple: always subtracted). Subtract 
the unique from the multiplicity to be construed; write at n-1 dimensions.” Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 
trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1987), 6. 
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comprehensive account of the screen’s ontology. The assumptions that this thesis imported into 
analysis include both limiting what was seen and limiting how these things were seen.
The object of enquiry was limited in two major ways that affected the kind of discoveries that 
could be made. Firstly, the ‘screen’ was limited to a material instance in its context, though 
this context was conceptual as well as material and spatial. Secondly, the ‘screen’ was limited 
to having a relationship to moving space, either through imagery or filtering. The purpose of 
these assumptions was to anchor the analysis within the field of design and spatial experience. 
But this also meant that certain issues came to light more than others. Particularly, a desire to 
locate the material within the screen’s ontology led to defining the subject and object and virtual 
and real as the beginning points of enquiry. This led to materiality and agency taking a strong 
role within the thesis, which in turn helped define speed and density as axial parameters. A 
focus on spatiality limited the kinds of effects that were considered relevant to the analysis, the 
types of examples that informed the argument, and the outcome of that argument as an abstract 
spatial representation of the screen.
Included in the limitations of the objects entering into enquiry is the perceivable commonality 
between the creative works. This commonality could be defined in various ways – according 
to the technological nature of the artefacts, their ability to move, or even their size. Each of 
these parameters might be of interest to others as they assess whether to include or exclude 
the findings of this thesis within their own analyses. However, to dwell on these parameters 
here runs the risk of returning to a relata-based analysis – of defining effects according to the 
physical properties of an object. Instead, it can only be said that the ontological relations entered 
into with, and explicated through, the creative works is of a particular character; just as the 
works themselves are of a particular character.
The thesis also defined a particular mode of enquiry. Approaching the ontology of the screen as 
relational according to the three frameworks put emphasis on ordering as a way of producing 
understanding. This influenced the argument that the screen was itself a form of ordering in 
conflict with the human, and the definition of order as an axial parameter. 
I could only define the ontology of the screen as it appeared under the restraints of this thesis, 
but these limitations do not disvalue the outcomes. There are, of course, more ways to look at the 
screen. Different sets of assumptions would generate different foci and different answers to the 
structure of the screen’s ontology. This project could be continued ad nauseam – by looking more 
closely at any of the relata that have arisen here, for instance, or conversely by looking across 
more contexts. There are always more gaps to fill. But such a project is, by nature, incompletable 
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– there is always another individual instance to include in the collective, or another way to draw 
perceptual boundaries around phenomena.
What is included here is a subset of the screen’s ontology that suffers from particular limitations. 
As with all conceptualisations, it is created more than discovered. But it is done so in a way that 
attempts to locate its own argument within the understandings it generates, and in this way it 
provides a situated knowledge. 
How far the findings of this thesis can be generalised is dependent on the reader’s interpretation 
of the limiting factors of the research. As with any research, the more commonalities that can 
be found between the contexts addressed in this investigation and the new context to which it is 
applied, the stronger the argument for extrapolation. Should the reader choose to focus on the 
largely technological nature of the artefacts discussed, the findings could safely be generalized 
to technological screens as a whole. If the ability of the objects of discussion to move is of more 
importance to the reader, this generalization might be better limited to mobile screens, or to 
screens that move autonomously.
My hope is that this thesis has demonstrated that none of these potential generalizations 
is intrinsically more valid than the others. Although this investigation has revealed just a 
small, incomplete set of ontological relations within the field of possibility of the screen, the 
methodological approach has made clear that these relations form part of a structure. Exploring, 
understanding, and manipulating the relational structure of the screen will always show 
commonalities to some sets of relations and differences to others.
Design, the screen, and this thesis
The findings that have arisen from this exploration of screen ontology act as a topology of screen 
understandings. They provide insight into what screens have in common, but also into how they 
arise differently in their contexts. This territory of ‘screenness’ locates the individual encounter 
amongst generalised understandings. 
My own bias lies in design, and this is the discipline where I hope this research can contribute 
most. Design is understood in the context of this thesis as a methodology, a system of thinking 
and doing that pays particular attention to the role of materiality in meaning. Its varied sub-
disciplines are defined by applying this methodology to different subject matter – to architecture, 
interiors, objects and interfaces.
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Yet this thesis is not strictly about design. Instead, it uses design as a practice to connect 
theory from the borders of the discipline to material expression in a way that produces new 
understanding. Design has not been the object of this thesis, but it has been used in this research 
as a method of connecting ideas to material in a number of ways: in the making of data to provoke 
analysis, in the interpretation and representation of that data, and in the establishment of the 
argument.7 
The findings that arise within this thesis arise from these design methodologies. These are 
located amongst other forms of situated knowledge, as a method of theoretical interrogation 
that produces certain kinds of outcomes. Design is embedded in this thesis as part of a process 
of understanding: as a mode of critical thought that focuses on links between material and 
conception. The things that are produced using design methodologies in this thesis – the bots, the 
animations and videos, the creative writing and even the thesis itself as a curated presentation 
of this process – are not the separated products of the thesis, rather they are part of its workings. 
Design disrupts written analysis at the same time as it works alongside it. It produces different 
understandings, acting as a counterpoint to written analysis, another way of looking that is 
outside of analytical literature. 
But what can be taken from a design thesis that talks so little about design itself? … by looking 
in to these structures strengthens these restrictions rather than loosening them. This thesis 
acts as a performance of a methodology that interrogates things using design methods alongside 
analytical methods. It demonstrates a mode of design and analysis that is not deterministic.
Although there is a continuing (and, perhaps, increasing) undercurrent of alternative design 
processes, formal and functional concerns remain the dominant paradigms within design 
practice. Much of conventional design is determinate. The affordance framework, for instance, 
determines use from form. Many design products, especially technological products, are produced 
in determinate ways – they connect human needs and desires to aspects of form and operation 
to make products that are more useful, more beautiful, more for humans. Johan Redström’s 
discussion of technological design epitomises this approach. Redström argues that “as we turn 
to these things, we do not only have to re-locate the functions of technical objects within a 
rich context of use; to understand the presence of technical objects, we also need to consider 
the materials that build them.” His examination of technological design asks designers to 
develop frameworks of use by “probing into possible use scenarios and user expectations” when 
designing new technologies.8 In some ways, this thesis supports such an approach. It provides 
understandings that link the structures of human perception and material to the ways that 
screens are perceived and used. However, its ethos argues the opposite: rather than developing 
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traditions and expectations as to how products behave, we could attempt to dismantle them.9 
Such a move would emphasise uncertainty, reinvigorating the products of design with their own 
vitality. In this regard, this thesis has also explored the role of design in the indeterminate, 
posing problems such as non-designing things and designing non-things. 
Connecting design to the excess of determination is not, in itself, new.10 Many of the projects 
discussed in chapter two – Niklas Roy’s My LittlePiece of Privacy and Random International’s 
Audience, for example – use design in a way that prolongs the process of determination and 
accentuates what comes before or during this process. Architectural theorists such as Cache 
and Massumi have discussed design techniques and methodologies that accentuate the 
indeterminate. This thesis also supports finding excesses of the screen’s determination in that it 
highlights regions where human perception and screen’s material directedness are mismatched.
This thesis, then, allows for an awareness of how the determinate and indeterminate aspects of 
experience sit side-by-side.11 Moreover, it demonstrates how this awareness can be fostered in a 
way that can be transferred across disciplines. It demonstrates a series of techniques for shifting 
the determinate to the indeterminate, isolating critical points of transition between the two 
frameworks. These techniques will become increasingly important as the challenges of working 
across disciplines and without definitive frameworks of knowledge deepen.
In terms of design, it suggests a series of interventions – a design process based on mapping 
perception, a series of issues that present themselves in the design of screens, and understandings 
that can be critically applied to designing with screens and for screens.
Topological design
In the sense that the ontology of the screen is found across each of the ways of understanding 
it, the conclusion of this thesis, the ‘answer’ to the ontology of the screen, is a depiction of the 
7. These connections were made in the making of the Behaviour Boxes, Gaze Returner, Moubie and the Some Assembly bots; in the 
presentattion of animation and video as layers of interpretation on top of the material; and in the design of the thesis itself as a 
document; respectively.
8. Johan Redström, “On Technology as Material in Design” Design Philosophy Papers 3, no.2 (2005): 39; 44.
9. Hélène Frichot draws on Deleuze and Guatarri’s repeated warnings against cliché to demonstrate the dangers of design as a process 
of fixing use and behaviour. Hélène Frichot, “Drawing, Thinking, Doing: From diagram work to the superfold” Access: Critical 
Perspectives on Communication, Cultural & Policy Studies 30, no.1 (2011): 1-10.
10. Jonathan Hughes’s essay “The Indeterminate Building,” for example, traces the legacy of indetermination in mid-century 
architecture. Jonathon Hughes, “The Indeterminate Building” in Non-Plan: essays on freedom, participation and change in modern 
architecture and urbanism, ed. Jonathon Hughes and Simon Sadler (Oxford: Architectural Press, 2000).
11. Gretchen Wilkins and Andrew Burrow refer to this type of completed incompletion as a “final draft” in their article of the same 
name; and it is a quality they find missing within the strict regulatory and financial restrictions of architectural design. Gretchen 
Wilkins and Andrew Burrow, “Final Draft: Designing Architecture’s Endgame” Architectural Design 83, no.1 (Jan/Feb. 2013): 98-105.
330
screen’s field of possibility. The maps, as abstract spatial representation of the what was found 
about the screen, is a depiction of the screen as it has been revealed in this thesis. 
Chapter one developed a region of the map that showed high order, as the relata-based system 
is implicitly a system of ordering. Chapter two developed a region of the map that showed low 
levels of order as generative relations, “always in flux,” resist the order of relata. But chapter 
two also gave hints as to the connections between relata, rather than their differences. Chapter 
three developed the structural space of the map. It overtly discussed the positioning of chapters 
one and two and, from this, developed the axial parameters of order, speed, and density. These 
parameters could then be applied to the findings of chapters one and two to ‘locate’ them in the 
map’s abstract space.
The maps act as a summary of understandings drawn from the analyses of the thesis. But more 
than this, they locate these understandings within their own assumptions and restrictions, and 
in regards to one another. They thereby provide a context for claims made about what the screen 
is and what it does, connecting these back to the way it surfaces in perception as something 
experienced and something conceived.
The screen was chosen as the focal point of this research because of the difficulty it poses 
for established modes of analytical understanding. The screen highlights the complexity of 
understanding and, in so doing, draws attention to the way that modes of thought connect 
to what is understood. The methodology proposed in this thesis may thereby be of interest in 
the disciplines of media and screen studies, as it draws attention to how these fields situate 
their understandings, and the ways in which that understanding is built and assessed. But 
the maps created here for the screen could be created for almost any type of object by testing 
what is determinately known against what cannot be known, and mapping these two domains 
on to one another.12 The methods and structure developed within this project could thereby be 
applied in a variety of design (and non-design) disciplines to create new material forms and new 
understandings of existing forms. The things that surface from such a process would be a little 
different to the determined products of functional design13 – they might acknowledge the human 
more, or less, or they may not be concrete things at all.
Designing screens
Given the discussions that have arisen in this thesis, is it appropriate to design the screen 
away, to allow the screen’s negation to happen more efficiently? Is it even possible to do such a 
thing, to design a non-thing? It is clear from the discussions here that the screen never really 
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disappears. Rather, it crosses a critical threshold and turns into something else – a different 
relata, a different thing.
Industrial and spatial designers may find the outcomes of this thesis, including the map, useful 
when critically engaging in the design of screen forms. In this sense, the axial parameters of 
order, speed and density could stand as design principles for the screen: tendencies and capacities 
that are embodied by the screen’s material. Perceptual transitions between screen and pixel, 
activity and passivity, lattice and television could be explored to challenge existing paradigms 
of use. Alternatively, these transitions could be acknowledged and avoided, allowing a territory 
to be defined that safely allows the connection of design intent to design outcome.
Designing with screens and for screens
The disciplines of design, particularly those of architecture and interiors, show an increasing 
trend toward software- and digital-based design processes and outcomes. Digital design 
processes are, necessarily for now, accessed through screens. Processes such as 3D printing 
create new forms of materiality, but they also rely on modelling this materiality on screen in 
order to produce it.  Software-based design platforms also open opportunities for designing 
the materiality of the immaterial object. Unbuilt work has a long tradition in architectural 
design. The design process often ends with the production of drawings rather than things – the 
presentation of concepts as objects is an end in itself. This paradigm is especially pronounced 
when taking into account design for digital environments, such as user experience design, game 
design. The design of objects within games and animations, for instance, relies on translating 
the materiality of actualised objects through the materiality of screens.
This thesis has shown that scale, perceptual access, and accuracy work differently through the 
speeds and orders of the screen than through the speeds and orders of the material object. When 
using digital design strategies, a stronger awareness of how the materiality of the screen and 
conceptual object interact can improve the material result of the design product. Viewing this 
relation ontologically allows a designer to develop this understanding.
12. This technique could become a particular affectation of what Anne-Marie Willis describes as an “ontological design” – a design 
process based on understanding how things arise through worlding and thinging. Anne-Marie Willis “Ontological Designing” Design 
Philosophy Papers 4, no.2  (2006): 69-92.
13. The way things are thought affect their material incarnation. Massumi writes: “the first rule of thumb if you want to invent or 
reinvent concepts is simple: don’t apply them. If you apply a concept or system of connection between concepts, it is the material 
you apply it to that undergoes change, more markedly than do the concepts. The change is imposed upon the material by the 
concept’s systematicity and constitutes a becoming homologous of the material to the system” Brian Massumi, Parables of the 
Virtual: Movement, affect, sensation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 17.
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Concluding remarks
In the sense that it set out to account for the screen’s material in its ontology, this research 
has not been definitive. There are times where this materiality is overtly discussed within the 
chapters, but on the whole what has been produced here is a collection of words, things and 
drawings; a conceptualisation of the screen rather than a material incarnation. There is good 
reason for this, as this thesis discovered: the moment that we step away from experiencing to 
reflect on experience, the thing in its materiality is lost. Any sort of generalised understanding 
that can be gained from reflecting on experience suffers from the imposition of the structure 
of that reflection – an imposition that creates a new entity, a thing that emerges between the 
structure of reflection, the structure of experience, and the structure of the material. 
Although I have, through this thesis, made some assertions about the screen itself and what its 
materiality means, what has been found out is not a definition of the screen, but a definition of 
how the screen is understood – a perceptual ontology of the screen. The difference between a 
definition of the screen and a definition of how the screen is understood is in the way analysis 
is situated. Definitions of the screen are non-contextual. They remove the analysis from the 
resultant thing, isolating it from the material and conceptual structures that produced it: 
the screen bears properties. Or, if analysis tends toward the relation, the definition is simply 
contingent: it recognises a social or spatial situation and the way that the screen arises in this 
situation. But there is something missing in both of these approaches: definitions of the screen 
are not contextual because they do not recognise the role of the definition itself within what is 
found. How the screen is perceived is bracketed out: the definition is of the screen (as perceived). 
No matter at what scale or level of abstraction I attempt to understand the screen, it is never 
understood independently of the structures of human perception. A definition of the screen can 
never be free from the material directedness of human perception, including the structures of 
thought and embodiment. The screen is a hybrid: a me-screen, or a me-here-now-screen.
If the structure of reflection is what causes this problem, it is somewhat strange that this thesis 
finds the answer to such imposition in further reflection. The map that concludes chapter three 
is a meta-reflection; a citing of all the contradictory understandings of the screen back within the 
structure of the analysis. But the act of turning back into the generalisation – acknowledging 
the structures of thought and material directedness and their impact on the perceived thing; the 
assumptions and their impacts on conclusions – allows the hybrid to be recognised for what it is. 
If enough of these hybrids are superimposed, patterns begin to emerge – regions of persistence 
and thresholds of change. It is within this structure of sameness and difference that the material 
directedness of the screen can be found.
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Despite not accounting for the material of the screen per se, this ontology does account for the 
role of materiality within screen perception and in conceptualising the screen. It has done 
this both literally (by creating material things and placing them within the analysis) and 
analogistically (by discussing conceptions of materiality and where it fits into the process of 
perception). It describes the screen in a way that is aware of its own restrictions and provides 
a graphical depiction of the range of screenic possibilities it found and their relations to each 




Videos can be viewed via the following link: 
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1tzI63PZaM1gq7fBaGlKTdeROnBd_sLwX?usp=sharing
1.  Behaviour Box Introduction.    [Video, 00:17]. 42
2.  Opposition and Slippage 1.     46
3.  Opposition and Slippage 2.     52
4.  Opposition and Slippage 3.     58
5.  Pitchmatcher.      60
6.  Mover.       76
7.  Matrix of Screenic Affordances.      82
8.  Cross-coding 1.      84
9.  Colourmapper.      94
10. A Spatial Filter.     [Video,  00:44]. 98
11.  Touchbuzzer.      102
12.  Filter and Suture.      104
13.  Cross-coding 2.      106
14.  Suture and Site.      110
15.  Cinema.       112
16.  Gaze Returner.      130
17.  Moubie.       130
18.  Returning Your Gaze.     [Video, 00:17]. 131
19.  Hijacked Perception.     [Video, 01:00]. 131
20.  A Stretched Plane.      144
21.  Restrictive Behaviours.     149
22.  Self Dimensioning.      149
23.  Difference and Order 1.     150
23.  Difference and Order 2.     155
24.  Material Differences.      158
25.  Split Embodiment.      162
26.  Thing-driven Aesthetic.    [Video, 00:16]. 168
27.  A Different Perspective.     178
28.  Scales of Action.      180
29.  Negotiations.     [Video, 00:10]. 186
30.  Perceptual Thresholds.     192
31.  Reflected.       196
32.  Shouting.        205
33.  Spatial Translation.      205
34.  Intent and Directedness.      214
35.  Screen?       222
36.  Some Assembly (Short).    [Video, 03:51]. 229
37.  Perception and Determination.    [Video, 00:35]. 232
38.  Twisting a Field.      234
39.  Telephonic deconstruction: Layers of the screen.   239
40.  Communication.      241
41.  Distributed Pixels.      253
42.  Screen to Pixels.      254
43.  Hero Shot.       255
44.  The Problem of Cuteness.    [Video, 02:41]. 260
45.  Regional Specificity.      263
46.  Lagging Behind.     [Video, 00:18]. 286
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Incorporates elements of open source sketch fft_adc_serial.ino by Erich Grunewald, Feb 22, 2016. https://github.com/
erwald/lights/blob/master/arduino/lib/ArduinoFFT2/src/examples/fft_adc_serial/fft_adc_serial.pde.
*/
#define LIN_OUT 1   // use the log output function
#define FFT_N 256   // set to 256 point fft
#include <FFT.h>   // include the FFT library
int n;    
int average;
int pl = 50;
void setup() {
 Serial.begin(9600);  // use the serial port
   TIMSK0 = 0;   // turn off timer0 for lower jitter
   ADCSRA = 0xe5;  // set the adc to free running mode
   ADMUX = 0x40;  // use adc0
   DIDR0 = 0x01;  // turn off the digital input for adc0
}
3/12/2017 7:12 PM  C:\Users\Max\Documents\eagle\PITCHMATCHER\PITCHMATCH.SCH (Sheet: 1/1)
100R 1W
8 Ohm 1W

























































  cli();      
     for (int i = 0 ; i < 512 ; i += 2) {  // save 256 samples
        while(!(ADCSRA & 0x10));  // wait for adc to be ready
        ADCSRA = 0xf5;   // restart adc
       byte m = ADCL;   // fetch adc data
        byte j = ADCH;
        int k = (j << 8) — m;   // form into an int
        k -= 0x0200;    // form into a signed int
        k <<= 6;    // form into a 16b signed int
        fft_input[i] = k;   // put real data into even bins
        fft_input[i+1] = 0;   // set odd bins to 0
      }
 fft_window();   // window the data for better frequency response
 fft_reorder();   // reorder the data before doing the fft
  fft_run();  // process the data in the fft
  fft_mag_lin();   // take the output of the fft
   sei();
    for (byte i = 0 ; i < 10; i++) { 
  // find the average size of the FFT buckets      
  average = (fft_lin_out[2] + fft_lin_out[3] + fft_lin_out[4] + fft_lin_out[5] +     
fft_lin_out[6] + fft_lin_out[7] + fft_lin_out[8])/7;
   
  //test each bucket against the average and threshold, play relevant tone.
  if (fft_lin_out[2] > average && fft_lin_out[2] >= 300)  { tone (3,75,pl); }
     if (fft_lin_out[3] > average && fft_lin_out[3] >= 140)  { tone (3,112,pl); }
     if (fft_lin_out[4] > average && fft_lin_out[4] >= 100)  { tone (3,150,pl); }
     if (fft_lin_out[5] > average && fft_lin_out[5] >=90)     { tone (3,187,pl); }
     if (fft_lin_out[6] > average && fft_lin_out[6] >= 90)    { tone (3,225,pl); }
    if (fft_lin_out[7] > average && fft_lin_out[7] >= 70)    { tone (3,262,pl); }
     if (fft_lin_out[8] > average && fft_lin_out[8] >= 70)    { tone (3,300,pl); }
     delay(200);
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#include <Servo.h> // include servo library
Servo myservo1;   // create servo objects
Servo myservo2;
long n;   // variable for lies
int pos = 0;      // variable for servo position
int LEDf = 5;  // variable for LED indicating backwards
int LEDb = 6;  // variable for LED indicating forwards
int brightness = 0;     // LED brightness
 
void setup() {
   randomSeed(analogRead(0)); 
 myservo1.attach(9); 




 n = random(1,5);

















void flashBack() {   // turn up brightness of backward LED until full      
 for (brightness = 0; brightness < 255; brightness += 5) {
          analogWrite(LEDb, brightness);
          delay(50);
       }
}
void flashFwd() {   // turn up brightness of backward LED until full 
 for (brightness = 0; brightness < 255; brightness += 5) {
          analogWrite(LEDf, brightness);
          delay(50);
       }
}
   
void goBack() {    // move servos to go backwards
 myservo1.write(100); 
     myservo2.write(80);
     delay(1000); 
 myservo1.write(90); 
     myservo2.write(90);                      
354
 analogWrite(LEDb, 0);   // turn off backward LED
 analogWrite(LEDf, 0);  // turn off forward LED
}
       
void goFwd() {     // move servos to go forwards
   myservo1.write(80); 
     myservo2.write(100);
     delay(1000); 
 myservo1.write(90); 
     myservo2.write(90);                   
  analogWrite(LEDb, 0);  // turn off backward LED






Incorporates elements of graphicstest.ino for the Adafruit 1.8” SPI display, by Limor Fried/Ladyada for Adafruit 
Industries, June 23, 2017. https://github.com/adafruit/Adafruit-ST7735-Library. Made available under MIT license.
*/
#include <Adafruit_GFX.h>       
#include <Adafruit_ST7735.h>    
#include <SPI.h>
Adafruit_ST7735 tft = Adafruit_ST7735(10, 8, 3); //TFT_CS,  TFT_DC, TFT_RST
unsigned int sensor;
unsigned int colourout;
const int screenlite = 2; 






















































































 tft.initR(INITR_BLACKTAB);     // initialize ST7735S chip
 pinMode (screenlite, OUTPUT);
}
void loop() {
 sensor = analogRead(A1);
 delay(100);
 
 // map the distance sensor to a colour range and push to LCD
 if (sensor >=70 && sensor <=480) {  
    unsigned int colour = map(sensor, 70, 480, 0, 31); 
    if  (colour <=15) {
     colourout = (colour*4096);
    }
    else {
     colourout = (((colour-16)*256)+61440);  
    }
  digitalWrite(screenlite, HIGH);
    tft.fillScreen(colourout);
    delay(50);
   }
 
 else {
      tft.fillScreen(0x0000);
      digitalWrite(screenlite, LOW);








































































int buzzPin = 9;
int n;
void setup() {




 touch = analogRead(A1);   //read touch sensor
 
 if (touch <= 50) {
    digitalWrite (buzzPin, HIGH); //if above threshold, turn on buzz motor
    n = random(10);
    delay(n*200);     //delay for a random period of time
    digitalWrite (buzzPin, LOW);  //turn off buzz motor





APPENDIX E: GAZE RETURNER
TECHNICAL DETAILS
/*
Incorporates elements of the following open source sketches: 
1. spitftbitmap.ino for the Adafruit 1.8” SPI display, by Limor Fried/Ladyada for Adafruit Industries, June 23, 2017. 
https://github.com/adafruit/Adafruit-ST7735-Library. Made available under MIT license.
2. arducam_lcd1_0.ino, by oric_dan, February 7, 2016. https://forum.arduino.cc/index.php?topic=377651.0. http://
forum.arduino.cc/index.php?topic=376790.0.
3. timelapse_1.ino, by Ben Sauerwine. July 25, 2013. https://sauerwine.blogspot.com.au/2013/07/an-arduino-time-
lapse-camera-using.html. Based on open source demo made for the Omnivision OV2640 sensor, available at arducam.
com.
4. ArduCAM_GPIO_TRIG.ino by Lee Jackson, December 15, 2012. http://www.arducam.com/how-arducam-use-a-
external-trigger-from-a-sensor/
*/















































































































#define DISP_ROTATE  3     //values 1-4, rotates image 90 degrees on screen
#define TFT_CS  10       //Chip select line for TFT display
#define T FT_RST  3       //Reset line for TFT
#define TFT_DC   8       //Data/command line for TFT
const int CAM_CS = 4;          //camera call pin
const int screenlite = A2;  //pin for turning screen backlight on and off






// instantiate LCD and ArduCAM.
Adafruit_ST7735 tft = Adafruit_ST7735(TFT_CS, TFT_DC, TFT_RST);
ArduCAM myCAM1(OV2640, CAM_CS);
// load and unload over SPI bus
#define cam_assert()   digitalWrite(CAM_CS,LOW)
#define cam_desert()   digitalWrite(CAM_CS,HIGH)
#define lcd_assert()   digitalWrite(TFT_CS,LOW)
#define lcd_desert()   digitalWrite(TFT_CS,HIGH)
void setup() {
   uint8_t vid, pid, temp;
   Wire.begin();
   SPI.begin();
   pinMode(CAM_CS, OUTPUT);
   pinMode (screenlite, OUTPUT);
   digitalWrite (screenlite, LOW);
   // Initialise screen
   tft.initR(INITR_BLACKTAB);
   tft.setRotation(DISP_ROTATE);  //set rotation for images.
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   //test the SPI bus is working
   myCAM1.write_reg(ARDUCHIP_TEST1, 0x55);
   temp = myCAM1.read_reg(ARDUCHIP_TEST1);
   if (temp != 0x55) {
          while (1);
   }
   // change MCU mode
   myCAM1.write_reg(ARDUCHIP_MODE, 0x00);
   myCAM1.InitCAM();
}
void loop() {
 //read sensor and convert to distance
 float IRval = analogRead(A1)*0.0048828125;
 distance = (pow(IRval, -1.1))*63;
 if (distance >=50 && distance <=135) {
    invertdistance = 135-distance;   //map distance to colour
    colour = invertdistance/5.67;
    colourout =round(colour);
    colourval = colourout * 4096;   //convert colour value to redscale
    digitalWrite(screenlite, HIGH);  //turn on screen
    tft.fillScreen(colourval);   //push colour to screen
    delay(500);
   }
 else if (distance <50 && distance >=23) {
    startCapture();    //take picture to buffer
      tft.fillScreen(0);    //push black to screen
      digitalWrite (screenlite, HIGH);
      capture2Lcd();    //push buffer to screen
      delay(7500);
      digitalWrite (screenlite, LOW);  //turn off screen
   }
  else  {
      delay(50);
   }
 }
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void capture2Lcd() {   //converts image and pushes to screen
 unsigned char VH, VL;  //define high and low bytes, must be unsigned.
   uint8_t temp;
   int row, col;
   int xo = 0, yo = 4;     //start position of displayed image.
   uint16_t color;
   unsigned long prevtm;
   prevtm = millis();
   int w = 160, h = 128;  // set TFT address window bounds to entire screen.
   tft.setAddrWindow(xo, yo, xo + w - 1, yo + h - 1);
   // read 320x240x2 bytes from FIFO, draw every other row, and every other pixel
   for ( row = 0; row < 240; row++) {   // for every row
        for ( col = 0; col < (320 / 2); col++) {  // for every other column
         cam_assert();
         VH = myCAM1.read_fifo();    //get every other pixel
         VL = myCAM1.read_fifo();
         temp = myCAM1.read_fifo();   //discard next pixel.
         temp = myCAM1.read_fifo();
         cam_desert();
         if ( (row % 2) == 0) {    //draw only every other row.
            lcd_assert();
            color = (VH << 8) — VL;   //compute RGB565 color.
            tft.pushColor(color);
            lcd_desert();
         }
      }
   }
}
void startCapture( ) {      //takes image as BMP  
   myCAM1.write_reg(ARDUCHIP_MODE, 0x00);
   myCAM1.set_format(BMP);
   myCAM1.InitCAM();
   myCAM1.flush_fifo();             //clear ArduCAM buffer.
   myCAM1.clear_fifo_flag();        //start capture.
   myCAM1.start_capture();
   while ( !(myCAM1.read_reg(ARDUCHIP_TRIG) & CAP_DONE_MASK) ) {
      delay(10);
   }       //wait for buffer
   myCAM1.clear_fifo_flag();






Incorporates elements of the following open source sketches: 
1. spitftbitmap.ino for the Adafruit 1.8” SPI display, by Limor Fried/Ladyada for Adafruit Industries, June 23, 2017. 
https://github.com/adafruit/Adafruit-ST7735-Library. Made available under MIT license.
2. arducam_lcd1_0.ino, by oric_dan, February 7, 2016. https://forum.arduino.cc/index.php?topic=377651.0. http://
forum.arduino.cc/index.php?topic=376790.0.
3. timelapse_1.ino, by Ben Sauerwine. July 25, 2013. https://sauerwine.blogspot.com.au/2013/07/an-arduino-time-
lapse-camera-using.html. Based on open source demo made for the Omnivision OV2640 sensor, available at arducam.
com.
4. ArduCAM_GPIO_TRIG.ino by Lee Jackson, December 15, 2012. http://www.arducam.com/how-arducam-use-a-
external-trigger-from-a-sensor/
*/
















































































































#include <Adafruit_GFX.h>     








#define DISP_ROTATE  3      
#define TFT_CS  10        
#define TFT_RST  3        
#define TFT_DC   8        
Servo walk;
int pos = 0;
const int CAM_CS = 4;         
const int screenlite = A3; 
int LEDf = 5;
int LEDb = 6;
long fbn;
int brightness = 0;    
// instantiate LCD and ArduCAM.
Adafruit_ST7735 tft = Adafruit_ST7735(TFT_CS, TFT_DC, TFT_RST);
ArduCAM myCAM1(OV2640, CAM_CS);
// load and unload over SPI bus
#define cam_assert()   digitalWrite(CAM_CS,LOW)
#define cam_desert()   digitalWrite(CAM_CS,HIGH)
#define lcd_assert()   digitalWrite(TFT_CS,LOW)
#define lcd_desert()   digitalWrite(TFT_CS,HIGH)
void setup() {
   uint8_t vid, pid, temp;
   Serial.begin(115200);
   Wire.begin();
   SPI.begin();
   pinMode(CAM_CS, OUTPUT);
   pinMode (screenlite, OUTPUT);
   digitalWrite (screenlite, LOW);
   pinMode(LEDf, OUTPUT);
   pinMode(LEDb, OUTPUT);
364
   walk.attach(9);   //attach servo and turn off
   walk.write(90);              
   // Initialise screen
   tft.initR(INITR_BLACKTAB);
   tft.setRotation(DISP_ROTATE);   //set rotation for images.
   tft.fillScreen(0);    //push black to screen
  
   //test the SPI bus is working
   myCAM1.write_reg(ARDUCHIP_TEST1, 0x55);
   temp = myCAM1.read_reg(ARDUCHIP_TEST1);
   if (temp != 0x55) {
     while (1);
   }
   myCAM1.write_reg(ARDUCHIP_MODE, 0x00);
   myCAM1.InitCAM();
}
void loop() {
   fbn = random(2);
   if (fbn == 1) {
      int x = 1;
      for (x = 1; x < 4; x++) {
         for (brightness = 0; brightness < 255; brightness += 5) {
            analogWrite(LEDb, brightness);
            delay(30);
         }
     }
      analogWrite(LEDb, 0);
      walk.write(100);              
      delay(3000);
      walk.write(90);
   } 
   else {
      int x = 1;
      for (x = 1; x < 4; x++) {
         for (brightness = 0; brightness < 255; brightness += 5) {
            analogWrite(LEDf, brightness);
            delay(30);
         }
      }
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      analogWrite(LEDf, 0);
      walk.write(75);              
      delay(3000);
      walk.write(90);
   }
   startCapture();    //take picture to buffer
   digitalWrite (screenlite, HIGH);
   capture2Lcd();    //push buffer to screen
   delay(500);
}
void capture2Lcd() {
   unsigned char VH, VL;   
 uint8_t temp;
   int row, col;
   int xo = 0, yo = 4;   
   uint16_t color;
  
 // set TFT address window bounds to entire screen.
   int w = 160, h = 128;
   tft.setAddrWindow(xo, yo, xo + w - 1, yo + h - 1);
     // read 320x240x2 bytes from FIFO, draw every other row, and every other pixel
 for ( row = 0; row < 240; row++) {
      for ( col = 0; col < (320 / 2); col++) {
         cam_assert();
         VH = myCAM1.read_fifo();    //get every other col pixel.
         VL = myCAM1.read_fifo();
         temp = myCAM1.read_fifo();   //toss next pixel.
         temp = myCAM1.read_fifo();
         cam_desert();
   if ( (row % 2) == 0) {    //draw only every other row.
            lcd_assert();
            color = (VH << 8) — VL;   //compute RGB565 color.
            tft.pushColor(color);
            lcd_desert();
         }
      }




   myCAM1.write_reg(ARDUCHIP_MODE, 0x00);
   myCAM1.set_format(BMP);
   myCAM1.InitCAM();
   myCAM1.flush_fifo();             //clear ArduCAM buffer.
   myCAM1.clear_fifo_flag();        //start capture.
   myCAM1.start_capture();
   while ( !(myCAM1.read_reg(ARDUCHIP_TRIG) & CAP_DONE_MASK) ) {
      delay(10);





APPENDIX G: SOME ASSEMBLY
TECHNICAL DETAILS





































































































































Incorporates elements of the following open source sketches: 
1. tcs34725.ino for the Adafruit TCS34725 library, by Kevin Townsend for Adafruit Industries, December 4, 2015. 
https://github.com/adafruit/Adafruit_TCS34725. Made available under BSD license.
2. simple.ino for the Adafruit NeoPixel library, by Shae Erisson, 2013. https://github.com/adafruit/Adafruit_NeoPixel. 
Made available under the LGPL-3.0 license.
3.ETVirtualWireDemoRX.ino and ETVirtualWireDemoTX.ino for the Easy Transfer library, by BillPorter, January 
2016. http://www.billporter.info/easytransfer-arduino-library/. Made available under CC BY-SA 3.0 license.




int n = 0;
int m = 0;
int t = 0;
int c, p, r;
int ID = 1;    // ID that determines triggerbot <= pop.




EasyTransferVirtualWire ET; //create object
struct SEND_DATA_STRUCTURE   //create data variables
{
   byte trigger;      
};
SEND_DATA_STRUCTURE mydata;  //name data package
//servos








#define echoPin 9 // Echo Pin




Adafruit_TCS34725 tcs = Adafruit_TCS34725(TCS34725_INTEGRATIONTIME_700MS, TCS34725_GAIN_4X);
int sLED = 2;






#define PIN  3
#define NUMPIXELS      3  
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Adafruit_NeoPixel pixels = Adafruit_NeoPixel(NUMPIXELS, PIN, NEO_GRB + NEO_KHZ800);
int delayval = 5000;
//evasion
long duration;  //duration used to calculate distance
long distance;   
int dt = 10;   //threshold for evasion
int pos, i;
int posmid = 1500;     //variables to store the eye servo position
int posmin = 1200;
int posmax = 1800;
int rmid = 1500; //mid position for right wheel
int lmid = 1500;   //mid position for right wheel
int lmax, lmin, rmax, rmin;
int flagL = 0;
int flagR = 0;
void setup() {
 //servos
 rmax = (rmid + 200);   //calculate max and min positions from mid
 rmin = (rmid - 200);
 lmax = (lmid + 200);
 lmin = (lmid - 200);
 walkL.attach(walkLpin);  //attach servos and turn off





   // US
 pinMode(trigPin, OUTPUT); 
 pinMode(echoPin, INPUT);
   // RF coms
 ET.begin(details(mydata));    //initiate and pass in the data details
 vw_set_ptt_inverted(true);     // Initialise the IO and ISR
 vw_set_tx_pin(7);
 vw_set_rx_pin(8);
 vw_setup(2000);     //Set bit rate
 mydata.trigger = 0;
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   //colour sensor
   pinMode (sLED, OUTPUT);
   digitalWrite(sLED, LOW);
   tcs.begin();
   //neopixels
   pixels.begin(); // initializes the NeoPixel library.
   for (i = 0; i < NUMPIXELS; i++) {
      pixels.setPixelColor(i, pixels.Color(0, 0, 0)); // Moderately bright green color.
      pixels.show(); // This sends the updated pixel color to the hardwar
   }
   delay(20000);
}
void loop() {
   if (n < 60) {          //case 1
    coloursense();
      if (c >= 1000) {
         colourdisplay();
         delay(delayval);
         gd = 0; rd = 0; bd = 0;
         colourdisplay();
      }
      delay(100);
   }
  if (n >= 60 && n < 120) {       //case 2
        coloursense();
      if (c >= 1000) {
       colourdisplay();
         delay(delayval);
         gd = 0; rd = 0; bd = 0;
         colourdisplay();
      }
      fakeScan();
   }
   if (n >= 120 && n < 180) {        //case 3
    coloursense();
      if (c >= 1000) {
       colourdisplay();
         delay(delayval);
         gd = 0; rd = 0; bd = 0;
         colourdisplay();
      }
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      fakeScan();
      goBack();
   }
   if (n >= 180) {    //case 4
    if (ID == 1) {
         Trigger();
      }
      else {
         Listen();
     }
      ID++;
      if (ID > pop) {
         ID = 1;
      }
   }
   delay (100);
   n++;
}
void evade() {    //if distance is under the threshold distance, test    
     until you find an exit condition
  flagL = 0;   
   flagR = 0;
   scanL();
   if (flagL == 0) {
        lookForward();
      scanR();
      if (flagR == 0) {
       lookForward();
         goBack();
         Listen();
      }
   }
   if (flagL == 1) {  //follow the test flags to avoid
       avoidL();
   }
   else if (flagR == 1) {
        avoidR();
   }
}
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void goForward() {   //moves the servos to go forward
 walkL.write(lmin);
   walkR.write(rmax);
   delay(50);
   walkL.write(lmid);
   walkR.write(rmid);
   delay(10);
}
void testDistance() {   //tests distance to obstacles using US sensor
 digitalWrite(trigPin, LOW);
   delayMicroseconds(2);
   digitalWrite(trigPin, HIGH);
   delayMicroseconds(10);
   digitalWrite(trigPin, LOW);
   duration = pulseIn(echoPin, HIGH);
   distance = duration / 58.2;
   Serial.println(distance);
}
void lookForward() {   //resets US sensor to forward position
   if (pos > posmid) {
      for (pos = posmax; pos > (posmid + 5); pos -= 5) {
         eyes.write(pos);
         delay(5);
      }
   }
   else if (pos < posmid) {
    for (pos = posmin; pos < (posmid - 5); pos += 5) {
       eyes.write(pos);
         delay(5);
      }
   }
}
void fakeScan() {   //emulates scanning with no test distance
   for (pos = posmid; pos < posmax; pos += 5) {
   eyes.write(pos);
      delay(5);
   }
   lookForward();
   for (pos = posmid; pos > posmin; pos -= 5){
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      eyes.write(pos);
      delay(5);
   }
   lookForward();
}
void scanL() {      //scan to the left
 for (pos = posmid; pos < posmax; pos += 5) {
    eyes.write(pos);
      delay(5);
      testDistance();
      if (distance > dt) {
       lookForward();
         flagL = 1;
         break;
      }
   }
}
void scanR() {      //scan to the right
 for (pos = posmid; pos > posmin; pos -= 5) {
    eyes.write(pos);
      delay(5);
      testDistance();
      if (distance > dt) {
       lookForward();
         flagR = 1;
         break;
      }
   }
}
void goBack() {      //moves the servos to go backward
 walkL.write(lmax);
   walkR.write(rmin);
   delay(200); //400, 200, 100
   walkL.write(lmid);
   walkR.write(rmid);
}
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void avoidR() {     //rotates right whilst under distance threshold
 testDistance();
   while (distance <= dt) {
    walkR.write(rmax);                  
  delay(20);
      walkR.write(rmid);
      testDistance();
   }
   flagR = 0;
}
void avoidL() {     //rotates left whilst under distance threshold
 testDistance();
   while (distance <= dt) {
    walkL.write(lmin);              
      delay(20);
      walkL.write(lmid);
      testDistance();
   }
   flagL = 0;
}
void Listen() {    //receives timing of triggered colour display
 vw_rx_start();          // Start the receiver PLL running
   delay(500);     
   if (ET.receiveData()) {   //check and see if a data packet has come in.
        while (mydata.trigger == 1) {  //if display is trigggered
      (ET.receiveData());
      }
      vw_rx_stop();    //stop listening
      delay(20);
      coloursense();   
      colourdisplay();
   }
   delay(delayval);
   gd = 0; rd = 0; bd = 0;
   colourdisplay();
   vw_rx_stop();
}
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void Trigger() {    //trigger sequence for display timing
   mydata.trigger = 0;
   coloursense();
   if (c >= 1000) {    //if colour is not black
      mydata.trigger = 1;
      for (r = 0; r < 50; r++) { //broadcast trigger on
       ET.sendData();
         delay(5);
      }
      delay(100);
      mydata.trigger = 0; //broadcast trigger off
      for (r = 0; r < 5; r++) {
   ET.sendData();
       delay(5);
      }
      coloursense();   //sense and display colour
      colourdisplay();
      delay(delayval);
      gd = 0; rd = 0; bd = 0;
      colourdisplay();
      t = 0;
   }
}
void coloursense() {    //analyse colour below using colour sensor
   uint16_t clear, red, green, blue;
   tcs.getRawData(&red, &green, &blue, &clear); 
   float r, g, b;
   c = clear;
   uint32_t sum = red + green + blue; //calculate values of each colour channel
   r = red; r /= sum;
   g = green; g /= sum;
   b = blue; b /= sum;
   rd = r * 400;    //convert to integers to feed neopixels
   gd = g * 400;
   bd = b * 400;
   if (rd > 255) {    //convert irregular values to max
        rd = 255;
   }
   if (gd > 255) {
      gd = 255;
   }
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   if (bd > 255) {
      bd = 255;
   }
   if (sum < 1000) {   //threshold for black
    rd = 0;
      gd = 0;
      bd = 0;
   }
}
void colourdisplay() {    //pushes colour value to LEDs
 for (i = 0; i < NUMPIXELS; i++) {
      pixels.setPixelColor(i, pixels.Color(gd, rd, bd));
      pixels.show();
   }
}
377
